- Rational Action without Knowledge (and vice versa).Jie Gao - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6):1901-1917.details
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Descartes’s Schism, Locke’s Reunion: Completing the Pragmatic Turn in Epistemology.John Turri & Wesley Buckwalter - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):25-46.details
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Problems for Wright's entitlement theory.Luca Moretti - 2021 - In Luca Moretti & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Non-Evidentialist Epistemology. Leiden: Brill. pp. 121-138.details
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Contextualism in Epistemology.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Analysis 75 (3):489-503.details
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Probability and Danger.Timothy Williamson - 2009 - Amherst Lecture in Philosophy.details
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Living Words: Meaning Underdetermination and the Dynamic Lexicon.Peter Ludlow - 2014 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic contextualism defended.Robin McKenna - 2015 - Synthese 192 (2):363-383.details
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Reasons and Theoretical Rationality.Clayton Littlejohn - 2018 - In Daniel Star (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Reasons and Normativity. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic closure, assumptions and topics of inquiry.Marcello Di Bello - 2014 - Synthese 191 (16):3977-4002.details
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Wisdom.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (1):1-16.details
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The Problem of Massive Deception for Justification Norms of Action.Arturs Logins - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (4):457-468.details
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The Stability Theory of Belief.Hannes Leitgeb - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (2):131-171.details
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(1 other version)Who Knows?Avner Baz - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):201-223.details
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Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias.John Turri - 2014 - Cognitive Science 38 (5):307-324.details
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Contextualism in Epistemology and the Context-Sensitivity of 'Knows'.Robert Stainton - 2010 - In Joseph Campbell (ed.), Knowledge and Skepticism. MIT Press.details
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Epistemic modality and truth conditions.Anna Papafragou - unknowndetails
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Are there any conceptual truths about knowledge?Finn Spicer - 2008 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt1):43-60.details
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Relativism, knowledge and understanding.J. Adam Carter - 2014 - Episteme 11 (1):35-52.details
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Norms of assertion and communication in social networks.Erik J. Olsson & Aron Vallinder - 2013 - Synthese 190 (13):2557-2571.details
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The open future, bivalence and assertion.Corine Besson & Anandi Hattiangadi - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):251-271.details
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Some Recent Work in Experimental Epistemology.Nestor Ángel Pinillos - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (10):675-688.details
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Vagueness without context change.Rosanna Keefe - 2007 - Mind 116 (462):275-292.details
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The Lockean Thesis and the Logic of Belief.James Hawthorne - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 49--74.details
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Is understanding a species of knowledge?Stephen R. Grimm - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):515-535.details
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Does knowledge secure warrant to assert?E. J. Coffman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (2):285 - 300.details
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CIA leaks.Kai von Fintel & Anthony S. Gillies - 2008 - Philosophical Review 117 (1):77-98.details
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(1 other version)Response.Herman Cappelen & Ernest Lepore - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (1):50–73.details
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The disvalue of knowledge.David Papineau - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5311-5332.details
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Epistemic logic without closure.Stephan Leuenberger & Martin Smith - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4751-4774.details
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The Duty to Object.Jennifer Lackey - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (1):35-60.details
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Skepticism and the acquisition of “knowledge”.Shaun Nichols & N. Ángel Pinillos - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (4):397-414.details
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Assertion, Telling, and Epistemic Norms.Charlie Pelling - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (2):335-348.details
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Recanati on the Semantics/pragmatics Distinction.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2006 - Critica 38 (112):35-68.details
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Googled Assertion.J. Adam Carter & Emma C. Gordon - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (4):490-501.details
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Misleading Evidence and the Dogmatism Puzzle.Ru Ye - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (3):563-575.details
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Knowledge and assumptions.Brett Sherman & Gilbert Harman - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):131-140.details
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IV—Understanding and Knowing.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (1pt1):57-74.details
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Wisdom in Theology.Stephen R. Grimm - forthcoming - In William and Frederick Abraham and Aquino (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Epistemology of Theology.details
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Stick to the Facts: On the Norms of Assertion.Daniel Whiting - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (4):847-867.details
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Surprising connections between knowledge and action: The robustness of the epistemic side-effect effect.James R. Beebe & Mark Jensen - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (5):689 - 715.details
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Subjunctive Credences and Semantic Humility.Sarah Moss - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (2):251-278.details
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Against Fallibilism.Dylan Dodd - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):665 - 685.details
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Knowledge, Experiments, and Practical Interests.Ángel Pinillos - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 192.details
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Not Expressivist Enough: Normative Disagreement about Belief Attribution.Eduardo Pérez-Navarro, Víctor Fernández Castro, Javier González de Prado Salas & Manuel Heras–Escribano - 2019 - Res Philosophica 96 (4):409-430.details
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The Dogmatism Puzzle.Maria Lasonen-Aarnio - 2014 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 92 (3):417-432.details
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Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):298-310.details
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II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action.David Enoch - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1):21-48.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Assertion: knowledge is enough.Mona Simion - 2016 - Synthese 193 (10).details
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Total Pragmatic Encroachment and Epistemic Permissiveness.Katherine Rubin - 2015 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 96 (1):12-38.details
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