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  1. Deprivation and the See-saw of Death.Christopher Wareham - 2009 - South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):246-56.
    Epicurus argued that death can be neither good nor bad because it involves neither pleasure nor pain. This paper focuses on the deprivation account as a response to this Hedonist Argument. Proponents of the deprivation account hold that Epicurus’s argument fails even if death involves no painful or pleasurable experiences and even if the hedonist ethical system, which holds that pleasure and pain are all that matter ethically, is accepted. I discuss four objections that have been raised against the deprivation (...)
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  • Personal Identity, Possible Worlds, and Medical Ethics.Nils-Frederic Wagner - 2022 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy: A European Journal (3):429-437.
    Thought experiments that concoct bizarre possible world modalities are standard fare in debates on personal identity. Appealing to intuitions raised by such evocations is often taken to settle differences between conflicting theoretical views that, albeit, have practical implications for ethical controversies of personal identity in health care. Employing thought experiments that way is inadequate, I argue, since personhood is intrinsically linked to constraining facts about the actual world. I defend a moderate modal skepticism according to which intuiting across conceptually incongruent (...)
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  • Sharing in a Common Life: People with Profound and Multiple Learning Difficulties.John Vorhaus - 2017 - Res Publica 23 (1):61-79.
    There is a view that what we owe to other people is explained by the fact that they are human beings who share in a common human life. There are many ways of construing this explanatory idea, and I explore a few of these here; the aim is to look for constructions that contribute to an understanding of what we owe to people with profound and multiple learning difficulties and disabilities. In exploring the idea of sharing in a common life (...)
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  • Engineering Life Expectancy and Non-identity Cases.Tatjana Višak - 2018 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 31 (2):281-293.
    In his paper “Eating Animals the Nice Way” McMahan : 66–76, 2008) explores whether there are ways of routinely using non-human animals for human consumption that are morally acceptable. He dismisses a practice of benign animal husbandry, in which animals are killed prematurely and believes that a practice in which animals were engineered to drop down dead instantaneously at the same age would be equally wrong, even though it would not involve killing. Yet, McMahan considers his intuition that both practices (...)
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  • Thinking Parts and Embodiment.Rina Tzinman - 2021 - Philosophical Quarterly 71 (1):163-182.
    According to the thinking parts problem, any part sufficient for thought—e.g. a head—is a good candidate for being a thinker, and therefore being us. So we can’t assume that we—thinkers—are human beings rather than their proper parts. Many solutions to this problem have been proposed. However, I will show that the views currently on the market all face serious problems. I will then offer a new solution that avoids these problems. The thinking parts problem arises from considerations that seem to (...)
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  • Withholding and Withdrawing Life-Sustaining Treatment and the Relevance of the Killing Versus Letting Die Distinction.Robert D. Truog & Andrew McGee - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (3):34-36.
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  • Your death might be the worst thing ever to happen to you (but maybe you shouldn't care).Travis Timmerman - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):18-37.
    Deprivationism cannot accommodate the common sense assumption that we should lament our death iff, and to the extent that, it is bad for us. Call this the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption. As such, either this assumption needs to be rejected or deprivationism does. I first argue that the Nothing Bad, Nothing to Lament Assumption is false. I then attempt to figure out which facts our attitudes concerning death should track. I suggest that each person should have two distinct (...)
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  • Doomsday Needn’t Be So Bad.Travis Timmerman - 2018 - Dialectica 72 (2):275-296.
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  • Dissolving Death’s Time-of-Harm Problem.Travis Timmerman - 2022 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 100 (2):405-418.
    Most philosophers in the death literature believe that death can be bad for the person who dies. The most popular view of death’s badness—namely, deprivationism—holds that death is bad for the person who dies because, and to the extent that, it deprives them of the net good that they would have accrued, had their actual death not occurred. Deprivationists thus face the challenge of locating the time that death is bad for a person. This is known as the Timing Problem, (...)
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  • Animals with Soul.Joshua C. Thurow - 2018 - Sophia 57 (1):85-101.
    I argue that ensouled animalism—the view that we are identical to animals that have immaterial souls as parts—has a pair of advantages over its two nearest rivals, materialistic animalism and pure dualism. Contra pure dualism, ensouled animalism can explain how physical predications can be literally true of us. Contra materialistic animalism, ensouled animalism can explain how animals can survive death. Furthermore, ensouled animalism has these advantages without creating any problems beyond those already faced by animalism and by belief in souls. (...)
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  • Critical notice--Defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice by Francis J Beckwith.D. Stretton - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (11):793-797.
    Francis Beckwith’s Defending life: a moral and legal case against abortion choice defends the pro-life position on moral, legal and political grounds. In this critical notice I consider three key issues and argue that Beckwith’s treatment of each of them is unpersuasive. The issues are: (1) whether abortion is politically justified by the principle that we should err on the side of liberty in the face of reasonable disagreement over the moral status of the fetus; (2) whether the fetus’s natural (...)
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  • Why It Does Not Matter What Matters: Relation R, Personal Identity, and Moral Theory.Bastian Steuwer - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (278):178-198.
    Derek Parfit famously argued that personal identity is not what matters for prudential concern about the future. Instead, he argues what matters is Relation R, a combination of psychological connectedness and continuity with any cause. This revisionary conclusion, Parfit argued, has profound implications for moral theory. It should lead us, among other things, to deny the importance of the separateness of persons as an important fact of morality. Instead, we should adopt impersonal consequentialism. In this paper, I argue that Parfit (...)
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  • Provokativ offentlig filosofi.Aksel Braanen Sterri - 2018 - Etikk I Praksis - Nordic Journal of Applied Ethics 12 (2):105-128.
    English summary: Provocative Public Philosophy In 2017, I argued that people with Down syndrome cannot live full lives. This sparked a heated debated in the Norwegian public sphere. This gave rise to a debate over what academics should and should not say in public. A certain form of public philosophy, what I will call provocative public philosophy, was criticized for being harmful, imperialistic, for eroding trust in philosophers, and for creating too much noise. In this article I will, in light (...)
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  • Døden som et onde.Carl Tollef Solberg - 2019 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 54 (3):167-186.
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  • Bør vi diskontere fremtidige helsegevinster?Carl Tollef Solberg, Mathias Barra & Bjarne Robberstad - 2020 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 55 (2-3):170-184.
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  • Human-animal transgenesis and chimeras might be an expression of our humanity.Julian Savulescu - 2003 - American Journal of Bioethics 3 (3):22 – 25.
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  • Targeting Human Shields.Amir Saemi & Philip Atkins - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (271):328-348.
    In this paper, we are concerned with the morality of killing human shields. Many moral philosophers seem to believe that knowingly killing human shields necessarily involves intentionally targeting human shields. If we assume that the distinction between intention and foresight is morally significant, then this view would entail that it is generally harder to justify a military operation in which human shields are knowingly killed than a military operation in which the same number of casualties result as a merely foreseen (...)
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  • Defending the link between ethical veganism and antinatalism.Joona Räsänen - 2023 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 44 (4):415-418.
    In my paper recently published in a collection of controversial arguments in this journal, I argued that the same principles that are behind ethical veganism also warrant antinatalist conclusions. I thus suggested that to be consistent in their ethical reasoning, moral vegans should not have children. William Bülow has kindly responded to my claims and offered a plausible reply, which, according to him, concludes that at least some moral vegans may resist antinatalism. In this short paper, I reply to Bülow.
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  • Saving the babies or the elderly in a time of crisis?Joona Räsänen - 2020 - American Journal of Bioethics 20 (7):180-182.
    In their important article, Haward et al. (2020) discuss whether guidelines for treating extremely premature babies should be altered to free up ventilators during crises such as COVID-19 pandemic. The authors’ claim is that premature babies do not deserve special consideration for ventilator treatment but merely equal consideration. In this brief commentary, I continue their discussion by considering additional factors that may help us determine whom we should save in a crisis: babies or the elderly.
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  • Demenz, Personalität und Praktische Selbstverhältnisse. Eine Auseinandersetzung mit den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Patientenautonomie Demenzbetroffener.Daniela Ringkamp - 2017 - Ethik in der Medizin 29 (2):119-132.
    ZusammenfassungAusgehend von den Positionen Ronald Dworkins, Rebecca Dressers und Agnieszka Jaworskas untersucht der Beitrag das Spannungsverhältnis zwischen vorgängigem und aktualem Selbstbestimmungsrecht demenzkranker Patienten und verbindet die Diskussion über das Autonomiepotential der Betroffenen mit einer Theorie praktischer Selbstverhältnisse, die die Patienten zumindest in den Anfangs- und den mittleren Stadien der Krankheit aufrechterhalten können. Theoretisches Grundgerüst für die Auseinandersetzung mit den Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der Patientenautonomie Demenzkranker ist dabei zunächst die Opposition zwischen Äquivalenz- und Nichtäquivalenztheorien der Personalität, in die sich auch die (...)
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  • Erzählte Identität? Zur Kritik narrativer Demenz-Theorien.Daniela Ringkamp - 2018 - Zeitschrift für Praktische Philosophie 5 (1):107-132.
    Nicht nur in der Demenzethik, sondern auch in grundlegenden Fragen zum Personen-Status von Demenzbetroffenen sind Verweise auf narrative Modelle, die die personale Identität Demenzkranker aufzeigen sollen, populär. Ziel des Beitrages ist eine kritische Auseinandersetzung mit den Voraussetzungen und argumentativen Problemen, die sich im Anschluss an diese ‚narrativen Demenztheorien‘ ergeben. Nach einer Einführung in die Begrifflichkeiten philosophischer Identitätskonzeptionen und einem exemplarischen Einblick in Modelle narrativer Demenztheorien werden Einwände gegen diese Positionen diskutiert. So ist zunächst unklar, welches Verständnis von ‚Narration‘ und ‚narrativer (...)
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  • Біоетична концепція якості життя: Критичний аналіз.Kateryna Rassudina - 2021 - Наукові Записки Наукма. Філософія Та Релігієзнавство 7:71-77.
    Bioethics is an interdisciplinary science that deals with the moral aspects of medicine, biotechnology and the value of life in general. Quality of life concept is the basis for one of the models of bioethics. Its supporters understand the value of human life by relying on the categories of its qualitative characteristics. They argue that the value of life is relative and depends on certain criteria, and prove the permissibility to terminate it in some cases. Quality of life conception is (...)
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  • Harm.Michael Rabenberg - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (3):1-32.
    In recent years, philosophers have proposed a variety of accounts of the nature of harm. In this paper, I consider several of these accounts and argue that they are unsuccessful. I then make a modest case for a different view.
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  • Desire satisfaction, death, and time.Duncan Purves - 2017 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (6):799-819.
    Desire satisfaction theories of well-being and deprivationism about the badness of death face similar problems: desire satisfaction theories have trouble locating the time when the satisfaction of a future or past-directed desire benefits a person; deprivationism has trouble locating a time when death is bad for a person. I argue that desire satisfaction theorists and deprivation theorists can address their respective timing problems by accepting fusionism, the view that some events benefit or harm individuals only at fusions of moments in (...)
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  • Does Division Multiply Desert?Theron Pummer - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):43-77.
    It seems plausible that (i) how much punishment a person deserves cannot be affected by the mere existence or nonexistence of another person. We might have also thought that (ii) how much punishment is deserved cannot increase merely in virtue of personal division. I argue that (i) and (ii) are inconsistent with the popular belief that, other things being equal, when people culpably do very wrong or bad acts, they ought to be punished for this—even if they have repented, are (...)
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  • Dignity, Health, and Membership: Who Counts as One of Us?Bryan C. Pilkington - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (2):115-129.
    This essay serves as an introduction to this issue of the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. The five articles in this issue address a range of topics from the human embryo and substantial change to conceptions of disability. They engage claims of moral status, defense of our humanity, and argue for an accurate and just classification of persons of different communities within a healthcare system. I argue in this essay that though their concerns are diverse, the authors in this issue (...)
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  • Moral Consistency Reasoning Reconsidered.Norbert Paulo - 2020 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 23 (1):107-123.
    Many contemporary ethicists use case-based reasoning to reach consistent beliefs about ethical matters. The idea is that particular cases elicit moral intuitions, which provide defeasible reasons to believe in their content. However, most proponents of case-based moral reasoning are not very explicit about how they resolve inconsistencies and how they abstract principles from judgments about particular cases. The aim of this article is to outline a methodology—called Consistency Reasoning Casuistry—for case-based reasoning in ethics. This methodology draws on Richmond Campbell and (...)
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  • Personal Identity, Substantial Change, and the Significance of Becoming.Michael Otsuka - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (6):1229-1243.
    According to philosophers who ground your anticipation of future experiences in psychological continuity and connectedness, it is rational to anticipate the experiences of someone other than yourself, such as a self that is the product of fission or of replication. In this article, I concur that it is rational to anticipate the experiences of the product of fission while denying the rationality of anticipating the experiences of a replica. In defending my position, I offer the following explanation of why you (...)
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  • The Passing of Temporal Well-Being.Ben Bramble - 2017 - New York, NY: Routledge.
    The philosophical study of well-being concerns what makes lives good for their subjects. It is now standard among philosophers to distinguish between two kinds of well-being: - lifetime well-being, i.e., how good a person's life was for him or her considered as a whole, and - temporal well-being, i.e., how well off someone was, or how they fared, at a particular moment in time or over a period of time longer than a moment but shorter than a whole life, say, (...)
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  • Withdrawal Aversion as a Useful Heuristic for Critical Care Decisions.Piotr Grzegorz Nowak & Tomasz Żuradzki - 2019 - American Journal of Bioethics 19 (3):36-38.
    While agreeing with the main conclusion of Dominic Wilkinson and colleagues (Wilkinson, Butcherine, and Savulescu 2019), namely, that there is no moral difference between treatment withholding and withdrawal as such, we wish to criticize their approach on the basis that it treats the widespread acceptance of withdrawal aversion (WA) as a cognitive bias. Wilkinson and colleagues understand WA as “a nonrational preference for withholding (WH) treatment over withdrawal (WD) of treatment” (22). They treat WA as a manifestation of loss aversion (...)
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  • The Symposium on “Setting Health-Care Priorities” by Torbjörn Tännsjö.Piotr Grzegorz Nowak - 2021 - Diametros 18 (68):1-8.
    The present paper constitutes an introduction to a special issue of Diametros devoted to Setting Health-Care Priorities. What Ethical Theories Tell Us by Torbjörn Tännsjö. The book in question states that there are three moral theories which have valid implications in the field of the distribution of medical resources in a healthcare system: utilitarianism, the maximin/leximin view, and egalitarianism. A number of authors have contributed to this special issue with papers which challenge this thesis. Robert E. Goodin argues that, besides (...)
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  • Non-conscious Entities Cannot Have Well-Being.Josh Mund - 2022 - Journal of Value Inquiry 58 (1):33-52.
    In this paper, I criticize the view that non-conscious entities—such as plants and bacteria—have well-being. Plausible sources of well-being include pleasure, the satisfaction of consciously held desires, and achievement. Since nonconscious entities cannot obtain well-being from these sources, the most plausible source of well-being for them is the exercise of natural capacities. Plants and bacteria, for example, certainly do exercise natural capacities. But I argue that exercising natural capacities does not in fact contribute (in a non-instrumental way) to well-being. I (...)
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  • The Wrongness of Third-Party Assisted Reproduction: A Natural Law Account.Melissa Moschella - 2016 - Christian Bioethics 22 (2):104-121.
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  • Trapped in the Wrong Body? Transgender Identity Claims, Body-Self Dualism, and the False Promise of Gender Reassignment Therapy.Melissa Moschella - 2021 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 46 (6):782-804.
    In this article, I explore difficult and sensitive questions regarding the nature of transgender identity claims and the appropriate medical treatment for those suffering from gender dysphoria. I first analyze conceptions of transgender identity, highlighting the prominence of the wrong-body narrative and its dualist presuppositions. I then briefly argue that dualism is false because our bodily identity is essential and intrinsic to our overall personal identity and explain why a sound, nondualist anthropology implies that gender identity cannot be entirely divorced (...)
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  • Scourges: Why Abortion Is Even More Morally Serious than Miscarriage.Calum Miller - 2023 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 48 (3):225-242.
    Several recent papers have suggested that the pro-life view entails a radical, implausible thesis: that miscarriage is the biggest public health crisis in the history of our species and requires radical diversion of funds to combat. In this paper, I clarify the extent of the problem, showing that the number of miscarriages about which we can do anything morally significant is plausibly much lower than previously thought, then describing some of the work already being done on this topic. I then (...)
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  • Early Abortion and Personal Ontology.Eugene Mills - 2013 - Acta Analytica 28 (1):19-30.
    We are beings endowed with “personal capacities”—the capacity for reason, for a concept of self, perhaps more. Among ontologically salient views about what else we are, I focus on the “Big Three.” According to animalism, we are animals that have psychological properties only contingently. According to psychologistic materialism, we are material beings; according to substance dualism, we are either immaterial beings or composites of immaterial and material ones; but according to both psychologistic materialism and substance dualism, we essentially have some (...)
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  • We Are Human Beings.Andrew McGee - 2016 - Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 41 (2):148-171.
    In this paper, I examine Jeff McMahan’s arguments for his claim that we are not human organisms, and the arguments of Derek Parfit to the same effect in a recent paper. McMahan uses these arguments to derive conclusions concerning the moral status of embryos and permanent vegetative state patients. My claim will be that neither thinker has successfully shown that we are not human beings, and therefore these arguments do not establish the ethical conclusions that McMahan has sought to draw (...)
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  • Kamm on inviolability and agent-relative restrictions.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2009 - Res Publica 15 (2):165-178.
    Agent-relative restrictions prohibit minimizing violations: that is, they require us not to minimize the total number of their violations by violating them ourselves. Frances Kamm has explained this prohibition in terms of the moral worth of persons, which, in turn, she explains in terms of persons’ high moral status as inviolable beings. I press the following criticism of this account: even if minimizing violations are permissible, we need not have a lower moral status provided other determinants thereof boost it. Thus, (...)
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  • Justice and the allocation of healthcare resources: should indirect, non-health effects count? [REVIEW]Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen & Sigurd Lauridsen - 2010 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (3):237-246.
    Alternative allocations of a fixed bundle of healthcare resources often involve significantly different indirect, non-health effects. The question arises whether these effects must figure in accounts of the conditions under which a distribution of healthcare resources is morally justifiable. In this article we defend a Scanlonian, affirmative answer to this question: healthcare resource managers should sometimes select an allocation which has worse direct, health-related effects but better indirect, nonhealth effects; they should do this when the interests served by such a (...)
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  • Our Atoms, Ourselves: Lucretius on the Psychology of Personal Identity (DRN 3.843–864).Maeve Lentricchia - 2020 - Elenchos: Rivista di Studi Sul Pensiero Antico 41 (2):297-328.
    In Epicurean cosmology, material reconstitution, or palingenesis (παλιγγενεσία) is the necessary consequence of the infinity of time and the eternity of atoms. I examine Lucretius’ treatment of this phenomenon (DRN 3.843–864) and consider the extent to which his view enables us to develop an Epicurean response to the question: what makes a person at two different times one and the same person? I offer a reading of this passage in the light of modern accounts of persistence and identity, and what (...)
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  • Accommodating Options.Seth Lazar - 2018 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (1):233-255.
    Many of us think we have agent-centred options to act suboptimally. Some of these involve favouring our own interests. Others involve sacrificing them. In this paper, I explore three different ways to accommodate agent-centred options in a criterion of objective permissibility. I argue against satisficing and rational pluralism, and in favour of a principle built around sensitivity to personal cost.
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  • Authorization and The Morality of War.Seth Lazar - 2016 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 94 (2):211-226.
    Why does it matter that those who fight wars be authorized by the communities on whose behalf they claim to fight? I argue that lacking authorization generates a moral cost, which counts against a war's proportionality, and that having authorization allows the transfer of reasons from the members of the community to those who fight, which makes the war more likely to be proportionate. If democratic states are better able than non-democratic states and sub-state groups to gain their community's authorization, (...)
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  • Ética en la guerra: la distinción entre soldados y civiles.Francisco Lara - 2013 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 38 (2):79-98.
    In war a soldier behaving properly should take into account a universal requirement not to kill, to be applied strictly in dealing with civilians, but at the same time to support the exception of taking the life of enemy combatants as an act of selfdefense. This is the usual way to distinguish morally the proper treatment to soldiers and civilians. In this article the author criticizes it and outlines a different way to understand and justify the moral distinction mentioned.
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  • Personales Leben und menschlicher Tod: Personale Identität als Prinzip der biomedizinischen Ethik, by Michael Quante. [REVIEW]Arto Laitinen - 2007 - European Journal of Philosophy 15 (2):306–313.
    Issues of personal identity are relevant in biomedical ethics, but in what way? The mainclaim that structures Quante’s book is that the debates about bioethics and medical ethicshave not been sufficiently clear about the different meanings of ‘personal identity’. Hedistinguishes four questions: 1)conditions of personhood (what properties and capacitiesmust a thing have to be a person: consciousness? self-consciousness? consciousness of timeand one’s persistence in time? rationality? capacity to recognize others and communicate with them?), 2) the question of unity or synchronous (...)
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  • Self-made People.David Mark Kovacs - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1071-1099.
    The Problem of Overlappers is a puzzle about what makes it the case, and how we can know, that we have the parts we intuitively think we have. In this paper, I develop and motivate an overlooked solution to this puzzle. According to what I call the self-making view it is within our power to decide what we refer to with the personal pronoun ‘I’, so the truth of most of our beliefs about our parts is ensured by the very (...)
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  • Tod des Körpers oder Tod der Person?: Philosophisch-anthropologische Untersuchungen zu einem integrativen Todeskonzept.Daniel Kersting - 2017 - Ethik in der Medizin 29 (3):217-232.
    ZusammenfassungDie aktuelle philosophische Diskussion um eine angemessene Bestimmung des Todesbegriffes ist vor allem durch zwei konkurrierende Ansätze geprägt: Gemäß dem einen Ansatz ist der menschliche Tod der Tod des Körpers, gemäß dem anderen Ansatz der Tod der Person bzw. des Bewusstseinslebens. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass beiden Ansätzen ein dualistisches und objektivistisches Verständnis des Menschen zugrunde liegt, dessen Anwendung in der Praxis zu zahlreichen Konflikten führt. Um diese Konflikte zu lösen, wird unter Rückgriff auf zentrale Einsichten der philosophischen Anthropologie Helmuth (...)
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  • What Justifies Our Bias Toward the Future?Todd Karhu - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (4):876-889.
    A person is biased toward the future when she prefers, other things being equal, bad events to be in her past rather than her future or good ones to be in her future rather than her past. In this paper, I explain why both critics and defenders of future bias have failed to consider the best version of the view. I distinguish external time from personal time, and show that future bias is best construed in terms of the latter. This (...)
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  • Non-identity, self-defeat, and attitudes to future children.Guy Kahane - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 145 (2):193-214.
    Although most people believe that it is morally wrong to intentionally create children who have an impairment, it is widely held that we cannot criticize such procreative choices unless we find a solution to Parfit’s non-identity problem. I argue that we can. Jonathan Glover has recently argued that, in certain circumstances, such choices would be self-defeating even if morally permissible. I argue that although the scope of Glover’s argument is too limited, it nevertheless directs attention to a moral defect in (...)
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  • Bioconservatism, Partiality, and the Human-Nature Objection to Enhancement.Pugh Jonathan, Guy Kahane & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - The Monist 99 (4):406-422.
    “Bioconservatives” in the human enhancement debate endorse the conservative claim that we should reject the use of biotechnologies that enhance natural human capacities. However, they often ground their objections to enhancement with contestable claims about human nature that are also in tension with other common tenets of conservatism. We argue that bioconservatives could raise a more plausible objection to enhancement by invoking a strain of conservative thought developed by G.A. Cohen. Although Cohen’s conservatism is not sufficient to fully revive the (...)
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  • Humanizing Personhood.Adam Kadlac - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (4):421 - 437.
    This paper explores the debate between personists, who argue that the concept of a person if of central importance for moral thought, and personists, who argue that the concept of a human being is of greater moral significance. On the one hand, it argues that normative naturalism, the most ambitious defense of the humanist position, fails to identify moral standards with standards of human behavior and thereby fails to undermine the moral significance of personhood. At the same time, it contends (...)
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