- Science, philosophy, and interpretation.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):535.details
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Intentional system theory and experimental psychology.Michael H. Van Kleeck - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):533.details
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What is the intentional stance?Gilbert Harman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):515.details
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The intentional stance and the knowledge level.Allen Newell - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):520.details
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Another “Just So” story: How the leopardguarders spot.Dorothy Cheney & Robert Seyfarth - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):506.details
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Event-causal libertarianism, functional reduction, and the disappearing agent argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 170 (3):413-432.details
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The Main Problem with USC Libertarianism.Levy Ken - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):107-127.details
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How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327 - 341.details
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Self-Movement and Natural Normativity: Keeping Agents in the Causal Theory of Action.Matthew McAdam - 2007 - Dissertation, Georgetown Universitydetails
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Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil (ed.) - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.details
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The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.details
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Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism.Andrei Buckareff - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.details
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Adversus Homo Economicus: Critique of Lester’s Account of Instrumental Rationality.Danny Frederick - manuscriptdetails
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Mitigating Soft Compatibilism.Justin A. Capes - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):640-663.details
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Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument.Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.details
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Free will and the unconscious precursors of choice.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):365-384.details
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Making a Difference.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (1):81-94.details
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Farewell to the luck (and Mind) argument.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (2):199-230.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Arguments for incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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An unconnected Heap of duties?David McNaughton - 1996 - Philosophical Quarterly 46 (185):433-447.details
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Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment‘.Paul Russell & Michael McKenna (eds.) - 2006 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A coherent, naturalistic, and plausible formulation of libertarian free will.Mark Balaguer - 2002 - Noûs 36 (3):379-406.details
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Precis of the intentional stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.details
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Frankfurt’s concept of identification.Chen Yajun - 2024 - Asian Journal of Philosophy 3 (1):1-19.details
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Ciceronov de fato: o helenističkim kondicionalima i slobodi volje.Vladimir Marko - 2023 - Novi Sad: Futura publikacije.details
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Moral Luck and Unfair Blame.Martin Sand & Michael Klenk - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (4):701-717.details
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Free will and self expression: A compatibilist garden of forking paths.Robyn Repko Waller - 2023 - Philosophical Issues 33 (1):299-313.details
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Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI.Huzeyfe Demirtas - 2023 - Dissertation, Syracuse Universitydetails
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Diverging lay intuitions about concepts related to free will in arbitrary and deliberate decisions.Jake Gavenas, Pamela Hieronymi & Uri Maoz - 2022 - Consciousness and Cognition 106 (C):103434.details
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Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility.Timothy Perrine - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):119-133.details
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Knowing About Responsibility.Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette - 2021 - American Philosophical Quarterly 58 (3):201-216.details
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Spontaneous Freedom.Jonathan Gingerich - 2022 - Ethics 133 (1):38-71.details
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Moral Agency.Timothy Nailer - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Adelaidedetails
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Have Compatibilists Solved the Luck Problem for Libertarians?Stephen Kearns & Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (2):9-36.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Gerhard Schurz, Maria Sekatskaya & Alexander Gebharter - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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Freedom in Uncertainty.Filippos Stamatiou - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Copenhagendetails
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Practical Perspective Compatibilism.Sofia Jeppsson - 2012 - Dissertation, Stockholm Universitydetails
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Of Gods and Clocks: Free Will and Hobbes-Bramhall Debate.Paul Russell - 2021 - In Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 133-157.details
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Laws of Nature as Constraints.Emily Adlam - 2022 - Foundations of Physics 52 (1):1-41.details
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Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem.Nadine Elzein - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2827-2846.details
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Moral Luck and Unfair Blame.Martin Sand & Michael Klenk - 2021 - Journal of Value Inquiry:1-17.details
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What Does Indeterminism Offer to Agency?Andrew Law - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):371-385.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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Chance or Agency? A Response to “Divine Providence and Chance in the World”.Peter Forrest - 2020 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 68 (3):111-125.details
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Free Will, Control, and the Possibility to do Otherwise from a Causal Modeler’s Perspective.Alexander Gebharter, Maria Sekatskaya & Gerhard Schurz - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (4):1889-1906.details
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