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Mara Beller, Quantum Dialogue: The Making Of A Revolution. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press , xvi + 366 pp., $35.00 , $20.00. [REVIEW]Scott Tanona - 2002 - Philosophy of Science 69 (2):395-400.details
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Conditional Excluded Middle without the Limit Assumption.Eric Swanson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):301-321.details
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Probaility and information.Patrick Suppes - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):81-82.details
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On Perceiving Continuity: the Role of Memory in the Perception of the Continuity of the Same Things.Mika Suojanen - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (5):1979-1995.details
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Memory, the fork asymmetry, and the initial state.Athamos Stradis - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):9523-9547.details
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Knowledge of objective modality.Margot Strohminger & Juhani Yli-Vakkuri - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1155-1175.details
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Backward Causation: Harder Than It Looks.Athamos Stradis - 2023 - Philosophy of Science 90 (1):77-91.details
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Against Lewis’s New Theory of Causation: A Story with Three Morals.Michael Strevens - 2003 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4):398–412.details
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Ya shouldn’ta couldn’ta wouldn’ta.Stephen Steward - 2015 - Synthese 192 (6):1909-1921.details
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Lewis' counterfactual analysis of causation.Cindy D. Stern - 1981 - Synthese 48 (3):333 - 345.details
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Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):875-898.details
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Woodward and variable relativity.Georgie Statham - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (4):885-902.details
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Counterfactual Plausibility and Comparative Similarity.L. Stanley Matthew, W. Stewart Gregory & Brigard Felipe De - 2017 - Cognitive Science 41 (S5):1216-1228.details
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A Uniform Theory of Conditionals.William B. Starr - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (6):1019-1064.details
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Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength.Jan Sprenger - 2018 - Philosophical Review 127 (3):371-398.details
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Deterministic and probabilistic reasons and causes.Wolfgang Spohn - 1983 - Erkenntnis 19 (1-3):371 - 396.details
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Causation: An alternative.Wolfgang Spohn - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):93-119.details
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Good reasons for losers: lottery justification and social risk.Kai Spiekermann - 2022 - Economics and Philosophy 38 (1):108-131.details
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Explaining the Disquotational Principle.Jeff Speaks - 2010 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 40 (2):211-238.details
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On the “content” and “relevance” of information-theoretic epistemology.Ernest Sosa - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):79-81.details
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The Selectivity of Aesthetic Explanation.Moonyoung Song - 2021 - Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 79 (1):5-15.details
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Strawson on 'if' and ⊃.Gunnar Björnsson - 2008 - South African Journal of Philosophy 27 (3):24-35.details
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Partition-theorems for causal decision theories.Jordan Howard Sobel - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (1):70-93.details
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Natural selection and distributive explanation: A reply to Neander.Elliott Sober - 1995 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (3):384-397.details
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Playing One’s Part.Thomas H. Smith - 2011 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 2 (2):213-44.details
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Ceteris Paribus Conditionals and Comparative Normalcy.Martin Smith - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 36 (1):97-121.details
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Are There Genuine Physical Explanations of Mathematical Phenomena?Bradford Skow - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (1):69-93.details
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Avoiding Late Preemption with the Right Kind of Influence.Kenneth Silver - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1297-1312.details
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A Troublesome Case of Backward Causation for Lewis’s Counterfactual Theory.George Seli - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 62 (3):275-294.details
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Subjunctive Conditional Probability.Wolfgang Schwarz - 2018 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 47 (1):47-66.details
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Quiddistic Knowledge.Jonathan Schaffer - 2005 - Philosophical Studies 123 (1):1-32.details
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Perceptual knowledge derailed.Jonathan Schaffer - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 112 (1):31-45.details
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Of ghostly and mechanical events. [REVIEW]Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (1):230–244.details
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Minimal models vs. logic programming: the case of counterfactual conditionals.Katrin Schulz - 2014 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 24 (1-2):153-168.details
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Kant’s Reply to the Consequence Argument.Matthé Scholten - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (2):135-158.details
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“If you’d wiggled A, then B would’ve changed”: Causality and counterfactual conditionals.Katrin Schulz - 2011 - Synthese 179 (2):239-251.details
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Explanatory fictions—for real?Samuel Schindler - 2014 - Synthese 191 (8):1741-1755.details
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Counterfactuals, causal independence and conceptual circularity.J. Schaffer - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):299-309.details
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Counterfactuals, causal independence and conceptual circularity.Jonathan Schaffer - 2004 - Analysis 64 (4):299–308.details
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Counterfactuals and Arbitrariness.Moritz Schulz - 2014 - Mind 123 (492):1021-1055.details
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Some untoward consequences of Dretske's “causal theory” of information.Kenneth M. Sayre - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-79.details
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Circularities in the Analysis of Counterfactuals.Tor Sandqvist - 2003 - Studia Logica 73 (2):281-298.details
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On Takahiro Isashiki’s Metaphysics of Temporal Modality.Takeshi Sakon - 2011 - Kagaku Tetsugaku 44 (1):59-74.details
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The sufficiency of information-caused belief for knowledge.Bede Rundle - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):78-78.details
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Can information be de-cognitized?William W. Rozeboom - 1983 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 6 (1):76-77.details
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Ifs, though, and because.Hans Rott - 1986 - Erkenntnis 25 (3):345-370.details
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Who’s Sitting in That Chair? Multiple Failing Presuppositions and Truth-Value Judgments.Martina Rosola - 2020 - Topoi 40 (1).details
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The Range Conception of Probability and the Input Problem.John T. Roberts - 2016 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 47 (1):171-188.details
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The epistemic significance of non-epistemic factors: an introduction.Andrea Robitzsch, Nikola Kompa & Igal Kvart - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-11.details
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