- Computation without representation.Stephen P. Stich - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):152-152.details
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Some questions regarding the rationality of a demonstration of human rationality.Robert J. Sternberg - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-353.details
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A solution to the lottery paradox.Nathan Stemmer - 1982 - Synthese 51 (3):339 - 353.details
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A bayesian way to make stopping rules matter.Daniel Steel - 2003 - Erkenntnis 58 (2):213--227.details
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Conditional Degree of Belief and Bayesian Inference.Jan Sprenger - 2020 - Philosophy of Science 87 (2):319-335.details
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Kyburg on ignoring base rates.Stephen Spielman - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):261-262.details
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A frequentist interpretation of probability for model-based inductive inference.Aris Spanos - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1555-1585.details
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Computation and symbolization.William E. Smythe - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):151-152.details
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Rationality is a necessary presupposition in psychology.Jan Smedslund - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):352-352.details
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Conditional probability, taxicabs, and martingales.Brian Skyrms - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):351-352.details
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A theory of probability should tutor our intuitions.Glenn Shafer - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):508.details
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An objectivist argument for thirdism.The Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149–155.details
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An objectivist argument for thirdism.Oscar Seminar - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):149-155.details
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Decisions with indeterminate probabilities.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-261.details
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Calibration, coherence, and scoring rules.Teddy Seidenfeld - 1985 - Philosophy of Science 52 (2):274-294.details
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Human rationality: Misleading linguistic analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350-351.details
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Functional architecture and model validation.Martin Ringle - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):150-151.details
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Penetrating the impenetrable.Georges Rey - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):149-150.details
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The logic is in the representation.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):259-259.details
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Human inference: The notion of reasonable rationality.Russell Revlin - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):507.details
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A Battle in the Statistics Wars: a simulation-based comparison of Bayesian, Frequentist and Williamsonian methodologies.Mantas Radzvilas, William Peden & Francesco De Pretis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):13689-13748.details
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Computation and cognition: Issues in the foundation of cognitive science.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):111-32.details
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Cognitive representation and the process-architecture distinction.Zenon W. Pylyshyn - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):154-169.details
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No Double-Halfer Embarrassment: A Reply to Titelbaum.Joel Pust - 2023 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (3):346-354.details
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Pylyshyn and perception.William T. Powers - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):148-149.details
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The theory of nomic probability.John L. Pollock - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):263 - 299.details
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Reasoning defeasibly about probabilities.John L. Pollock - 2011 - Synthese 181 (2):317-352.details
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Foundations for direct inference.John L. Pollock - 1994 - Theory and Decision 17 (3):221-255.details
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Epistemic norms.John L. Pollock - 1987 - Synthese 71 (1):61 - 95.details
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Causal probability.John L. Pollock - 2002 - Synthese 132 (1-2):143 - 185.details
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Confirming confirmation bias.P. Pollard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):258-259.details
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A theory of direct inference.John L. Pollock - 1983 - Theory and Decision 15 (1):29-95.details
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Explanations in theories of language and of imagery.Steven Pinker - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):147-148.details
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Demystifying Dilation.Arthur Paul Pedersen & Gregory Wheeler - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (6):1305-1342.details
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Psychology, statistics, and analytical epistemology.Richard E. Nisbett & Paul Thagard - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):257-258.details
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Lay arbitration of rules of inference.Richard E. Nisbett - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-350.details
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L. J. Cohen versus Bayesianism.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):349-349.details
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Probability and Direct Reference: Three Puzzles of Probability Theory: The Problem of the Two Boys, Freund's Problem and the Problem of the Three Prisoners.Martine Nida-Rümelin - 1993 - Erkenntnis 39 (1):51 - 78.details
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In defense of the Turing test.Eric Neufeld & Sonje Finnestad - 2020 - AI and Society 35 (4):819-827.details
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Imitation Game: Threshold or Watershed?Eric Neufeld & Sonje Finnestad - 2020 - Minds and Machines 30 (4):637-657.details
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Can philosophy resolve empirical issues?Clifford R. Mynatt, Ryan D. Tweney & Michael E. Doherty - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (3):506.details
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Being Seen by the Doctor: A Meditation on Power, Institutional Racism, and Medical Ethics.Bryan Mukandi - 2021 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 18 (1):33-44.details
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Criteria of cognitive impenetrability.Robert C. Moore - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146-147.details
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Contrapositivism; or, The only evidence worth paying for is contained in the negatives.David Miller - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (2):256-257.details
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Cognitive penetrability: let us not forget about memory.James R. Miller - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146-146.details
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Computation, consciousness and cognition.George A. Miller - 1980 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 3 (1):146-146.details
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Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics?Deborah G. Mayo - 1992 - Synthese 90 (2):233 - 262.details
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An objective theory of statistical testing.Deborah G. Mayo - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):297 - 340.details
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Equivocation for the Objective Bayesian.George Masterton - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (2):403-432.details
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The irrational, the unreasonable, and the wrong.Avishai Margalit & Maya Bar-Hillel - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):346-349.details
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