- Don't trust Fodor's guide in Monte Carlo: Learning concepts by hypothesis testing without circularity.Michael Deigan - 2023 - Mind and Language 38 (2):355-373.details
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Descartes and the Possibility of Enlightened Freedom.Daniel Fogal - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):499-534.details
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Semicompatibilism: no ability to do otherwise required.Taylor W. Cyr - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):308-321.details
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Moral Responsibility Without General Ability.Taylor W. Cyr & Philip Swenson - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):22-40.details
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Abilities, freedom, and inputs: a time traveller's tale.Olivia Coombes - 2023 - Dissertation, University of Edinburghdetails
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A dispositional account of practical knowledge.Constantin Jan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (9):2309-2329.details
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Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups.Stephanie Collins - 2023 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3375-3396.details
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Abilities and Obligations: Lessons from Non-agentive Groups.Stephanie Collins - 2022 - Erkenntnis 88 (8):3375-3396.details
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Forget the Folk: Moral Responsibility Preservation Motives and Other Conditions for Compatibilism.Cory J. Clark, Bo M. Winegard & Roy F. Baumeister - 2019 - Frontiers in Psychology 10:397001.details
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The Defeasibility of Knowledge-How.J. Adam Carter & Jesús Navarro - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):662-685.details
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Self-Effacing Reasons and Epistemic Constraints: Some Lessons from the Knowability Paradox.Massimiliano Carrara & Davide Fassio - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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On Behalf of a Bi-Level Account of Trust.J. Adam Carter - 2019 - Philosophical Studies:1-24.details
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On behalf of a bi-level account of trust.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2299-2322.details
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Intentional action and knowledge-centered theories of control.J. Adam Carter & Joshua Shepherd - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (3):957-977.details
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Causality, determination and necessitation in free human action.Vanessa Carr - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-28.details
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Unavoidable actions.Justin A. Capes - 2023 - Philosophical Explorations 27 (1):57-73.details
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Distributive Justice in Education and Conflicting Interests: Not (Remotely) as Bad as you Think.Tammy Harel Ben-Shahar - 2015 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 49 (4):491-509.details
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Conceptos de cognoscibilidad.Jan Heylen & Felipe Morales Carbonell - 2023 - Revista de Humanidades de Valparaíso 23:287-308.details
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The irrational failure to act.Matthew Heeney - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
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On being able to intend.Alfred R. Mele - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 180 (1):51-71.details
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Intentional action first.Yair Levy - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):705-718.details
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Agents’ Abilities.Romy Jaster - 2020 - Berlin, New York: De Gruyter.details
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Prospective Possibilism.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (2):117-150.details
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The paradox of the diffusiveness of power.Xiaoxing Zhang - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2489-2500.details
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Ability and the Past.Bokai Yao - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (4):397-406.details
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Rational 'ought' implies 'can'.Ralph Wedgwood - 2013 - Philosophical Issues 23 (1):70-92.details
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Perspectivism and the Argument from Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):361-374.details
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Reasons and Guidance.Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting - 2016 - Analytic Philosophy 57 (3):214-235.details
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Time Travel, Ability, and Arguments by Analogy.Ryan Wasserman - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):17-23.details
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Tracking and managing deemed abilities.Nicolas Troquard - 2019 - Synthese 198 (6):5027-5045.details
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Graded Abilities and Action Fragility.David Storrs-Fox - forthcoming - Erkenntnis:1-19.details
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Some Conceptual Aspects of Temporality and the Ability to Possess Rights.Sandeep Sreekumar - 2015 - Ratio Juris 28 (3):330-353.details
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Able to Do the Impossible.Jack Spencer - 2017 - Mind 126 (502):466-497.details
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Agency and Practical Abilities.Will Small - 2017 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 80:235-264.details
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No work for a theory of epistemic dispositions.Robert Weston Siscoe - 2021 - Synthese 198 (4):3477-3498.details
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Free Will and Consciousness: Experimental Studies.Joshua Shepherd - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):915-927.details
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Free will and mystery: looking past the Mind Argument.Seth Shabo - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):291-307.details
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What ability can do.Ben Schwan - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):703-723.details
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Ought implies can, asymmetrical freedom, and the practical irrelevance of transcendental freedom.Matthé Scholten - 2021 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (1):25-42.details
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A conditional theory of trying.David-Hillel Ruben - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (1):271-287.details
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Talent dispositionalism.Catherine M. Robb - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8085-8102.details
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The Logic of Joint Ability in Two-Player Tacit Games.Peter Hawke - 2017 - Review of Symbolic Logic 10 (3):481-508.details
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Unable to Do the Impossible.Anthony Nguyen - 2020 - Mind 129 (514):585-602.details
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Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence.Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):147-198.details
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Punishing the Awkward, the Stupid, the Weak, and the Selfish: The Culpability of Negligence.Michael S. Moore & Heidi M. Hurd - 2011 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 5 (2):147-198.details
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Doing One’s Reasonable Best: What Moral Responsibility Requires.Martin Montminy - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (1):55--73.details
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Joint Abilities, Joint Know-how and Collective Knowledge.Seumas Miller - 2019 - Social Epistemology 34 (3):197-212.details
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Omissions, Moral Luck, and Minding the (Epistemic) Gap.Joseph Metz - 2021 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 51 (4):301-314.details
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Keeping It Simple: Rethinking Abilities and Moral Responsibility.Joseph Metz - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):651-668.details
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An ability-based theory of responsibility for collective omissions.Joseph Metz - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2665-2685.details
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