The idea of moral progress is a necessary presupposition of action for beings like us. We must believe that moral progress is possible and that it might have been realized in human experience, if we are to be confident that continued human action can have any morally constructive point. I discuss the implications of this truth for moral psychology. I also show that once we understand the complex nature and the complicated social sources of moral progress, we will appreciate why (...) we cannot construct a plausible comprehensive action-guiding theory of moral progress. Yet while the nature and sources of moral progress consistently thwart many theoretical hopes, the idea of moral progress is a plausible, critically important and morally constructive principle of historical interpretation. (shrink)

Hoping is an integral part of what it is to be human, and its significance for education has been widely noted. Hope is, however, a contested category of human experience and getting to grips with its characteristics and dynamics is a difficult task. The paper argues that hope is not a singular undifferentiated experience and is best understood as a socially mediated human capacity with varying affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions. Drawing on the philosophy, theology and psychology of hope, five (...) modes of hoping are outlined: patient, critical, sound, resolute and transformative. The key aim of the paper is to illustrate how different modes of hoping are associated with different pedagogical strategies. Phrased differently, the paper seeks to delineate a range of pedagogies of hope. The phrase ‘pedagogy of hope’ is very much associated with critical theory—one thinks instantly of, for example, Paulo Freire, Henry Giroux or bell hooks. There are many pedagogies of hope, however, and an explicitly conservative text such as William Bennett’s Book of Virtues has as strong a claim to the title as Freire’s radical and utopian ideas. A broader argument, therefore, is that there is nothing inherently radical or subversive about a pedagogy of hope. Pedagogies of hope can serve to reproduce social relations as well as to transform them. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that hoping is an integral part of what it is to be human. The present article strives to make sense of the myriad competing conceptions of hope that have emerged over the past half-century. Two problems with the literature are highlighted. First, discussions of hope tend to take place within rather than between disciplines. Second, hope is often taken to be an undifferentiated experience. In order to address the first problem, the article takes an interdisciplinary approach, (...) drawing on research from the fields of philosophy, anthropology, psychology, theology and politics. In order to address the second problem, the article proposes that hope be regarded as a human universal that can be experienced in different modes. A variety of theories and models of hope are discussed, including those offered by Marcel, Dauenhauer, Bloch, Moltmann, Bovens, Pettit, Snyder, Rorty and Gutiérrez. While many of these claim to have identified the characteristics of hope, it is argued that each captures something about a particular mode of hoping. The theories and models are integrated into a framework comprising five modes of hoping: patient, critical, estimative, resolute and utopian. Examining hope in this way, as a human universal that can be experienced in different modes, may help us see the varying conceptions that presently exist within the human sciences not as conflicting, nor even as competing, but rather as complementary. (shrink)

I examine three attitudes: belief, faith, and hope. I argue that all three attitudes play the same role in rationalizing action. First, I explain two models of rational action—the decision-theory model and the belief-desire model. Both models entail there are two components of rational action: an epistemic component and a conative component. Then, using this framework, I show how belief, faith, and hope that p can all make it rational to accept, or act as if, p. I conclude by showing (...) how my picture can explain how action-oriented commitments can be rational over time, both in the face of counterevidence and in the face of waning affections. (shrink)

Subject-subject relationship as a significant aspect of personal development in adulthood The issue of the subject-subject relationship, also known as the relationship of encounter or the I-Thou relationship, which has a strong presence in the humanities and Christian mysticism, is rarely addressed by psychology. This type of relationship goes beyond the psychosocial approach to personal maturity and human development at the so-called higher stages, thus falling outside the predominant lines of psychological inquiry. Consequently, this paper concerns issues that are not (...) popular in psychology, albeit they are close to the problem of the person's development as a subject. Drawing inspiration from cultural anthropology and intersubjective philosophy - especially Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue and Gabriel Marcel's concrete philosophy - the author presents from a psychological stance the phenomenon of the subject-subject relationship and its prerequisite conditions. Adopting the perspective of personalistic psychology in its existentialist-phenomenological strands, the author indicates the place of this relationship in human personal development and highlights its crucial significance to this process. (shrink)

The dramatic change in the focus and overall project of French philosophy since World War I has become increasingly apparent, with one of the resultant developments being, as Geroulanos has identified, the emergence of “an atheism that is not humanist.” This article discusses parallels between the philosophical methodology of Gabriel Marcel and this new form of atheism. In so doing, it explores connections between Marcel and French philosophy’s more recent “turn to religion,” and uses these to demonstrate how Marcel’s notion (...) of disponibilité or “availability” operates with respect to Marcel’s conception of philosophy itself. (shrink)

El presente artículo desarrolla la comprensión marceliana de la esperanza como fruto de una experiencia de comunión intersubjetiva. De tal modo que la esperanza nos abre un nuevo horizonte de sentido para el itinerario vital, anunciando ya una plenitud intersubjetiva imperecedera. Así, podremos reconocer una fuente de renovación personal y comunitaria en la vivencia de la intersubjetividad, como condición metafísica de la existencia personal que responde a la profunda exigencia de trascendencia del hombre.

Professional involvement and the moral life of individuals and professional groups, especially those with high social prestige, such as firefighters, are linked by the category of “ethos”. Since the ethos of this service is today significantly influenced by multifaceted and dynamic ideological and existential transformations, it seems necessary to analyse the nature of this impact. Therefore, it seems that postmodernity brings with it ideological tendencies, which, by destroying the traditional preferences established so far, do not propose anything in their place. (...) These include, among others: the crisis of personal and community identity, secularisation processes, the “axiology” of consumerism that is clearly being shaped nowadays, the depreciation of the meaning of work, and, finally, irrationalism and the crisis of the meaning of life. (shrink)

This paper considers what is at stake in the idea of universitas – a community of masters and scholars – in the context of the shifting landscape of higher education engendered by the COVID-19 pandemic. Drawing on the philosophy of Gabriel Marcel, we consider what it means to be together in a university community. We draw a distinction between the idea of ‘functioning’ as universitas and ‘being’ universitas, arguing that, that while universities have continued to function effectively through the pandemic, (...) something of what it means to be universitas has been lost. We explore, through Marcel’s concepts of disponibilité and indisponibilité (availability and unavailability), presence and communion, what is at stake in our being with others, and participating in their plenitude. We conclude that being bodily present to each other opens up possibilities for realising something of what it means to be universitas as a community of masters, scholars and students. (shrink)

In this article I wish to defend hope by arguing that it is a child-like predisposition and that its strength and uniqueness stem exactly from its naïve, infantilizing character. To discuss the concepts of hope and of childhood and the relationship between them, I read in Kazuo Ishiguro’s latest book – Klara and the Sun (2021), using Lyotard’s concepts of the inhuman, development, and infancy (1991, 1998). I argue for an alternative approach to childhood, in which it is not viewed (...) merely as a basic developmental phase or as a lack in maturity but as an irreducible and potent element in human life, further showing that when understood as an event, childhood can be a strong basis for hope, and as such should be recognized by educators. (shrink)

Although ietsism, which comes from a Dutch term referring to “somethingism,” came on the religious scene a couple of decades ago, Anglophone publications springing from serious reflections on this term have only just recently appeared. This paper constitutes an attempt at addressing a couple of questions pertaining to this rather novel term. Two of these main questions concern the characteristics of ietsism that set it apart from other faith orientations, and the means by which ietsism is able to stand up (...) to the test of its practical worth in terms of promising to fulfil a profound need in human life. (shrink)

Este artículo presenta la filosofía de Marcel como una reflexión sobre el ser humano que es, en el fondo, una forma de humanismo. Es, no obstante, un humanismo trágico, una visión del ser humano como un ser digno que puede destruirse a sí mismo. Esta capacidad de envilecimiento es tal que ha llevado a los seres humanos a vivir en un mundo roto. Sin embargo, la descripción que Marcel realiza de la sociedad industrial occidentalizada no cae en el desanimo, pues (...) a pesar de que no se dan las condiciones óptimas, siempre es posible recuperar la sabiduría, el pensar capaz de ejercer un control sobre la técnica. En este escrito se describirá la filosofía concreta del francés, se pasará a su visión del ser humano y se concluirá con la exposición de su análisis de la crisis que está padeciendo el ser humano agónico tras la muerte de Dios. (shrink)

This article examines the compatibility and relevance of Gabriel Marcel’s phenomenology of hope in interdisciplinary research on the role of hope in end-of-life care. Our analysis is divided into three thematic topics which examine the various shades of hope observed in Marcel’s phenomenology of hope and in the collection of 20 EOL studies on hope as experienced by adult palliative care patients, health care professionals and parents of terminally ill children. The three topics defining the shades of hope are: the (...) meaning of hope in its dynamic aspects, the dialectics of hope and despair, and the transcendent facets of hope. We analyse how Marcel’s understanding of hope is reflected in EOL studies, and how this perception can enrich the philosophy of PC and significantly deepen and broaden HCPs’ understanding of hope. Our findings prove that despite terminological differences between Marcelian phenomenology and the concepts of hope in the 20 EOL studies, hope emerges as a resourceful movement towards being. Implementing Marcelian hope within communication in EOL care could help in HCPs’ interpersonal approach to patients as his concept harbors a holistic perception of the existential situation of a person. Equally, introducing Marcel’s phenomenology of hope into the clinical encounter could play a beneficial role in improving the ability of patients to adapt to the difficult conditions of their disease and PC treatment. (shrink)

In this paper we will try to show how Gabriel Marcel understands the junction between the self and the other as appears in his reflections on the opposition freedom-gift, on his critique of Sartre’s philosophy of freedom, and on metaphysical implications of love. These three approaches point out a way that leads to understand man’s tension between selfhood and alterity, in the heart of a fundamental communion which refer, ultimately, to the divine. Therefore, metaphysical and religious discourses are constantly crossing (...) but, instead of revoking value to Marcel’s philosophy, this double rapport teaches us a way of attending religious symbols and testimonies in order to get close to the meaning of human experience. (shrink)

Prognostication has something of a rich and distinguished history. Hippocrates, for instance, suggests that “the best physician is the one who has the providence to tell to the patients according to his knowledge the present situation, what has happened before, and what is going to happen in the future”. In Hippocrates’s estimation, the truly exceptional physician is one who is able to forecast competently the outcome of a disease or other medical condition and effectively communicate that information to the patient (...) or the patient’s proxy.In addition to influencing therapeutic decisions, an accurate and honest prognosis may serve to manage patients’ expectations and facilitate a frank.. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Ernst Bloch is a philosopher of hope, of this there can be no doubt. It is the fidelity to the proposition that a better world is possible that undergirds Bloch’s work. Yet, the hopeful tenor of Bloch’s philosophy, as I argue here, is accompanied by a second, more subterranean strand: a concern with the phenomenon of disappointment. Bloch has an interest in what happens after hope fails; those moments when the desire for utopia confronts the impossibility of its realisation. (...) By considering Bloch’s philosophical history of the defeat of the chiliastic movements of the medieval moment alongside his ontology of not-yet-being, the claim is made that disappointment has a constitutive role in the philosophy of hope, such that the dream of a new world is mediated through the history of its failures. Hope and disappointment are entangled, the power of the former indexed to the act of confronting the latter. (shrink)

Inherent in the self–other dynamic structure are the mechanisms to reduce the other to the self, to surrender the self to the other, to place an insurmountable wedge between them, and to effect a harmonious, mutually beneficent relationship. In this paper, I explore the varied self–other relations between the self in hope, confronting the prospect of its death as other. I also endeavour to unravel a possible eclipse of the above self–other patterns, which can serve as an indication of the (...) uniqueness and perhaps the mystery that surround our attempts to come to terms with the reality of our own mortality. (shrink)

In many universities and related knowledge transmission organisations, professional focus on empirical data shows as in vocational education that preparation for real life technical work is important, as one would expect from “career education”. University is as the name shows on the contrary focusing on the universality of some sort of education, which is neither a technical one, nor much concerned by preparing oneself for a career. The scope of this chapter is to propose an analysis of inclusion as the (...) very essence of an ethics of reformation of education, which in our opinion cannot come from the institution of education as much as from a common basis between everyday learning capacities and curriculum based learning methods. Inclusive vision and values should be theoretically explained by philosophers in order to be refined and adapted into our current experience of values, pointing out issues about method and knowledge parameters. In particular a focus on epistemic values should bring good indications on how to empower others, and leave a more inclusive life, assuming the somehow paradoxical and surprising idea that knowledge is as important in real life outside the university as it is in the classroom, being the real universal value and currency across disciplines, times and contexts. University learns from being inclusive, i. e. by bringing not only a higher point of view on technical education but also a wider view on the human being. (shrink)

Sustaining hope in patients is an important element of health care, allowing improvement in patient welfare and quality of life. However in the palliative care context, with patients who are terminally ill, it might seem that in order to maintain hope the palliative care practitioner would sometimes have to deceive the patient about the full nature or prospects of their condition by providing a ‘false hope’. This possibility creates an ethical tension in palliative practice, where the beneficent desire to improve (...) patient welfare through sustaining hope appears to be in conflict with an autonomy-based requirement not to deceive patients about their condition. In order to resolve this ethical tension, we provide an analysis of the concept of hope and argue that there is at least one conception – the ‘absolute’ conception of hope – which when properly understood allows practitioners to foster hope in terminally-ill patients while avoiding any need to deceive them about their condition. Practitioners therefore do not need to shy away from using the language of hope in the palliative setting, as on this understanding of hope it can be used in a way that both promotes patient welfare and respects patient autonomy. (shrink)

In much environmentally concerned literature, there is a burgeoning concern for the status and sustainability of human hope. Within Christian circles, this attention has often taken the form of eschatological reflection. While there is important warrant for attention to eschatology in Christian examinations of hope, I claim that to move so quickly from hope to eschatology is to confuse a species of Christian hope for a definition of hope itself; as such, it is important for theological ethicists to examine hope (...) also from the experiential perspective of the human hoper. In particular, this is important today given the shortcomings of an eschatological focus in addressing anxieties arising due to the environmental crisis. Through examining hope as a fallible human activity, one can come to better understand hope's importance to human life, its profound ambiguity, and the potential threat that the environmental crisis poses to it. (shrink)

In this article, the place and the nature of an ethical dialogue that develops within Christian healthcare institutions in Flanders, Belgium is examined. More specifically, the question is asked how Christian healthcare institutions should position themselves ethically in a context of a pluralistic society. The profile developed by Caritas Catholica Flanders must take seriously not only the external pluralistic context of our society and the internal pluralistic worldviews by personnel/employees and patients, but also the inherent inspiration of a Christian healthcare (...) institution. This article concludes with ten general orientations that could shape the ethical dialogue from a Christian inspiration in a pluralistic context. (shrink)

Confidence or trust is obviously a sort of reliance or dependence. Confidence is related to fiducia , which in turn is related to fido and to the Greek peitho . The latter term implies persuasion or persuasiveness. If we follow, as we should, the nuances hidden in these terms, we may assume that confidence is a reliance stemming from persuasion or accompanied by it. Confidence may be related to a person, including oneself, and in this sense we speak of self-confidence; (...) or it may be related to another person, either in the singular or in the plural, or even perhaps to the course of events at large, to history, to the cosmos, to God etc. It is in this sense that confidence is the opposite of or contradictory to fear. And Aristotle indeed placed the brave man between the two poles of fear and confidence. The man who exceeds in confidence is rash, and he who exceeds in fear and falls short in confidence is a coward. (shrink)

This paper takes the movement of transcendence in Sartre and examines it in relation to another understanding of transcendence in relation to God circulating in Paris in Sartre’s formative years: that of Karl Jaspers. Through exploring the transmission and reception of Jaspers' thought in French philosophy, different understandings can be advanced as to why he engages with the figure of God as that which we transcend towards, however impossibly, and why he counts Jaspers as a Catholic existentialist.

Résumé L’espoir joue un rôle important dans notre vie de tous les jours et pour le future. Bien que l’espoir et le désespoir soient des concepts importants adressés dans de nombreuses analyses théoriques en psychologie, théologie, philosophie, sciences politiques, infirmerie, littérature et les arts ; ils sont omis en théorie économique. Cette absence est d’autant plus notable que l’espoir joue un rôle fondamental dans la prise de décisions et plus particulièrement pour les choix inter-temporels qui sont au centre de la (...) théorie économique. Dans le but de l’incorporer dans la théorie des choix inter-temporels il est essentiel de définir clairement les caractéristiques de l’espoir et de le dissocier d’autres concepts. L’espoir n’est pas constant à travers le temps. L’espoir diffère de l’optimisme et du rêve sans fondements réels. L’espoir n’est pas irrationnel. Je définis l’espoir en me basant sur des caractéristiques identifiées dans plusieurs disciplines. Grace à la comparaison de ces caractéristiques, je peux identifier les points communs et les définitions communes. En utilisant les définitions obtenues, j’incorpore l’espoir dans l’analyse économique et j’analyse les implications en termes de modélisation des choix et de comportement économique. Cela me permet de vérifier si l’espoir est implicitement inclus ou est absent de l’analyse économique actuelle. (shrink)

The Stoics considered that in order to die well, one must previously have lived (well) and not merely existed, an assertion which will not be contested in this paper. The question raised here is whether an individual whose life expectancy is jeopardized by serious illness or whose life has not been lived to the ‘full’ for whatever reason should have to abandon all hope or, alternately, whether that life could still somehow be saved (in an ethical sense). One clear obstacle (...) to achieving this stems from (bad) moral character, given that moral character is an element which conditions an individual’s moral behaviour, as pointed out by Beauchamp and Childress and particularly Pellegrino and Thomasma. The transformation of moral character requires time and effort but the testimonies of patients who have given their lives a radical new direction upon being diagnosed with a serious illness seem to show the existence of a peculiar phenomenon of moral catharsis. In this paper we attempt to illustrate that this alleged phenomenon is not the result of a kind of cataleptic impression but rather the result of a dialectic and narrative process, during which a first hope of healing is dashed, unveiling a new sense in the illness. Its fulfillment provides the patient with a final hope. (shrink)

The language of hope is a ubiquitous part of political life, but its value is increasingly contested. While there is an emerging debate about hope in political philosophy, an assessment of the prevalent scepticism about its role in political practice is still outstanding. The aim of this article is to provide an overview of historical and recent treatments of hope in political philosophy and to indicate lines of further research. We argue that even though political philosophy can draw on recent (...) analyses of hope in analytic philosophy, there are distinct challenges for an account of hope in political contexts. Examples such as racial injustice or climate change show the need for a systematic normative account that is sensitive to the unavoidability of hope in politics as much as its characteristic dangers. (shrink)

This article explores the concept of human dignity in the work of French philosopher Gabriel Marcel. It demonstrates how this lesser-known aspect of his philosophical thinking is organic to his work and draws attention to the current relevance of the way he resolves the question of human dignity for philosophy and ethics. The first part of the article looks at the basic ideas behind Marcel’s understanding of man as a being on the road, as unfinished, temporal, in the process of (...) becoming, and creatively open on the road of transcendence to the mystery of being. This is followed by an explanation of Marcel’s criticism of the traditional understanding of human dignity, which has degenerated into the formalism. Criticizing this rationalist conception of dignity as a particular kind of power, Gabriel Marcel produces an original conception of existential dignity as weakness—the fragile vulnerable finitude of the human individual. But it is an active weakness/finitude that lies in the ability of the individual to creatively resist attempts to humiliate him and in his effort to recognize his unique human values. Part of this finitude, on the inter-subjective level, is an encounter with the neighbour in love, which is a service to others in defence of man’s weakness. The author draws attention to the fact that Marcel’s conception of human dignity has been partially accepted in philosophy, ethics and bioethics. (shrink)

Hope is hard to characterise because of the exceptional diversity of its applications, to the point that one may wonder whether there is continuity between ordinary cases of hope and what is often called 'hope against hope'. In this paper, I shall follow the relatively small but growing literature on hope and examine propositional hopes, i.e. hopes of the form 'hoping that p', with a particular focus on recent work by Philip Pettit and Adrienne Martin. I shall do this first (...) by identifying a significant difficulty encountered by what has become known as the 'orthodox definition'. The OD defines hope by means of two necessary and sufficient conditions: A hopes that p if and only if A desires that p and A assigns to p a degree of probability between 0 and 1. On this definition, to hope is to desire an outcome we deem neither certain nor impossible. Note that the relevant probability assignment is subjective: the OD allows, for example, that children can hope for Father Christmas to visit them on Christmas Eve. (shrink)

The meaning of being a middle‐aged close relative of a person who has suffered a stroke, 1 month after discharge from a rehabilitation clinicThe sudden and unexpected impact of stroke may have a stressful affect on close relatives. To illuminate the essential meaning in the lived experience of a middle‐aged close relative of a person who has suffered a stroke, narrative interviews were conducted with 10 close relatives of people who had suffered their first stroke where both parties were aged (...) over 18 and under 65. A phenomenological‐hermeneutic interpretation of the narratives was then conducted. Three intimately intertwined themes emerged during the analysis: ‘being called to mission’, ‘feeling lost and set adrift’ and ‘struggling to keep going’. The middle‐aged close relatives felt unreflectively duty bound. There was a struggle with suffering and enduring the process of coping with life and overcoming a feeling of helplessness. Life turned out to be a struggle with overwhelming feelings. They felt alienated in a restricted life situation, disconnected from themselves and others, and from a world that supports feelings of being lost and set adrift (i.e. feeling homeless). Strength was found in moments when the situation improved, in being related to oneself and others, and when feelings of normality were regained. (shrink)

This paper explores the death of God narrative through the lens of kenosis, drawing insights from thinkers such as Marcel, Heidegger, Vattimo, and Girard. It investigates the implications of kenotic thought for contemporary religious and philosophical discourse, exploring various interpretations of kenosis, ranging from Altizer and Žižek’s apocalyptic views to Vattimo’s more hopeful perspective. Through critical engagement with these viewpoints, this paper advocates for a nuanced understanding of kenosis inspired by Hegel, one that bypasses both radical theology and excessive optimism. (...) Methodologically, this study adopts a hermeneutic approach, analyzing key texts and engaging in philosophical dialogue. This paper concludes that rethinking kenotic thought could provide a robust framework for grappling with the death of God in the contemporary context, offering avenues for ethical reflection, social critique, and speculative renewal. (shrink)

This article is an extended discussion from the recent opening presentation for the Annual Winchester Advanced ‘Philosophy for Children’ Seminar in Climate Change Education, Hope and Philosophy for Children. The presentation and text originate from Rosamonde Birch's (2019) Masters’ dissertation research discerning hope through an Education for Sustainable Development Philosophy for Children workshop.

Hope takes on a particularly important role in end of life situations. Sustaining hope can have considerable benefits for the quality of life and any prospect of a good death for the dying. However, it has proved difficult to adequately account for hope when dying, particularly in some of the more extreme end of life situations. Standard secular accounts of hope struggle to establish how the fostering of hope may be possible in such situations. This leads to a practical ethical (...) dilemma for those caring for the dying, the ‘paradox of hope’, whereby one can either help maintain the welfare of the dying by generating a misleading ‘false hope’ or maintain truthfulness and concede that hope is not possible. These two problems combine to leave individuals the prospect of dying in terrible circumstances facing only despair. To address this, I argue that we should look beyond standard intentional or dispositional accounts of hope in such cases and treat hope as a cluster concept. Rather than appeal to a unitary conception, what we precisely mean by ‘hope’ may therefore vary depending on the context of use. I outline an account of hope based on Marcel’s account of ‘absolute’ hope but offering an alternative, secular foundation based on solidarity that can explain how hope when dying in extreme circumstances is possible. Hence, where the more familiar accounts break-down in these circumstances, ‘hope talk’ may still be possible if it is seen as relying on this conception of hope. (shrink)

The purpose of this phenomenological-hermeneutic study was to illuminate the meaning of being in ethically difficult care situations. The participants were 20 enrolled nurses employed in six intensive care units in Sweden. The results reveal a complex human process manifested in relation to one’s inner self and the other person, which transforms desolation into consolation through becoming present to the suffering other when perceiving fragility rather than tragedy. The main point of significance here is for all health professionals to create (...) an ethical work environment and strive for praxis that fosters ‘athomeness’, which renders us free to transform desolation into consolation. Consolation is of significance in ethics because it makes us available and helps us to fulfil the demands of life, while desolation makes us unavailable to others. (shrink)

This article offers a general discussion of the concept of false hope. Its ultimate aim is to clarify the meaning and the relevance of that concept for medicine and medical research. In the first part, the concept of hope is discussed. I argue that hope is more than a combination of a desire and a belief about the probability that the desire will be fulfilled. Imagination and anticipation are as well components of hope. I also discuss if hope implies orientation (...) to action. In the second part, I examine the concept of false hope. I show that hope is false if it cannot be justified epistemically. There is, I argue, an intimate relation between false hope and ignorance. Hope is justified—“realistic”—when the hoping person knows and accepts experts’ judgement about the probability of hope fulfillment. I then argue that what matters for evaluating a person’s hope is not only whether it is realistic, but also whether it is reasonable in the light of the aim and goals that a person strives for in his life. Part three goes into the question of what is morally wrong about having or causing false hope. In the fourth part, the relevance is shown of the insights from the previous parts for the debate on false hope in medicine and clinical research. (shrink)

This paper explores the importance of hope as a determining factor for patients to participate in first-in-human trials for synthetic biology therapies. This paper focuses on different aspects of hope in the context of human health and well-being and explores the varieties of hope expressed by patients. The research findings are based on interview data collected from stable gout and diabetes patients. Three concepts of hope have emerged from the interviews: hope as certainty ; hope as reflective uncertainty ; hope (...) as self-therapy. The purpose of the paper is twofold. First, it aims to underline the significance of hope in patients’ medical decision-making, as well as the beneficence of hope for patients’ well-being, and for progress in research. Second, it shows how philosophical investigations—in particular Descartes—explore the phenomenon of hope and provide medical empirical research with profitable insights and tools. (shrink)

THIS PAPER COMPARES THE WORK OF MERLEAU-PONTY WITH THAT OF MARCEL, TO WHOM HE IS SAID TO OWE A MAJOR INTELLECTUAL DEBT. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE APPARENT SIMILARITIES TO BE FOUND IN THEIR WORK, ESPECIALLY IN THEIR CONCEPTS OF "INCARNATION" AND "SITUATION," THERE ARE STRIKING DIVERGENCES IN THEIR VIEWS ABOUT "HISTORY." A STUDY OF THESE POINTS THE WAY TO AN EXPLORATION OF YET MORE FUNDAMENTAL DISAGREEMENTS BETWEEN THEIR SUPERFICIALLY SIMILAR "PHILOSOPHIES OF EXISTENCE.".

The aim of this article is to argue that Marcel’s idea of freedom as participation in being is what constitutes authentic freedom and existence. A “pessimistic” existentialist, Sartre conceives of authentic freedom and existence or life as making free choices and committing oneself to one’s chosen mode of life and taking responsibility for it. However, this stand of absolute freedom of choice, irrespective of the morality and nature of one’ actions with regard to human essence and ontological status as finite (...) and potential being in need of plenitude, could lead to the loss of sense of being and the proliferation of evil in a society. This is because one might freely choose to indulge in an act that negates the essence of humanity and engenders self-destruction as well as the destruction of others, since, for the “pessimistic” existentialist, one only has to be committed to it and accept its accompanying responsibility to qualify as authentic freedom and existence. I will argue that Marcel’s conception of freedom as participation in being leads to an individual’s awareness of their ontological status as a finite being and that their finitude imposes a limitation on their hold on being and generates some self-trepidation that they might lose their sense of being, and consequently propels them to engage in those acts that are consistent and compatible with their essence and are geared towards self-realisation. I will conclude that genuine freedom and authentic life lie in participation in being. (shrink)

The Roman Catholic theological approach to euthanasia is radically prohibitive. The main theological argument for this prohibition is the so-called “stewardship argument”: Christians cannot escape accounting to God for stewardship of the bodies given them on earth. This contribution presents an alternative approach based on European existentialist and philosophical traditions. The suggestion is that exploring the fullness of our relational responsibility is more apt for a pluralist – and even secular – debate on the legitimacy of euthanasia.

The paper contrasts two approaches to the analysis of hope: one that takes its departure from a view broadly shared by Hobbes, Locke and Hume, another that fits better with Aquinas's definition of hope. The former relies heavily on a sharp distinction between the cognitive and conative aspects of hope. It is argued that while this approach provides a valuable source of insights, its focus is too narrow and it rests on a problematic rationalistic psychology. The argument is supported by (...) a discussion of hope understood as a stance and by a consideration of the phenomenological contrast between expectation and anticipation. The paper concludes with some reflections on the relation between hope and illusion and the idea of responsible hope. (shrink)

En el presente artículo nos aproximaremos al misterio del hombre a partir de las reflexiones antropológicas de Gabriel Marcel, presentes tanto en sus trabajos filosóficos como en sus obras dramáticas. En especial, nos centraremos en sus análisis sobre las dimensiones estructurales o metafísicas de la existencia personal. En primer lugar, abordaremos la condición corpórea y encarnada del hombre como punto de partida de toda reflexión filosófica concreta. Además, emprenderemos el estudio de la dimensión itinerante y temporal de la existencia personal, (...) marcada por la esperanzada búsqueda de una plenitud profundamente anhelada. También analizaremos la noción marceliana de “exigencia ontológica” como impulso interior de la apertura a la trascendencia. A su vez, desarrollaremos las reflexiones de Marcel sobre la libertad como conquista del propio ser, y como apertura que se consuma plenamente en la intersubjetividad. De este modo, destacaremos las diversas vías por las cuales nuestro autor buscar que nos dejemos asombrar por el misterio del hombre en su dramática plenitud, que nos interpela al reconocimiento y respeto de su sagrada dignidad. (shrink)

In a widely noted book, Henry Greely has suggested that “the end of sex” is on the horizon. By this he means that sexual activity for pleasure will be increasingly disconnected from the process by which children are conceived—a result of the growing availability of what he terms Easy PGD. This essay explores the possibility that this sense of an “end” of sex fails to attend adequately to another sense of “end”—namely, the telos that connects human sexual activity to the (...) birth of children. Articulating a Christian understanding of procreation, the essay notes that Easy PGD may invite us to miss the human significance of the connection between the love-giving and life-giving aspects of sexual activity. (shrink)

In this article, I discuss the nature, causes and effects of the crisis of civilization which we can observe for over forty years. This crisis affects social order, with its economic, institutional and demographic dimensions, as well as the culture and the social structure. Here, I am particularly dealing with the question of human person and their relations with others, as well as the humanities. I show globalization, the growth of cancerous mass culture and secularization as a background of the (...) crisis of civilization. In this context, I try to show the importance of Chiara Lubich and her work. (shrink)