- Causal Decision Theory, Context, and Determinism.Calum McNamara - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Counterfactual Conditionals: Orthodoxy and its Challenges.Daniel Dohrn - 2020 - Milan: Mimesis International.details
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And Therefore.Bram Vaassen & Alex Sandgren - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Levelling counterfactual scepticism.Katie Steele & Alexander Sandgren - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):927-947.details
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Counterfactual Skepticism and Multidimensional Semantics.H. Orri Stefánsson - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (5):875-898.details
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Indicatives at stake.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2019 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 62 (7):755-778.details
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Counterfactuals, indeterminacy, and value: a puzzle.Eli Pitcovski & Andrew Peet - 2022 - Synthese 200 (1):1-20.details
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Strict conditional accounts of counterfactuals.Cory Nichols - 2017 - Linguistics and Philosophy 40 (6):621-645.details
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Relevance first: relocating similarity in counterfactual semantics.Cory Nichols - 2020 - Synthese 198 (11):10529-10564.details
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Should we be skeptics or contextualists about counterfactual conditionals?Yael Loewenstein - 2021 - Philosophy Compass 16 (10).details
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Heim Sequences and Why Most Unqualified ‘Would’-Counterfactuals Are Not True.Yael Loewenstein - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (3):597-610.details
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Counterfactual Discourse in Context.Karen S. Lewis - 2018 - Noûs 52 (3):481-507.details
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Does Chance Undermine Would?Alexander W. Kocurek - 2022 - Mind 131 (523):747-785.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.details
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Contra counterfactism.Alan Hájek - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):181-210.details
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Counterfactual scepticism and antecedent-contextualism.Alan Hájek - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):637-659.details
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Counterfactuals and modality.Gabriel Greenberg - 2021 - Linguistics and Philosophy 44 (6):1255-1280.details
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Defeasibility and Inferential Particularism.Javier González de Prado Salas - 2017 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 25 (1):80-98.details
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The Metaphysical Consequences of Counterfactual Skepticism.Nina Emery - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 94 (2):399-432.details
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The non-maximality-solution to counterfactual scepticism.Daniel Dohrn - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):1499-1520.details
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Perceived similarity of imagined possible worlds affects judgments of counterfactual plausibility.Felipe De Brigard, Paul Henne & Matthew L. Stanley - 2021 - Cognition 209 (C):104574.details
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Simple belief.John Collins - 2020 - Synthese 197 (11):4867-4885.details
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Counterfactual skepticism is (just) skepticism.David Boylan - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 108 (1):259-286.details
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Inheritance: Professor Procrastinate and the logic of obligation1.Kyle Blumberg & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (1):84-106.details
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A graded semantics for counterfactuals.Libor Běhounek & Ondrej Majer - 2021 - Synthese 199 (5-6):11963-11994.details
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Disposition Ascriptions.Simona Aimar - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (7):1667-1692.details
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Counterfactuals and Knowledge.Karen S. Lewis - 2017 - In Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa (ed.), The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Contextualism. pp. 411-424.details
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Conditionals.R. A. Briggs - 2019 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 543-590.details
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"Knowledge First" and Its Limits.Tammo Lossau - 2022 - Dissertation, Johns Hopkins Universitydetails
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How to reject a counterfactual.Vittorio Morato - 2017 - Logique Et Analyse 239:317-335.details
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Dynamic Semantics.Karen S. Lewis - 2017 - Oxford Handbooks Online.details
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