- Doxastic responsibility, guidance control, and ownership of belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):82-98.details
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A social solution to the puzzle of doxastic responsibility: a two-dimensional account of responsibility for belief.Robert Carry Osborne - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9335-9356.details
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Ampliative Transmission and Deontological Internalism.Luis R. G. Oliveira - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):174-185.details
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Why is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?Kate Nolfi - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):97-121.details
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Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.details
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IX—Equal Opportunity: A Unifying Framework for Moral, Aesthetic, and Epistemic Responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2020 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 120 (2):203-235.details
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No achievement beyond intention: A new defence of robust virtue epistemology.Jesús Navarro - 2015 - Synthese 192 (10):3339-3369.details
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Responsibility for forgetting.Samuel Murray, Elise D. Murray, Gregory Stewart, Walter Sinnott-Armstrong & Felipe De Brigard - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1177-1201.details
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The eye's mind: Perceptual process and epistemic norms.Jessie Munton - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):317-347.details
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Epistemic Reasons Are Not Normative Reasons for Belief.Samuel Montplaisir - 2021 - Acta Analytica 36 (4):573-587.details
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A puzzle about excuses.Martin Montminy - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Shared Epistemic Responsibility.Boyd Millar - 2021 - Episteme 18 (4):493-506.details
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Attributionism and degrees of Praiseworthiness.Daniel J. Miller - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (10):3071-3087.details
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Conceptual limitations, puzzlement, and epistemic dilemmas.Deigan Michael - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (9):2771-2796.details
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The Reasons-Responsiveness Account of Doxastic Responsibility.Anne Meylan - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (4):877-893.details
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The epistemic significance of address.Benjamin McMyler - 2013 - Synthese 190 (6):1059-1078.details
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Responsibility for Testimonial Belief.Benjamin McMyler - 2012 - Erkenntnis 76 (3):337-352.details
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Entkräftung und Widerruf: Fügsame Überzeugungen im Zeitverlauf.Benjamin McMyler - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (6):992-1007.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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Normativism and Doxastic Deliberation.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):447-465.details
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Judging as a non-voluntary action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.details
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Epistemic responsibility and doxastic agency.Conor McHugh - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):132-157.details
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Control of Belief and Intention.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (4):337-346.details
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Exercising Doxastic Freedom.Conor Mchugh - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1):1-37.details
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Belief and aims.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (3):425-439.details
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A limitation on agency in judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-21.details
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Taking control of belief.Miriam McCormick - 2011 - Philosophical Explorations 14 (2):169-183.details
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Responding to Skepticism About Doxastic Agency.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (4):627-645.details
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Justification Without Excuses: A Defense of Classical Deontologism.Blake McAllister - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (4):353-366.details
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On fundamental responsibility.Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.details
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Two Faces of Responsibility for Beliefs.Giulia Luvisotto - 2022 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 52 (7):761-776.details
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Knowledge from Scientific Expert Testimony without Epistemic Trust.Jon Leefmann & Steffen Lesle - 2018 - Synthese:1-31.details
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Knowledge from scientific expert testimony without epistemic trust.Jon Leefmann & Steffen Lesle - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3611-3641.details
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False Confessions and Subverted Agency.Jennifer Lackey - 2021 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 89:11-35.details
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Eyewitness testimony and epistemic agency.Jennifer Lackey - 2022 - Noûs 56 (3):696-715.details
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Desiderata for a Viable Secular Humanism.Ryan Kemp - 2013 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 30 (2):176-186.details
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Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.details
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The Activity of Reasoning: How Reasoning Can Constitute Epistemic Agency.David Jenkins - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (3):413-428.details
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Pragmatic Encroachment and Belief-Desire Psychology.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2012 - Analytic Philosophy 53 (4):327-343.details
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VIII—What Do We Want from a Model of Implicit Cognition?Jules Holroyd - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (2):153-179.details
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Reflection and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):3-41.details
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Compensation and Moral Luck.Nora Heinzelmann - 2021 - The Monist 104 (2):251-264.details
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Semantic Knowledge, Semantic Guidance, and Kripke's Wittgenstein.Derek Green - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (2):186-206.details
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Epistemic Responsibility and Criminal Negligence.Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 14 (1):91-111.details
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Doxastic Responsibility is Owed to Others.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Research 44:63-77.details
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Biased Emotions: Implicit Bias, emotion & attributability.Kris Goffin - 2023 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 14 (4):1237-1255.details
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Conceptual responsibility.Trystan S. Goetze - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 64 (1-2):20-45.details
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Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamar Szabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552--585.details
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Alief in Action (and Reaction).Tamarszabó Gendler - 2008 - Mind and Language 23 (5):552-585.details
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Moral Responsibility, Voluntary Control, and Intentional Action.Kyle G. Fritz - 2018 - Philosophia 46 (4):831-855.details
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