Epistemic infinitism is the view that infinite series of inferential relations are productive of epistemic justification. Peirce is explicitly infinitist in his early work, namely his 1868 series of articles. Further, Peirce's semiotic categories of firsts, seconds, and thirds favors a mixed theory of justification. The conclusion is that Peirce was an infinitist, and particularly, what I will term an impure infinitist. However, the prospects for Peirce's infinitism depend entirely on the prospects for Peirce's early semantics, which are not good. (...) Peirce himself revised the semantic theory later, and in so doing, it seems also his epistemic infinitism. (shrink)

Saul_Jennifer, Scepticism and Implicit Bias.

The aim of this collection is to show how work in the analytic philosophical tradition can shed light on the nature, value, and experience of anxiety. Contrary to widespread assumptions, anxiety is not best understood as a mental disorder, or an intrinsically debilitating state, but rather as an often valuable affective state which heightens our sensitivity to potential threats and challenges. As the contributions in this volume demonstrate, learning about anxiety can be relevant for debates, not only in the philosophy (...) of emotion, but also in epistemology, value theory, and the philosophy of psychopathology. In this introductory article, we also show that there is still much to discover about the relevance that anxiety may have for moral action, self-understanding, and mental health. (shrink)

Against the view that symbol-based semiosis is a human cognitive uniqueness, we have argued that non-human primates such as African vervet monkeys possess symbolic competence, as formally defined by Charles S. Peirce. Here I develop this argument by showing that the equivocal role ascribed to symbols by “folk semiotics” stems from an incomplete application of the Peircean logical framework for the classification of signs, which describes three kinds of symbols: rheme, dicent and argument. In an attempt to advance in the (...) classifying semiotic processes, Peirce proposed several typologies, with different degrees of refinement. Around 1903, he developed a division into ten classes. According to this typology, symbols can be further analysed in three subclasses (rheme, dicent, argument). I proceed to demonstrate that vervet monkeys employ dicent symbols. There are remarkable implications of this argument since ‘symbolic species theory’ fails to explore the vast Peircean semiotic philosophy to frame questions regarding the emergence and evolution of symbolic processes. (shrink)

Deflationism is usually thought to differ from the correspondence theory over whether truth is a substantial property. However, I argue that this notion of a ‘substantial property’ is tendentious. I further argue that the Equivalence Schema alone is sufficient to lead to idealism when combined with a pragmatist theory of truth. Deflationism thus has more powerful metaphysical implications than is generally thought and itself amounts to a kind of correspondence theory.

This paper defends a key aspect of the Peircean conception of truth—the idea that truth is in some sense epistemically-constrained. It does so by exploring parallels between Peirce’s epistemology of inquiry and that of Wittgenstein in On Certainty. The central argument defends a Peircean claim about truth by appeal to a view shared by Peirce and Wittgenstein about the structure of reasons. This view relies on the idea that certain claims have a special epistemic status, or function as what are (...) popularly called ‘hinge propositions’. (shrink)

Charles Peirce’s model of inquiry is supposed to demarcate appropriate methods of inquiry from specious ones. Cheryl Misak points out that Peirce’s explicit account fails, but can nevertheless be rescued by elements of his own system. While Misak’s criticism is a propos, her own attempt to fortify Peirce’s account does not succeed, as it falls prey to the same criticism she raises against Peirce’s explicit account. The account provided in this paper—the ‘open path’ alternative—draws from Peirce’s corollary to his “first (...) rule of reason”, that one should not block the road to inquiry. The ‘open path’ account is able to withstand Misak’s objections, and when combined with other aspects of Peirce’s work, shows us why the optimal way to conduct inquiry is to follow the path of greatest resistance. Inquiry, however, is rarely conducted in optimal conditions. Actual, constrained conditions of inquiry require a measure of economy in terms of what can be reasonably pursued and how. The question, then, is how to conduct our inquiries so that they are as nearly optimal as possible given actual constraints. As a working scientist, Peirce was acutely aware of the need to economize in research. Nicholas Rescher has recognized this issue’s significance for Peirce, and noted its neglect in discussions of Peirce’s work. One issue that has been largely neglected in the literature on Peirce is what specifically he recommends, based on considerations of economy, for how to go about gathering evidence. Kronz & McLaughlin points out that Peirce’s primary recommendation is that in gathering evidence relevant to a particular hypothesis we should test for empirical consequences that would not have been expected otherwise. The view that is developed in this paper is that economy in research, according to Peirce, follows the general line of his theory of inquiry. Peirce’s theory of inquiry implies that pursuit of truth requires maximizing resistance. I argue that his considerations about how to navigate within the constraints introduced in the context of actual research are also best understood as recommendations for maximizing resistance. (shrink)

Scott Aiken and Thomas Dabay contend that a satisfactory account of truth is both infallibilist and antiskeptical. Externalist correspondence theories, they say, preserve the infallibility of the truth-relation yet invite skeptical qualms. In tying truth to experience, pragmatist theories resist skeptical challenges, but embrace a fallibilism that renders their account of truth inconsistent and even incoherent. While agreeing with Aiken and Dabay that externalist accounts are vulnerable to skepticism, I dispute each of the four arguments they offer against pragmatist fallibilism. (...) Though partially successful against Peirce’s more popular view that truth is the final belief of a community of inquirers, their arguments are wholly ineffective against Dewey’s account of truth as warranted assertability. (shrink)

It is well known that the process of scientific inquiry, according to Peirce, is drivenby three types of inference, namely abduction, deduction, and induction. What isbehind these labels is, however, not so clear. In particular, the common identificationof abduction with Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE) begs the question,since IBE appears to be covered by Peirce's concept of induction, not that of abduction.Consequently, abduction ought to be distinguished from IBE, at least on Peirce's account. The main aim of the paper, (...) however, is to show that this distinction is most relevant with respect to current problems in philosophy of science and epistemology (like attempts to supply suitable notions of realism and truth as well as related concepts like coherence and unification). In particular, I also try to show that (and in what way) Peirce's inferential triad can function as a method that ensures both coherence and correspondence. It is in this respect that his careful distinction between abduction and induction (or IBE) ought to be heeded. (shrink)

There are two ways that we might respond to the underdetermination of theory by data. One response, which we can call the agnostic response, is to suspend judgment: "Where scientific standards cannot guide us, we should believe nothing". Another response, which we can call the fideist response, is to believe whatever we would like to believe: "If science cannot speak to the question, then we may believe anything without science ever contradicting us". C.S. Peirce recognized these options and suggested evading (...) the dilemma. It is a Logical Maxim, he suggests, that there could be no genuine underdetermination. This is no longer a viable option in the wake of developments in modern physics, so we must face the dilemma head on. The agnostic and fideist responses to underdetermination represent fundamentally different epistemic viewpoints. Nevertheless, the choice between them is not an unresolvable struggle between incommensurable worldviews. There are legitimate considerations tugging in each direction. Given the balance of these considerations, there should be a modest presumption of agnosticism. This may conflict with Peirce's Logical Maxim, but it preserves all that we can preserve of the Peircean motivation. (shrink)

How should one describe the irreducible relationships in photopoetry observed in intermedial literary photobooks? According to most authors, in literary photobooks, the verbal sign system is linked to the photographic image as a bidirectional interaction, creating a coupled system that can be seen as a new sign system. Mutually modulatory influences link verbal text and photography. But the nature of such influences needs to be explained in detail and with accuracy. What kind of relation are we dealing with? Many authors (...) have tried to explain this phenomenon through several epistemic metaphors. The problem is that these metaphors are rarely subjected to any general theory of meaning. Surprisingly, this is not even mentioned as a problem. In this article, we propose a general semiotic model to describe the irreducible photography-poetry relation, derived from C. S. Peirce’s pragmatic theory of signs, and we also present some preliminary results of the analysis of Quarenta Clics em Curitiba, a photobook by Paulo Leminski and Jack Pires. Our purpose here is to introduce and explore this model to describe the photography-poetry relationship in coupled systems. This relationship is decomposed, in the functional roles occupied by poems and photographs, into a sign-object-interpretant relation. The triadic irreducibility that characterizes semiosis (à la Peirce) is the main property applied to photograph-poetry coupling in Quarenta Clics em Curitiba. (shrink)

Any description of the emergence and evolution of different types of meaning processes (semiosis, sensu C.S.Peirce) in living systems must be supported by a theoretical framework which makes it possible to understand the nature and dynamics of such processes. Here we propose that the emergence of semiosis of different kinds can be understood as resulting from fundamental interactions in a triadically-organized hierarchical process. To grasp these interactions, we develop a model grounded on Stanley Salthe's hierarchical structuralism. This model can be (...) applied to establish, in a general sense, a set of theoretical constraints for explaining the instantiation of different kinds of meaning processes (iconic, indexical, symbolic) in semiotic systems. We use it to model a semiotic process in the immune system, namely, B-cell activation, in order to offer insights into the heuristic role it can play in the development of explanations for specific semiotic processes. (shrink)

In recent years there have been an increasing number of contributions to economic methodology that develop or seek to reveal ontological positions. Despite this there is no agreement about either what ontology is or how it can contribute to economics. For some ontological theorising reveals the presuppositions of economists and its role is largely descriptive. Others see ontology as primarily engaged in setting out and defending a general account of some domain of reality and suggest that such a conception can (...) help us evaluate the appropriateness of the methods economists deploy. In this paper I clarify the scope and role of such theorising in economics by considering two projects with ontological orientations, namely critical realism in economics as developed by Tony Lawson and Nancy Cartwright’s work on the nature of economic theory. I argue that there are similarities between these two projects but also differences and show that these can be better understood once we recognise that each draws on a distinct conception of the legitimate scope of ontological theorising. I use Peirce’s writings on the nature of sustainable metaphysical analysis to clarify certain aspects of the approach to ontological theorising that Lawson favours. (shrink)

The background target of the research going into the present article is to forge an intellectual alliance between, on the one hand, active inference and the free-energy principle (FEP), and on the other, Charles S. Peirce’s theory of semiotics and pragmatism. In the present paper, the focus is on the allegiance between the nomenclatures of active and abductive inferences as the proper place to begin reaching at that wider target. The paper outlines the key conceptual elements involved in a naturalistic (...) rendering of Peirce’s late semiotic and logical notion of abductive reasoning. The target is a cognitive-biological model of abduction which preserves the functional integrity of an organism and fulfils the existential imperative for living beings’ evidence of existence. Such a model is an adaptation of Peirce’s late logical schema of abduction proposed in his largely unpublished works during the early 20th century. The proposed model is argued to be a feasible sketch also of recent breakthroughs in computational (sensu Bayesian) cognitive science. (shrink)

Nicholas Rescher embraces a more objectivist, realist, analytic pragmatism than the pragmatism which has been in vogue in the last two decades. He rejects any pragmatism for which there is no truth, reality, or objectivity but only conversations or solidarity within this or that vocabulary. Rescher has argued that pragmatism, far from being anti-realist, provides the only good argument for realism and for our ability to operate the causal model of inquiry about the real world. I examine this kind of (...) pragmatist argument, point out its pitfalls, and argue that Rescher avoids them. (shrink)

Arguably, a theory of assertion should be able to provide (i) a definition of assertion, and (ii) a set of conditions for an assertion to be appropriate. This paper reviews two strands of theories that have attempted to meet this challenge. Commitment-based accounts à la Peirce define assertion in terms of commitment to the truth of the proposition. Restriction-based accounts à la Williamson define assertion in terms of the conditions for its appropriate performance. After assessing the suitability of these projects (...) to meet the desiderata of a theory of assertion, I argue that a speech act theoretic account à la Searle is more suitable for this purpose: it integrates the core intuitions of both restriction-based and commitment-based accounts while avoiding their respective problems, and has the further advantage of determining how assertion fits into a more general theory of illocutionary acts. (shrink)

Peircean Truth is the view that truth is in some sense epistemically constrained, constrained that is by what we would, if we inquired long enough and well enough, eventually come to believe. Contemporary Peirceans offer various different formulations of the view, which can make it difficult, particularly for critics, to see exactly how PT differs from popular alternatives such as correspondence theories or deflationism. This article, therefore, considers four possible formulations of PT, and sets out the different objections and challenges (...) they each face and their relationships with one another. I focus upon the question of what, if anything, PT has to say about the property of truth. (shrink)

It is commonplace to describe the pragmatist conception of truth as incompatible with correspondence theory. This popular description relies on a deflationary reading of Peirce and James’s many apparent endorsements of correspondence. This reading says they regarded it as a mere platitude or truism, not as a substantive piece of philosophical theorizing. There are two main reasons typically offered in support of this platitude narrative – its consonance with Peirce’s original formulation of PT from 1878, and the objections that pragmatists (...) frequently raised against various notions traditionally associated with CT. I argue that neither reason is compelling and that PT and CT are compatible conceptions of truth. (shrink)

Truth is a fundamental philosophical concept that, despite its common and everyday use, has resisted common-sense formulations. At this point, one may legitimately wonder if there even is a common-sense notion of truth or what it could look like. In response, I propose here a common-sense account of truth based on four “truisms” that set a baseline for how to go about building an account of truth. Drawing on both ordinary language philosophy and contemporary pragmatic approaches to truth, I defend (...) a pragmatic, common-sense theory of truth. The result is a theory that focuses the use and function of truth while also emphasizing its “subject-independence.”. (shrink)

This paper discusses the virtue epistemology literature on epistemic emotions and challenges the individualist, unworldly account of epistemic emotions. It argues that epistemic emotions can be truth-motivating if embedded in co-inquiry epistemic cultures, namely virtuous epistemic cultures that valorise participatory processes of inquiry as truth-conducive. Co-inquiry epistemic cultures are seen as playing a constitutive role in shaping, developing, and regulating epistemic emotions. Using key references to classical Pragmatism, the paper describes the bridge between epistemic emotions and co-inquiry culture in terms (...) of habits of co-inquiry that act as the scaffolding of epistemic emotions. The result is a context-sensitive and practice-oriented approach to epistemic emotions that conceives of those emotions as being shaped by co-inquiry epistemic cultures. (shrink)

Although a number of authors have used diagrams extensively in their studies of Navya-Nyāya, they have done so to explain and illustrate concepts, not with the goal of reasoning with the diagrams themselves. Adherents of diagrammatic reasoning have made claims for its potential by pointing to key structural correspondences between diagrams and logical concepts, arguably lacking in sentential representations, and describing these relations using concepts such as “well matchedness” and “iconicity”. A canonical example of this iconicity is the use of (...) Euler diagrams to depict categorical syllogisms. Since the meaning of expressions in Indian logic differs in so many important ways from logic in the Western tradition, the use or adaptation of diagrams developed in the latter would seem to preclude iconicity. Thus, the development of diagrams which reflect the nature of inference in Navya-Nyāya, which centres on the anumāna inference schema, is motivated. In this paper we extend Ganeri’s method of depicting the Vaiśeṣika ontology with graphs to include syntax intended to expose the nature of anumāna. The diagrams are given a formal basis: i.e. abstract syntax, inference rules defined abstractly and a graph-theoretic semantics. These are the first formalised logical diagrams that aim to reflect the nature of the anumāna inference. This paper lays the way for further work in extending the formalism to cover more of Navya-Nyāya, and in exploring a dialogue between properties of the formalism and of Navya-Nyāya. (shrink)

En la primera parte realizo una reconstrucción de la postura infinitista de Peirce a partir de los argumentos formulados en sus textos de juventud. En la segunda parte formulo rápidamente el problema del regreso epistémico de la justificación y reconstruyo tres objeciones clásicas: la objeción de las mentes finitas, la objeción del origen inexplicado, y la objeción de la descripción errada. En la tercera parte muestro cómo en sus textos de juventud Peirce consideró todas estas objeciones y cómo trató de (...) enfrentarlas. En la cuarta parte me adentraré en el periodo de madurez de Peirce para mostrar cómo, con los conceptos de duda y creencia, es posible formular una respuesta más robusta a las objeciones. Finalmente, en la última parte, iré un poco más allá de Peirce, pero sin abandonar el espíritu peircea- no, para mostrar cómo es posible explicar el carácter finito de nuestro ejercicio habitual de dar razones, sin que esto vaya en contravía de la postura infinitista doxástica peirceana sobre la estructura de la justificación. -/- . (shrink)

У овом раду бавићемо се проблемом картезијанског дуализма супстанција у светлу Персове критике „духа картезијанизма“. Веру у интуитивно сазнање и наглашавање индивидуализма Перс види као два главна обележја тог духа, због чега ћемо највише пажње посветити управо њима. Полазна идеја рада јесте та да се картезијански дуализам, посматран у светлу прагматичке критике, испоставља првенствено као епистемолошки и методолошки проблем, а не као засебни метафизички проблем диспаратних супстанција.

To Doubt in Our Hearts: The Substance Dualism in the Light of Peirce’s Criticism of "the Spirit of Cartesianism" -/- In this article, the author addresses the problem of Cartesian dualism through the prism of Peirce’s criticism of the "spirit of Cartesianism". The faith in the intuitive knowledge and the strong emphasis on individualism Peirce sees as its two main features, therefore, they are the focus of the paper. The underlying idea is to show that, in the light of the (...) pragmatic critique, the Cartesian substance dualism appears to be foremost an epistemological and methodological problem, and not a metaphysical problem of disparate substances. (shrink)

Christopher Hookway has been influential in promoting engagement with pragmatist and naturalist perspectives from classical and contemporary American philosophy. This book reflects on Hookway’s work on the American philosophical tradition and its significance for contemporary discussions of the understanding of mind, meaning, knowledge, and value. -/- Hookway’s original and extensive studies of Charles S. Peirce have made him among the most admired and frequently referenced of Peirce’s interpreters. His work on classical American pragmatism has explored the philosophies of William James, (...) John Dewey, and Josiah Royce, and examined the influence of pragmatist ideas outside of the United States. Additionally, Hookway has participated in a number of celebrated exchanges with some of the most high-profile figures of twentieth- and twenty-first-century philosophy, including Karl-Otto Apel, Philip Pettit, Hilary Putnam, and W.V.O. Quine, through which his treatments of a large range of topics in epistemology and the philosophies of mind and language have been developed and promoted. The chapters in this book—which include contributions from several of Hookway’s former students and colleagues—include studies of Hookway’s engagement with the works of Peirce, James, and Dewey, his contributions to virtue epistemology, and his discussions of hope and pragmatist metaphysics. -/- Pragmatic Reason will be of interest to researchers and advanced students working on American philosophy, the history of analytic philosophy, and epistemology. (shrink)

This thesis is concerned with establishing a bridge between matters of aesthetics and epistemology, by investigating the mechanisms through which artworks allow agents to derive knowledge through the former’s manipulation. It is proposed that, in order to understand the epistemic potential of artworks, we need to approach them as diagrams, in the sense developed by Charles Peirce. The background upon which the arguments are developed are mainly those of American Pragmatism – with a special emphasis on primary literature from Charles (...) Sanders Peirce about semiotics and inquiry, and John Dewey about aesthetics. It is introduced that the manipulation upon artworks can be an example of an inquiry process, due to artworks’ diagrammatic symbol-type-token structure, which embody the logical relations of abduction, deduction and induction. Through Peirce’s definition of inquiry, and Dewey’s definition of an aesthetic experience, it is possible to defend that artworks deliberate create states of doubt and chance as to stimulate and guide inquiry as a way to achieve an aesthetic experience, corroborating to the claim that inquiry processes and aesthetic experience share the same ontological basis: it is in the nature of aesthetic experience to confront agents and contexts with state of chance and doubt, to be further guided through inference into a state of regularity and belief. In order to develop and test the argument, I present the development of Arthur Danto’s influential theory of aesthetics based on Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes, by focusing on a review of Danto’s main writings about it. The central point that Danto developed in this theory is that what gives something the status of an artwork are not the immediately perceivable sensorial features of an artifact, but something else. I claim it to be a “diagrammatic structure” that can be potentially manipulated through an inquiry process. I conclude by establishing a possible development of my argument in relation to modelling processes: as diagrams, artworks can be understood as models, opening room for the emergence of new hypothesis and conjectures about the relationship between aesthetics and epistemology. (shrink)

An overview of a philosophical movement originating in the United States of America in the 19th century.

Intersemiotic translation (IT) was defined by Roman Jakobson (The Translation Studies Reader, Routledge, London, p. 114, 2000) as “transmutation of signs”—“an interpretation of verbal signs by means of signs of nonverbal sign systems.” Despite its theoretical relevance, and in spite of the frequency in which it is practiced, the phenomenon remains virtually unexplored in terms of conceptual modeling, especially from a semiotic perspective. Our approach is based on two premises: (i) IT is fundamentally a semiotic operation process (semiosis) and (ii) (...) IT is a deeply iconic-dependent process. We exemplify our approach by means of literature to dance IT and we explore some implications for the development of a general model of IT. (shrink)

Biosemiotics is a growing fi eld that investigates semiotic processes in the living realm in an attempt to combine the fi ndings of the biological sciences and semiotics. Semiotic processes are more or less what biologists have typically referred to as “ signals, ” “ codes, ”and “ information processing ”in biosystems, but these processes are here understood under the more general notion of semiosis, that is, the production, action, and interpretation of signs. Thus, biosemiotics can be seen as biology (...) interpreted as a study of living sign systems — which also means that semiosis or sign process can be seen as the very nature of life itself. In other words, biosemiotics is a field of research investigating semiotic processes (meaning, signification, communication, and habit formation in living systems) and the physicochemical preconditions for sign action and interpretation. -/- (...). (shrink)

The icon is the type of sign connected to efficient representational features, and its manipulation reveals more information about its object. The London Underground Diagram (LUD) is an iconic artifact and a well-known example of representational efficiency, having been copied by urban transportation systems worldwide. This paper investigates the efficiency of the LUD in the light of different conceptions of iconicity. We stress that a specialized representation is an icon of the formal structure of the problem for which it has (...) been specialized. By embedding such rules of action and behavior, the icon acts as a semiotic artifact distributing cognitive effort and participating in niche construction. (shrink)

This book attempts to explicate and expand upon Frank Ramsey's notion of the realistic spirit. In so doing, it provides a systematic reading of his work, and demonstrates the extent of Ramsey's genius as evinced by both his responses to the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , and the impact he had on Wittgenstein's later philosophical insights.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide a robust epistemological justification for Evidence Based Medicine (EMB), and thereby to demonstrate the epistemological short comings of Complementary and Alternative Medicine (CAM). CAM has received support from both philosophers, such as Rorty and Feyerband, and the Sociology and Anthropology of Medicine. The thesis will thus review both the internal coherence and the application of non-realist arguments, and counter non-realism with the realist epistemology and philosophy of science that is represented by C.S. (...) Peirce’s pragmatism. Rorty and Feyerabend and others have developed radical forms of scientific antirealism in the latter 20th century. Subsequently, sociologists developed even more intractable forms of anti-realism, which they applied to the social study of science. This approach served to challenge the legitimacy of orthodox scientific practice (including EMB). A practical expression of this controversy was immediately identified in the question of the role of scientific authority in a democratic society. That question was immediately applied to the status of alternative medical systems and their legitimacy vis-a-vis EBM in terms of the controversy over what has come to be termed "medical pluralism": If scientific medicine has no particular authority, should other, medical systems, epistemically incompatible with EBM, be made available as well? The thesis will suggest that non-realism is in fact a marginal position within the philosophy of science. Scientists, medical researchers and medical practitioners may thus appeal to the philosophy of science in order to justify their authority in the face of challenges from CAM. However, it will be suggested that they are frequently ill-served by a reliance on a simplistic understanding of the philosophy of Karl Popper. An alternative will be proposed in the philosophy of C. S. Peirce. His pragmatism offers to medical research and medical practice a way of understanding and justifying the scientific process, a justification of realism in the face of non-realism, and a resource for the criticism of CAM and medical pluralism, as at once epistemologically ill grounded and potentially dangerous to patients and the general public. (shrink)

چکیده در پژوهش حاضر با تحلیل محتوایی که از آثار موجود در رابطه با فلسفه چارلز ساندرس پیرس انجام شد، روش‌شناسی این فیلسوف آمریکایی و بررسی سهم آن بر رویکردها و روش‌های پژوهش مورد توجه قرار گرفت. این بررسی ضمن اینکه بیانگر ارتباط بیانات پیرس در حوزه روش، با فن خطابه نظری در منطق، مقولات سه‌گانه و انواع استدلال است، نشان می‌دهد که پیرس در فلسفه خود از سه روش پراگماتیک، دستیابی به مقولات فلسفی و روش‌های تثبیت عقیده سخن می‌گوید. (...) همچنین یافته‌ها علاوه بر بیان مبانی روش‌های مذکور، حاکی از تأثیر روش پراگماتیک بر پوزیتیویسم منطقی و سهم روش دستیابی به مقولات در حوزه پدیدارشناسی است. در رابطه با تثبیت عقیده، پیرس چهار روش دلبستگی جزم‌آلود، سلطه‌گرا، پیشینی و علمی را مطرح می‌سازد و از آن میان تنها از روش علمی جانبداری می‌کند. این روش که متشکل از سه روش حدسی، قیاسی و استقرائی است، به دلیل نقش پژوهش در دستیابی به حقیقت، به همراه روش پراگماتیک در بسط رویکرد پوزیتیویسم منطقی سهیم بوده است. این روش ضمن دربرداشتن مشخصات تحقیق کیفی، به دلیل رویکرد تجربی‌اش به پژوهش به همراه روش‌های پراگماتیک و دستیابی به مقولات، پراگماتیسم پیرس را به عنوان بنیادی برای روش تحقیق ترکیبی معرفی می‌کند. (shrink)