- An Epistemic Version of Pascal's Wager.Elizabeth Jackson - forthcoming - Journal of the American Philosophical Association:1-17.details
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Infinite Opinion Sets and Relative Accuracy.Ilho Park & Jaemin Jung - 2023 - Journal of Philosophy 120 (6):285-313.details
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XII—Deferring to Doubt.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 122 (3):269-290.details
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Should credence be sensitive to practical factors? A cost–benefit analysis.Jie Gao - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (5):1238-1257.details
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Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscriptdetails
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The Nature of Awareness Growth.Chloé de Canson - 2024 - Philosophical Review 133 (1):1-32.details
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Meditations on Beliefs Formed Arbitrarily.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler, John Hawthorne & Julianne Chung (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology 7. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press. pp. 278-305.details
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Accuracy Across Doxastic Attitudes: Recent Work on the Accuracy of Belief.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (2):201-217.details
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Accurate Updating for the Risk Sensitive.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (3):751-776.details
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Generalized Immodesty Principles in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 10 (31):874–907.details
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Ideological innocence.Daniel Rubio - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-22.details
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Just As Planned: Bayesianism, Externalism, and Plan Coherence.Pablo Zendejas Medina - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23.details
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Accurate Updating.Ginger Schultheis - forthcoming - Philosophy of Science.details
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Accuracy and Probabilism in Infinite Domains.Michael Nielsen - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):402-427.details
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Imperfection, Accuracy, and Structural Rationality.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1095-1116.details
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Credal imprecision and the value of evidence.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):684-721.details
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Diachronic and Interpersonal Coherence.Kenny Easwaran & Reuben Stern - forthcoming - In Baron Reed & A. K. Flowerree (eds.), Towards an Expansive Epistemology: Norms, Action, and the Social Sphere. Routledge.details
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Updating without evidence.Yoaav Isaacs & Jeffrey Sanford Russell - 2023 - Noûs 57 (3):576-599.details
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Downwards Propriety in Epistemic Utility Theory.Alejandro Pérez Carballo - 2023 - Mind 132 (525):30-62.details
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Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.Marc-Kevin Daoust - 2023 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):170-194.details
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Best Laid Plans: Idealization and the Rationality–Accuracy Bridge.Brett Topey - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.details
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How should your beliefs change when your awareness grows?Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - Episteme:1-25.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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Can Arbitrary Beliefs be Rational?Mattias Skipper - 2023 - Episteme 20 (2):377-392.details
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Shrinking three arguments for conditionalization.Sophie Horowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):303-319.details
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The value of cost-free uncertain evidence.Patryk Dziurosz-Serafinowicz & Dominika Dziurosz-Serafinowicz - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13313-13343.details
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On the pragmatic and epistemic virtues of inference to the best explanation.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):12407-12438.details
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Closing the Case on Self-Fulfilling Beliefs.Chad Marxen - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):1-14.details
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Normativity, Epistemic Rationality, and Noisy Statistical Evidence.Boris Babic, Anil Gaba, Ilia Tsetlin & Robert Winkler - 2024 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 75 (1):153-176.details
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Epistemic Risk and the Demands of Rationality.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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Epistemic utility theory’s difficult future.Chad Marxen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7401-7421.details
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You say you want a revolution: two notions of probabilistic independence.Alexander Meehan - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3319-3351.details
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On the epistemic rationality and significance of self-fulfilling beliefs.Chad Marxen - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4243-4260.details
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Accuracy-dominance and conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3217-3236.details
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Formal Methods.Richard Pettigrew - manuscriptdetails
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Approximate Coherentism and Luck.Boris Babic - 2021 - Philosophy of Science 88 (4):707-725.details
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Epistemic Consequentialism. [REVIEW]Kevin Dorst - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (3):484-489.details
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Accuracy-First Epistemology Without Additivity.Richard Pettigrew - 2022 - Philosophy of Science 89 (1):128-151.details
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A New Argument for Kolomogorov Conditionalization.Michael Nielsen - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):1-16.details
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The value of truth: introduction to the topical collection.Luca Moretti, Peter Hartl & Akos Gyarmathy - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1):1453-1460.details
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Bayesian updating when what you learn might be false.Richard Pettigrew - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (1):309-324.details
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Bayesian coherentism.Lisa Cassell - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9563-9590.details
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The Value of Biased Information.Nilanjan Das - 2023 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 74 (1):25-55.details
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A note on deterministic updating and van Fraassen’s symmetry argument for conditionalization.Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):665-673.details
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The Arbitrariness Objection Against Permissivism.Ru Ye - 2019 - Episteme (4):654-673.details
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Logical ignorance and logical learning.Richard Pettigrew - 2020 - Synthese 198 (10):9991-10020.details
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Avoiding Risk and Avoiding Evidence.Catrin Campbell-Moore & Bernhard Salow - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (3):495-515.details
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Epistemic Decision Theory's Reckoning.Conor Mayo-Wilson & Gregory Wheeler - manuscriptdetails
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Bayesian Philosophy of Science.Jan Sprenger & Stephan Hartmann - 2019 - Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Accuracy and Verisimilitude: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly.Miriam Schoenfield - 2022 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 73 (2):373-406.details
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