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Groups with Minds of Their Own Making.Leo Townsend - 2019 - Journal of Social Philosophy 51 (1):129-151.details
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Incommensurability, incomparability, and practical reason.Ruth Chang (ed.) - 1997 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.details
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Epistemic Blame and the Normativity of Evidence.Sebastian Schmidt - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (1):1-24.details
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Controlling our Reasons.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Noûs 57 (4):832-849.details
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Mental Agency as Self-Regulation.Leon de Bruin, Fleur Jongepier & Derek Strijbos - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):815-825.details
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Is believing for a normative reason a composite condition?J. J. Cunningham - 2019 - Synthese 196 (9):3889-3910.details
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Unsettledness and the intentionality of practical decisions.E. J. Coffman - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (2):220-231.details
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Do We Decide Intentionally?E. J. Coffman - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (4):822-827.details
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Reasons and Defeasible Reasoning.John Brunero - 2022 - Philosophical Quarterly 72 (1):41-64.details
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On knowing one's own resistant beliefs.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):212-225.details
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Dissonance and Doxastic Resistance.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (5):957-974.details
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Two Levels of Metacognition.Santiago Arango-Muñoz - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):71-82.details
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Expressivism, Moral Psychology and Direction of Fit.Carlos Nunez - forthcoming - In David Copp & Connie Rosati (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaethics. Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic Deontology and Voluntariness.Conor McHugh - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (1):65-94.details
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What Is Evaluable for Fit?Oded Na'aman - 2023 - In Chris Howard & R. A. Rowland (eds.), Fittingness. OUP.details
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Epistemic agency: Some doubts.Kieran Setiya - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):179-198.details
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Aiding self-knowledge.Casey Doyle - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (8):1104-1121.details
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Pluralistic Attitude-Explanation and the Mechanisms of Intentional Action.Daniel Burnston - 2021 - In David Shoemaker (ed.), Oxford Studies in Agency and Responsibility Volume 7. Oxford University Press. pp. 130-153.details
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Doxastic Dilemmas and Epistemic Blame.Sebastian Schmidt - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.details
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Mental Muscles and the Extended Will.Tillmann Vierkant - 2014 - Topoi 33 (1):1-9.details
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What reasoning might be.Markos Valaris - 2017 - Synthese 194 (6).details
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Mere moral failure.Julie Tannenbaum - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (1):58-84.details
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Biased by our imaginings.Ema Sullivan-Bissett - 2018 - Mind and Language 34 (5):627-647.details
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Self-Interpretation as First-Person Mindshaping: Implications for Confabulation Research.Derek Strijbos & Leon de Bruin - 2015 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (2):297-307.details
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Four objections to the standard story of action (and four replies).Michael Smith - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):387-401.details
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Why Decision-making Capacity Matters.Ben Schwan - 2021 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 19 (5):447-473.details
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Patient autonomy and withholding information.Melissa Rees - 2023 - Bioethics 37 (3):256-264.details
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How to judge intentionally.Antonia Peacocke - 2023 - Philosophical Perspectives 37 (1):330-339.details
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Why is Epistemic Evaluation Prescriptive?Kate Nolfi - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):97-121.details
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Which Mental States Are Rationally Evaluable, And Why?Kate Nolfi - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):41-63.details
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Epistemic Akrasia and Mental Agency.Cristina Borgoni - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):827-842.details
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On not making up one’s own mind.Benjamin McMyler - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2765-2781.details
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The Illusion of Exclusivity.Conor McHugh - 2013 - European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4):1117-1136.details
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Judging as a non-voluntary action.Conor McHugh - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):245 - 269.details
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Attitudinal control.Conor McHugh - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2745-2762.details
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Asymmetry arguments.Berislav Marušić - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (4):1081-1102.details
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Reasoning, rational requirements, and occurrent attitudes.Wooram Lee - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (4):1343-1357.details
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Exploring the Stability of Belief: Resiliency and Temptation.Krista Lawlor - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (1):1-27.details
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Belief as an act of reason.Nicholas Koziolek - 2018 - Manuscrito 41 (4):287-318.details
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Transparent emotions? A critical analysis of Moran's transparency claim.Naomi Kloosterboer - 2015 - Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):246-258.details
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Does intention involve belief?Christian Kietzmann - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (2):426-440.details
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Inquiry And The Transmission Of Knowledge.Christoph Kelp - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):298-310.details
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Accounting for Doxastic Agency: Mental Action and Self-Awareness.Sophie Keeling - 2023 - Synthese 201 (6):1-24.details
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Obsessive–compulsive akrasia.Samuel Kampa - 2019 - Mind and Language 35 (4):475-492.details
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Explaining Free Will by Rational Abilities.Frank Hofmann - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (2):283-297.details
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Foot Without Achilles’ Heel.Ulf Hlobil & Katharina Nieswandt - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (5):1501-1515.details
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The relations between agency, identification, and alienation.Alec Hinshelwood - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (3):243-258.details
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Making a Difference.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):81-94.details
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Uncertainty and the act of making a difficult choice.Jonathan J. Hall - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (3):368-390.details
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