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Must I do what I ought (or will the least I can do do)?

In Mark Brown & Jose' Carmo (eds.), Deontic Logic, Agency and Normative Systems. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. pp. 154-173 (1996)

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  1. ‘Ought’ and Control.Matthew Chrisman - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (3):433-451.
    Ethical theorists often assume that the verb ?ought? means roughly ?has an obligation?; however, this assumption is belied by the diversity of ?flavours? of ought-sentences in English. A natural response is that ?ought? is ambiguous. However, this response is incompatible with the standard treatment of ?ought? by theoretical semanticists, who classify ?ought? as a member of the family of modal verbs, which are treated uniformly as operators. To many ethical theorists, however, this popular treatment in linguistics seems to elide an (...)
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  • Motivational Judgement Internalism and The Problem of Supererogation.Alfred Archer - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:601-621.
    Motivational judgement internalists hold that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. There is, though, an important lack of clarity in the literature about the types of moral evaluation the theory is supposed to cover. It is rarely made clear whether the theory is intended to cover all moral judgements or whether the claim covers only a subset of such judgements. In this paper I will investigate which moral judgements internalists should hold their theory to apply to. (...)
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  • Deontic Logic.Paul McNamara - 2006 - In Dov Gabbay & John Woods (eds.), The Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 7: Logic and the Modalities in the Twentieth Century. Elsevier Press. pp. 197-288.
    Overview of fundamental work in deontic logic.
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  • ‘Ought Implies Can’: Not So Pragmatic After All.Alex King - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95 (3):637-661.
    Those who want to deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle often turn to weakened views to explain ‘ought implies can’ phenomena. The two most common versions of such views are that ‘ought’ presupposes ‘can’, and that ‘ought’ conversationally implicates ‘can’. This paper will reject both views, and in doing so, present a case against any pragmatic view of ‘ought implies can’. Unlike much of the literature, I won't rely on counterexamples, but instead will argue that each of these views fails (...)
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  • Doing Well Enough in an Andersonian-Kangerian Framework.Paul McNamara - 1998 - In Paul McNamara & Henry Prakken (eds.), Norms, Logics and Information Systems: New Studies on Deontic Logic and Computer Science. IOS Press. pp. 181-198.
    I recast the DWE ("Doing Well Enough") deontic framework as an Andersonian-Kangerian modal framework and explore its metatheory systematically.
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  • The Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons.D. W. Portmore - 2011 - Mind 120 (477):117-153.
    It is through our actions that we affect the way the world goes. Whenever we face a choice of what to do, we also face a choice of which of various possible worlds to actualize. Moreover, whenever we act intentionally, we act with the aim of making the world go a certain way. It is only natural, then, to suppose that an agent's reasons for action are a function of her reasons for preferring some of these possible worlds to others, (...)
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  • Deontic Logic.Paul McNamara - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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  • Conversation and Responsibility.Ishtiyaque Haji - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (2):267 - 286.
    (2013). Conversation and responsibility. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, No. 2, pp. 267-286.
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  • Clinical Equipoise and Adaptive Clinical Trials.Nicolas Fillion - 2019 - Topoi 38 (2):457-467.
    Ethically permissible clinical trials must not expose subjects to risks that are unreasonable in relation to anticipated benefits. In the research ethics literature, this moral requirement is typically understood in one of two different ways: as requiring the existence of a state of clinical equipoise, meaning a state of honest, professional disagreement among the community of experts about the preferred treatment; or as requiring an equilibrium between individual and collective ethics. It has been maintained that this second interpretation makes it (...)
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  • Doing Well Enough: Toward a Logic for Common-Sense Morality.Paul McNamara - 1996 - Studia Logica 57 (1):167 - 192.
    On the traditional deontic framework, what is required (what morality demands) and what is optimal (what morality recommends) can't be distinguished and hence they can't both be represented. Although the morally optional can be represented, the supererogatory (exceeding morality's demands), one of its proper subclasses, cannot be. The morally indifferent, another proper subclass of the optional-one obviously disjoint from the supererogatory-is also not representable. Ditto for the permissibly suboptimal and the morally significant. Finally, the minimum that morality allows finds no (...)
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  • Contrastive Semantics for Deontic Modals.Justin Snedegar - 2012 - In Martijn Blaauw (ed.), Contrastivism in Philosophy: New Perspectives. Routledge.
    This paper argues for contrastivism about the deontic modals, 'ought', 'must', and 'may'. A simple contrastivist semantics that predicts the desired entailment relations among these modals is offered.
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  • On Necessity and Comparison.Aynat Rubinstein - 2014 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (4):512-554.
    The ability to compare possibilities and designate some as ‘better’ than others is a fundamental aspect of our use of modals and propositional attitude verbs. This article aims to support a proposal by Sloman that certain modal expressions, in particular, ought, in fact have a more pronounced comparative backbone than others . The connection between ‘ought’ and ‘better’ is supported by linguistic data and a proposal is advanced for modeling ideals in a way that makes room for non-comparative, strong, priority-type (...)
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