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Doing Things with Thoughts: Brain-Computer Interfaces and Disembodied Agency.Steffen Steinert, Christoph Bublitz, Ralf Jox & Orsolya Friedrich - 2019 - Philosophy and Technology 32 (3):457-482.details
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The Moral Worth of Intentional Actions.Laura Tomlinson - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):704-723.details
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Agents in movement.István Zoltán Zárdai - 2019 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 143:61-83.details
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Basic Action and Practical Knowledge.Will Small - 2019 - Philosophers' Imprint 19.details
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Knowing how, basic actions, and ways of doing things.Kevin Lynch - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (8):956-977.details
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Know-how, action, and luck.Carlotta Pavese - 2018 - Synthese 198 (Suppl 7):1595-1617.details
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How Many Accounts of Act Individuation Are There?Joseph Ulatowski - 2008 - Dissertation, University of Utahdetails
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The generality problem for intellectualism.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Mind and Language 33 (3):242-262.details
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Towards a Definition of Efforts.Olivier Massin - 2017 - Motivation Science 3 (3):230-259.details
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One-particularism in the theory of action.David-Hillel Ruben - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (11):2677-2694.details
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Pollard on Habits of Action.Christos Douskos - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (4):504-524.details
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Motor Intentions and Non‐Observational Knowledge of Action: A Standard Story.Olle Blomberg & Chiara Brozzo - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):137-146.details
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Embodied Agency.Hong Yu Wong - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):584-612.details
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Basic Knowledge First.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2017 - Episteme 14 (3):343-361.details
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Attempting art: an essay on intention-dependence.Michel-Antoine Xhignesse - 2017 - Dissertation, Mcgill Universitydetails
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The divisibility of basic actions.Kevin Lynch - 2017 - Analysis 77 (2):312-318.details
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The objects of moral responsibility.Andrew C. Khoury - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1357-1381.details
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Knowing-how, showing, and epistemic norms.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Synthese 195 (8):3597-3620.details
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Knowledge-how: Interrogatives and Free Relatives.Joshua Habgood-Coote - 2018 - Episteme 15 (2):183-201.details
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Causation and Responsibility.Michael S. Moore - 1999 - Social Philosophy and Policy 16 (2):1-51.details
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Agent causation as a solution to the problem of action.Michael Brent - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):656-673.details
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Agency and Embodiment: Groups, Human–Machine Interactions, and Virtual Realities.Johannes Himmelreich - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):197-213.details
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Experience and Reason.Fabian Dorsch - 2011 - Rero Doc.details
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The logical form of negative action sentences.Jonathan D. Payton - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (6):855-876.details
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Frog and Toad lose control.J. Kennett & M. Smith - 1996 - Analysis 56 (2):63-73.details
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Events, agents, and settling whether and how one intervenes.Jason D. Runyan - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (6):1629-1646.details
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Action as a form of temporal unity: on Anscombe’s Intention.Douglas Lavin - 2015 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 45 (5):609-629.details
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The Physical Action Theory of Trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2015 - Methode 4 (6).details
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Causing Things and Doing Things.Helen Steward - 2014 - In C. G. Pulman (ed.), Hart on Responsibility. New York, NY: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
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Storia e teorie dell'intenzionalità.Simone Gozzano - 1997details
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Reasons for Action: Wittgensteinian and Davidsonian perspectives in historical, meta-philosophical and philosophical context.Hans-Johann Glock - 2014 - Nordic Wittgenstein Review 3 (1):7-46.details
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Action, the Act Requirement and Criminal Liability.Antony Duff - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:69-103.details
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The Structure of Orthonomy.Michael Smith - 2004 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 55:165-193.details
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Indexes for action.Joëlle Proust - 1999 - Revue Internationale de Philosophie 1999 (3):321-345.details
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Choosing your poison and the time of a killing.Auke J. K. Pols - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):719-733.details
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Free will and probability.Danny Frederick - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (1):60-77.details
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Intentional, Unintentional, or Neither? Middle Ground in Theory and Practice.Alfred Mele - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):369 - 379.details
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Actions and activity.Jennifer Hornsby - 2012 - Philosophical Issues 22 (1):233-245.details
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Joint attention in joint action.Anika Fiebich & Shaun Gallagher - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):571-87.details
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The Vulnerability of Action.Robert Ellis - 1989 - Religious Studies 25 (2):225 - 233.details
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Individuating Actions: The Fine—Grained Approach.Hugh J. McCann - 1983 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 13 (4):493 - 512.details
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Popper and Free Will.Danny Frederick - 2010 - Studia Philosophica Estonica 3 (1):21-38.details
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Moral responsibility for actions: epistemic and freedom conditions.Alfred Mele - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):101-111.details
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Knowledge by Intention? On the Possibility of Agent's Knowledge.Anne Newstead - 2006 - In Stephen Cade Hetherington (ed.), Aspects of Knowing: Epistemological Essays. Elsevier Science. pp. 183.details
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The truth in compatibilism and the truth of libertarianism.Helen Steward - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):167 – 179.details
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Judging and the scope of mental agency.Fabian Dorsch - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental actions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 38-71.details
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The Phenomenology of Action: A Conceptual Framework.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2008 - Cognition 107 (1):179 - 217.details
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The Sense of Control and the Sense of Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2007 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 13:1 - 30.details
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Skilled activity and the causal theory of action.Randolph Clarke - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):523-550.details
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