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When is it selectively advantageous to have true beliefs? Sandwiching the better safe than sorry argument.Christopher L. Stephens - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):161-189.details
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Styles of computational representation.M. P. Smith - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):530.details
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Representation and knowledge are not the same thing.Leslie Smith - 1999 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (5):784-785.details
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Why philosophers should be designers.Aaron Sloman - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):529.details
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Undermining versus rebutting: options for responding to evolutionary debunking arguments.Emily Slome - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-18.details
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On Content Uniformity for Beliefs and Desires.Daniel Skibra - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 12 (2):279-309.details
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Theory autonomy and future promise.Matti Sintonen - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):488-488.details
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ECHO and STAHL: On the theory of combustion.Herbert A. Simon - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):487-487.details
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Bursting Bealer’s Bubble: How the Starting Points Argument Begs the Question of Foundationalism Against Quine.Michael J. Shaffer & Jason A. Warnick - 2004 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):87-106.details
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The realistic stance.John R. Searle - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):527.details
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Permission to Believe: Why Permissivism Is True and What It Tells Us About Irrelevant Influences on Belief.Miriam Schoenfield - 2014 - Noûs 48 (2):193-218.details
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Defusing eliminative materialism: Reference and revision.Maurice K. D. Schouten & Huib Looren de Jong - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (4):489-509.details
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Truth-reliability and the evolution of human cognitive faculties.James Sage - 2004 - Philosophical Studies 117 (1-2):95-106.details
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SINBaD neurosemantics: A theory of mental representation.Dan Ryder - 2004 - Mind and Language 19 (2):211-240.details
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Sound intuitions on Moral Twin Earth.Michael Rubin - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (3):307-327.details
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Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the concept of belief.Hans Rott - 2017 - Synthese 194 (8):2695–2720.details
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Will the argument for abstracta please stand up?Alexander Rosenberg - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):526.details
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Knowledge entails dispositional belief.David Rose & Jonathan Schaffer - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (S1):19-50.details
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How to build a mind.H. L. Roitblat - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):525.details
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Witness agreement and the truth-conduciveness of coherentist justification.William Roche - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):151-169.details
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Coherence, Probability and Explanation.William Roche & Michael Schippers - 2014 - Erkenntnis 79 (4):821-828.details
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The limits of cognitive theory in anthropology.Mark Risjord - 2004 - Philosophical Explorations 7 (3):281 – 297.details
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Measuring the plausibility of explanatory hypotheses.James A. Reggia - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):486-487.details
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Explanatory coherence in understanding persons, interactions, and relationships.Stephen J. Read & Lynn C. Miller - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):485-486.details
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Against explanationist skepticism regarding philosophical intuitions.Joel Pust - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 106 (3):227 - 258.details
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Paraconsistent Belief Revision.Graham Priest - 2001 - Theoria 67 (3):214-228.details
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Logical Theory Choice.Graham Priest - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):283-297.details
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Intentionality: How to tell Mae West from a crocodile.David Premack - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):522.details
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The Lycan–Stich Argument and the Plasticity of “Belief”.Krzysztof Poslajko - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (3):1257-1273.details
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Introduction: “Epistemic coherentism”.Ted Poston - 2012 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (1):1-4.details
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Finite Reasons Without Foundations.Ted Poston - 2014 - Metaphilosophy 45 (2):182-191.details
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Dynamic permissivism.Abelard Podgorski - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (7):1923-1939.details
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The Explication Defence of Arguments from Reference.Mark Pinder - 2017 - Erkenntnis 82 (6):1253-1276.details
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Is knowledge a natural kind?Tuomas K. Pernu - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 142 (3):371 - 386.details
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Naturalism in mathematics and the authority of philosophy.Alexander Paseau - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (2):377-396.details
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Probability and normativity.David Papineau - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):484-485.details
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Coherence and abduction.Paul O'Rorke - 1989 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 12 (3):484-484.details
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Epistemically flawless false beliefs.Kate Nolfi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309.details
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Epistemic norms, all things considered.Kate Nolfi - 2019 - Synthese 198 (7):6717-6737.details
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Imagination and Immortality: Thinking of Me.Shaun Nichols - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):215 - 233.details
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Imagination and immortality: thinking of me.Shaun Nichols - 2007 - Synthese 159 (2):215-233.details
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Ambiguous Reference.Shaun Nichols, N. Ángel Pinillos & Ron Mallon - 2016 - Mind 125 (497):145-175.details
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The No-Miracles Argument, reliabilism, and a methodological version of the generality problem.Mark Newman - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):111 - 138.details
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The intentional stance and the knowledge level.Allen Newell - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (3):520.details
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