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Being Rational and Being Wrong.Kevin Dorst - 2023 - Philosophers' Imprint 23 (1).details
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Voiko ihmistiede olla arvovapaata?Panu Raatikainen - 2006 - In Etiikkaa ihmistieteilijöille. SKS.details
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Degrees of belief.Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.) - 2009 - London: Springer.details
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A theory of conclusions.Raymond Dacey - 1978 - Philosophy of Science 45 (4):563-574.details
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Fallibilism, Verisimilitude, and the Preface Paradox.Gustavo Cevolani - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (1):169-183.details
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Static justification in the dynamics of belief.John Cantwell - 1999 - Erkenntnis 50 (2-3):481-503.details
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Faith and steadfastness in the face of counter-evidence.Lara Buchak - 2017 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 81 (1-2):113-133.details
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A Faithful Response to Disagreement.Lara Buchak - 2021 - The Philosophical Review 130 (2):191-226.details
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Keynes’s Coefficient of Dependence Revisited.Peter Brössel - 2015 - Erkenntnis 80 (3):521-553.details
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Assessing Theories: The Coherentist Approach.Peter Brössel - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (3):593-623.details
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Adequacy conditions and event identity.Michael Bradie - 1981 - Synthese 49 (3):337 - 374.details
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Practical and scientific rationality: A difficulty for Levi's epistemology.Wayne Backman - 1983 - Synthese 57 (3):269 - 276.details
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A Theory of Epistemic Risk.Boris Babic - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):522-550.details
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Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer.details
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Degrees all the way down: Beliefs, non-beliefs and disbeliefs.Hans Rott - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 301--339.details
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Non-additive degrees of belief.Rolf Haenni - 2009 - In Franz Huber & Christoph Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of belief. London: Springer. pp. 121--159.details
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The significance test controversy. [REVIEW]Ronald N. Giere - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):170-181.details
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On the role of the research agenda in epistemic change.Erik J. Olsson & David Westlund - 2006 - Erkenntnis 65 (2):165 - 183.details
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Truth-Seeking by Abduction.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2018 - Cham, Switzerland: Springer.details
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Inter-model connectives and substructural logics.Igor Sedlár - 2014 - In Roberto Ciuni, Heinrich Wansing & Caroline Willkommen (eds.), Recent Trends in Philosophical Logic (Proceedings of Trends in Logic XI). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. pp. 195-209.details
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The structure of acceptance and its evidential basis.P. M. Williams - 1969 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (4):325-344.details
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Decision-theoretic epistemology.Ruth Weintraub - 1990 - Synthese 83 (1):159 - 177.details
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A bayesian paradox.Ruth Weintraub - 2001 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (1):51-66.details
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Against Deductive Closure.Paul D. Thorn - 2017 - Theoria 83 (2):103-119.details
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When adjunction fails.Choh Man Teng - 2012 - Synthese 186 (2):501-510.details
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Maurice Clavelin on Galileo's natural philosophy. [REVIEW]Howard Stein - 1974 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 25 (4):375-397.details
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Propensity theories of probability unscathed: A reply to white.Tom Settle - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (4):331-335.details
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The Problem of Coherence and Truth Redux.Michael Schippers - 2016 - Erkenntnis 81 (4):817-851.details
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Review. Elements of scientific inquiry. E Martin, D Osherson.O. Schulte - 2000 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 51 (2):347-352.details
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Impossibility Results for Rational Belief.Gerhard Schurz - 2019 - Noûs 53 (1):134-159.details
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Explanations, desires, and inscriptions.Israel Scheffler - 1971 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 22 (4):362-369.details
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Theory choice in a two-level science.Geoffrey Sampson - 1975 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 26 (4):303-318.details
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Human rationality: Misleading linguistic analogies.Geoffrey Sampson - 1981 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3):350-351.details
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Mind Critical Notice of Kant's Transcendental Deduction, by Henry Allison.Golob Sacha - 2017 - Mind 126 (501):278-289.details
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Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM.Hans Rott - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 40 (2):155-191.details
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Probabilistic Belief Contraction.Raghav Ramachandran, Arthur Ramer & Abhaya C. Nayak - 2012 - Minds and Machines 22 (4):325-351.details
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Jamesian epistemology formalised: An explication of ‘the will to believe’.Richard Pettigrew - 2016 - Episteme 13 (3):253-268.details
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Engel vs. Rorty on truth.Erik J. Olsson - 2017 - Synthese 194 (5).details
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Avoiding epistemic hell: Levi on pragmatism and inconsistency.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):119 - 140.details
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Avoiding Epistemic Hell: Levi on Pragmatism and Inconsistency.Erik J. Olsson - 2003 - Synthese 135 (1):119-140.details
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Persistent propensities: Portrait of a familiar controversy. [REVIEW]Alfred Nordmann - 1990 - Biology and Philosophy 5 (4):379-399.details
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Statistical explanation reconsidered.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1981 - Synthese 48 (3):437 - 472.details
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Truthlikeness: old and new debates.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1990 - Synthese 84 (1):139-152.details
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Truthlikeness: old and new debates.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 2020 - Synthese 197 (4):1581-1599.details
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Measuring the Success of Science.Ilkka Niiniluoto - 1990 - PSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990 (1):434-445.details
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Epistemic virtues, metavirtues, and computational complexity.Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481–502.details
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Epistemic Virtues, Metavirtues, and Computational Complexity.Professor Adam Morton - 2004 - Noûs 38 (3):481-502.details
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Skepticism and Epistemic Closure: Two Bayesian Accounts.Luca Moretti & Tomoji Shogenji - 2017 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 7 (1):1-25.details
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Assertion is weak.Matthew Mandelkern & Kevin Dorst - 2022 - Philosophers' Imprint 22.details
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