- It Can Be Rational to Change Priors.Ru Ye - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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Vindicating the verifiability criterion.Hannes Leitgeb - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (1):223-245.details
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Probabilifying reflective equilibrium.Finnur Dellsén - 2024 - Synthese 203 (2):1-24.details
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Inquiry beyond knowledge.Bob Beddor - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (1):330-356.details
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Rational Polarization.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (3):355-458.details
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An accuracy-based approach to quantum conditionalization.Alexander Meehan & Jer Alex Steeger - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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Rational Aversion to Information.Sven Neth - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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The value of information and the epistemology of inquiry.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
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'Logic Will Get You From A to B, Imagination Will Take You Anywhere'.Francesco Berto - 2023 - Noûs (3):717-729.details
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Essays in Formal Metaphysics.Daniel Rubio - 2019 - Dissertation, Rutgers - New Brunswickdetails
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Accuracy, Deference, and Chance.Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2023 - Philosophical Review 132 (1):43-87.details
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On the Ecological and Internal Rationality of Bayesian Conditionalization and Other Belief Updating Strategies.Olav Benjamin Vassend - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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An Epistemic Version of Pascal's Wager.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-17.details
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Does Non-Measurability Favour Imprecision?Cian Dorr - 2024 - Mind 133 (530):472-503.details
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Infinite Opinion Sets and Relative Accuracy.Ilho Park & Jaemin Jung - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):285-313.details
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XII—Deferring to Doubt.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):269-290.details
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Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis.Jie Gao - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (5):1238-1257.details
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Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscriptdetails
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The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (1):1-32.details
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Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne & Julianne Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-305.details
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(2 other versions)Permissivism, the value of rationality, and a convergence‐theoretic epistemology.Ru Ye - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):157-175.details
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Accurate Updating.Ginger Schultheis - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.details
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Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains.Michael Nielsen - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):402-427.details
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Imprecise Bayesianism and Inference to the Best Explanation.Namjoong Kim - 2023 - Foundations of Science 28 (2):755-781.details
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Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):30-62.details
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Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.details
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How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Episteme:1-25.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Higher-Order Evidence and the Dynamics of Self-Location: An Accuracy-Based Argument for Calibrationism.Brett Topey - 2022 - Erkenntnis 89 (4):1407-1433.details
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On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12407-12438.details
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Updating incoherent credences ‐ Extending the Dutch strategy argument for conditionalization.Glauber De Bona & Julia Staffel - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 105 (2):435-460.details
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Group epistemic value.Jeffrey Dunn - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 179 (1):65-92.details
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Scoring, truthlikeness, and value.Igor Douven - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):8281-8298.details
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Strict propriety is weak.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Benjamin A. Levinstein - 2021 - Analysis 81 (1):8-13.details
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Towards a pluralistic view of formal methods.Ko-Hung Kuan - 2020 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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A modesty proposal.Jennifer Rose Carr - 2019 - Synthese 198 (4):3581-3601.details
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Normativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical Evidence.Boris Babic, Anil Gaba, Ilia Tsetlin & Robert Winkler - 2024 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (1):153-176.details
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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic utility theory’s difficult future.Chad Marxen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7401-7421.details
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You say you want a revolution: two notions of probabilistic independence.Alexander Meehan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3319-3351.details
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On the epistemic rationality and significance of self-fulfilling beliefs.Chad Marxen - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4243-4260.details
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Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3217-3236.details
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Formal Methods.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
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Approximate Coherentism and Luck.Boris Babic - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (4):707-725.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism. [REVIEW]Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):484-489.details
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Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.details
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Beyond linear conciliation.Ko-Hung Kuan - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11483-11504.details
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The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection.Luca Moretti, Peter Hartl & Akos Gyarmathy - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1453-1460.details
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Bayesian coherentism.Lisa Cassell - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9563-9590.details
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(1 other version)On the Accuracy of Group Credences.Richard Pettigrew - 2019 - Oxford Studies in Epistemology 6.details
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