The encounter of the cognitive apparatus with the phenomenal world had led to the emergence of independent thought processes either based on scientific method of enguiry or on meditative experiences. In the course of time these have developed into a systematized body of knowledge. They purport to provide peace and happiness, but when seduced by power a distorted value structure has been legitimized. The plethora of evidences suggest the 'self' has been incapacitated for long. The scientific experiences have been given (...) supreme status. The paper stresses the need to attain a beginner's mind so that looking within and looking without no longer remain intangible goals of education. The naodalities have been discussed to escape the bonds of conceptual limitations. Finally, it is suggested that this constructive role of optimizing the oppor tunities for formation of intellect, which moves beyond conventional intellectualism, will evolve into a com passionate world-serving intellect, and pave the way for peace and harmony in this turbulent world. (shrink)

In this paper, we discuss various aspects of Heisenberg’s thought on hidden variables in the period 1927–1935. We also compare Heisenberg’s approach to others current at the time, specifically that embodied by von Neumann’s impossibility proof, but also views expressed mainly in correspondence by Pauli and by Schroedinger. We shall base ourselves mostly on published and unpublished materials that are known but little-studied, among others Heisenberg’s own draft response to the EPR paper. Our aim will be not only to clarify (...) Heisenberg’s thought on the hidden-variables question, but in part also to clarify how this question was understood more generally at the time. (shrink)

The main interpretations of the quantum-mechanical wave function are presented emphasizing how they can be divided into two ensembles: The ones that deny and the other ones that attribute a form of reality to quantum waves. It is also shown why these waves cannot be classical and must be submitted to the restriction of the complementarity principle. Applying the concept of smooth complementarity, it is shown that there can be no reason to attribute reality only to the events and not (...) to the wave or to the initial state of a given system. Thereafter, an experiment proposed by the authors is presented, where it is shown that the wave-like behaviour allows predictions that are not allowed on the grounds of a particle-like behaviour. In conclusion, we upheld that quantum waves must be real even if they do not belong to the same ontological level of events, which connected with particle detections. (shrink)

In this paper I present a new perspective for interpreting the wavefunction as a non-material, non-epistemic, non-representational entity. I endorse a functional view according to which the wavefunction is defined by its roles in the theory. I argue that this approach shares some similarities with the nomological account of the wave function as well as with the pragmatist and epistemic approaches to quantum theory, while avoiding the major objections of these alternatives.

Wallace has recently argued that a number of popular approaches to the measurement problem can’t be fully extended to relativistic quantum mechanics and quantum field theory; Wallace thus contends that as things currently stand, only the unitary-only approaches to the measurement problem are viable. However, the unitary-only approaches face serious epistemic problems which may threaten their viability as solutions, and thus we consider that it remains an urgent outstanding problem to find a viable solution to the measurement problem which can (...) be extended to relativistic quantum mechanics. In this article we seek to understand in general terms what such a thing might look like. We argue that in order to avoid serious epistemic problems, the solution must be a single-world realist approach, and we further argue that any single-world realist approach which is able to reproduce the predictions of relativistic quantum mechanics will most likely have the property that our observable reality does not supervene on dynamical, precisely-defined microscopic beables. Thus we suggest three possible routes for further exploration: observable reality could be approximate and emergent, as in relational quantum mechanics with the addition of cross-perspective links, or observable reality could supervene on beables which are not microscopically defined, as in the consistent histories approach, or observable reality could supervene on beables which are not dynamical, as in Kent’s solution to the Lorentzian classical reality problem. We conclude that once all of these issues are taken into account, the options for a viable solution to the measurement problem are significantly narrowed down. (shrink)

Não é pensando que criamos mundos. É compreendendo o mundo que aprendemos a pensar. Cosmovisão é um termo que deve significar um conjunto de fundamentos dos quais emerge uma compreensão sistêmica do Universo, seus componentes como a vida, o mundo em que vivemos, a natureza, o fenômeno humano e suas relações. Trata-se, portanto, de um campo da filosofia analítica alimentado pelas ciências, cujo objetivo é esse conhecimento agregado e epistemologicamente sustentável sobre tudo o que somos e contemos, que nos cerca (...) e que nos relaciona de alguma forma. É algo tão antigo quanto o pensamento humano e, além de utilizar elementos da cosmologia científica, engloba tudo na filosofia e na ciência que se refere ao universo e à vida. Uma cosmovisão não é um conjunto de ideias, hipóteses e suposições, mas um sistema baseado em observação, análise, evidência e demonstração. Nenhuma cosmovisão pretende definir, estabelecer, propor, mas apenas compreender, analisar e interpretar. Cada um de nós constrói e transporta sua cosmovisão ao longo da vida, sem estabelecer formas, como pano de fundo para nosso pensamento e comportamento. Linguisticamente, o termo “cosmovisão” derivaria do alemão, equivalente ao conceito de “ Weltanschauung”, usado por vários filósofos. No entanto, essa relação linguística não é aplicável porque contraria o que propomos como cosmovisão. Esta palavra alemã refere-se a uma visão pré-lógica ou proto-experimental da realidade, com um contexto intuitivo e longe de um conhecimento crítico ainda inexistente no momento da sua formulação. Sem dúvida, as cosmovisões , no sentido em que as entendemos, abrigam e utilizam esses elementos protoexperimentais ou pré-lógicos que incluem a história, o inconsciente coletivo e todos os arquétipos que carregamos. No entanto, no conceito que aqui aplicamos, a cosmovisão vai muito além desse conteúdo, primeiro por submetê-lo constantemente ao pensamento crítico presente e, finalmente, por tornar a experiência analítica (e não o próprio pensamento ou intuição) seu universo real. António Lopes expõe a amplitude deste conteúdo: -/- “Cosmovisões não são o produto do pensamento. Não nascem do simples desejo de saber. A apreensão da realidade é um momento importante em sua configuração, mas, no entanto, é apenas um. Vem da conduta vital, da experiência da vida, da estrutura de nossa totalidade psíquica. A elevação da vida à consciência no conhecimento da realidade, na valorização da vida e na realidade volitiva é o trabalho lento e árduo que a humanidade tem feito no desenvolvimento das concepções de vida. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)” Neste trabalho, buscamos traçar uma cosmovisão baseada nas realidades que a ciência oferece hoje. Não nos propomos, em nenhum momento, a fazer ciência ou teorizar a filosofia, mas sempre buscaremos ser apoiados por elas ou, pelo menos, protegidos por elas das distorções cognitivas que costumamos carregar. (shrink)

It is not by thinking that we create worlds. It is by understanding the world that we learn to think. Cosmovision is a term that should mean a set of foundations from which emerges a systemic understanding of the Universe, its components as life, the world we live in, nature, human phenomena, and their relationships. It is, therefore, a field of analytical philosophy fed by the sciences, whose objective is this aggregated and epistemologically sustainable knowledge about everything that we are (...) and contain, that surrounds us, and that relates to us in any way. It is something as old as human thought, and, in addition to using elements of scientific cosmology, it encompasses everything in philosophy and science that refers to the universe and life. A cosmovision is not a set of ideas, hypotheses, and assumptions but a system based on observation, analysis, evidence, and demonstration. No cosmovision intends to define, establish, or propose but only to understand, analyse, and interpret. Each of us builds and transports his cosmovision throughout life, without establishing forms, as a background for our thinking and behaviour. Linguistically, the term “cosmovision” would derive from the German, equivalent to the concept of “ Weltanschauung,” as used by several philosophers. However, this linguistic relationship is not applicable because it contradicts what we propose as a cosmovision. This German word refers to a pre-logical or proto- experimental vision of reality, with an intuitive context and far from critical knowledge still non-existent at the time of its formulation. Undoubtedly, cosmovisions, in the sense in which we understand them, house and use these proto-experimental or pre-logical elements that include history, the collective unconscious, and all the archetypes we carry. However, in the concept that we apply here, the cosmovision goes far beyond this content, firstly by constantly submitting it to present critical thinking, and finally by making the analytic experience ( and not the thought itself or intuition) its actual universe. António Lopes expose the breadth of this content: -/- "Cosmovisions are not the product of thought. They do not spring from the simple desire to know. The apprehension of reality is an important moment in its configuration, but, nevertheless, it is only one. It comes from the vital conduct, from the experience of life's evaluation, and from the structure of our psychic totality. The elevation of life to consciousness in the knowledge of reality, in the valuation, and in the volitional reality is the slow and arduous work that humanity has done in the development of the conceptions of life. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)”(1) -/- In this work, we seek to outline a cosmovision based on the realities that science offers today. We do not propose, at any time, to do science; or theorise philosophy, but we will always seek to be supported by them or, at least, protected by them from the cognitive distortions that we usually carry. ________________________________________________ (1) Lopes , Antonio – “ Weltanschauung (Cosmovision)” (2009 ) in Carlos Ceia's E-Dictionary of Literary Terms. -/- . (shrink)

In this paper I examine the role of dispositional properties in the most frequently discussed interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After offering some motivation for this project, I briefly characterize the distinction between non-dispositional and dispositional properties in the context of quantum mechanics by suggesting a necessary condition for dispositionality – namely contextuality – and, consequently, a sufficient condition for non-dispositionality, namely non-contextuality. Having made sure that the distinction is conceptually sound, I then analyze the plausibility of the widespread, monistic (...) ontological thesis about the reducibility of dispositional properties to categorical properties in the context of the philosophy of quantum mechanics. I conclude that with the exception of Bohmian mechanics, the other “minimally realist” views of quantum mechanics require essential dispositions, i.e., dispositions of a non-reducible kind. Interestingly, seen behind the lenses of dispositionalism, Bohr’s and Bohm’s interpretations of quantum mechanics are much closer than it is usually recognized, a fact that could teach us something about the way the quantum world is. (shrink)

It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause (PCC) can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, (...) which has moved on to consider the virtues of a generalised PCC-inspired condition, the so-called Causal Markov Condition (CMC). In this paper we argue that the CMC is an appropriate benchmark for debating possible causal explanations of the EPR correlations. But we go on to take issue with some pronouncements on EPR by defenders of the CMC. (shrink)

This paper argues against the view that the standard explanation of phase transitions in statistical mechanics may be considered a causal explanation, a distortion that can nevertheless successfully represent causal relations.

Я интерпретирую философские взгляды Вернера Гайзенберга как прагматизм и неметафизический реализм виттгенштайновского типа. «Замкнутая теория» – виттгенштайновское правило/концепт. В отличие от Бокулич, предпочитающей позицию Дирака относительно природы связей между различными физическими теориями, я отдаю предпочтение позиции Гайзенберга. Моя позиция, интерпретирующая Гайзенберга, также прямо противоположна позиции Поппера: критерием устоявшейся научной (замкнутой) теории является её нефальсифицируемость. -/- I interpret philosophical views of Werner Heisenberg as a pragmatism and non-metaphysical realism of a Wittgensteinian kind. The “closed theory” is a Wittgensteinian rule/concept. Unlike Alisa (...) Bokulich, favouring Dirac’s position about inter-theoretical relations, I favour Heisenberg’s one. My position, interpreting Heisenberg’s notion of a closed theory, is also in direct opposition to Popper’s one: the criterion of an established scientific (closed) theory is its non-falsifiability. (shrink)

Drawing on unpublished and published sources from 1926-1932, this chapter builds on John Dewey’s naturalistic pragmatic pluralism in ethical theory. A primary focus is “Three Independent Factors in Morals,” which analyzes good, duty, and virtue as distinct categories that in many cases express different experiential origins. The chapter suggests that a vital role for contemporary theorizing is to lay bare and analyze the sorts of conflicts that constantly underlie moral and political action. Instead of reinforcing moral fundamentalism via an outdated (...) quest for the central and basic source of normative justification, we should foster theories with a range of idioms and emphases which, while accommodating monistic insights, better inform decision-making by opening communication across diverse elements of moral and political life, placing these elements in a wider context in which norms gain practical traction in non-ideal conditions, and expanding prospects for social inquiry and convergence on policy and action. (shrink)

No es pensando como creamos mundos. Es comprendiendo el mundo como aprendemos a pensar. Cosmovisión es un término que debe significar un conjunto de fundamentos a partir de los cuales emerge una comprensión sistémica del Universo, sus componentes como la vida, el mundo en que vivimos, la naturaleza, el fenómeno humano y sus relaciones. Es, por tanto, un campo de la filosofía analítica alimentado por las ciencias, cuyo objetivo es ese conocimiento agregado y epistemológicamente sostenible sobre todo lo que somos (...) y contenemos, que nos rodea y con lo que nos relacionamos de alguna manera. Es algo tan antiguo como el pensamiento humano y, además de utilizar elementos de la cosmología científica, engloba todo lo que en filosofía y ciencia se refiere al universo y la vida. Una cosmovisión no es un conjunto de ideas, hipótesis y suposiciones, sino un sistema basado en la observación, el análisis, la evidencia y la demostración. Ninguna cosmovisión pretende definir, establecer, proponer, sino solo comprender, analizar e interpretar. Cada uno de nosotros construimos y transportamos nuestra cosmovisión a lo largo de nuestra vida, sin establecer formas, como trasfondo de nuestro pensamiento y comportamiento. Lingüísticamente, el término “cosmovisión” se deriva del alemán, equivalente al concepto de “Weltanschauung” utilizado por varios filósofos. Sin embargo, esta relación lingüística no es aplicable porque va en contra de lo que proponemos como cosmovisión. Esta palabra alemana hace referencia a una visión prelógica o protoexperimental de la realidad, con un contexto intuitivo y alejado de un conocimiento crítico que aún no existía en el momento de su formulación. Sin duda, las cosmovisiones, no tiene sentido en que las entendamos, cobijen y utilicen estos elementos proto-experimentales o prelógicos que incluyen la historia, el inconsciente colectivo y todos los arquetipos que portamos. Sin embargo, en el concepto que aquí aplicamos, la cosmovisión va mucho más allá de este contenido, primero al someterlo constantemente al pensamiento crítico actual y, finalmente, al hacer de la experiencia analítica (y no del pensamiento o la intuición en sí) su verdadero universo. António Lopes expone la amplitud de este contenido: -/- “Las cosmovisiones no son el producto del pensamiento. No nacen del simple deseo de saber. La aprehensión de la realidad es un momento importante en su configuración, sin embargo, es uno solo. Proviene de la conducta vital, de la experiencia de vida, de la estructura de nuestra totalidad psíquica. El apoyo de la vida a la conciencia en el conocimiento de la realidad, en la apreciación de la vida y en la realidad volitiva, es el trabajo lento y arduo que ha hecho la humanidad en el desarrollo de los conceptos de vida. (W. Dilthey, 1992 [1911]: 120)” . En este trabajo buscamos esbozar una cosmovisión a partir de las realidades que ofrece la ciencia en la actualidad. No nos proponemos, en ningún momento, hacer ciencia; o teorizar la filosofía, pero siempre buscaremos ser apoyados por ellos o, al menos, protegidos por ellos de las distorsiones cognitivas que solemos llevar. -/- . (shrink)

I argue that scientific and poetic modes of objectivity are perspectival duals: 'views' from and onto basic natural forces, respectively. I ground this analysis in a general account of objectivity, not in terms of either 'universal' or 'inter-subjective' validity, but as receptivity to basic features of reality. Contra traditionalists, bare truth, factual knowledge, and universally valid representation are not inherently valuable. But modern critics who focus primarily on the self-expressive aspect of science are also wrong to claim that our knowledge (...) is or should be ultimately mediated by ourselves. In objective science, we represent nature as a field of phenomena determined by and within explanatorily-basic physical structures that encode the causal impact of elemental physical forces. These causally-basic forces hence ground the possibility of objective scientific theory, even though (I argue) they are systematically excluded from its representational contents. I show how my notions of force and field emerge partly through my effort to naturalize concepts of 'God' and 'Laws' in 17th-century natural philosophy. In science, we use the structure of basic forces' impact to see corresponding objects. We do not see these forces themselves—and this relates to the 'transcendence' of 'God'. I supplement this historical analysis by critiquing standard accounts of objectivity, and by synthesizing elements from neo-Kantian epistemology and current 'structural' realism into a view that I call 'dynamic structuralism'. Finally, I argue that physics systematically relies on passive characterizations of phenomena like inertia and impressed force. Dynamic alternatives that are just as empirically adequate are possible, but they are non-scientific. Poetic objectivity involves a direct presentation of nature as an order of interacting forces. I elaborate first by developing a novel theory of the relation between beauty and sublimity, mediated by a basic category of 'sensory force' (e.g. a 'singing' tone in a beautiful melody). I then describe the interaction between sensory and affective dimensions of aesthetic experience, in relation to an original historical analysis of passion and 'disinterestedness' in Kant, Schiller and Nietzsche. I synthesize these lines of analysis into a critique of the role of 'expression' in art. I also resist 'spectator'-centric aesthetics, in this connection, by developing an account of artistic objectivity in dialogue with Ruskin's critique of the 'pathetic fallacy'. I contrast artistic objectivity with Romantic ideals of self-expression, while elaborating its positive relation to certain currents within Victorian and Modernist aesthetics, including Imagists' stress on 'exteriority'. My project creatively extends Nietzsche's view that philosophical and scientific theories are 'perspectival' expressions of theorists' drives. It is a virtue of Nietzsche's account that he takes the outlet of strong human drives in creative acts of theorizing to be just one among many higher modes of 'will to power' in nature—many of which are totally impersonal. But Nietzsche is still too focused on self-expression or willing one's own power. Objective science involves external forces' 'expression' in and through us, not just 'expressing' our own powers. And Nietzsche's vitalistic 'will to power' must be replaced by a basic ontology that better accommodates inorganic phenomena, like the 'lawful' order of celestial motions. Thus I aim to de-anthropomorphize and 'de-organicize' post-Kantian notions of willful striving and organic development, while preserving for force the primary ontological and evaluative status that theorists from Schiller and Goethe to Schelling and Schlegel to Emerson and Nietzsche attributed to will or to life. (shrink)

Drawing on archival and published sources from 1926 to 1932, this chapter analyzes “Three Independent Factors in Morals” (1930) as a blueprint to Dewey’s chapters in the 1932 Ethics. The 1930 presentation is Dewey’s most concise and sophisticated critique of the quest in ethical theory for the central and basic source of normative justification. He argued that moral situations are heterogeneous in their origins and operations. They elude full predictability and are not controllable by the impositions of any abstract monistic (...) principle. Moral life instead has at least three distinct experiential roots that cannot be encompassed in one ideal way to proceed. More specifically, Dewey hypothesized that each of the primary Western ethical systems (represented for him by Aristotle, Kant, and the British moralists) represents a basic, non-arbitrary force, or factor of moral life: aspiration, obligation, and approbation, respectively. Each factor is expressed in that system’s leading fundamental concept: good, duty, and virtue, respectively. Yet he contended that aspirations, obligations, and approbations are distinctive phenomena that cannot be blanketed by a single covering concept. By exposing Dewey’s own generalizations to scrutiny, the promises and limitations of his approach can be critically evaluated. (shrink)

Classical physics and quantum physics suggest two meta-physical types of reality: the classical notion of a objectively definite reality with properties "all the way down," and the quantum notion of an objectively indefinite type of reality. The problem of interpreting quantum mechanics is essentially the problem of making sense out of an objectively indefinite reality. These two types of reality can be respectively associated with the two mathematical concepts of subsets and quotient sets which are category-theoretically dual to one another (...) and which are developed in two dual mathematical logics, the usual Boolean logic of subsets and the more recent logic of partitions. Our sense-making strategy is "follow the math" by showing how the mathematics of set partitions can be transported in a natural way to complex vector spaces where it yields the mathematical machinery of QM. And then we show how the machinery of QM can be transported the other way down to set-like vector spaces over ℤ₂ yielding a rather fulsome "toy" or pedagogical model of "quantum mechanics over sets." In this way, we try to make sense out of objective indefiniteness and thus to interpret quantum mechanics. (shrink)

In this multi-disciplinary investigation we show how an evidence-based perspective of quantification---in terms of algorithmic verifiability and algorithmic computability---admits evidence-based definitions of well-definedness and effective computability, which yield two unarguably constructive interpretations of the first-order Peano Arithmetic PA---over the structure N of the natural numbers---that are complementary, not contradictory. The first yields the weak, standard, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically verifiable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. (...) The second yields a strong, finitary, interpretation of PA over N, which is well-defined with respect to assignments of algorithmically computable Tarskian truth values to the formulas of PA under the interpretation. We situate our investigation within a broad analysis of quantification vis a vis: * Hilbert's epsilon-calculus * Goedel's omega-consistency * The Law of the Excluded Middle * Hilbert's omega-Rule * An Algorithmic omega-Rule * Gentzen's Rule of Infinite Induction * Rosser's Rule C * Markov's Principle * The Church-Turing Thesis * Aristotle's particularisation * Wittgenstein's perspective of constructive mathematics * An evidence-based perspective of quantification. By showing how these are formally inter-related, we highlight the fragility of both the persisting, theistic, classical/Platonic interpretation of quantification grounded in Hilbert's epsilon-calculus; and the persisting, atheistic, constructive/Intuitionistic interpretation of quantification rooted in Brouwer's belief that the Law of the Excluded Middle is non-finitary. We then consider some consequences for mathematics, mathematics education, philosophy, and the natural sciences, of an agnostic, evidence-based, finitary interpretation of quantification that challenges classical paradigms in all these disciplines. (shrink)

It is argued that quantum theory is best understood as requiring an ontological duality of res extensa and res potentia, where the latter is understood per Heisenberg’s original proposal, and the former is roughly equivalent to Descartes’ ‘extended substance.’ However, this is not a dualism of mutually exclusive substances in the classical Cartesian sense, and therefore does not inherit the infamous ‘mind-body’ problem. Rather, res potentia and res extensa are proposed as mutually implicative ontological extants that serve to explain the (...) key conceptual challenges of quantum theory; in particular, nonlocality, entanglement, null measurements, and wave function collapse. It is shown that a natural account of these quantum perplexities emerges, along with a need to reassess our usual ontological commitments involving the nature of space and time. (shrink)

My research into Virtual Reality technology and its central property of immersion has indicated that immersion in Virtual Reality (VR) electronic systems is a significant key to the understanding of contemporary culture as well as considerable aspects of previous culture as detected in the histories of philosophy and the visual arts. The fundamental change in aesthetic perception engendered by immersion, a perception which is connected to the ideal of total-immersion in virtual space, identifies certain shifts in ontology which are relevant (...) to a better understanding of the human being. This understanding was achieved through a broad inquiry into the histories of Virtual Reality, philosophy, and the visual arts and has lead to the formulation of an aesthetic theory of immersive consciousness indicative of immersive culture. The primary subject of this discourse is immersion then: an experience which will be identified within the dissertation as the indispensable characteristic of Virtual Reality. The understanding of immersion arrived at here will be used to fashion a synchronous theory of art particularly informed by encounters and concepts of immersion into virtuality. To sufficiently address this subject in a scholarly fashion, I have researched, found and accumulated aesthetic and philosophic examples of immersive tendencies, as found within the histories of art and philosophy, which subsequently contributed towards the articulation of what I have come to call immersive consciousness. As a result of formulating such an immersive consciousness, a good deal of the basis for the questioning of the Western ontological tradition has been found in the Western tradition itself when we look with new eyes and ask new uncertain questions. Moreover, this immersive consciousness will be used to propose some abstract questions encircling today's electronic-based culture. Through the structuring of the argument within the thesis - and overtly within the conclusion - I have articulated a non-teleological creative strategy which provides the basis for an unconstraining integration of noologies (ways of semblancing the thinking process). This strategy provides a means of exemplifying - and for honoring - various methods of thinking. This structuring strategy is consistent with the 'hacker ethic' as defined by Steven Levy, as a demand that access to computers - and anything which might teach us something about the way the world works - should be unlimited and total. To follow this strategy, this dissertation has set out to understand how topical conceptions of virtual immersion connect to pre-existing systems of thought as revealed in art as they have extended out of antecedent ontological self-understandings, historical human self-understandings which have evidenced themselves in the elaboration of technological objectives. To do this I have forged a certain rhizomatic paternity/maternity for Virtual Reality within this dissertation by joining choice immersive examples of simulacra technology into mental connections with the relevant examples culled from the histories of art, architecture, information-technology, sex, myth, space, consciousness and philosophy. (shrink)

The practicability of the comprehensive FSR concept is problematic. Contemporary FSR must be positioned at the point of overlap between the positivist and constructivist paradigms, which are both grounded in a continual identification with the rational-empirical consciousness, in thinking -being.Spirituality, defined as the process in which one systematically trains the receptivity to gain regular access to transcendental consciousness, emphasizes the experience of just being, of consciousness-as-such. It is an experiential spirituality, which is not based on dogmas, but on do-it-yourself techniques (...) to break the continuous spell of the rational-empirical consciousness. Such a spirituality facilitates the cultivation of societally and environmentally friendly behavior. Sustainability can be defined as the integrative 'emergent property' of experiential spirituality and rational morality based on negotiated agreements.In addition to the outward-oriented approaches of the positivist and constructivist paradigms, an inward-oriented approach, focusing on consciousness development, is recommended. Language-mediated interaction must be supported by consciousness-mediated interaction. (shrink)

[This is the full issue of the first issue of Mɛtascience] -/- This inaugural issue of the journal Mεtascience is also a special issue since it pays tribute to Mario Bunge (1919-2020) to high light his contribution to knowledge and our filiation with his thought. Mario Bunge's project is part of the humanist and scientific tradition of the Enlightenment. At the end of his intellectual journey, he wrote more than 150 books and 540 articles or chapters, including translations into several (...) languages. The work covers almost all branches of philosophy, from ontology to ethics, semantics, episte mology, methodology, praxeology and axiology, as well as a large number of scientific disciplines, ranging from physics to sociology, chemistry, biology and psychology. Without a doubt, Bunge's mag num opus is the Treatise on Basic Philosophy in nine volumes (1974- 1989). The six contributions gathered here come from authors from differ ent backgrounds. Like Bunge's project, they are neither part of the an alytic or continental movement in philosophy. The reader will find studies on the Bungean system, applications of Bungean thought, re flections and testimonies, and metascientific contributions. From the point of view of metascience as theorized in these pages, Bunge is the last of the philosophers and the first metascientific. He kept from philosophy the idea of a complete system that would inte grate semantics, ontology, epistemology, ethics, axiology and praxe ology, but he refused to problematize scientific knowledge in a tradi tional way. The result is surprising: even by accepting science as it is, he finds room for questioning. May Mεtascience be a place of questioning and deployment of the approach designed by Mario Bunge. (shrink)

It is still a matter of controversy whether the Principle of the Common Cause can be used as a basis for sound causal inference. It is thus to be expected that its application to quantum mechanics should be a correspondingly controversial issue. Indeed the early 90’s saw a flurry of papers addressing just this issue in connection with the EPR correlations. Yet, that debate does not seem to have caught up with the most recent literature on causal inference generally, which (...) has moved on to consider the virtues of a generalised PCC inspired condition, the so called Causal Markov Condition. In this paper we argue that the CMC is an appropriate benchmark for debating possible causal explanations of the EPR correlations. But we go on to take issue with some pronouncements on EPR by defenders of the CMC. (shrink)

Although biological autonomy is widely discussed, its description in scientific terms remains elusive. I present here a series of recent evidences on the existence of genuine biological autonomy. Nevertheless, nowadays it seems that the only acceptable ground to account for any natural phenomena, including biological autonomy, is physics. But if this were the case, then arguably there would be no way to account for genuine biological autonomy. The way out of such a situation is to build up an exact theoretical (...) biology, and one of the first steps is to clarify the basic concepts of biology, among them biological aim, function and autonomy. We found a physical mechanism to realize biological autonomy, namely, biologically initiated vacuum processes. In the newly emerging picture, biological autonomy shows up as a new, fundamental and inevitable element in our scientific world picture. It offers new perspectives for solving problems regarding the origin and nature of life, connecting ancient Greek philosophy with modern science. Namely, our proposal sheds light in what sense can the God as conceived by Xenophanes can move the material objects of the Universe by its thoughts without toil. (shrink)

A fairly simple theory of the semantics of tense is obtained by combining three claims: (i) for any time t, a present-tense sentence `p' is either true or false at t; (ii) for any time t0 earlier than t, the future-tense sentence `It will be the case that p at t' is true at t0 if `p' is true at t, false otherwise; (iii) for any time t0 later than t, the past-tense sentence `It was the case that p at (...) t' is true at t0 if `p' is true at t, false otherwise. This theory, which has been called the theory of timeless truth, is often dismissed on the basis of its alleged incapacity to comply with indeterminism. Here, instead, it will be suggested that there is no reason to be dismissive. Section 1 provides some elucidations about the theory. Sections 2 and 3 explain how a foregone objection to it can be resisted. Sections 4 and 5 show that there is a plausible sense in which (i)-(iii) are compatible with indeterminism. Sections 6 and 7 dispel some misunderstandings that may lead to think that indeterminism is not vindicated in some important sense other than that outlined. (shrink)

There is a deeply entrenched view in philosophy and physics, the closed systems view, according to which isolated systems are conceived of as fundamental. On this view, when a system is under the influence of its environment this is described in terms of a coupling between it and a separate system which taken together are isolated. We argue against this view, and in favor of the alternative open systems view, for which systems interacting with their environment are conceived of as (...) fundamental, and the environment's influence is represented via the dynamical equations that govern the system's evolution. Taking quantum theories of closed and open systems as our case study, and considering three alternative notions of fundamentality: (i) ontic fundamentality, (ii) epistemic fundamentality, and (iii) explanatory fundamentality, we argue that the open systems view is fundamental, and that this has important implications for the philosophy of physics, the philosophy of science, and for metaphysics. (shrink)

Entropy is ubiquitous in physics, and it plays important roles in numerous other disciplines ranging from logic and statistics to biology and economics. However, a closer look reveals a complicated picture: entropy is defined differently in different contexts, and even within the same domain different notions of entropy are at work. Some of these are defined in terms of probabilities, others are not. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at an understanding of some of the most important notions (...) of entropy and to clarify the relations between them, After setting the stage by introducing the thermodynamic entropy, we discuss notions of entropy in information theory, statistical mechanics, dynamical systems theory and fractal geometry. (shrink)

As the theory of the atom, quantum mechanics is perhaps the most successful theory in the history of science. It enables physicists, chemists, and technicians to calculate and predict the outcome of a vast number of experiments and to create new and advanced technology based on the insight into the behavior of atomic objects. But it is also a theory that challenges our imagination. It seems to violate some fundamental principles of classical physics, principles that eventually have become a part (...) of western common sense since the rise of the modern worldview in the Renaissance. So the aim of any metaphysical interpretation of quantum mechanics is to account for these violations. (shrink)

This letter has been simultaneously published in EdgeScience magazine (7, April–June 2011), also published by the Society for Scientific Exploration.

The concept of “objective reality” is addressed, and an ontological model is suggested, in which correlations of events in the configuration space of the wave function are considered invariant with respect to changes of observer. It is suggested that these statements make the best sense when considered from within a fifth-dimensional framework, extrapolated from the four dimensions of spacetime in a direct way. A pair of postulates is then suggested which strengthens two current models of quantum theory into a broader (...) picture, giving a physical interpretation of Macroscopic Quantum Superposition (MQS) states. Relational Quantum Mechanics (RQM) from Rovelli and Consistent Histories (“CH”) from Griffiths are discussed and related to the postulates. By dropping the assumption that unobserved macroscopic events are “in a definite state” determined independently of an observer, a surprising but consistent theory of quantum macroscopic reality is arrived at (with fewer fundamental assumptions about everyday reality) that does not contradict experiment or everyday experience. As a result, a concept herein termed “retroactive event determination” is extended from a quantum principle (in CH) to a macroscopic principle. Macroscopic events that have not been observed by a particular observer are free to be retroactively determined. The feasibility of applying the physics of quantum operators to macro systems is analyzed using the concept of “macro projectors.” Various concerns with this model are addressed, such as solipsism and decoherence of the wave function for macro objects. A discussion is also made of the philosophical context of the ideas suggested. Some experimental ideas are offered. Keywords: Macroscopic quantum superposition—MQS—consistent histories—relational quantum mechanics—time—spacetime—retrocausation—framework—single-framework rule—macro pointers—synchronicity—meaningful coincidence—positivism—observer effect—measurement problem—delayed choice experiment—retroactive event determination—existential behavior—Many-Worlds model. (shrink)

Although consciousness-correlated physical phenomena are widely and credibly documented, their appearance and behavior display substantial departures from conventional scientific criteria. Under even the most rigorous protocols, they are only irregularly replicable, and they appear to be insensitive to most basic physical coordinates, including distance and time. Rather, their strongest correlations are with various subjective parameters, such as intention, emotional resonance, uncertainty, attitude, and meaning, and information processing at an unconscious level appears to be involved. If science, by its most basic (...) definition, is to pursue understanding and utilization of these extraordinary processes, it will need to expand its current paradigm to acknowledge and codify a proactive role for the mind in the establishment of physical events, and to accommodate the spectrum of empirically indicated subjective correlates. The challenges of quantitative measurement and theoretical conceptualization within such a ‘‘Science of the Subjective’’ are formidable, but its potential intellectual and cultural benefits could be immense, not least of all in improving the reach, the utility, the attitude, and the image of science itself. Keywords: consciousness-correlated physical phenomena (CCPP)—science of the subjective (SOS)—scientific criteria—scientific models. (shrink)

I propose a new approach to the constitutive problem of psychology ‘what is mind?’ The first section introduces modifications of the received scope, methodology, and evaluation criteria of unified theories of cognition in accordance with the requirements of evolutionary compatibility and of a mature science. The second section outlines the proposed theory. Its first part provides empirically verifiable conditions delineating the class of meaningful neural formations and modifies accordingly the traditional conceptions of meaning, concept and thinking. This analysis is part (...) of a theory of communication in terms of inter-level systems of primitives that proposes the communication-understanding principle as a psychological invariance. It unifies a substantial amount of research by systematizing the notions of meaning, thinking, concept, belief, communication, and understanding and leads to a minimum vocabulary for this core system of mental phenomena. Its second part argues that written human language is the key characteristic of the artificially natural human mind. Overall, the theory both supports Darwin’s continuity hypothesis and proposes that the mental gap is within our own species. (shrink)

Cette étude défend l’idée que, contrairement à l’opinion de Latour sur la nécessité de laisser de côté l’épistémologie pour traiter de tout ce qui a de la valeur pour la science, Mario Bunge a systématiquement construit une épistémologie détaillée et approfondie. La stratégie argumentative consistera à montrer (a) qu’il est faux que nous n’avons jamais été modernes (b) que l’épistémologie est là pour de bon et (c) que Mario Bunge soutient un réalisme scientifique fort, une version du matérialisme, du systémisme (...) et de l’émergentisme, comportant une dimension morale (il existe des valeurs objectives comme la vérité, la paix et la justice qui méritent d’être étudiées). Ensuite, le réalisme de Bunge rejette la neutralité axiologique rendant les scientifiques responsables de leurs actions. Bunge a toujours été moderne et continue à enrichir ses propres positions. (shrink)

The main claim of this study is that, contrary to Latour’s view about the need to leave aside epistemology to deal with anything valuable about science, Mario Bunge has consistently built up a detailed and thorough epistemology. The argumentative strategy will be to show that (a) it is not true that we have never been modern (b) epistemology is here to stay, and (c) Mario Bunge endorses a strong scientific realism, a brand of materialism, systemism and emergentism, including a moral (...) dimension (there are objective values like, truth, peace and justice that deserve to be respected). Then, Bunge’s realism rejects axiological neutrality making scientists responsible for their actions. Bunge has always been modern and keeps enriching his own views. (shrink)

Classical physics and quantum physics suggest two meta-physical types of reality: the classical notion of a objectively definite reality with properties "all the way down," and the quantum notion of an objectively indefinite type of reality. The problem of interpreting quantum mechanics (QM) is essentially the problem of making sense out of an objectively indefinite reality. These two types of reality can be respectively associated with the two mathematical concepts of subsets and quotient sets (or partitions) which are category-theoretically dual (...) to one another and which are developed in two mathematical logics, the usual Boolean logic of subsets and the more recent logic of partitions. Our sense-making strategy is "follow the math" by showing how the logic and mathematics of set partitions can be transported in a natural way to Hilbert spaces where it yields the mathematical machinery of QM--which shows that the mathematical framework of QM is a type of logical system over ℂ. And then we show how the machinery of QM can be transported the other way down to the set-like vector spaces over ℤ₂ showing how the classical logical finite probability calculus (in a "non-commutative" version) is a type of "quantum mechanics" over ℤ₂, i.e., over sets. In this way, we try to make sense out of objective indefiniteness and thus to interpret quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Recent developments in pure mathematics and in mathematical logic have uncovered a fundamental duality between "existence" and "information." In logic, the duality is between the Boolean logic of subsets and the logic of quotient sets, equivalence relations, or partitions. The analogue to an element of a subset is the notion of a distinction of a partition, and that leads to a whole stream of dualities or analogies--including the development of new logical foundations for information theory parallel to Boole's development of (...) logical finite probability theory. After outlining these dual concepts in mathematical terms, we turn to a more metaphysical speculation about two dual notions of reality, a fully definite notion using Boolean logic and appropriate for classical physics, and the other objectively indefinite notion using partition logic which turns out to be appropriate for quantum mechanics. The existence-information duality is used to intuitively illustrate these two dual notions of reality. The elucidation of the objectively indefinite notion of reality leads to the "killer application" of the existence-information duality, namely the interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Traditionally the role and meaning of the knowing subject has been a salient issue for the Western metaphysics, particularly for the modern one. The notion of the measuring subject, corresponding more or less to the knowing subject in the traditional metaphysical sense, whose measuring act directly interferes in the dynamic state of being of an object, takes up a central place in the philosophical narration of quantum mechanics. Nevertheless the possibility for the metaphysical subject and the quantum mechanical subject to (...) have a certain co-relation has not been thought out in both spheres. This paper addresses and discusses precisely that topic: How is the quantum mechanically playing subject to relate to the metaphysical transcendental subject traditionally set out, specifically to the Kantian subject and the Husserlian subject each? Meanwhile it raises a question as to the so-called ‘progressive’ character of quantum mechanics whether the quantum mechanical theory of subject ‘really’ resists the inertia of the Western metaphysical tradition or rather inherits and faithfully upholds it. (shrink)

It has been argued that quantum mechanics forces us to accept the existence of metaphysical, mind-independent indeterminacy. In this paper we provide an interpretation of the indeterminacy involved in the quantum phenomena in terms of a view that we call Plural Metaphysical Supervaluationism. According to it, quantum indeterminacy is captured in terms of an irreducibly plural relation between the actual world and various misrepresentations of it.

The inherently subjective nature of consciousness severely limits our ability to make progress on the problem of consciousness. The inability to acquire objective, publicly available data on the phenomenal aspect of consciousness makes evaluating alternative theories very difficult, if not impossible. However, the anomalous nature of subjective states with respect to our conventional theories of the physical world suggests the possibility of considering other anomalous data around consciousness that happen to be objective. For such purposes, I propose that we examine (...) the psi data gathered under laboratory conditions, which generally receive little attention. I wish to consider whether we have theories or frameworks of consciousness that attempt to account for subjective qualia but also fit the psi data. I argue that Russellian monism can be combined with an argument regarding quantum holism to arrive at a version of cosmopsychism that fits very well with the psi data. While I do not argue that such a framework exhausts the theoretical possibilities, I do suggest we can move forward with a framework that has attractive theoretical features and is also consistent with objective data currently on the table. (shrink)

The aim of this talk is to provide a rationally coherent physics-based understanding of the manner in which our conscious thoughts can influence our physical actions. An incidental aim is to expose the profoundly illinformed understanding behind the quip that “The claim of quantum physicists that consciousness is related to quantum mechanics comes from the idea that because quantum mechanics is a mystery and consciousness is a mystery, maybe the two are related.”.

John Searle begins his recent article “Dualism Revisited” by stating his belief that the philosophical problem of consciousness has a scientific solution. He then claims to refute dualism. It is therefore appropriate to examine his arguments against dualism from a scientific perspective.

A draft of a possible comparison between the use made of mathematics in classical field theories and in quantum mechanics is presented. Hilbert’s space formalism, although not only elegant and powerful but intuitive as well, does not give us a spatio-temporal representation of physical events. The picture of the electromagnetic field as an entity which is real in itself– i.e., as a wave without support – fostered by the emergence of special relativity can be seen as the first step, favored (...) by many physicists and philosophers, of a gradual “escape” from intuition into a purely mathematical representation of the external world. After the introduction, in recent theoretical physics, of fiber bundle formalism the classical notion of field acquires a new spatio-temporal intuitiveness. This intuitiveness is clearly foreshadowed in the Kantian and Meinongian analysis of the notion of magnitude. At the end of the paper we show that, contrary to what happens in quantum mechanics, mathematics plays a truly explicative role in general relativity, without any loss of spatio-temporal intuitiveness. (shrink)

There has been growing interest in theory building in Information Systems research. We extend this literature by examining theory building perspectives. We define a perspective as a researcher’s choice of the types of concepts and relationships used to construct a theory, and we examine three perspectives – process, variance, and systems. We contribute by clarifying these perspectives and explaining how they can be used more flexibly in future research. We illustrate the value of this more flexible approach by showing how (...) researchers can use different theoretical perspectives to critique and extend an existing theoretical model. Overall, we suggest a shift from the traditional process-variance dichotomy to a broader view defined by conceptual latitude and conceptual fit. We explain why this shift should help researchers as they engage in the knowledge generation process. (shrink)

Common wisdom, philosophical analysis and psychological research share the view that memory is subjectively positioned toward the past: Specifically, memory enables one to become re-acquainted with the objects and events of his or her past. In this paper I call this assumption into question. As I hope to show, memory has been designed by natural selection not to relive the past, but rather to anticipate and plan for future contingencies -- a decidedly future-oriented mode of subjective temporality. This is not (...) to say memory makes no reference to the past. But, I argue, past-oriented subjectivity is a by-product of a system designed by natural selection to help us face and respond to the "now and the next". I discuss the implications of the proposed temporal realignment for research agendas as well as the potential limitations of measures designed to explore memory by focusing on its retentive capabilities. (shrink)

The relationship between classical and quantum theory is of central importance to the philosophy of physics, and any interpretation of quantum mechanics has to clarify it. Our discussion of this relationship is partly historical and conceptual, but mostly technical and mathematically rigorous, including over 500 references. For example, we sketch how certain intuitive ideas of the founders of quantum theory have fared in the light of current mathematical knowledge. One such idea that has certainly stood the test of time is (...) Heisenberg's `quantum-theoretical Umdeutung (reinterpretation) of classical observables', which lies at the basis of quantization theory. Similarly, Bohr's correspondence principle (in somewhat revised form) and Schroedinger's wave packets (or coherent states) continue to be of great importance in understanding classical behaviour from quantum mechanics. On the other hand, no consensus has been reached on the Copenhagen Interpretation, but in view of the parodies of it one typically finds in the literature we describe it in detail. On the assumption that quantum mechanics is universal and complete, we discuss three ways in which classical physics has so far been believed to emerge from quantum physics, namely in the limit h -> 0 of small Planck's constant (in a finite system), in the limit N goes to infinity of a large system with $N$ degrees of freedom (at fixed h), and through decoherence and consistent histories. The first limit is closely related to modern quantization theory and microlocal analysis, whereas the second involves methods of C*-algebras and the concepts of superselection sectors and macroscopic observables. In these limits, the classical world does not emerge as a sharply defined objective reality, but rather as an approximate appearance relative to certain ``classical" states and observables. Decoherence subsequently clarifies the role of such states, in that they are ``einselected", i.e. robust against coupling to the environment. Furthermore, the nature of classical observables is elucidated by the fact that they typically define (approximately) consistent sets of histories. This combination of ideas and techniques does not quite resolve the measurement problem, but it does make the point that classicality results from the elimination of certain states and observables from quantum theory. Thus the classical world is not created by observation (as Heisenberg once claimed), but rather by the lack of it. (shrink)