Narrative theories currently dominate our understanding of how selfhood is constituted and concretely individuated throughout personal history. Despite this success, the narrative perspective has recently been exposed to a range of critiques. Whilst these critiques have been effective in pointing out the shortcomings of narrative theories of selfhood, they have been less willing and able to suggest alternative ways of understanding personal history. In this article, I assess the criticisms and argue that an adequate phenomenology of personal history must also (...) go beyond narrative. Drawing on a distinction between history and narrative, I outline an account of historical becoming through a process of sedimentation and a rich notion of what I call historical selfhood on an embodied level. Five embodied existentials are suggested, sketching a preliminary understanding of how selves are concretely individuated on a pre-narrative level. (shrink)

Two major twentieth century philosophers, of East and West, for whom the nothing is a significant concept are Nishida Kitarō and Martin Heidegger. Nishida’s basic concept is the absolute nothing upon which the being of all is predicated. Heidegger, on the other hand, thematizes the nothing as the ulterior aspect of being. Both are responding to Western metaphysics that tends to substantialize being and dichotomize the real. Ironically, however, while Nishida regarded Heidegger as still trapped within the confines of Western (...) metaphysics with its tendency to objectify, Heidegger’s impression of Nishida was that he is too Western, that is, metaphysical. Yet neither was too familiar with the other’s philosophical work as a whole. I thus compare and assess Nishida’s and Heidegger’s discussions of the nothing in their attempts to undermine traditional metaphysics while examining lingering assumptions about the Nishida–Heidegger relationship. Neither Nishida nor Heidegger means by “nothing” a literal nothing, but rather that which permits beings in their relative determinacy to be what they are and wherein or whereby we find ourselves always already in our comportment to beings. Nishida characterizes this as a place that negates itself to give rise to, or make room for, beings. For Heidegger, being as an event that clears room for beings, releasing each into its own, is not a being, hence nothing. We may also contrast them on the basis of the language they employ in discussing the nothing. Yet each seemed to have had an intuitive grasp of an un/ground, foundational to experience and being. And in fact their paths cross in their respective critiques of Western substantialism, where they offer as an alterantive to that substantialist ontology, in different ways, what I call anontology. (shrink)

The aim of this essay is to elaborate on the inner connection between three such diverse entities as lifelong learning, globalization and hermeneutics. After placing lifelong learning in a societal context framed by globalization, my intention is to reflect on the prerequisites for introducing a hermeneutical contribution to the understanding of lifelong learning. First, it is stated that globalization is the most profound horizon today for explaining the current interest we experience in both lifelong learning and hermeneutics. Second, from these (...) links to on globalization, we can also expect to find new links between lifelong learning and hermeneutics. Third, the predominant configuration of lifelong learning according to the logics of globalization and virtues of flexibility is demonstrated, and thereafter criticized mainly from the perspectives of philosophical anthropology. Finally, an alternative configuration of meaning and identity formation in lifelong learning is proposed by utilizing a reformulated theory of interpretation made possible thanks to recent metamorphosis inside the hermeneutical tradition itself. (shrink)

The acquaintance with significant philosophical doctrines emerging in the West has been a systematic process in the leading Russian-language philosophical journals, collections of articles, monographs and translations. Practically all the most important Western philosophical doctrines have been subjected to scrutiny by Russian philosophers. One of the most vivid Neo-Kantian projects of the early twentieth century, Emil Lask’s Logic of Philosophy, has not gone unnoticed either. Reaction to Lask’s works were far from being homogeneous. His project received several different evaluations, including (...) the critical ones. The project was criticized for the unsolved ontological potential of philosophy, the dogmatic immobility of logic of philosophy, inconsistency of material–form relation, etc. The article considers the first reviews and critical assessments of Lask’s works in Russia as well as the texts of Russian religious philosophers and Russian Neo-Kantians which contain constructive criticism. The range of reviews allows us to reconstruct the reception of Lask’s ideas in Russia and provides a significant supplement to the overall picture of the reception of Neo-Kantianism in Russia. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to destruct the metaphor of “turn” in M. Heidegger`s philosophy. The author argues that this problem has already been formulated in the phenomenological project by E. Husserl. There is analized the influence of transcendental philosophy (first of all I. Kant`s one) on the phenomenology, as well as the influence of some other philosophical projects, which actualized the philosophical problem which was called by Heidegger as the “turn”. The author substantiates the idea that the “turn” (...) is a principled methodical requirement of philosophizing in a phenomenological way. (shrink)

The purpose of the article is to demonstrate how Heidegger's statement, "Language is the House of Being," claims to represent the essence of all Western European philosophy, namely, as an outline of the unity of indirect identities - being, form and name. The author raises a number of questions in his research. Can we identify "beginning" and "consequence" by exploring the phenomenon of language? Is there anything in the language between beginning and effect? What is a language? And why does (...) Heidegger call language home? Is it possible to identify philosophically what makes language possible regardless of cultural contexts and historical eras? Does the question "What is language?" at the same time lead us to the question "What is a person?" and then "What does it mean to be?" The article focuses on the connection of Heidegger's philosophy with Plato's philosophy, and therefore on the constancy of fundamental philosophical problems, which finds different ways of expression (mythological, metaphysical, phenomenological...). The second part of the article is devoted to the actual analysis of the concept of "house of being" through the comprehension of the speech (communicative) dimension of one's being. The author also explores the concept of Heidegger's philosophy of openness, distance, speech: existence is Dasein's relation to being, that is, to one's own making; speech (Rede) as a mode of openness (Dasein) is an existential phenomenon; language (Sprache) is an implementation of self-projecting (entwerfen) speech (Rede) into the "world". Given that a language contains a plurality of certain elements and relationships, the essential unity of the language should be sought at the discontinuity. The gap means openness and freedom of speech. That is, the existential condition of the possibility of language, called in the early Heidegger openness, in his later work appears as a gap, but here and there it is the essential language, which is at the same time the essence of man. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that J. Patočka’s conception of three movements of human existence can be considered a contribution to the “pragmatic turn” in phenomenology. In order to demonstrate this contribution, I will first recapitulate the context of pragmatic turn, outlining both Heidegger’s original position and its consequent pragmatic interpretation offered by H. Dreyfus and other scholars. The core of the pragmatic interpretation is based on a modification of the Primacy of Praxis thesis that can be described as (...) the Primacy of Practic_es_ thesis, according to which our background practices, i.e., the ‘contingent ways of acting and judging,’ operate as a “source” of intelligibility. Based on Patočka’s criticisms, I will further argue that Heidegger-inspired pragmatism is hampered by the opposition between authentic and inauthentic disclosure, leading to both the rigidification of everyday practices and rendering authentic disclosure formal and empty. In the final section, I will demonstrate that Patočka’s own conception of the three movements of existence can be seen as committed to the Primacy of Practices thesis and that this version of the Primacy of Practice thesis is more acceptable because it does not share the disdainful attitude in regards of the public world. (shrink)

The article explores specificities of thematization of science and scientific rationality in Martin Heidegger’s fundamental ontology. This analysis focuses on the concept of scienticity, character- istic for Heidegger’s “early” line of thought, as well as continuation and divergence of exposition of “science” and the nature of “theoretical attitude” as the subject of interpretation of transcen- dental phenomenology of E. Husserl. This research places an emphasis on particularity of Hei- degger’s explication of existential concept of science as opposed to prevailing logico-epistemolog- (...) ical philosophy of science, and foundation of thematization of scientific “subject matters” and theoretical attitude upon the universe of ontological understanding of being of entities (regional ontologies). It also focuses on Heidegger’s assertion of fundamental ontological projection in a status of a peculiar “science of knowledge”, which gives ground for a priori pre-conditions of specific sciences. Separate attention is paid to a specifically Heideggerian approach to explication of the rooting of initial scientific orientation in the sphere of pre-scientific experience, which ar- ticulates itself in so called “fundamental concepts”, as well as positioning of contemplative ‘present-at-hand’ paradigm of theoretical knowledge as a derivative modus of a primary use of ‘ready-to-handness’ as a phenomenological founding basis of everydayness’ experience. The author came to the attention that scientific knowledge is a project Dasein. It is within the framework of self-design that Dasein thematizes what happens to another region of being that is the subject of scientific knowledge. In other words, making things available in researching, applying themes, provided that the design allowed late as the systematic development of the most modern buildings, such as is done in the world, and possibly everyday greeting improvised performance. (shrink)

This article discusses the tension between social relationality and self-relationality central to Heidegger’s ontology of Dasein and the possible ways of reconciling this tension. Arguing that this is a tension between communicability and existential commitments, the article poses the question: How are existential commitments responsive to communication? After problematizing the quasi-Kantian and communitarian ways of settling the tension, the article uses Heidegger’s early reading of Aristotle to develop a third hermeneutic model of ethical relationality according to which existential commitments are (...) shareable in communication, since ethos – the existential posture towards the good – arises out of pathos that exposes Dasein to coexistence. The account of ethical relationality found in Heidegger’s interpretation of Aristotle thus takes the world to be a shared and dynamic ontological condition and emphasize that the world constitutes selfhood in a way that is constantly at stake in ethical communication. (shrink)

How are we to understand Agamben’s philosophical anthropology and his frequent invocations of the relation between bios and zoe? In Remnants of Auschwitz Agamben evokes a quasi-phenomenological account of shame in order to elucidate this question thus implying that the phenomenon of shame carries an ontological significance. That shame has an ontological significance is also a belief held in current debates on moral emotions and the phenomenology of intersubjectivity, but despite this common philosophical intuition phenomenologists have criticized Agamben’s account of (...) shame. In this paper, I will try to show how these criticisms often rely on misreadings of Agamben’s terminology. Once Agamben’s analysis of shame have been properly placed in the broader context if his work, I will outline how Agamben’s analysis of shame and his ontology of life feeds into a rethinking of community and belonging. (shrink)

This paper addresses the notion of communicative action on the basis of Alfred Schutz’ writings. In Schutz’ work, communication is of particular significance and its importance is often neglected by phenomenologists. Communication plays a crucial role in his first major work, the Der sinnhafte Aufbau der sozialen Welt from 1932, yet communication is also a major feature in his unfinished works which were later completed posthumously by Thomas Luckmann: The Structures of the Life World (1973, 1989). In these texts, Schutz (...) sometimes refers to “communicative action,” and he comes to ascribe a crucial role to communication within the domain of the life world he calls everyday life. Based on Schutz’ texts, I shall first attempt to critically reconstruct the defining features of his notion of communication and communicative action. As a result, it emerges that Schutz’ notion of communication, particularly in its early incarnation, seems to be, at first glance, characterized by a dichotomy between virtual communication, that is communicative action in a narrow sense, and non-virtual communication. As I want to show with respect to the seemingly established dichotomous distinction between “mediated” and “immediate social action,” Schutz himself started to overcome this dichotomy. Based on this thesis, I will try to sketch a basic outline of a theory of communicative action, a theory less formulated by Schutz’ than built on Schutz’ writings. As the idea of communicative action, and particularly the transgression of the distinction between mediated and immediate action, affects the very structures of the life-world described by Schutz and Luckmann, I will ultimately demonstrate that any mundane phenomenology of the life-world requires a triangulatory method. (shrink)

Phenomenological descriptions are supposed to be revelatory and coincide with the self-showing of the things themselves. These features of phenomenological descriptions lead to the peculiar character of their expression, which has the effect of making them difficult to communicate. That is, the problem with communicating the findings of phenomenological researches is a consequence of the descriptive nature of the endeavor and the disclosive character of phenomenological descriptions. In the Logical Investigations Edmund Husserl recognized that the problem has three facets: how (...) does one state the findings of phenomenological researches, how can one effectively communicate these findings, and how can these communications be persuasive? In this essay I elaborate on these problems and then show that Heidegger’s method of formal indication was designed to solve these problems just as Husserl understood them. We can thus take formal indication as a model for dealing with these problems—and for informing phenomenological discourse—because it solves them with a single strategy. (shrink)

This essay focuses on and attempts to uncover the truly radical character of Nietzsche’s early “philological” work, specifically asking after the benefit he claims the study of classical culture should have for our present, late-modern historical moment. Taking up his study of the Pre-Platonic thinkers in 1873’s Philosophie im tragischen Zeitalter der Griechen , the first section analyzes Nietzsche’s statement that history’s principle task is the uncovering of Persönlichkeiten . I argue that it is not at all the subjective character (...) of a psychologized individual that Nietzsche has in mind, but rather the moment of persönliche Stimmung or ‘being attuned’ to the world, which grounds and gives rise to thinking. In the second section, I show that the phusis or ‘nature’ to which the thinker is exposed in this attunement is comparable to the tension between the Dionysian and Apollonian natural forces in tragic poetry, as Nietzsche understands it. This dynamic conception of phusis does not provide a metaphysical substrate or an objectively real ground to which we might return via that Greeks, but is rather essentially phenomenal , i.e. it is nothing other than the movement into and out of appearance, which always entails and requires its reception by the human being to whom it appears. In the final section of the essay, this origin proves for Nietzsche not to be located in a distant past moment. Rather, it is the abyssal origin of the tradition that is always already effective in our present moment, informing our contemporary conceptions of our world and ourselves. (shrink)

Heidegger calls his early philosophy a “science of being.” Being and Time combines phenomenological, ontological, hermeneutical, and existential themes in a way that is not obviously coherent. Commentators have worried in particular that Heidegger’s hermeneutical transformation of phenomenology is incompatible with his “scientific” aspirations. I outline three interpretations on which Heidegger cannot adopt Husserl’s “scientific” conception of phenomenology as eidetic, intuitive, propositionally articulated, and non‐relativistic due to his hermeneutical commitments. I argue that each of these readings rests on a misinterpretation (...) of one or more of three hermeneutical concepts that are central to Heidegger’s early thought: the understanding of being, the hermeneutical situation, and phenomenological destruction. By giving fresh analyses of these concepts, I show that Heidegger retains the scientific conception while refining it to avoid distortions that are introduced when inquiry is “infiltrated with traditional theories and opinions about being.” I also respond to the charge that Being and Time is a “disguised theology.”. (shrink)

The concept of guilt in relation to conscience and anxiety is not referred to as a feeling or an emotion in existential philosophy. Rather, the phenomenon of guilt is analyzed through the structure of existence. In Being and Time, Heidegger interprets guilt in the context of Dasein’s understanding of its own Being. The nature of Dasein as a finite entity permeates the analysis of guilt, which is based on the analysis of negation and the time structure of Dasein. An existential (...) interpretation of guilt, conscience, and anxiety offers a new dimension of the study of emotions with regard to the understanding of human Being. (shrink)

(2005). Frameworks & foundations. Angelaki: Vol. 10, continental philosophy and the sciences the german traditionissue editor: damian veal, pp. 201-218.

Things make sense to us. The identity of a thing is a meaningful style that expresses the usability of the thing. The usability is a dynamic order of the praxis in which the thing is embedded and in which we are ourselves de-centered. According to Merleau-Ponty, this sociocultural and psychosocial order is a formation of practical understanding and interpretation that rests upon and resumes the elementary, perceptual-expressive structuring of being. The Spiel is one of the three dimensions of corporeal intentionality, (...) in which this entire organization of meaning and experience unfolds. So, the Spiel of usability is a corporeal and practical intentionality that reaches from an aesthetic-ontological structuring of meaning to the order of the things in modern everyday praxes. (shrink)

Modes-of-being figure centrally in Heidegger's masterwork Being and Time. Testimony to this is Heidegger's characterisation of two of his most celebrated enquiries—the Existential analytic and the Zeug analysis—as investigations into the respective modes-of-being of the entities concerned. Yet despite the importance of this concept, commentators disagree widely about what a mode-of-being is. In this paper, I systematically outline and defend a novel and exegetically grounded interpretation of this concept. Strongly opposed to Kantian readings, such as those advocated by Taylor Carman (...) and Cristina Lafont, I interpret a mode-of-being as a universal that defines a district —that is, a natural class of entities that ought to be conceptualised in a special way. As such, every mode-of-being plays an important metaphysical and epistemic role: serving both to unify a natural class of a high degree of generality and as the interpretandum of an act yielding the basic-concepts pertaining to the entities therein. In explicating and arguing for this interpretation, I attribute a characteristically Aristotelian philosophical position to the early Heidegger, encompassing both metaphysical and epistemological realism and a conceptualist theory of universals. (shrink)

This article is dedicated to 130th Anniversary of German thinker Martin Heidegger. The main goal of the article is to develop Ukrainian reception of Heidegger’s philosophical heritage. The author considers the particularities of Heidegger’s understanding of thinking in the context of Dasein’s fundamental ontology. Thus, thinking is understood as being in a "tradition without tradition"; this, in turn, means the immediacy of thinking, which will never be past, never become a memory or a system of memories (beliefs). The element of (...) thinking is the element of spontaneity, that is, of voluntaries: it is impossible to "develop" thinking or "teach" to think meaningfully, because it is a voluntary affair. The voluntary cause of meaningful thinking reveals the truth (unconcealedness) of being. The author considers the scenario of falling now-being into its non-existent existence, interpreting it in Heidegger's terminology as a state of "forgetting of being". This status is updated if it is transformed into a "techno-technological" object, which must act on certain algorithms and provide "development" or "progress" metrics. The author develops the thesis that Dasein’s fundamental ontology of Heidegger reveals its condition as being-between. Being-between is not anthropological, but ontological category. The world of Dasein is everydayness between the birth and the death. The very being-between of Dasein induces its meaningful thinking. Following Heidegger, the author states that Dasein, that is lost in being-between, becomes centered (by subject) which pointlessly deploys power under the being. Therefore, in this context of Heidegger’s understanding of thinking the author also interprets the causes of such pointless existence of Dasein and its consequences. According to the author, now-being can save only reflection. (shrink)

In this article, I elucidate Martin Heidegger’s interpretation of Soph-ocles’ tragedy Antigone from a topological point of view by focusing on the place-character of Antigone’s poetic ethos. Antigone’s decision to defy Creon’s order and bury her brother Polynices is discussed as a movement that underpins her poetic disposition as a demigod. Antigone’s situatedness between gods and hu-mans is identified as the place of poetic dwelling, and the significance of Antig-one’s relation to the polis is explained. The main argument of the (...) article is two-fold: 1) When we read Antigone focusing on the notion of dwelling, we can better make sense how Heidegger’s engagement with the question of finitude closes the envisioned gap between ontology and ethics. 2) The idea of poetic dwelling is a confrontation with spatio-temporal limits of human existence, and requires a more holistic way of thinking about the place of humans in the world, thinking beyond being-action dichotomy. (shrink)

The article introduces the phenomenological idea of 'natural attitude' in the field of dance. Three phenomena, which very clearly show the embodiment of the natural attitude and its resistance to the requirements of dance, are analyzed. The 'controlling gaze' is the natural tendency to look at the limbs andfollow their movements instead of proprioceptive control The 'chess play' is a natural tendency of moving on the flat surface and ignoring the volume of movement. The 'seduction' is a natural tendency to (...) lose the body-self because of an interference with the others body. The dancing body has constantly to deal with these natural inclinations. And a dance teacher has to understand this split between 'ought' and 'is'. (shrink)

Theories of personality and personality disorders need, from time to time, to be revised and updated according to new empirical and conceptual developments. Such development has taken place in the realms of affective neuroscience, evolution and social cognition. In this article we outline a new personality theory which claims that phenomena we usually ascribe to the concept personality are best understood by postulating a web consisting of three major constituents: Temperament (mainly primary emotions), attachment and self-consciousness (mentalizing). We describe these (...) constituents, their neurobiological underpinnings, the subjective experiences they evoke and their behavioral implications. We discuss the relevance of the espoused theory for the field of personality disorders with references to borderline, narcissistic and avoidant personality disorders as well as the DSM-5 Alternative Model. Implications for social psychology, psychotherapy and common-sense self-understanding are outlined. The theory aims to bridge previous contradictions between natural sciences and hermeneutics by its propositions of the evolution of self-consciousness. (shrink)

The teacher’s pedagogical ethics refers to the Kantian maxims that a teacher is obliged to follow. One could provide a list of the most crucial maxims that a teacher must absolutely not violate. We surely need these Kantian maxims in the teachers’ pedagogical ethics, although they tell us very little about the properties that good and moral teachers should possess. In teacher education we must of course elaborate on the ethical code of the teacher (maxims), but we must also consider (...) the properties of a morally good teacher. A good source in endeavouring to find these properties is the book Aristotle wrote over 2,000 years ago, Nicomachean Ethics. According to Aristotle, a virtuous citizen must be educated. Without virtues (άρετή) – at least a certain degree of virtues – the polis community is impossible. Virtues are the human properties or action dispositions which facilitate the existence of telos, the purpose of a human being.” The telos of a man is to live a life worth living (eudaimon). Man achieves his telos by living a good life, which is a life lived according to certain virtues. In this article we consider what kind of a person a virtuous teacher is and what kind of a friend she is to her pupils. (shrink)

Given that we all live in the same world, how is it that we can have such very different worldviews? Answers to this question may be found in worldview constructions and their cognitive affordances in text and discourse. This paper discusses why and how worldviews can unfold from a schematic rationale that is grounded in ‘the primacy of spatial cognition’ in perception, thought patterns and their presentations in language. Although worldview frames are selective, and therefore subjective coordinate systems, the spatial (...) organising principle provides a tangible ground for abstract worldview ontologies. Rhetorically, this real-world/social-world analogy gives worldview constructions an objective epistemic quality that can prime commitment and activate intentions and actions. To operationalise this discourse-space theory, a model is proposed to investigate variation in spatial and temporal frames in political texts, involving their scope of attention and point of view. Examples are taken from an election manifesto analysis for Dutch party positioning. The critical question concerns the rhetorical nature of time- and space frames of reference in discursive constructions: How ‘real’ are text and discourse worlds and how does this relate to variation in discourse-world constructions and stance? (shrink)

We elaborate and defend the claim that human affective states are, among other things, self-disclosing. We will show why affective intentionality has to be considered in order to understand human self-consciousness. One specific class of affective states, so-called existential feelings, although often neglected in philosophical treatments of emotions, will prove central. These feelings importantly pre-structure affective and other intentional relations to the world. Our main thesis is that existential feelings are an important manifestation of self-consciousness and figure prominently in human (...) self-understanding. We offer an ordering of four levels of existential feelings and also give considerations in favour of the essential bodily nature of these feelings. (shrink)

Die vorliegende Arbeit ber?cksichtigt die Philosophie und Poetik der Geschichte und der Sprache a priori im poetischen und literarischen Werk von Peter Handke, in seinem poetologischen Essay Ich bin ein Bewohner des Elfenbeinturms und seinem Drama Die Fahrt im Einbaum oder das St?ck zum Film vom Krieg, und zwar im Ausgang von der kantianischen Idee der Apriorit?t der Geschichte. Die Geschichte a priori ist, laut Kant, m?glich,?wenn der Wahrsager die Begebenheiten selber macht und veranstaltet, die er zum voraus verk?ndigt?. Die (...) identische Idee vom Subjekt, das vor der Geschichte besteht, finden wir auch im poetischen Werk von Peter Handke, sowohl in seinen poetologischen Schriften, als auch in seinem dichterischen Werk. Das Ziel der Arbeit ist, durch eine immanente, ph?nomenologisch-hermeneutische Deutung der Werke des Philosophen und des Schriftstellers die unumstrittene enge Beziehung zwischen ihren geschichtsphilosophischen, bzw. - poetologischen Ideen aufzuweisen und einen allgemeinen philosophisch-dichterischen Rahmen f?r die Erkl?rung aller Geschichtsphilosophien ohne Ausnahmen zu geben. nema. (shrink)

This essay critically develops Watsuji’s nondual ontology of the self. Watsuji shows that the self is constituted by its relational contact with others and by its immersion in a wider geo-cultural environment. Yet Watsuji himself had difficulty in smoothly bringing together and integrating these notions. By showing how these domains work together to constitute the self, I bring into view the unity at the ground of Watsuji’s thought and the implications of this account for key ideas in Heidegger’s philosophy and (...) for environmental ethics. (shrink)

Gadamer claims that an essential form of truth is disclosed in the search for, and discovery of, a shared language in and through which the matter at issue between the participants in a conversation can come to presentation. He maintains in this regard that the thing itself is given in language. This contention is grounded in his account of the “belonging together” of word and thing. To help us understand this idea I turn to his discussion of the image, since—in (...) a comparison that Gadamer explicitly makes—here, too, the image “gives” the thing. (shrink)

Este artículo explora una vía para pensar en una individualidad de las cosas cotidianas desde aquel modo de ser que Heidegger denominó ser-a-la-mano. Para ello proponemos un diálogo entre sus tesis sobre la significatividad del mundo y las consideraciones de Wilhelm Schapp sobre las cosas-para. A partir de Heidegger, se expondrá la individualidad física objetual como resultado de lamera presencia espacial. Luego, abordaremos al útil según el para-algo que constituye el sentido de la situación. Las consideraciones de Schapp contribuirán a (...) entender que las cosas han de ser abordadas desde su pertenencia situacional, y no desde la actividad corporal y perceptiva de un sujeto. Desde esta perspectiva, y en contraposición con la materia física, la dimensión material de las cosas cotidianas será entendida como “de algo”. Así, desde Heidegger y Schapp proponemos un concepto de materialidad situacional de carácter histórico como la singularización de las cosas cotidianas y que proponemos como una vía para indagar su individualidad inmediata. Palabras clave: Materia, mera presencia espacial, ser-a-la-mano, Heidegger, Schapp. (shrink)

Mediante una reflexión acerca de la ausencia de una tematización detallada del cuerpo humano en Sein und Zeit y atendiendo a la negación de una «fenomenología del cuerpo» en Zollikoner Seminare, el presente artículo se propone desarrollar la advertencia metódica que subyace a las discusiones de Heidegger sobre la corporalidad humana. En este contexto, se destacará la incompatibilidad que hay entre el modo de ser del Dasein, y el modo de ser que configura la interpretación tradicional del cuerpo, esto es, (...) el cuerpo en cuanto cosa. A partir de lo anterior, se destacará la necesidad de atender a la pertenencia ontológica del fenómeno del cuerpo al Ser de lo Humano en el intento de desplegar una consideración existencial de la corporalidad humana. (shrink)

Este artículo problematiza la relación de Heidegger con el Nacionalsocialismo para discutir cómo es que ella se gesta desde una ceguera en su propio pensar. Atendiendo a sus Cuadernos Negros, en especial al volumen referente a los años 30, se analizará la posición crítica de Heidegger a Ser y Tiempo y las nuevas tendencias en su pensar para entender el horizonte comprensivo en el que éste asume posturas políticas fácticas como rector de la Universidad de Freiburg. Así, se mostrará que (...) tanto su planteamiento filosófico como sus posturas políticas obedecen a un único horizonte de problemáticas: el tiempo y su traducción histórico-política en tanto que destino. Desde esta primacía del tiempo, indagaremos cómo la filosofía heideggeriana es conducida a un descuido de lo inmediato. Así es como esta labilidad será comprendida como el motivo por el cual dicho pensamiento, en los Cuadernos Negros, se anula a sí mismo en cuanto filosofía. (shrink)

Este artículo se propone exponer el fenómeno del existir humano, denominado por Heidegger “Dasein”, en íntima relación con el problema de la constitución de la realidad. Para ello, se entenderá lo real como aquella multiplicidad de entes con los que la vida se confronta diariamente. En este sentido, se plantea que esta multiplicidad no pertenece a lo percibido, sino que deviene más bien de la estructura de la percepción sensible. Mediante advertencias de Heidegger en torno a la filosofía kantiana y (...) a través del uso de ejemplos propios, se realzarán los momentos trascendentales de la sensibilidad: el espacio y el tiempo, hasta llegar al cuidado como ser del Dasein. Así, comprendiendo al cuidado en su sentido temporal, advertiremos que lo real se origina desde el futuro perteneciente al existir mismo. Con lo anterior, el estudio expondrá cómo es que el “Dasein” puede ser entendido como aperturidad o de-velamiento de nuestra realidad. (shrink)

I argue that Hubert Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background as well as his anti-representationalism rest on introspection. I denote with ‘introspection’ the methodological malpractice of formulating ontological statements about the conditions of possibility of phenomena merely based on descriptions. In order to illustrate the insufficiencies of Dreyfus’ methodological strategy in particular and introspection in general, I show that Heidegger, to whom Dreyfus constantly refers as the foundation of his own work, derives ontological statements (...) about the conditions of possibility of phenomena not merely from descriptions, but also from analyses. I further show that deriving ontological statements directly from descriptions entails implausible results. I do so by discussing representative cases. Based on these general methodological considerations, I show that Dreyfus’ work on action, skill and understanding is introspective. First, I demonstrate that Dreyfus’ influential claim that rules and representations do not govern skillful actions is the result of introspection, because it is merely founded on the absence of rules and representations in representative descriptions of skillful actions. Second, I show that Dreyfus’ work on embodied coping, the intentional arc, solicitations and the background is also based on introspection. These ontological structures are merely reifications of descriptions and are not further substantiated by analyses. (shrink)

In the following I show that Hubert Dreyfus’ account of skill rests on a misguided interpretation of Martin Heidegger’s work on understanding in Being and Time. Dreyfus separates understanding according to the analytic philosophical concept pair, so called ‘know-how’ and ‘knowledge-that’, that corresponds for him to the pragmatist differentiation between skillful acting and theoretical conceptual thinking. Contrary to that, Heidegger argues that only one form of understanding exists that is neither captured by ‘know-how’, ‘knowledge-that’ or a combination of both. Instead (...) of presupposing two radically different ways to engage with the world, one practical-agential, the other theoretical-conceptual, Heidegger shows that all genuine forms of comportments rest on the same form of understanding that exhibits the highest degree of intelligibility when we deal with the world ordinarily. The Heideggerian account therefore comes without the many dichotomies so often criticized in the literature on skill and understanding, and offers a radically different view of world disclosure and of what we do when we ‘theorize’. (shrink)

In this paper I analyze constitution embodiment, a particular conception of embodiment. Proponents of constitution embodiment claim that the body is a condition of the constitution of entities. Constitution embodiment is popular with phenomenologically-inspired Embodied Cognition, including research projects such as Enactivism and Radical Embodied Cognitive Science. Unfortunately, PEC’s use of constitution embodiment is neither clear nor coherent; in particular, PEC uses the concept of constitution embodiment so that a major inconsistency is entailed. PEC conceives of the body in a (...) transcendental sense as a condition of the constitution of entities, and, in an ontic sense, as a scientifically describable entity. Yet, a condition of the constitution of entities cannot be itself an entity—rather, it is the very condition of the possibility of an entity. This inconsistency entails further problems, among them PEC’s misguided focus on the location of the embodied mind. In order to correct these mistakes, I develop a conception of constitution embodiment based on the work of Heidegger, Husserl and to a lesser degree Merleau-Ponty. This has two purposes. First, it provides the conceptual groundwork to secure the status of PEC as a consistent and coherent research project and to clarify PEC’s conception of the relationship between phenomenology and the sciences. In that spirit, my approach provides further guidelines for fruitful research alliances between PEC and other research programs such as Grounded Cognition and identifies current research alliances, such as those with Radical Enactivism, as undesirable. Second, my account provides an elaborate concept of constitution embodiment that can function as the basis for more sophisticated work in the future. (shrink)

The 'Metaphysics of Dasein ' is the name which Heidegger gave to a new philosophical project developed immediately after the partial publication of his masterwork Being and Time. As Heidegger was later to recall, an 'overturning' took place at that moment, more precisely right in the middle of the 1929 treatise On the Essence of Ground. Between the fundamental-ontological formulation of the question of being and its metaphysical rephrasing, Heidegger discovered that a 'metaphysical freedom' stood at the root of Dasein (...) 's relation to his world and, thus, at the basis of his whole ontological questioning. This article will show how the very structure of the 1929 essay clearly illustrates the path Heidegger followed between Being and Time and the new philosophical beginning of the mid 1930s. It will conclude with a few critical remarks concerning Heidegger 's attempt to free his thinking from traditional philosophy and to overcome metaphysics. (shrink)

Esta investigación aborda el tema de la diferencia ontológica desde la perspectiva de las maneras del ser (ser-cómo), uno de los momentos constitutivos de la idea complejo-unitaria del ser. Tema y perspectiva se complementan recíprocamente. Primero, la diferencia ontológica posibilita evidenciar el fenómeno óntico de las maneras de ser del ente y el ontológico de las maneras del ser. Segundo, ambas maneras proveen una palpable visualización sobre los términos de la diferencia ontológica, desbrozando el terreno para distinguir al ser, no (...) sólo del ente, sino de la entidad, la cual está determinada unilateralmente por el ser-dado-delante (Vorhandenheit) en sentido amplísimo. (shrink)