- The Bayesian boom: good thing or bad?Ulrike Hahn - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5.details
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Rational argument, rational inference.Ulrike Hahn, Adam J. L. Harris & Mike Oaksford - 2012 - Argument and Computation 4 (1):21 - 35.details
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General properties of bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations.Zalán Gyenis & Miklós Rédei - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (4):719-755.details
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On the Modal Logic of Jeffrey Conditionalization.Zalán Gyenis - 2018 - Logica Universalis 12 (3-4):351-374.details
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Denying antecedents and affirming consequents: The state of the art.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2015 - Informal Logic 35 (1):88-134.details
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A probabilistic analysis of argument cogency.David Godden & Frank Zenker - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1715-1740.details
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Varieties of propensity.Donald Gillies - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (4):807-835.details
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Timothy Childers. Philosophy and Probability. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013. ISBN: 978-0-19-966182-4 (hbk); 978-0-19-966183-1 (pbk). Pp. xviii + 194. [REVIEW]Donald Gillies - 2014 - Philosophia Mathematica 22 (3):413-417.details
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Popper's Contribution to the Philosophy of Probability.Donald Gillies - 1995 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 39:103-120.details
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Responses and Clarifications Regarding Science and Worldviews.Hugh G. Gauch - 2009 - Science & Education 18 (6-7):905-927.details
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The Confounding Question of Confounding Causes in Randomized Trials.Jonathan Fuller - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):901-926.details
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Confirmation and Meaning Holism Revisited.Timothy Fuller - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (6):1379-1397.details
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Probability in GRW theory.Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer - 2007 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 38 (2):371-389.details
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How to Tell When Simpler, More Unified, or Less A d Hoc Theories Will Provide More Accurate Predictions.Malcolm R. Forster & Elliott Sober - 1994 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 45 (1):1-35.details
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Bayes and Bust: Simplicity as a Problem for a Probabilist’s Approach to Confirmation. [REVIEW]Malcolm R. Forster - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):399-424.details
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Wayne, Horwich, and evidential diversity.Branden Fitelson - 1996 - Philosophy of Science 63 (4):652-660.details
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The paradox of confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):95–113.details
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Likelihoodism, Bayesianism, and relational confirmation.Branden Fitelson - 2007 - Synthese 156 (3):473-489.details
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Bayesians sometimes cannot ignore even very implausible theories (even ones that have not yet been thought of).Branden Fitelson & Neil Thomason - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Logic 6:25-36.details
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Bayesian confirmation and auxiliary hypotheses revisited: A reply to Strevens.Branden Fitelson & Andrew Waterman - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):293-302.details
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A bayesian account of independent evidence with applications.Branden Fitelson - 2001 - Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2001 (3):S123-.details
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Does Science Presuppose Naturalism ?Yonatan I. Fishman & Maarten Boudry - 2013 - Science & Education 22 (5):921-949.details
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Can Science Test Supernatural Worldviews?Yonatan I. Fishman - 2009 - Science & Education 18 (6-7):813-837.details
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Does Roush show that evidence should be probable?Damien Fennell & Nancy Cartwright - 2010 - Synthese 175 (3):289 - 310.details
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What Liars Can Tell Us about the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning.Don Fallis - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.details
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When no Reason for is a Reason against.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):426-431.details
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Reasoning to and from belief: Deduction and induction are still distinct.Jonathan St B. T. Evans & David E. Over - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):267-283.details
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Bayesian argumentation and the value of logical validity.Benjamin Eva & Stephan Hartmann - 2018 - Psychological Review 125 (5):806-821.details
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Rationality in the new paradigm: Strict versus soft Bayesian approaches.Shira Elqayam & Jonathan St B. T. Evans - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):453-470.details
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Bayesian humility.Adam Elga - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):305-323.details
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Twenty-one arguments against propensity analyses of probability.Antony Eagle - 2004 - Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416.details
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Randomness Is Unpredictability.Antony Eagle - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (4):749-790.details
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Agents and norms in the new economics of science.Stephen M. Downes - 2001 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 31 (2):224-238.details
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The epistemic benefits of religious disagreement.Katherine Dormandy - 2020 - Religious Studies 56 (3):390-408.details
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Knowing our degrees of belief.Sinan Dogramaci - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):269-287.details
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Confirmation and Reduction: a Bayesian Account.Foad Dizadji-Bahmani, Roman Frigg & Stephan Hartmann - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):321-338.details
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Using Bayes to get the most out of non-significant results.Zoltan Dienes - 2014 - Frontiers in Psychology 5:85883.details
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The Epistemic Value of Expert Autonomy.Finnur Dellsén - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2):344-361.details
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The No Alternatives Argument.Richard Dawid, Stephan Hartmann & Jan Sprenger - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):213-234.details
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Turning Norton’s Dome Against Material Induction.Richard Dawid - 2015 - Foundations of Physics 45 (9):1101-1109.details
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Delimiting the Unconceived.Richard Dawid - 2018 - Foundations of Physics 48 (5):492-506.details
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Hawking radiation and analogue experiments: A Bayesian analysis.Radin Dardashti, Stephan Hartmann, Karim P. Y. Thébault & Eric Winsberg - 2019 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 67:1-11.details
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Confirmational Holism and Theory Choice: Arrow Meets Duhem.Eleonora Cresto & Diego Tajer - 2020 - Mind 129 (513):71-111.details
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Belief and contextual acceptance.Eleonora Cresto - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):41-66.details
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The structure of epistemic probabilities.Nevin Climenhaga - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (11):3213-3242.details
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The variety-of-evidence thesis: a Bayesian exploration of its surprising failures.François Claveau & Olivier Grenier - 2017 - Synthese:1-28.details
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Explanation in Physics: Explanation in Physical Theory.Peter Clark - 1990 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 27:155-175.details
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Generalized logical consequence: Making room for induction in the logic of science. [REVIEW]Samir Chopra & Eric Martin - 2002 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 31 (3):245-280.details
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Eliciting Uncertainties: A Two Structure Approach.Timothy Childers & Ondrej Majer - 2018 - Studia Logica 106 (3):615-636.details
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Reconciling simplicity and likelihood principles in perceptual organization.Nick Chater - 1996 - Psychological Review 103 (3):566-581.details
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