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Names and Singular Thought.Rachel Goodman - 2021 - In Heimir Geirsson & Stephen Biggs (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of Linguistic Reference. New York: Routledge. pp. 421-435.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - Introduction 5 (36):i-vi.details
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Introduction.[author unknown] - 2013 - Introduction 5 (36):i-vi.details
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Names vs nouns.Laura Delgado - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (11):3233-3258.details
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Between singularity and generality: the semantic life of proper names.Laura Delgado - 2019 - Linguistics and Philosophy 42 (4):381-417.details
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Indefinites and intentional identity.Samuel Cumming - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):371-395.details
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In defense of ordinary language philosophy.Herman Cappelen & Matthew McKeever - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 53 (2-3):221-237.details
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Arbitrary reference.Wylie Breckenridge & Ofra Magidor - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 158 (3):377-400.details
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Indexical Sinn: Fregeanism versus Millianism.João Branquinho - 2014 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 26 (39):465-486.details
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On the Singularity of Descriptive Files.Mayank Bora - 2019 - Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research 36 (1):71-95.details
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Mental Files and Naïve Semantic Accounts of Substitution Failure.Mayank Bora - 2019 - Acta Analytica 34 (3):301-325.details
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Singular truth-conditions without singular propositions.Gregory Bochner - 2018 - Synthese 195 (6):2741-2760.details
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Ultra-liberal attitude reports.Kyle Blumberg & Ben Holguín - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (8):2043-2062.details
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Revisionist reporting.Kyle Blumberg & Harvey Lederman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):755-783.details
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Demonstratives, definite descriptions and non-redundancy.Kyle Hammet Blumberg - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (1):39-64.details
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Desire.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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Counterfactual Attitudes and the Relational Analysis.Kyle Blumberg - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):521-546.details
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Careful What You Wish.John Beverley - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (1):21-38.details
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The Predicate View of Proper Names.Kent Bach - 2015 - Philosophy Compass 10 (11):772-784.details
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Consulting The Reference Book.Kent Bach - 2014 - Mind and Language 29 (4):455-474.details
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Securing singular thought about merely hypothetical entities.Greg Ackerman - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (8):2193-2213.details
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Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.details
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Empty Singular Terms in the Mental-File Framework.François Recanati - 2014 - In Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.), Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 162-185.details
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Empty Representations: Reference and Non-Existence.Manuel García-Carpintero & Genoveva Martí (eds.) - 2014 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.details
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The Unity of Perception: Content, Consciousness, Evidence.Susanna Schellenberg - 2018 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Acquaintance and first-person attitude reports.Henry Ian Schiller - 2019 - Analysis 79 (2):251-259.details
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A Defense of Russellian Descriptivism.Brandt H. van der Gaast - unknowndetails
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Other People.Kieran Setiya - 2023 - In Sarah Buss & Nandi Theunissen (eds.), Rethinking the Value of Humanity. New York, US: OUP Usa.details
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Descriptions.P. Elbourne - 2012 - In Peter Adamson (ed.), Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Singular Thought and Mental Files: An Introduction.Rachel Goodman & James Genone - 2020 - In Rachel Goodman, James Genone & Nick Kroll (eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 1-17.details
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The Mental Files Theory of Singular Thought: A Psychological Perspective.Michael Murez, Joulia Smortchkova & Brent Strickland - 2020 - In Rachel Goodman, James Genone & Nick Kroll (eds.), Singular Thought and Mental Files. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press. pp. 107-142.details
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Singular Ontology: How To.Alexis Burgess - 2015 - In Christopher Daly (ed.), Palgrave Handbook on Philosophical Methods. Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 77-111.details
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Reference in remembering: towards a simulationist account.James Openshaw & Kourken Michaelian - 2024 - Synthese 203 (3):1-32.details
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Making AI Intelligible: Philosophical Foundations.Herman Cappelen & Josh Dever - 2021 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press.details
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Como os Nomes Nomeiam: Um Passeio Filosófico Sobre a Referência.Sagid Salles - 2020 - Pelotas: UFPel.details
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Paths from the Philosophy of Art to Everyday Aesthetics.Oiva Kuisma, Sanna Lehtinen & Harri Mäcklin (eds.) - 2019 - Helsinki, Finland: Finnish Society for Aesthetics.details
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Interperspectival Content.Peter Ludlow - 2019 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Indirect reports and pragmatics: interdisciplinary studies.Alessandro Capone, Ferenc Kiefer & Franco Lo Piparo (eds.) - 2015 - Cham: Springer International Publishing.details
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Indirect Reports and Pragmatics in the World Languages.Alessandro Capone, Manuel García-Carpintero & Alessandra Falzone (eds.) - 2018 - Springer.details
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Quantifying In from a Fregean Perspective.Seth Yalcin - 2015 - Philosophical Review 124 (2):207-253.details
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Ways to Knowledge-First Believe.Simon Wimmer - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (3):1189-1205.details
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The Significance of the Division of Linguistic Labor.Henri Wagner - 2020 - The Monist 103 (4):381-390.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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How I Really Say What You Think.José Manuel Viejo - 2021 - Axiomathes 31 (3):251-277.details
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Complex demonstratives, singular thought, and belief attributions.José Manuel Viejo - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-27.details
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Frege’s puzzle is about identity after all.Elmar Unnsteinsson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (3):628-643.details
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Extended Modal Realism — a New Solution to the Problem of Intentional Inexistence.Andrew D. Thomas - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (3):1197-1208.details
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Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?Pär Sundström - 2018 - Erkenntnis:1-20.details
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Are Sensory Concepts Learned by “Abstraction” from Experience?Pär Sundström - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (5):1159-1178.details
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