- Relative Modality and the Ability to do Otherwise.Ralph Weir - 2016 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 12 (1):47-61.details
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Freedom and Experience: Self-Determination Without Illusions.Magill Kevin - 1997 - London: author open access, originally MacMillan.details
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Free Will: The Scandal in Philosophy.Bob Doyle - 2011 - Cambridge, MA, USA: I-Phi Press.details
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The Two-Stage Solution to the Problem of Free Will.Robert O. Doyle - 2013 - In Antoine Suarez Peter Adams (ed.), Is Science Compatible with Free Will? Springer. pp. 235-254.details
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(1 other version)Traditional and Experimental Approaches to Free Will and Moral Responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson & Derk Pereboom - 2016 - In Wesley Buckwalter & Justin Sytsma (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Experimental Philosophy. Malden, MA: Blackwell. pp. 142-57.details
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Reflection and Responsibility.Pamela Hieronymi - 2014 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 42 (1):3-41.details
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The Free Will Problem [Hobbes, Bramhall and Free Will].Paul Russell - 2011 - In Desmond M. Clarke & Catherine Wilson (eds.), The Oxford handbook of philosophy in early modern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 424-444.details
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Normative Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1996 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 19-33.details
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Connectionism, Realism, and realism.Stephen P. Stich - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):531.details
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What really matters.Charles Taylor - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):532.details
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Intentional system theory and experimental psychology.Michael H. Van Kleeck - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):533.details
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Real intentions?Donald R. Griffin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):514.details
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How to Think about the Problem of Free Will.Peter van Inwagen - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):327 - 341.details
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(2 other versions)Willensfreiheit.Geert Keil - 2017 - Berlin: De Gruyter.details
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The neuroscientific study of free will: A diagnosis of the controversy.Markus E. Schlosser - 2014 - Synthese 191 (2):245-262.details
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Hobartian Voluntarism and Epistemic Deontologism.Andrei Buckareff - 2006 - Disputatio 2 (21):1 - 17.details
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Against libertarianism.Alicia Finch - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (3):475-493.details
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Adversus Homo Economicus: Critique of Lester’s Account of Instrumental Rationality.Danny Frederick - manuscriptdetails
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Mitigating Soft Compatibilism.Justin A. Capes - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):640-663.details
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The Problem of Enhanced Control.Christopher Evan Franklin - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (4):687 - 706.details
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Free will and the unconscious precursors of choice.Markus E. Schlosser - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (3):365-384.details
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Hume's Theory of Moral Responsibility: Some Unresolved Matters.Clarence Shole Johnson - 1992 - Dialogue 31 (1):3-.details
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Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism.Randolph Clarke - 2009 - Mind 118 (470):323-351.details
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Hume on Liberty and Necessity.George Botterill - 2001 - In Peter Millican (ed.), Reading Hume on Human Understanding: Essays on the First Enquiry. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Metaphysical illusions.J. J. C. Smart - 2006 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (2):167 – 175.details
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Free will: Problem of pseudo-problem?R. D. Bradley - 1958 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 36 (1):33 – 45.details
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(1 other version)The conception of a person as a series of mental events.Scott Campbell - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (2):339–358.details
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Free will, determinism, and the theory of important criteria.Michael A. Slote - 1969 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 12 (1-4):317-38.details
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Free Will and Reactive Attitudes: Perspectives on P. F. Strawson’s “Freedom and Resentment‘.Paul Russell & Michael McKenna (eds.) - 2006 - New York, NY, USA: Routledge.details
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Free will.Timothy O'Connor & Christopher Evan Franklin - 2018 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Precis of the intentional stance.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):495-505.details
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Ciceronov de fato: o helenističkim kondicionalima i slobodi volje.Vladimir Marko - 2023 - Novi Sad: Futura publikacije.details
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(1 other version)Moral Luck and Unfair Blame.Martin Sand & Michael Klenk - 2023 - Journal of Value Inquiry 57 (4):701-717.details
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Responsibility Internalism and Responsibility for AI.Huzeyfe Demirtas - 2023 - Dissertation, Syracuse Universitydetails
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Epistemic deontology and the Revelatory View of responsibility.Timothy Perrine - 2022 - Metaphilosophy 54 (1):119-133.details
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Spontaneous Freedom.Jonathan Gingerich - 2022 - Ethics 133 (1):38-71.details
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Moral Agency.Timothy Nailer - 2022 - Dissertation, University of Adelaidedetails
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Have Compatibilists Solved the Luck Problem for Libertarians?Stephen Kearns & Alfred R. Mele - 2014 - Philosophical Inquiries 2 (2):9-36.details
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Actual Control - Demodalising Free Will.David Heering - 2020 - Dissertation, University of Leedsdetails
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Of Gods and Clocks: Free Will and Hobbes-Bramhall Debate.Paul Russell - 2021 - In Recasting Hume and Early Modern Philosophy: Selected Essays. New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press. pp. 133-157.details
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Undetermined Choices, Luck and the Enhancement Problem.Nadine Elzein - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (7):2827-2846.details
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Free Will for the Long Run.Benjamin I. Huff - 2021 - The Monist 104 (3):352-365.details
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What Does Indeterminism Offer to Agency?Andrew Law - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):371-385.details
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Taking Hobart Seriously.Taylor W. Cyr - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (4):1407-1426.details
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Determinism and attributions of consciousness.Gunnar Björnsson & Joshua Shepherd - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (4):549-568.details
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On Fundamental Responsibility.Anna Sara Malmgren - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):198-213.details
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Free Will, Self‐Creation, and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Kristin M. Mickelson - 2019 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 43 (1):224-256.details
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Explaining Free Will.Michael Elstob - 2018 - Chesham, UK: C. M. Elstob. Printed and distributed by Amazon.details
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