- Reliability Theories of Justified Credence.Weng Hong Tang - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):63-94.details
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(1 other version)Rational Credence and the Value of Truth.Allan Gibbard - 2007 - In Tamar Szabo Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology:Volume 2: Volume 2. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)Arguments For—Or Against—Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 229--251.details
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Why It Is Time To Move Beyond Nagelian Reduction.Marie I. Kaiser - 2012 - In D. Dieks, S. Hartmann, T. Uebel & M. Weber (eds.), Probabilities, Laws and Structure. Springer. pp. 255-272.details
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Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief.James M. Joyce - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 263-297.details
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Second Guessing: A Self-Help Manual.Sherrilyn Roush - 2009 - Episteme 6 (3):251-268.details
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(1 other version)A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joyce - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Consequences of Calibration.Robert Williams & Richard Pettigrew - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:14.details
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Bayesian Recalibration: A Generalization.Sherrilyn Roush - manuscriptdetails
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Epistemic Self-Doubt.Sherrilyn Roush - 2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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On the Possibility of Testimonial Justice.Rush T. Stewart & Michael Nielsen - 2020 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98 (4):732-746.details
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The theory of games as a tool for the social epistemologist.Kevin J. S. Zollman - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1381-1401.details
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What is justified credence?Richard Pettigrew - 2021 - Episteme 18 (1):16-30.details
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Calibration: Modelling the measurement process.Eran Tal - 2017 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 65:33-45.details
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Against Conditionalization.Fahiem Bacchus, Henry E. Kyburg & Mariam Thalos - 1990 - Synthese 85 (3):475-506.details
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Bayesian humility.Adam Elga - 2016 - Philosophy of Science 83 (3):305-323.details
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Reliability for degrees of belief.Jeff Dunn - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1929-1952.details
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Belief and the problem of Ulysses and the sirens.Bas C. van Fraassen - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (1):7-37.details
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How to deal with risks of AI suffering.Leonard Dung - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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(1 other version)Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.details
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Merging of Opinions and Probability Kinematics.Simon M. Huttegger - 2015 - Review of Symbolic Logic 8 (4):611-648.details
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A nonpragmatic vindication of probabilism.James M. Joycetl - 1998 - Philosophy of Science 65 (4):575-603.details
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Credences and Trustworthiness: a Calibrationist Account.John Wilcox - forthcoming - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-40.details
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Norms of Group Rationality.Matthew Kopec - 2012 - Dissertation, University of Wisconsin at Madisondetails
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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We ought to agree: A consequence of repairing Goldman's group scoring rule.Matthew Kopec - 2012 - Episteme 9 (2):101-114.details
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