Switch to: References

Citations of:

Intention

Philosophical Quarterly 10 (40):281 (1960)

Add citations

You must login to add citations.
  1. Intentional Behaviorism Revisited.Gordon R. Foxall - 2008 - Behavior and Philosophy 36:113 - 155.
    The central fact in the delineation of radical behaviorism is its conceptual avoidance of propositional content. This eschewal of the intentional stance sets it apart not only from cognitivism but from other non-behaviorisms. Indeed, the defining characteristic of radical behaviorism is not that it avoids mediating processes per se but that it sets out to account for behavior without recourse to propositional attitudes. Based, rather, on the contextual stance, it provides definitions of contingency-shaped, rule-governed verbal and private behaviors which are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Two Problems with the Socio-Relational Critique of Distributive Egalitarianism.Christian Seidel - 2013 - In Miguel Hoeltje, Thomas Spitzley & Wolfgang Spohn (eds.), Was dürfen wir glauben? Was sollen wir tun? Sektionsbeiträge des achten internationalen Kongresses der Gesellschaft für Analytische Philosophie e.V. DuEPublico. pp. 525-535.
    Distributive egalitarians believe that distributive justice is to be explained by the idea of distributive equality (DE) and that DE is of intrinsic value. The socio-relational critique argues that distributive egalitarianism does not account for the “true” value of equality, which rather lies in the idea of “equality as a substantive social value” (ESV). This paper examines the socio-relational critique and argues that it fails because – contrary to what the critique presupposes –, first, ESV is not conceptually distinct from (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Logic, planning agency and branching time.Ricardo Souza Silvestre - 2010 - Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 14 (3):421-438.
    O propósito desse artigo é fornecer um tratamento formal para um tipo de ação até o momento negligenciada nas lógicas modais filosóficas da ação: ação em plano. Ao fazer isso nós seguimos a abordagem padrão nas lógicas modais da ação exemplificados pelos trabalhos de Belnap, Chellas and Pörn. Como nós acreditamos que existe uma relação forte entre plano, tempo e indeterminismo, nós usamos a teoria do tempo ramificado para investigar as características básicas da ação em plano. Além de introduzir uma (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Introduction.Dario Martinelli - 2009 - Sign Systems Studies 37 (3/4):353-368.
    Realism has been a central object of attention among analytical philosophers for some decades. Starting from analytical philosophy, the return of realism has spread into other contemporary philosophical traditions and given birth to new trends in current discussions, as for example in the debates about “new realism.” Discussions about realism focused on linguistic meaning, epistemology, metaphysics, theory of action and ethics. The implications for politics of discussion about realism in action theory and in ethics, however, are not much discussed.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • The Causal Autonomy of Reason Explanations and How Not to Worry about Causal Deviance.Karsten R. Stueber - 2013 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 43 (1):24-45.
    This essay will defend a causal conception of action explanations in terms of an agent’s reasons by delineating a metaphysical and epistemic framework that allows us to view folk psychology as providing us with causal and autonomous explanatory strategies of accounting for individual agency. At the same time, I will calm philosophical concerns about the issue of causal deviance that have been at the center of the recent debates between causalist and noncausalist interpretations of action explanations. For that purpose, it (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Introduction: intersubjectivity and empathy.Rasmus Thybo Jensen & Dermot Moran - 2012 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):125-133.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • Deliberation and Acting for Reasons.Nomy Arpaly & Timothy Schroeder - 2012 - Philosophical Review 121 (2):209-239.
    Theoretical and practical deliberation are voluntary activities, and like all voluntary activities, they are performed for reasons. To hold that all voluntary activities are performed for reasons in virtue of their relations to past, present, or even merely possible acts of deliberation thus leads to infinite regresses and related problems. As a consequence, there must be processes that are nondeliberative and nonvoluntary but that nonetheless allow us to think and act for reasons, and these processes must be the ones that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   65 citations  
  • Sharing and Ascribing Goals.Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (2):200-227.
    This paper assesses the scope and limits of a widely influential model of goal-ascription by human infants: the shared-intentionality model. It derives much of its appeal from its ability to integrate behavioral evidence from developmental psychology with cognitive neuroscientific evidence about the role of mirror neuron activity in non-human primates. The central question raised by this model is whether sharing a goal with an agent is necessary and sufficient for ascribing it to that agent. I argue that advocates of the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Modern Moral Philosophy and the Problem of Relevant Descriptions.Onora O'Neill - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 54:301-316.
    Anscombe's indictment of modern moral philosophy is full-blooded. She began with three strong claims: The first is that is not profitable to do moral philosophy… until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology, in which we are conspicuously lacking. The second is that the concepts of obligation and duty… and of the moral sense of ‘ought’, ought to be jettisoned… because they are derivatives… from an earlier conception of ethics… and are only harmful without it. The third thesis is that (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • The Right Thing to Believe.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - In Timothy Chan (ed.), The Aim of Belief. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 123-139.
    Many philosophers have claimed that “belief aims at the truth”. But is there any interpretation of this claim on which it counts as true? According to some philosophers, the best interpretation of the claim takes it as the normative thesis that belief is subject to a truth-norm. The goal of this essay is to clarify this normative interpretation of the claim. First, the claim can be developed so that it applies to partial beliefs as well as to flat-out full beliefs. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   27 citations  
  • Ifs and Cans - I.D. F. Pears - 1971 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):249 - 274.
    Austin's lecture on this topic contributes little to the problem of freedom of the will, and so in my discussion of his ideas I shall stop short of the difficult part of that problem. His most important positive suggestion is that hypotheticals should be divided into two classes, conditionals and pseudo-conditionals. He claims that neglect of this distinction has been the cause of mistakes in certain forms of the dispositional analysis of the statement that an agent could have acted otherwise, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Good and Bad.Robert W. Simpson - 1982 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):101 - 117.
    What are the philosophically significant grammatical constructions in which the term ‘good’ is used? It is not possible, I think, to base the philosophical analysis of a concept such as goodness on linguistic considerations alone; but an adequate analysis must be able to give an account of the principal uses of the term, and noting usage can be very helpful in providing a starting-point for philosophy. There are three constructions in which ‘good’ is typically used: ‘Good for X,’ ‘A good (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Perception and non-inferential knowledge of action.Thor Grünbaum - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):153 - 167.
    I present an account of how agents can know what they are doing when they intentionally execute object-oriented actions. When an agent executes an object-oriented intentional action, she uses perception in such a way that it can fulfil a justificatory role for her knowledge of her own action and it can fulfil this justificatory role without being inferentially linked to the cognitive states that it justifies. I argue for this proposal by meeting two challenges: in an agent's knowledge of her (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Philosophical and religious origins of the private inner self.Phillip Cary - 2011 - Zygon 46 (1):121-134.
    Abstract. The modern concept of the inner self containing a private inner world has ancient philosophical and religious roots. These begin with Plato's intelligible world of ideas. In Plotinus, the intelligible world becomes the inner world of the divine Mind and its ideas, which the soul sees by turning “into the inside.” Augustine made the inner world into something merely human, not a world of divine ideas, so that the soul seeking for God must turn in, then up: entering into (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   6 citations  
  • “I Am Eating a Sandwich Now”: Intent and Foresight in the Twitter Age.Stacy Elizabeth Stevenson & Lee Anne Peck - 2011 - Journal of Mass Media Ethics 26 (1):56-65.
    Although the criteria of double effect is usually used with issues of warfare and human health, such as abortion and euthanasia, the authors suggest using T. A. Cavanaugh's version of double effect reasoning when deliberating about cases that deal with the social media. With the creation of a modified version of Cavanaugh's three criteria, both social media users and those who evaluate decisions in that medium will have an alternate ethical decision-making model to use. The authors show how one might (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Popper and Free Will.Danny Frederick - 2010 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38.
    Determinism seems incompatible with free will. However, even indeterminism seems incompatible with free will, since it seems to make free actions random. Popper contends that free agents are not bound by physical laws, even indeterministic ones, and that undetermined actions are not random if they are influenced by abstract entities. I argue that Popper could strengthen his account by drawing upon his theories of propensities and of limited rationality; but that even then his account would not fully explain why free (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • La thèse des descriptions multiples: lieu commun ou paradoxe de la philosophie de l'action?Marc Neuberg - 1985 - Dialogue 24 (4):617-.
    Nous appelons «thèse des descriptions multiples» l'opinion qui veut qu'une seule et même action peut etre decrite de plusieurs façons différentes selon que Ton prend en considération ou non les différentes conséquences, plus ou moins lointaines, de cette action. Cette thèse joue chez certains penseurs un rôle essentiel dans la solution du problème de l'individuation des actions. Chez D. Davidson notamment, elle intervient de façon décisive dans la démonstration de sa fameuse thèse que toute action se réduit à des mouvements (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (S1):1-24.
    I argue that there is a continuum of judgments ranging from those that are affectively rich, what might be called passionate judgments, to those that are purely cognitive and nonaffective, what might be called dispassionate judgments. The former are akin to desires and other affective states and so are necessarily motivating. Applying this schema to moral judgments, I maintain that the motivational internalist is wrong in claiming that all moral judgments are necessarily motivating, but right in regard to the subset (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • On the Autonomy of Legal Reasoning.Joseph Raz - 1993 - Ratio Juris 6 (1):1-15.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   7 citations  
  • Hermeneutic philosophy of understanding as a heuristic horizon for displaying the problem-dimension of analytic philosophy of meaning.Karl-Otto Apel - 1980 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 7 (3-4):242-259.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Anthropology as ritual: Wittgenstein's reading of Frazer's the golden bough.Paul Redding - 1987 - Metaphilosophy 18 (3-4):253-269.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Dretske on the Causation of Behavior.Constantine Sandis - 2008 - Behavior and Philosophy 36:71-86.
    In two recent articles and an earlier book Fred Dretske appeals to a distinction between triggering and structuring causes with the aim of establishing that psychological explanations of behavior differ from non-psychological ones. He concludes that intentional human behavior is triggered by electro-chemical events but structured by representational facts. In this paper I argue that while this underrated causalist position is considerably more persuasive than the standard causalist alternative, Dretske’s account fails to provide us with a coherent analysis of intentional (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Motivation to the Means.Stephen Finlay - 2008 - In David K. Chan (ed.), Values, Rational Choice and the Will. Springer. pp. 173-191.
    Rationalists including Nagel and Korsgaard argue that motivation to the means to our desired ends cannot be explained by appeal to the desire for the end. They claim that a satisfactory explanation of this motivational connection must appeal to a faculty of practical reason motivated in response to desire-independent norms of reason. This paper builds on ideas in the work of Hume and Donald Davidson to demonstrate how the desire for the end is sufficient for explaining motivation to the means. (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Expressive Actions.Monika Betzler - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):272-292.
    Actions expressing emotions (such as caressing the clothes of one's dead friend in grief, or tearing apart a photograph out of jealousy) pose a notorious challenge to action theorists. They are thought to be intentional in that they are in some sense under the agent's control. They are not thought to be done for a reason, however, because they cannot be explained by considerations that favor them from the agent's point of view. This seems to be the case, at least, (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   9 citations  
  • Why Animals Can't Act.Ralf Stoecker - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (3):255-271.
    Given the many marvelous things animals can do and moreover the success we have in employing the intentional stance towards animals, it seems to be almost unthinkable to say that animals could not act at all. Nonetheless, this is exactly what I argue for. I claim that strictly speaking there is no animal action, only behaviour. I defend this claim in three steps. Firstly, I recapitulate some of the weighty grounds that speak in favour of animal agency. Secondly, I explain (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   8 citations  
  • Kinds of consequentialism.Michael Smith - 2009 - In Ernest Sosa & Enrique Villanueva (eds.), Metaethics. Boston: Wiley Periodicals. pp. 257-272.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   22 citations  
  • Because I Want It.Stephen Darwall - 2001 - Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2):129-153.
    How can an agent's desire or will give him reasons for acting? Not long ago, this might have seemed a silly question, since it was widely believed that all reasons for acting are based in the agent's desires. The interesting question, it seemed, was not how what an agent wants could give him reasons, but how anything else could. In recent years, however, this earlier orthodoxy has increasingly appeared wrongheaded as a growing number of philosophers have come to stress the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   19 citations  
  • Free will and the mind–body problem.Bernard Berofsky - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):1 – 19.
    Compatibilists regard subsumption under certain sorts of deterministic psychological laws as sufficient for free will. As _bona fide_ laws, their existence poses problems for the thesis of the unalterability of laws, a cornerstone of the Consequence Argument against compatibilism. The thesis is challenged, although a final judgment must wait upon resolution of controversies about the nature of laws. Another premise of the Consequence Argument affirms the supervenience of mental states on physical states, a doctrine whose truth would not undermine the (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Intentional omissions.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Noûs 44 (1):158-177.
    It is argued that intentionally omitting requires having an intention with relevant content. And the intention must play a causal role with respect to one’s subsequent thought and conduct. Even if omissions cannot be caused, an account of intentional omission must be causal. There is a causal role for one’s reasons as well when one intentionally omits to do something.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   33 citations  
  • Intentional action and "in order to".Eric Wiland - 2007 - Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology 27 (1):113-118.
    I. Thanks largely to Joshua Knobe, philosophers now frequently empirically investigate the folk psychological concept of intentional action. Knobe (2003, 2004a, 2004b) argues that application of this concept is often surprisingly sensitive to one’s moral views. In particular, it seems that people are much more willing to regard a bit of behavior as intentional, if they think that the action in question is bad or wrong. There is much controversy about both the design and the interpretation of the experiments Knobe (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   2 citations  
  • Rational choice, social identity, and beliefs about oneself.Fernando Aguiar & Andrés de Francisco - 2009 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 39 (4):547-571.
    Social identity poses one of the most important challenges to rational choice theory, but rational choice theorists do not hold a common position regarding identity. On one hand, externalist rational choice ignores the concept of identity or reduces it to revealed preferences. On the other hand, internalist rational choice considers identity as a key concept in explaining social action because it permits expressive motivations to be included in the models. However, internalist theorists tend to reduce identity to desire—the desire of (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Toward an epistemology of certain substantive a priori truths.Joshua Gert - 2009 - Metaphilosophy 40 (2):214-236.
    Abstract: This article explains and motivates an account of one way in which we might have substantive a priori knowledge in one important class of domains: domains in which the central concepts are response-dependent. The central example will be our knowledge of the connection between something's being harmful and the fact that it is irrational for us to fail to be averse to that thing. The idea is that although the relevant responses (basic aversion in the case of harm, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Plato's Rejection of Thoughtless and Pleasureless Lives.Matthew Evans - 2007 - Phronesis 52 (4):337 - 363.
    In the Philebus Plato argues that every rational human being, given the choice, will prefer a life that is moderately thoughtful and moderately pleasant to a life that is utterly thoughtless or utterly pleasureless. This is true, he thinks, even if the thoughtless life at issue is intensely pleasant and the pleasureless life at issue is intensely thoughtful. Evidently Plato wants this argument to show that neither pleasure nor thought, taken by itself, is sufficient to make a life choiceworthy for (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   4 citations  
  • Alternative motivation: A new challenge to moral judgment internalism.Andrew Sneddon - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):41 – 53.
    Internalists argue that there is a necessary connection between motivation and moral judgment. The examination of cases plays an important role in philosophical debate about internalism. This debate has focused on cases concerning the failure to act in accordance with a moral judgment, for one reason or another. I call these failure cases . I argue that a different sort of case is also relevant to this debate. This sort of case is characterized by (1) moral judgment and (2) behavior (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   11 citations  
  • Truth and a Priori Possibility: Egan’s Charge Against Quasi Realism.Simon Blackburn - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (2):201-213.
    In this journal Andy Egan argued that, contrary to what I have claimed, quasi-realism is committed to a damaging asymmetry between the way a subject regards himself and the way he regards others. In particular, a subject must believe it to be a priori that if something is one of his stable or fundamental beliefs, then it is true. Whereas he will not hold that this is a priori true of other people. In this paper I rebut Egan's argument, and (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   28 citations  
  • The moral belief problem.Neil Sinclair - 2006 - Ratio 19 (2):249–260.
    The moral belief problem is that of reconciling expressivism in ethics with both minimalism in the philosophy of language and the syntactic discipline of moral sentences. It is argued that the problem can be solved by distinguishing minimal and robust senses of belief, where a minimal belief is any state of mind expressed by sincere assertoric use of a syntactically disciplined sentence and a robust belief is a minimal belief with some additional property R. Two attempts to specify R are (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   32 citations  
  • What makes cultural heredity unique? On action-types, intentionality and cooperation in imitation.Frank Kannetzky - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (5):592–623.
    The exploration of the mechanisms of cultural heredity has often been regarded as the key to explicating human uniqueness. Particularly early imitative learning, which is explained as a kind of simulation that rests on the infant’s identification with other persons as intentional agents, has been stressed as the foundation of cumulative cultural transmission. But the question of what are the objects of this mechanism has not been given much attention. Although this is a pivotal point, it still remains obscure. I (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Philosophy of science (wissenschaftstheorie) in finland.Jaakko Hintikka - 1970 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 1 (1):119-132.
    Summary A survey of recent work in the philosophy of science in Finland, with a bibliography. The main sources of influence emphasized are Eino Kaila (1890–1958) and G. H. von Wright (b. 1916). The main topics covered are: induction and probability; information and explanation; the acceptance and application of theories; the role of auxiliary (theoretical) terms; measurement; general methodology of social and behavioral sciences; finalistic explanation; methodology of sociology and history.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation  
  • Practical reason: A review of the current debate and problems. [REVIEW]Stefan Gosepath - 2002 - Philosophical Explorations 5 (3):229 – 238.
    In this review article I refer to some of the most relevant recent publications in the field of practical rationality, mainly drawing on two new anthologies by Wallace and Millgram that contain the principal arguments in the current debate, and on new books and articles by Bittner, Dancy, Nida-Rümelin and Raz. The purpose of the article is to offer an overview of the relevant positions in the current debate, to clarify the main arguments against the belief-desire model, and to situate (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Humanity's natural face.Simon Blackburn - 2000 - Philosophical Explorations 3 (3):282 – 296.
    In my article I summarize a 'Humean' view of deliberation, and in particular deliberation with an ethical aspect. I regard Hume as having paved the way for a 'naturalistic' account of these things, avoiding Kantian fantasies of agency that dominate much current work. Contrary to what is often supposed, the Humean story gives a satisfactory account of dutiful or principled motivations, and a rich account of the ways in which different aspects of character are selected as 'useful or agreeable to (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark  
  • Words About Young Minds: The Concepts of Theory, Representation, and Belief in Philosophy and Developmental Psychology.Eric Schwitzgebel - 1997 - Dissertation, University of California Berkeley
    In this dissertation, I examine three philosophically important concepts that play a foundational role in developmental psychology: theory, representation, and belief. I describe different ways in which the concepts have been understood and present reasons why a developmental psychologist, or a philosopher attuned to cognitive development, should prefer one understanding of these concepts over another.
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   5 citations  
  • Emotional behaviour and the scope of belief-desire explanation.Finn Spicer - 2004 - In Dylan Evans & Pierre Cruse (eds.), Emotion, Evolution, and Rationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 51--68.
    In our everyday psychologising, emotions figure large. When we are trying to explain and predict what a person says and does, that person’s emotions are very much among the objects of our thoughts. Despite this, emotions do not figure large in our philosophical reconstruction of everyday psychological practice—in philosophical accounts of the rational production and control of behaviour. Barry Smith has noted this point: We frequently mention people’s emotional sates when assessing how they behave, when trying to understand why they (...)
    Download  
     
    Export citation  
     
    Bookmark   1 citation