- On Ratio Measures of Confirmation: Critical Remarks on Zalabardo’s Argument for the Likelihood-Ratio Measure.Valeriano Iranzo & Ignacio Martínez de Lejarza - 2013 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 44 (1):193-200.details
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Hempel meets Wason.I. L. Humberstone - 1994 - Erkenntnis 41 (3):391-402.details
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Theories of probability.Colin Howson - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (1):1-32.details
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Popper, prior probabilities, and inductive inference.Colin Howson - 1987 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 38 (2):207-224.details
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Prediction versus accommodation and the risk of overfitting.Christopher Hitchcock & Elliott Sober - 2004 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):1-34.details
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On the predilections for predictions.David Harker - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (3):429-453.details
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A surprise for Horwich (and some advocates of the fine-tuning argument (which does not include Horwich (as far as I know))).David Harker - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (2):247-261.details
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Richard Swinburne, the existence of God, and exact numerical values.Jeremy Gwiazda - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (2):357-363.details
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From mere coincidences to meaningful discoveries.Thomas L. Griffiths & Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2007 - Cognition 103 (2):180-226.details
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Justifying conditionalization: Conditionalization maximizes expected epistemic utility.Hilary Greaves & David Wallace - 2006 - Mind 115 (459):607-632.details
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Wayne, Horwich, and evidential diversity.Branden Fitelson - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):652-660.details
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The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.details
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Symmetries and asymmetries in evidential support.Ellery Eells & Branden Fitelson - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (2):129 - 142.details
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Can the skepticism debate be resolved?Igor Douven - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):23 - 52.details
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Goldman on Probabilistic Inference.Fallis Don - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 109 (3):223 - 240.details
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Ontological infidelity.Patrick Dieveney - 2008 - Synthese 165 (1):1 - 12.details
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Contemporary debates in philosophy of science.Christopher Hitchcock (ed.) - 2004 - Malden, MA: Blackwell.details
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Does murphy’s law apply in epistemology?David Christensen - 2007 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 2:3-31.details
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A verisimilitudinarian analysis of the Linda paradox.Gustavo Cevolani, Vincenzo Crupi & Roberto Festa - 2012 - VII Conference of the Spanish Society for Logic, Methodology and Philosphy of Science.details
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O Problema da Indução.Eduardo Castro & Diogo Fernandes - 2014 - Compêndio Em Linha de Problemas de Filosofia Analítica.details
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Frá skoðunum til trúnaðar og aftur til baka: Yfirlit um bayesíska þekkingarfræði [English title: "From Belief to Credence and Back Again: An Overview of Bayesian Epistemology"].Finnur Dellsén - 2017 - Hugur 28:146-162.details
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Explanation as a guide to induction.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.details
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Eschewing Entities: Outlining a Biology Based Form of Structural Realism.Steven French - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 371--381.details
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Approaching the truth via belief change in propositional languages.Gustavo Cevolani & Francesco Calandra - 2010 - In M. Suàrez, M. Dorato & M. Rèdei (eds.), EPSA Epistemology and Methodology of Science: Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association. Springer. pp. 47--62.details
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Robustness, Diversity of Evidence, and Probabilistic Independence.Jonah N. Schupbach - 2015 - In Mäki, Ruphy, Schurz & Votsis (eds.), Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science: EPSA13 Helsinki. Springer. pp. 305-316.details
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The Limits of Probabilism.Wolfgang Pietsch - 2013 - In Vassilios Karakostas & Dennis Dieks (eds.), Epsa11 Perspectives and Foundational Problems in Philosophy of Science. Springer. pp. 55--65.details
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Luck, Rationality, and Explanation.Joshua Schechter - manuscriptdetails
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How Bayesian Confirmation Theory Handles the Paradox of the Ravens.Branden Fitelson & James Hawthorne - 2010 - In Ellery Eells & James Fetzer (eds.), The Place of Probability in Science. Springer. pp. 247--275.details
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Probability captures the logic of scientific confirmation.Patrick Maher - 2004 - In Christopher Hitchcock (ed.), Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Science. Blackwell. pp. 69--93.details
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Robust Biomarkers: Methodologically Tracking Causal Processes in Alzheimer’s Measurement.Vadim Keyser & Louis Sarry - 2020 - In Barbara Osimani & Adam La Caze (eds.), Uncertainty in Pharmacology. pp. 289-318.details
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