- Self-representationalism and phenomenology.Uriah Kriegel - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 143 (3):357-381.details
|
|
Phenomenal epistemology: What is consciousness that we may know it so well?Terry Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Issues 17 (1):123-144.details
|
|
Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.details
|
|
Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.details
|
|
Theories of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (1):58-64.details
|
|
A cross-order integration hypothesis for the neural correlate of consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Consciousness and Cognition 16 (4):897-912.details
|
|
The vagueness constraint and the quality space for pain.Daniel Kostic - 2012 - Philosophical Psychology 25 (6):929-939.details
|
|
Explanatory Perspectivalism: Limiting the Scope of the Hard Problem of Consciousness.Daniel Kostić - 2017 - Topoi 36 (1):119-125.details
|
|
Kritische Metaphysik oder Analytische Hermeneutik?: Über die Lesbarkeit der Dinge und die apriorischen Voraussetzungen der Bezugnahme.Anton Friedrich Koch - 2019 - Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie 67 (1):118-131.details
|
|
The phenomenology of propositional attitudes.Søren Harnow Klausen - 2008 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 7 (4):445-462.details
|
|
The Irreducibility of Consciousness.Amy Kind - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (19):1-18.details
|
|
The idols of inner-sense.Chad Kidd - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (7):1759-1782.details
|
|
Phenomenal consciousness with infallible self-representation.Chad Kidd - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (3):361-383.details
|
|
The illusion of conscious experience.François Kammerer - 2019 - Synthese 198 (1):845-866.details
|
|
How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2845-2867.details
|
|
How Rich is the Illusion of Consciousness?François Kammerer - 2019 - Erkenntnis 87 (2):499-515.details
|
|
Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?François Kammerer - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 10 (4):649-667.details
|
|
Can you believe it? Illusionism and the illusion meta-problem.François Kammerer - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):44-67.details
|
|
Three strands in Kripke's argument against the identity theory.Jesper Kallestrup - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (6):1255-1280.details
|
|
Subjectivity: A Case of Biological Individuation and an Adaptive Response to Informational Overflow.Jakub Jonkisz - 2016 - Frontiers in Psychology 7.details
|
|
Consciousness, Subjectivity, and Gradedness.Jakub Jonkisz - 2021 - Studia Semiotyczne 35 (1):9-34.details
|
|
Against qualia theory.James John - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (3):323 - 346.details
|
|
In Defense of the What-It-Is-Likeness of Experience.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.details
|
|
The knowledge argument and objectivity.Robert J. Howell - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 135 (2):145-177.details
|
|
Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the Subjective Character of Consciousness.Robert J. Howell & Brad Thompson - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):103-127.details
|
|
Turning the zombie on its head.Amir Horowitz - 2009 - Synthese 170 (1):191 - 210.details
|
|
Phenomenal concepts as bare recognitional concepts: harder to debunk than you thought, …but still possible.Emmett L. Holman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (3):807-827.details
|
|
The search for neural correlates of consciousness.Jakob Hohwy - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (3):461–474.details
|
|
Explanation and two conceptions of the physical.Jakob Hohwy - 2005 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):71-89.details
|
|
Thinking of oneself as the thinker: the concept of self and the phenomenology of intellection.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):138-160.details
|
|
I Me Mine: on a Confusion Concerning the Subjective Character of Experience.Marie Guillot - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology (1):1-31.details
|
|
On ambitious higher-order theories of consciousness.Joseph Gottlieb - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (3):421-441.details
|
|
A dilemma for higher-order theories of consciousness.Isabel Gois - 2010 - Philosophia 38 (1):143-156.details
|
|
An Acquaintance alternative to Self-Representationalism.Anna Giustina - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3831-3863.details
|
|
Mental Causation.Sophie Gibb - 2014 - Analysis 74 (2):327-338.details
|
|
Closure Principles and the Laws of Conservation of Energy and Momentum.Sophie Gibb - 2010 - Dialectica 64 (3):363-384.details
|
|
Is There a Simple Argument for Higher-Order Representation Theories of Awareness Consciousness?Mikkel Gerken - 2008 - Erkenntnis 69 (2):243-259.details
|
|
Cotard syndrome, self-awareness, and I-concepts.Rocco J. Gennaro - 2020 - Philosophy and the Mind Sciences 1 (1):1-20.details
|
|
Śaṅkaran Monism and the Limits of Thought.Luca Gasparri - 2022 - The Monist 105 (1):76-91.details
|
|
What Mary’s Aboutness Is About.Martina Fürst - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74.details
|
|
Uriah Kriegel and Kenneth Williford (eds), self-representational approaches to consciousness. [REVIEW]Jason Ford - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (2):283-287.details
|
|
Introspective disputes deflated: The case for phenomenal variation.Sascha Benjamin Fink - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (12):3165-3194.details
|
|
Editorial: Consciousness and Inner Awareness.Jonathan Farrell & Tom McClelland - 2017 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 8 (1):1-22.details
|
|
A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.details
|
|
Blocking the A Priori Passage.Andreas Elpidorou - 2014 - Acta Analytica 29 (3):285-307.details
|
|
Phenomenal character, phenomenal concepts, and externalism.Jonathan Ellis - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 147 (2):273 - 299.details
|
|
Content externalism and phenomenal character: A new worry about privileged access.Jonathan Ellis - 2007 - Synthese 159 (1):47 - 60.details
|
|
The physical: Empirical, not metaphysical.J. L. Dowell, & Janice Dowell - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (1):25-60.details
|
|
Embodied Conceivability: How to Keep the Phenomenal Concept Strategy Grounded.Guy Dove & Andreas Elpidorou - 2016 - Mind and Language 31 (5):580-611.details
|
|
On the supposed limits of physicalist theories of mind.Jonathan E. Dorsey - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):207-225.details
|
|