There is a common approach to metaphysical disputes, which takes language as its starting point, and leads to a view about the range of acceptable metaphysical positions in any such dispute. I argue that this approach rests on accepting what I call the Strong Linguistic Thesis (SLT). In the metaphysical debate about time I argue that the new B-theory has rejected SLT, and for good reasons. The metaphysical debate about modality parallels the early metaphysical debate about time. I argue that (...) a position analogous to the new B-theory of time is available in the modal debate, and has some advantages over its rivals. (shrink)

I argue that Composition as Identity blocks the plural version of Cantor's Theorem, and that therefore the plural version of Cantor's Theorem can no longer be uncritically appealed to. As an example, I show how this result blocks a recent argument by Hawthorne and Uzquiano.

Ward Blondé ABSTRACT: In this paper, an evolutionary multiverse argument against naturalism is presented: E1. In an evolutionary multiverse, phenomena have variable evolutionary ages. E2. After some time T, the development of the empirical sciences will be evolutionarily conserved. E3. The phenomena with an evolutionary age above T are methodologically supernatural. Entities are classified ….

McKitrick (2003) proposes that an object has a disposition if and only if there are a manifestation, the circumstances of the manifestation, a counterfactual true of the object, and an overtly dispositional locution referring to the disposition. A disposition is extrinsic if and only if an object has it, but a perfect duplicate of the object might not have it. I present an alternative definition that an object has a disposition if and only if a counterfactual is true of the (...) object that under a certain condition, it would interact with another object in a certain manner. There are three reasons for thinking that my definition is better than her definition. 1. Ockham’s razor favors my definition over McKitrick’s definition. My definition is consistent, while her definition is not, with Lewis’s and her definitions of intrinsic and extrinsic properties. 3. My definition goes well, while her definition does not, with our intuition that an object has a disposition even in a possible world where there is nothing but that object. (shrink)

It is usually suggested that the rational self-interest for our future is justified only if we accept endurance theory of personal persistence. This suggestion has been sometimes used to strengthen the plausibility of endurantism over perdurantism, which seemingly does not justify this type of interest. Contrary to the widespread assumption I argue that rational self-interest in some circumstances could be problematic not only for perdurantism but for endurantism as well. The second part of the paper deals with the perdurantistic and (...) endurantistic possibilities to face this common challenge of rational self-interest. (shrink)

In most cases, we think that what settles what act it is right to perform is sensitive to what we take the facts about the world to be. But those facts include many controversial metaphysical claims about the world. I argue that depending on what metaphysical model we take to be correct, we will have very different views about what the right actions are. In particular, I argue that if a particular metaphysical model — the branching universe model — is (...) correct, then many of our ethical intuitions are false. We need to think carefully about the relation between ethical and metaphysical intuitions, and ethical and metaphysical theories. (shrink)

A noção de objecto abstracto desempenha um papel central em diferentes debates filosóficos contemporâneos, da metafísica à estética, passando pela filosofia da linguagem. A sua origem está contudo relacionada com a filosofia da matemática e em particular, com o trabalho de Frege nos fundamentos da aritmética. O nosso primeiro objectivo será assim o de explicar o contributo desta noção para o entendimento Fregeano da realidade matemática. Veremos também que, em virtude de certas dificuldades inerentes ao projeto Fregeano, a dada altura (...) a natureza do universo matemático passou a ser entendida nos termos da chamada teoria dos conjuntos. Com este material à nossa disposição, podemos então discutir o papel desempenhado pela noção de objecto abstracto em certos debates filosóficos contemporâneos. Em particular, procuraremos ilustrar o interesse actual da noção, discutindo a distinção abstracto/concreto. (shrink)

My main purpose in this article is to present an argument for the idea that necessity qua truth in all possible worlds, without other qualifications, leads us to contradiction. If we do not want to accept the contradiction, we will face a dilemma: or accepting that everything we take as contingent is in fact necessary, or accepting that we cannot translate some sentences – at least the indexed to worlds sentences – to the possible worlds vocabulary. We have an intuition (...) – and we develop an argument for it – that if “P”, evaluated in w*, is a contingent truth, so it cannot be the case that “P in w*” is a necessary truth. Generally, the argument tries to show that “P”, evaluated in w*, and “P in w*” are made true by the same contingent fact. If we suppose that “P in w*” is necessary, we would have to suppose that the fact that makes it true is also necessary, which would be contradictory with the fact that makes “P” true in w*, if we accept that what makes “P” in w* and “P in w*” true is the same fact. I attain such an aim by presenting an argument that is divided in two parts, one to imply the contradiction and the other to show that there is no relevant difference between the indicated sentences, by showing how the dilemma arises, and by answering some possible objections. This is an important objective because the possible worlds vocabulary is the default vocabulary to treat the modalities of necessity and possibility. And if it is flawed, it is important that we identify the flaw and fix it – which is exactly what we intend to do at the end of this article, by suggesting some qualification at the necessity notion, that the necessity is the native truth in all possible worlds. And this would save the possible worlds vocabulary from the presented objection. (shrink)

This paper argues that the Einstein-Minkowski space-time of special relativity provides an adequate model for classical tense logic, including rigorous definitions of tensed becoming and of the logical priority of proper time. In addition, the extension of classical tense logic with an operator for predicate-term negation provides us with a framework for interpreting and defending the significance of future contingency in special relativity. The framework for future contingents developed here involves the dual falsehood of non-logical contraries, only one of which (...) becomes true. This has several methodological, metaphysical and physical advantages over the alternative traditional frameworks for handling future contingents. (shrink)

The concept of appearance has had the historical misfortune of being associated with a Kantian or idealist program in metaphysics. Within this program, appearances are treated as "internal objects" that are immaterial and exert no causal powers over the physical world. However, there is a more mundane and innocuous notion of appearance, in which to say that x appears to y is just to say that y perceives x. In this more mundane sense of the term, an appearance is a (...) perceived object ? qua perceived. In this paper, I try and develop an account of the metaphysic of appearances in this more mundane sense. The account is developed within the framework of Trope Theory. After defining the notion of a "phenomenal trope," I construe appearances as special bundles of phenomenal tropes. I then use this account to develop an approach to the thorny issue of appearance individuation. (shrink)

In this chapter I consider what recent work on background independent physics can do for structuralism, and what structuralism can do for background independent physics. I focus on the problems of time and observables in gravitational physics. The ‘frozen’ character of the observables of general relativity is usually considered to constitute a serious problem for the theory. I argue that by invoking correlations between physical quantities we can provide a natural explanation of the appear- ance of time and change in (...) timeless structures. I argue that this response can resolve a problem with Max Tegmark’s ‘extreme structuralist’ position. I then consider what bearing the mathematical representation used has on the debate over the nature of structure in discussions of structural realism. I argue that it has both the resources to ground the notion of structure in physics and to answer the ‘no relations without relata’ objection. (shrink)