- The Knowledge Argument.Luca Malatesti - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Stirlingdetails
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The Nature of Appearance in Kant’s Transcendentalism: A Seman- tico-Cognitive Analysis.Sergey L. Katrechko - 2018 - Kantian Journal 37 (3):41-55.details
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Conscious awareness and representation.Joseph Levine - 2006 - In Kenneth Williford & Uriah Kriegel (eds.), Self-Representational Approaches to Consciousness. MIT Press. pp. 173--198.details
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Absent Qualia and the Mind-Body Problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.details
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Absent qualia and the mind-body problem.Michael Tye - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):139-168.details
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Qualia that it is right to Quine.Manuel Garcia-Carpintero - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):357-377.details
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Phenomenal Concepts and Higher‐Order Experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.details
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Phenomenal concepts and higher-order experiences.Peter Carruthers - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (2):316-336.details
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An adverbial theory of consciousness.Alan Thomas - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):161-85.details
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Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness.Jessica Wilson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):598-602.details
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Review of Knowledge, Possibility, and Consciousness, by John Perry. [REVIEW]Jessica Wilson - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (4):598-601.details
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A Refutation of Qualia-Physicalism.Michael McKinsey - 2007 - In Michael O'Rourke Corey Washington (ed.), Situating Semantics: Essays on the Philosophy of John Perry. pp. 469.details
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Conceivability, possibility, and the mind-body problem.Katalin Balog - 1999 - Philosophical Review 108 (4):497-528.details
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Skepticism, Abductivism, and the Explanatory Gap.Ram Neta - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):296-325.details
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Skepticism, abductivism, and the explanatory gap.Ram Neta - 2004 - Philosophical Issues 14 (1):296-325.details
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Experience and structure: Philosophical history and the problem of consciousness.Paul M. Livingston - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (3):15-33.details
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Coulda, woulda, shoulda.Stephen Yablo - 2002 - In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 441-492.details
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External world scepticism and self scepticism.Joshua Rowan Thorpe - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):591-607.details
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A Posteriori Physicalism and the Discrimination of Properties.Philip Woodward - 2018 - Acta Analytica 33 (1):121-143.details
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The Hard Problem Isn’t Getting any Easier: Thoughts on Chalmers’ “Meta-Problem”.Ben White - 2020 - Philosophia 49:495-506.details
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Other minds are neither seen nor inferred.Mason Westfall - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11977-11997.details
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The cognitive significance of phenomenal knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.details
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What makes you think you are conscious? An agnosticist manifesto.Cees van Leeuwen - 2015 - Frontiers in Human Neuroscience 9.details
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Some reflections on Husserlian intentionality, intentionalism, and non-propositional contents.Corijn van Mazijk - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (4):499-517.details
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How to dig up minds: The intentional analysis program in cognitive archaeology.Corijn van Mazijk - 2024 - European Journal of Philosophy 32 (1):130-144.details
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A theory of phenomenal concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - In Anthony O'Hear (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press. pp. 91-105.details
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A Theory of Phenomenal Concepts.Michael Tye - 2003 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 53:91-105.details
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'Appearing Equal' at Phaedo 74 B 4-C 6: an Epistemic Interpretation.Thomas M. Tuozzo - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 54.details
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Dispositional realism without dispositional essences.Matthew Tugby - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-27.details
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Categoricalism, dispositionalism, and the epistemology of properties.Matthew Tugby - 2014 - Synthese 191 (6):1-16.details
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Revelation and physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.details
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Representationalism and the conceivability of inverted spectra.Brad Thompson - 2008 - Synthese 160 (2):203-213.details
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Powerful Qualities, Phenomenal Concepts, and the New Challenge to Physicalism.Henry Taylor - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (1):53-66.details
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Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts: Bringing Ontology and Philosophy of Mind Together.John Henry Taylor - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (4):1283-1297.details
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In Defence of Powerful Qualities.John H. Taylor - 2013 - Metaphysica 14 (1):93-107.details
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On Imagism About Phenomenal Thought.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophical Review 120 (1):43-95.details
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Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.details
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Is the mystery an illusion? Papineau on the problem of consciousness.Pär Sundström - 2008 - Synthese 163 (2):133-143.details
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Review of David Papineau's Thinking about Consciousness. [REVIEW]Pär Sundström - 2006 - Theoria 72 (1):80-86.details
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What is it Like to Have an Unconscious Mental State?Jim Stone - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 104 (2):197-202.details
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Two Conceptions of the Physical.Daniel Stoljar - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (2):253-281.details
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Physicalism and phenomenal concepts.Daniel Stoljar - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):296-302.details
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Liberal phenomenal concepts.Benjamin D. Storer - 2020 - Philosophical Explorations 23 (2):95-111.details
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Lewis on Materialism and Experience.Daniel Stoljar - 2015 - In Barry Loewer & Jonathan Schaffer (eds.), A Companion to David Lewis. Oxford, UK: Wiley. pp. 519–532.details
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An Epistemic Case for Empathy.Justin Steinberg - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (1):47-71.details
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Naive Introspection in the Philosophy of Perception.Maja Spener - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):29-45.details
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Divine Fine-Tuning vs. Electrons in Love.Neil Sinhababu - 2017 - American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (1):89-98.details
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In favor of (plain) phenomenology.Charles Siewert - 2007 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 6 (1-2):201-220.details
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Using phenomenal concepts to explain away the intuition of contingency.Nicholas Shea - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (4):553-570.details
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Methodological Encounters with the Phenomenal Kind.Nicholas Shea - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2):307-344.details
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