This article is in three parts. Part I gives an account of Erwin Schrödinger's growing up and studies in Vienna, his scientific work—first in Vienna from 1911 to 1920, then in Zurich from 1920 to 1925—on the dielectric properties of matter, atmospheric electricity and radioactivity, general relativity, color theory and physiological optics, and on kinetic theory and statistical mechanics. Part II deals with the creation of the theory of wave mechanics by Schrödinger in Zurich during the early months of 1926; (...) he laid the foundations of this theory in his first two communications toAnnalen der Physik. Part III deals with the early applications of wave mechanics to atomic problems—including the demonstration of equivalence of wave mechanics with the quantum mechanics of Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan, and that of Dirac—by Schrödinger himself and others. The new theory was immediately accepted by the scientific community. (shrink)

I have spent over 50 years of dedicated research on this theme. These are my overall conclusions. I think that science-as-it-is has come to too-limited conclusions, largely because, by in large, they are using an outmoded, "Newtonian" model of reality, (echoing Penrose, D'Espagnat, Maturana). Twentieth century physics has changed that, and it is time to apply its results to the rest of our world picture. I contend that the "materialists", as exemplified by Dennett, are archeological artifacts! There still remains room (...) for the human mind and the human soul -and my book shows how! This book proposes an entirely new perspective and an actual solution to the problem based on modern biology,(Maturana), modern physics, (Bohr, D'Espagnat, Einstein), modern logic, (Quine) and modern philosophy, (Cassirer), but it is still firmly grounded in Realism. It's conclusion is that the existence of "mind" is a necessary consequence of realism. (shrink)

Employing the ideas of modern mathematics and biology, seen in the context of Ernst Cassirer's "Symbolic Forms, the author presents an entirely new and novel solution to the classical mind-brain problem. This is a "hard" book, I'm sorry, but it is the problem itself, and not me which has made it so. I say that Dennett, and, indeed, the whole of academia is wrong.

This paper deals with an attempt of the mathematician Riemann to develop an outstandingly broad view of the philosophy of nature encompassing basic phenomena of both the material and the mental world. Riemann's draft is traced in its main aspects, and is accompanied by a comparison with certain chapters in the philosophical writings of Herbart that were particularly relevant to Riemann's conception of mathematics and science on the whole. This applies, in particluar, to the epistemological background and to Herbart's theory (...) of the Self. (shrink)

Between Calculability and Non-Calculability. Issues of Calculability and Predictability in the Physics of Complex Systems. The ability to predict has been a very important qualifier of what constitutes scientific knowledge, ever since the successes of Babylonian and Greek astronomy. More recent is the general appreciation of the fact that in the presence of deterministic chaos, predictability is severely limited (the so-called ‘butterfly effect’): Nearby trajectories diverge during time evolution; small errors typically grow exponentially with time. The system obeys deterministic laws (...) and still is unpredictable, seemingly a paradox for the traditional viewpoint of Laplacian determinisms. With the concept of deterministic chaos the epistemological issue about an adequate understanding of predictability is no longer just a mere philosophical topic. Physicists on the one hand recognize the limits of (long term) predictability, computability and even of scientific knowledge, on the other hand they work on concepts for extending the horizon of predictability. It is shown in this paper that physics of complex systems is useful to clarify the jungle of different meanings of the terms ‘predictability’ and ‘computability’ — also with philosophical implications for understanding science and nature. Today, from the physical point of view, the relevance of the concepts of predictability seems to be underestimated by philosophers as a mere methodological topic. In the paper I analyse the importance of predictability and computability in physics of complex systems. I show a way how to cope with problems of unpredictability and noncomputability. Nine different concepts of predictability and computability (i.e. open solution, sensitivity/chaos, redundancy/chance) are presented, compared and evaluated. (shrink)

By briefly reviewing three well-known scientific revolutions in fundamental physics (the discovery of inertia, of special relativity and of general relativity), I claim that problems that were supposed to be crying for a dynamical explanation in the old paradigm ended up receiving a structural explanation in the new one. This claim is meant to give more substance to Kuhn’s view that revolutions are accompanied by a shift in what needs to be explained, while suggesting at the same time the existence (...) of a pattern that is common to all of the discussed case-studies. It remains to be seen whether also quantum mechanics, in particular entanglement, conforms to this pattern. (shrink)

The dramatic development of physics in the twentieth century has thrown philosophy into a crisis regarding its self-image, from which today's philosophy has still not fully recovered.1 The crisis had two consequences or complementary manifestations: First, there was a gradual retreat of philosophy from the natural sciences. Because physics turned out to be an autonomous discipline, which aims at cognition of nature apparently totally independent of any kind of philosophy, "natural philosophy" as a particular branch of philosophy seemed superfluous. Second, (...) in order to prevent its own abdication, natural philosophy mutated into a kind of meta-science, called philosophy of science, that avoids any serious .. (shrink)

This paper is intended to sketch the definition of a methodological tool -- the notion of a format of representation -- for the study of scientific theorising. One of its main assumption is that a philosophical study of theorising needs to pay attention to other types of units of analysis than the traditional ones, namely, theories and models approached in a logical and structural way, since scientific reasoning is always led on concrete representational devices and depends upon their specific properties. (...) The notion of a format is intended to characterise the differences between various types of representational devices, in terms of the inferences they enable cognitive agents to draw. (shrink)

In an influential article, Gerd Grasshoff has argued for the identification of the objects in Wittgenstein's Tractatus with the ultimate constituents of reality in Heinrich Hertz's Principles of Mechanics. Grasshoff's interpretation is based on two interrelated claims: The specific determination of the objects in the world and the relation among them is the primary theme in Wittgenstein's early philosophy, because it is the primary theme for Hertz. Wittgenstein did not assume the existence of simple objects on purely logical grounds without (...) having specific examples of simple objects in mind, because Hertz did not do this. (shrink)

Il seguente lavoro si concentra su un confronto tra la filosofia di Peirce e quella di Cassirer, con particolare attenzione alla loro trattazione del problema della semiotica e della sua rilevanza in relazione alla teoria della conoscenza.

The principle of conservation of energy tells us that ‘energy can neither be created nor destroyed but only transformed’. The validity of the principle is without question. The problem is the concept. Contemporary physicists have asserted that we do not know what energy is. We find, however, 19th century physicists, contemporary physicists and historians of science who converge on the point: Mayer and Joule discovered energy. Therefore, we do not know what energy is, but we know these authors discovered it. (...) What did they then discover? What can we learn from this with regard to the energy concept problem? To deal with this issue, I will distinguish between what the authors did experimentally and what they said about the phenomena. This method of analysis makes the difference in relation to historical works on the subject. In a second step, I will consider the introduction of the energy concept, which is from 1850s, and the reification of the energy in 1880s. Finally, I will address the energy conservation principle and the concept of energy conveyed by this principle in contemporary textbooks. As we shall see, the conservation of a magnitude that we call energy nowadays was discovered by Mayer and Joule; an indestructible and transformable entity was not. Adopting the original conservation principle would be enough to avoid the energy concept problem. (shrink)

The ability of predicting upcoming events or conditions in advance offers substantial selective advantage to living beings. The most successful systematic tool for fairly reliable prognoses is the use of dynamical causal models in combination with memorised experience. Surprisingly, causality is a fundamental but rather controversially disputed concept. For both models and memory, symbol processing is requisite. Symbols are a necessary and sufficient attribute of life from its very beginning; the process of their evolutionary emergence was discovered by Julian Huxley (...) a century ago. In behavioural biology, this universal symmetry-breaking kinetic phase transition became known as ritualisation. Symbol use for predicting future dynamical processes has culminated in the unprecedented complexity of mental models used in science and technology, coining the historical ascent of modern humans. Observation and measurement transform structural information of physical exchange processes into symbolic information from which state quantities are derived by means of mental models. However, phylogenetically inherited models such as naïve realism do not necessarily explain the sophisticated insights revealed by modern experiments with, say, entangled quantum states. It is suggested to carefully distinguish observed exchange quantities from predicted unobservable state quantities, and physical reality from mental models thereof. (shrink)

In early major works, Cassirer and Schlick differently recast traditional doctrines of the concept and of the relation of concept to intuitive content along the lines of recent epistemological discussions within the exact sciences. In this, they attempted to refashion epistemology by incorporating as its basic principle the notion of functional coordination, the theoretical sciences' own methodological tool for dispensing with the imprecise and unreliable guide of intuitive evidence. Examining their respective reconstructions of the theory of knowledge provides an axis (...) of comparison along which to locate Cassirer's Neo-Kantianism and Schlick's pre-positivist empiricism, and an immediate background of contrast to the subsequent rise of logical empiricism. For in the absence of intuition all our knowledge is without objects and therefore remains entirely empty. (Kant A62/B87) And how awkward is the human mind in diving the nature of things when forsaken by the analogy of what we see and touch directly? (Boltzmann 1895). (shrink)

This paper is an attempt to clarify why Ludwig Boltzmann from about 1895 to 1905 seemed to adopt a series of extreme epistemological positions, ranging from phenomenalism to pragmatism, while emphatically rejecting what he called ‘metaphysics’ (by which he meant all traditional philosophy). He concluded that all philosophical differences were merely linguistic and most were ultimately meaningless. But at about the time that young Ludwig Wittgenstein began absorbing these desperate ideas (1905), Boltzmann himself under the influence of Franz Brentano seemed (...) to assume a type of representationalism about the external physical world, while in his own mind adopting it for pragmatic reasons. Why? Because “it worked”. He seems to have defended his non-representationalist Bildtheorie on similar grounds, but his suicide followed shortly (1906). (shrink)

I show that Albert Einstein’s distinction between principle and constructive theories was predated by Hendrik A. Lorentz’s equivalent distinction between mechanism- and principle-theories. I further argue that Lorentz’s views toward realism similarly prefigure what Arthur Fine identified as Einstein’s ‘‘motivational realism.’’ r 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd.

According to the Einstein-Mayer theory of the Riemanniann space-time with Einstein-Cartan teleparallelism, the local Lorentz invariance is broken by the gravitational field defining Machian reference systems. This breaking of symmetry implies the occurrence of “hidden matter” in the Einstein equations of gravity. The hidden matter is described by the non-Lorentz-invariant energy-momentum tensor $\hat \Theta _{ik}$ satisfying the relation $\hat \Theta _{i;k}^k = 0$ . The tensor $\hat \Theta _{ik}$ is formed from the Einstein-Cartan torsion field given by the anholonomy objects, (...) FAik=2hA[i,k], and appears together with Hilbert’s energy-momentum tensor T* ik and Poincaré’s pressure λgik on the right-hand side of Einstein’s equations so that one has $$R_{ik} - (1/2)g_{ik} R = - \kappa T*_{ik} - \lambda g_{ik} - \hat \Theta _{ik}$$ According to this theory, in the universe and in cosmic systems one must excep “invisible masses” described by the Poincaré and Einstein-Cartan terms to exist. The torsion field FAik makes the space-time a Machian universe; it is of the same nature as the “weak interacting matter” discussed in astrophysics. (shrink)