Since special relativity and quantum mechanics, information has become a central concept in our description and understanding of physical reality. This statement may be construed in different ways, depending on the meaning we attach to the concept of information, and on our ontological commitments. One distinction is between mind-independent ‘Shannon information’ and a traditional conception of information, connected with meaning and knowledge. Another, orthogonal, distinction is between information considered as a fundamental physical entity, and an ontological agnosticism where physics is (...) about our information of the world rather than about the world itself. Combinations of these lead to various possibilities. I argue that adopting mind-independent information as ontologically fundamental is a hitherto undefended position with important advantages. This position appears similar to Floridi’s informational structural realism, but is fundamentally different. Rather than ‘epistemically indistinguishable differences’, it requires a robust conception of information as consisting of readable and interpretable messages. (shrink)

This paper examines the almost ineradicable misconception of Wittgenstein's alleged antagonism to science as evidenced through some characteristic disparaging comments by world-renowned scientists, notably by Anton Zeilinger. Above all, he criticizes Wittgenstein on the basis of the opening sentence of the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, "The world is all that is the case", which he regards as expressing *"the naive world-view"*1 of a *"typical philosopher of classical physics"*. He proposes an extension in agreement with the findings of quantum theory, namely by the (...) clause *"… and all that can be the case"* (Zeilinger 2003, 231). -/- It will become apparent, however, that this amplification is redundant, that Wittgenstein was in tune with modern physics, that a surprising number of his philosophical concepts are in agreement with it, and that various quantum pundits consider them to be relevant. (shrink)

Various esoteric traditions apply different modes of expression for the same metaphysical truths. We may name the two most known esoteric languages as ecstatic and scholastic. Early Daoist use of reverse symbolism as for metaphysical truths and its critical way of viewing formalist understanding of traditional teachings, common virtues and popular beliefs show that it applies an ecstatic language, which, being called shaṭḥ in Sufi terminology, has a detailed literature and technical description in Sufism. This article tries, after a short (...) survey of the concept of shaṭḥ in Sufism, to consider some early Daoist teachings such as wuwei, disparagement of moralism, and disparagement of rationality from an Eastern Sufi point of view regarding shaṭḥ to achieve a clearer insight into the gnostic aspects of the tradition, and to avoid certain possible misunderstanding of the teachings. (shrink)

We articulate the problems posed by the quantum liar experiment (QLE) for backwards causation interpretations of quantum mechanics, time-symmetric accounts and other dynamically oriented local hidden variable theories. We show that such accounts cannot save locality in the case of QLE merely by giving up “lambda-independence.” In contrast, we show that QLE poses no problems for our acausal Relational Blockworld interpretation of quantum mechanics, which invokes instead adynamical global constraints to explain Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) correlations and QLE. We make the case (...) that the acausal and adynamical perspective is more fundamental and that dynamical entities obeying dynamical laws are emergent features grounded therein. (shrink)

This paper argues for a metaphysics of relations based on a characterization of quantum entanglement in terms of non-separability, thereby regarding entanglement as a sort of holism. By contrast to a radical metaphysics of relations, the position set out in this paper recognizes things that stand in the relations, but claims that, as far as the relations are concerned, there is no need for these things to have qualitative intrinsic properties underlying the relations. This position thus opposes a metaphysics of (...) individual things that are characterized by intrinsic properties. A principal problem of the latter position is that it seems that we cannot gain any knowledge of these properties insofar as they are intrinsic. Against this background, the rationale behind a metaphysics of relations is to avoid a gap between epistemology and metaphysics. (shrink)

This is a discussion of how we can understand the world-view given to us by the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics, and in particular the role played by the concept of 'world'. The view presented is that we are entitled to use 'many-worlds' terminology even if the theory does not specify the worlds in the formalism; this is defended by means of an extensive analogy with the concept of an 'instant' or moment of time in relativity, with the lack of (...) a preferred foliation of spacetime being compared with the lack of a preferred basis in quantum theory. Implications for identity of worlds over time, and for relativistic quantum mechanics, are discussed. (shrink)

In this paper I present and defend Rovelli's relation quantum mechanics from some foreseeable objections, so as to clarify its philosophical implications vis a vis rival interpretations. In particular I will ask whether RQM presupposes a hidden recourse to both a duality of evolutions and of ontology. I then concentrate on the pluralistic, antimonistic metaphysical consequences of the theory, due to the impossibility of assigning a state to the quantum universe. Finally, in the last section I note interesting consequences of (...) RQM with respect to the possibility of defining a local, quantum relativistic becoming.Given the difficulties of having the cosmic form of becoming that would be appropriate for priority monism, RQM seems to present an important advantage with respect to monistic views, at least insofar as far as the possibility of explaining our experience of time is concerned. (shrink)

Barbour shows that time does not exist in the physical world, and similar conclusions are reached by others such as Deutsch, Davies and Woodward. Every possible configuration of a physical environment simply exists in the universe. The system is objectively static. Observation, however, is an inherently transtemporal phenomenon, involving actual or effective change of the configuration, collapse. Since, in a static environment, all possible configurations exist, transtemporal reality is of the logical type of a movie. The frame of a movie (...) film is of one logical type, an element of a set of frames, the movie, itself of a second logical type. In a static no-collapse universe, the configurations are of the first logical type, transtemporal reality of the second. To run, the movie requires iteration, a third logical type. Phenomenal consciousness is subjectively experienced as of this third logical type with regard to physical configurations. Everett's formulation clearly describes the transtemporal reality of an observer, which follows the physical in the linear dynamics, but departs from it on observation, giving rise to the the appearance of collapse, and the alternation of dynamics defined in the standard von Neumann-Dirac formulation. Since there is no physical collapse, his formulation is disputed. Given an iterator of the third logical type, the appearance of collapse is simply evidence of iteration. Chalmers demonstrates that phenomenal consciousness is of this logical type, an emergent property of the unitary system as a whole. Given an iterative function of this nature, one contextual to the physical configurations, paradoxes of time are resolved. Subjectively, meaning from the perspective of the iterative process, time passes in an objectively static universe, and the appearance of collapse is effected. (shrink)

A common understanding of quantum mechanics (QM) among students and practical users is often plagued by a number of “myths”, that is, widely accepted claims on which there is not really a general consensus among experts in foundations of QM. These myths include wave-particle duality, time-energy uncertainty relation, fundamental randomness, the absence of measurement-independent reality, locality of QM, nonlocality of QM, the existence of well-defined relativistic QM, the claims that quantum field theory (QFT) solves the problems of relativistic QM or (...) that QFT is a theory of particles, as well as myths on black-hole entropy. The fact is that the existence of various theoretical and interpretational ambiguities underlying these myths does not yet allow us to accept them as proven facts. I review the main arguments and counterarguments lying behind these myths and conclude that QM is still a not-yet-completely-understood theory open to further fundamental research. (shrink)

In the article I discuss possible amendments and corrections to Lewis’s semantics for counterfactuals that are necessary in order to account for the indeterministic and non-local character of the quantum world. I argue that Lewis’s criteria of similarity between possible worlds produce incorrect valuations for alternate-outcome counterfactuals in the EPR case. Later I discuss an alternative semantics which rejects the notion of miraculous events and relies entirely on the comparison of the agreement with respect to individual facts. However, a controversy (...) exists whether to include future indeterministic events in the criteria of similarity. J. Bennett has suggested that an indeterministic event count toward similarity only if it is a result of the same causal chain as in the actual world. I claim that a much better agreement with the demands of the quantum-mechanical indeterminism can be achieved when we stipulate that possible worlds which differ only with respect to indeterministic facts that take place after the antecedent-event should always be treated as equally similar to the actual world. In the article I analyze and dismiss some common-sense counterexamples to this claim. Finally, I critically evaluate Bennett’s proposal regarding the truth-conditions for true-antecedent counterfactuals. (shrink)

Objectively, time does not pass, physics reveals no such phenomenon. While subjectively we find ourselves at a specific point in time, 'now', and we appear to pass from moment to moment, physics can accommodate neither of these concepts, thus there is no explanation of subjective transtemporal reality, or how an observation could possibly be made. A solution to the puzzle is proposed based on an analysis of the logical type of the system required to explain such subjective experience. Relativity requires (...) that we consider the dimension of time on a par with the spatial dimensions, thus making a block universe inevitable. The concept of change can be recovered by considering a sequence of definitions of the block universe, and thus the passage of time can be considered to be the change of this definition, resulting in a sequence of block universes as transtemporal reality. However, the unitary wave function must subsume all possible block universes, all possibilities exist 'already', thus there is no becoming. As Barbour explains, each moment in time is a complete definition of the state of the whole four-dimensional universe, the sequence of states being static like the frames of a movie on the film. Since nothing passes from moment to moment it appears impossible that there could be any such thing as time that passes; this would require something of different logical type to the moments to account for such a phenomenon, and the moments are all that exist. What would be required is something that is to the moments as the projector is to the movie, something that contains all the moments and iterates the sequence. Clearly only the unitary system as a whole contains all the moments of any given sequence. Additionally, the only possible expression of the necessary logical type for an iterator is an emergent property of the system as a whole; only the system as a whole is of the correct logical type to change the functional frame of reference from one block universe to another, giving rise to the appearance of collapse described by Everett. Objectively this transtemporal process is the collapse dynamics, subjectively it is phenomenal consciousness passing through time. (shrink)

It is shown that Lewis’ ontological doctrine of Humean supervenience incorporates at its foundation the so-called separability principle of classical physics. In view of the systematic violation of the latter within quantum mechanics, the claim that contemporary physical science may posit non-supervenient relations beyond the spatiotemporal ones is reinforced on a foundational basis concerning constraints on the state representation of physical systems. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to quantum systems — unit state vectors versus statistical density operators (...) — we distinguish between strongly and weakly non-Humean, non-supervenient relations. It is demonstrated that in either case, the relations of quantum entanglement constitute prototypical examples of irreducible physical relations that do not supervene upon a spatiotemporal arrangement of Humean qualities, weakening, thereby, the thesis of Humean supervenience. In this respect, the status of Lewis’ recombination principle is examined, whereas his conception of lawhood is critically investigated. It is concluded that the assumption of ontological reductionism, as expressed in Lewis’ Humean doctrine, cannot be regarded as a reliable code of the nature of the physical world and its contents. It is proposed instead that due to the undeniable existence of non-supervenient relations, a metaphysic of relations of a moderate kind ought to be acknowledged as an indispensable part of our understanding of the natural world at a fundamental level. (shrink)

** The primary topic of this dissertation is the study of the relationships between parts and wholes as described by particular physical theories, namely generalized probability theories in a quasi-classical physics framework and non-relativistic quantum theory. ** A large part of this dissertation is devoted to understanding different aspects of four different kinds of correlations: local, partially-local, no-signaling and quantum mechanical correlations. Novel characteristics of these correlations have been used to study how they are related and how they can be (...) discerned via Bell-type inequalities that give non-trivial bounds on the strength of the correlations. ** The study of quantum correlations has also prompted us to study a) the multi-partite qubit state space with respect to its entanglement and separability characteristics, and b) the differing strength of the correlations in separable and entangled qubit states. Results include a novel classification of multipartite (partial) separability and entanglement, strong constraints on the monogamy of entanglement and of non-local correlations, and many new entanglement detection criteria that are directly experimentally accessible. ** Because of the generality of the investigation these results also have strong foundational as well as philosophical repercussions for the different sorts of physical theories as a whole; notably for the viability of hidden variable theories for quantum mechanics, for the possibility of doing experimental metaphysics, for the question of holism in physical theories, and for the classical vs. quantum dichotomy. (shrink)

J.S. Bell believed that his famous theorem entailed a deep and troubling conflict between the empirically verified predictions of quantum theory and the notion of local causality that is motivated by relativity theory. Yet many physicists continue to accept, usually on the reports of textbook writers and other commentators, that Bell’s own view was wrong, and that, in fact, the theorem only brings out a conflict with determinism or the hidden-variables program or realism or some other such principle that (unlike (...) local causality), allegedly, nobody should have believed anyway. Moreover, typically such beliefs arise without the person in question even being aware that the view they are accepting differs so radically from Bell’s own. Here we try to shed some light on the situation by focusing on the concept of local causality that is the heart of Bell’s theorem, and, in particular, by contrasting Bell’s own understanding with the analysis of Jon Jarrett which has been the most influential source, in recent decades, for the kinds of claims mentioned previously. We point out a crucial difference between Jarrett’s and Bell’s own understanding of Bell’s formulation of local causality, which turns out to be the basis for the erroneous claim, made by Jarrett and many others, that Bell misunderstood the implications of his own theorem. (shrink)

It is known that the global state of a composite quantum system can be completely determined by specifying correlations between measurements performed on subsystems only. Despite the fact that the quantum correlations thus suffice to reconstruct the quantum state, we show, using a Bell inequality argument, that they cannot be regarded as objective local properties of the composite system in question. It is well known since the work of Bell, that one cannot have locally preexistent values for all physical quantities, (...) whether they are deterministic or stochastic. The Bell inequality argument we present here shows this is also impossible for correlations among subsystems of an individual isolated composite system. Neither of them can be used to build up a world consisting of some local realistic structure. As a corrolary to the result we argue that entanglement cannot be considered ontologically robust. The Bell inequality argument has an important advantage over others because it does not need perfect correlations but only statistical correlations. It can therefore easily be tested in currently feasible experiments using four particle entanglement. (shrink)

It is shown that the Hilbert-Bernays-Quine principle of identity of indiscernibles applies uniformly to all the contentious cases of symmetries in physics, including permutation symmetry in classical and quantum mechanics. It follows that there is no special problem with the notion of objecthood in physics. Leibniz's principle of sufficient reason is considered as well; this too applies uniformly. But given the new principle of identity, it no longer implies that space, or atoms, are unreal.

This paper argues for a metaphysics of relations based on a characterization of quantum entanglement in terms of non-separability, thereby regarding entanglement as a sort of holism. By contrast to a radical metaphysics of relations, the position set out in this paper recognizes things that stand in the relations, but claims that, as far as the relations are concerned, there is no need for these things to have qualitative intrinsic properties underlying the relations. This position thus opposes a metaphysics of (...) individual things that are characterized by intrinsic properties. A principal problem of the latter position is that it seems that we cannot gain any knowledge of these properties insofar as they are intrinsic. Against this background, the rationale behind a metaphysics of relations is to avoid a gap between epistemology and metaphysics. (shrink)

In this paper I examine the role of dispositional properties in the most frequently discussed interpretations of non-relativistic quantum mechanics. After offering some motivation for this project, I briefly characterize the distinction between non-dispositional and dispositional properties in the context of quantum mechanics by suggesting a necessary condition for dispositionality – namely contextuality – and, consequently, a sufficient condition for non-dispositionality, namely non-contextuality. Having made sure that the distinction is conceptually sound, I then analyze the plausibility of the widespread, monistic (...) ontological thesis about the reducibility of dispositional properties to categorical properties in the context of the philosophy of quantum mechanics. I conclude that with the exception of Bohmian mechanics, the other “minimally realist” views of quantum mechanics require essential dispositions, i.e., dispositions of a non-reducible kind. Interestingly, seen behind the lenses of dispositionalism, Bohr’s and Bohm’s interpretations of quantum mechanics are much closer than it is usually recognized, a fact that could teach us something about the way the quantum world is. (shrink)

We examine the question of whether scientific theories can ever be complete. For two closely related reasons, we will argue that they cannot. The first reason is the inability to determine what are “valid empirical observations”, a result that is based on a self-reference Gödel/Tarski-like proof. The second reason is the existence of “meta-empirical” evidence of the inherent incompleteness of observations. These reasons, along with theoretical incompleteness, are intimately connected to the notion of belief and to theses within the philosophy (...) of science: the Quine-Duhem (and underdetermination) thesis and the observational/theoretical distinction failure. Some puzzling aspects of the philosophical theses will become clearer in light of these connections. Other results that follow are: no absolute measure of the informational content of empirical data, no absolute measure of the entropy of physical systems, and no complete computer simulation of the natural world are possible. The connections with the mathematical theorems of Gödel and Tarski reveal the existence of other connections between scientific and mathematical incompleteness: computational irreducibility, complexity, infinity, arbitrariness and self-reference. Finally, suggestions will be offered of where a more rigorous (or formal) “proof” of scientific incompleteness can be found. (shrink)

Structural realism as developed by John Worrall and others can claim philosophical roots as far back as the late 19th century, though the discussion at that time does not unambiguously favor the contemporary form, or even its realism. After a critical examination of some aspects of the historical background some severe critical challenges to both Worrall's and Ladyman's versions are highlighted, and an alternative empiricist structuralism proposed. Support for this empiricist version is provided in part by the different way in (...) which we can do justice to Worrall's original demands and in part by the viewpoint it provides (in contrast to e.g. Michael Friedman's) on the stability maintained through scientific theory change. Planck against the heretics 1.1 Poincaré on the meaning of Maxwell's equations 1.2 Two responses: reification and structuralism On the road to structuralism 2.1 The microscope 2.2 Mathematization of the world picture 2.3 The 18th–20th century The new structural realism 3.1 From scientific realism to structuralism 3.2 The Ladyman variant: objectivity and invariance 3.3 How is structural realism supported? An empiricist structuralism 4.1 Royal succession in science 4.2 Defence of the empiricist version 4.3 Structure: an empiricist view. (shrink)

Standard quantum mechanics unquestionably violates the separability principle that classical physics (be it point-like analytic, statistical, or field-theoretic) accustomed us to consider as valid. In this paper, quantum nonseparability is viewed as a consequence of the Hilbert-space quantum mechanical formalism, avoiding thus any direct recourse to the ramifications of Kochen-Specker’s argument or Bell’s inequality. Depending on the mode of assignment of states to physical systems – unit state vectors versus non-idempotent density operators – we distinguish between strong/relational and weak/deconstructional forms (...) of quantum nonseparability. The origin of the latter is traced down and discussed at length, whereas its relation to the all important concept of potentiality in forming a coherent picture of the puzzling entangled interconnections among spatially separated systems is also considered. Finally, certain philosophical consequences of quantum non-separability concerning the nature of quantum objects, the question of realism in quantum mechanics, and possible limitations in revealing the actual character of physical reality in its entirety are explored. (shrink)

The claim of this paper is that we should envisage physicalism as an ontological holism. Our current basic physics, quantum theory, suggests that, ontologically speaking, we have to assume one global quantum state of the world; many of the properties that are often taken to be intrinsic properties of physical systems are in fact relations, which are determined by that global quantum state. The paper elaborates on this conception of physicalism as an ontological holism and considers issues such as supervenience, (...) realization of higher-order properties by basic physical properties, and reduction. Keywords: physicalism, holism, relations, space-time, quantum physics, Humean supervenience. (shrink)

The most debated status of the wave function of Quantum Mechanics is discussed in the light of the epistemological vs ontological opposition.

The extremely successful _Standard Model of Particle Physics_ allows one to define the so-called _Elementary Particles_. From another point of view, how can we think of them? What kind of a status can be attributed to Elementary Particles and their associated quantised fields? Beyond the unprecedented efficiency and reach of quantum field theories, the current paper attempts at understanding the nature of what these theories describe, the enigmatic reality of the quantum world.

Despite remarkable efforts, it remains notoriously difficult to equip quantum theory with a coherent ontology. Hence, Healey (2017, 12) has recently suggested that ‘‘quantum theory has no physical ontology and states no facts about physical objects or events’’, and Fuchs et al. (2014, 752) similarly hold that ‘‘quantum mechanics itself does not deal directly with the objective world’’. While intriguing, these positions either raise the question of how talk of ‘physical reality’ can even remain meaningful, or they must ultimately embrace (...) a hidden variables-view, in tension with their original project. I here offer a neo-Kantian alternative. In particular, I will show how constitutive elements in the sense of Reichenbach (1920) and Friedman (1999, 2001) can be identified within quantum theory, through considerations of symmetries that allow the constitution of a ‘quantum reality’, without invoking any notion of a radically mind-independent reality. The resulting conception will inherit elements from pragmatist and ‘QBist’ approaches, but also differ from them in crucial respects. Furthermore, going beyond the Friedmanian program, I will show how non-fundamental and approximate symmetries can be relevant for identifying constitutive principles. (shrink)

Математическата величина на вероятността се определя стандартно като положително реално число в затворения интервал от нула до единица, еднозначно опредимо в съотвествие с няколко аксиоми, напр. тези на Колмпгоров. Нейната философска интерпретация е на мярка за част от цяло. В теорията на квантовата информация, изследваща явленията на сдвояване [entanglement] в квантовата механика, се въвеждат отрицателни и комплексни вероятности. Статията обсъжда проблема какво би следвало да бъде тяхното релевантно философско тълкувание.

A historical review and philosophical look at the introduction of “negative probability” as well as “complex probability” is suggested. The generalization of “probability” is forced by mathematical models in physical or technical disciplines. Initially, they are involved only as an auxiliary tool to complement mathematical models to the completeness to corresponding operations. Rewards, they acquire ontological status, especially in quantum mechanics and its formulation as a natural information theory as “quantum information” after the experimental confirmation the phenomena of “entanglement”. Philosophical (...) interpretations appear. A generalization of them is suggested: ontologically, they correspond to a relevant generalization to the relation of a part and its whole where the whole is a subset of the part rather than vice versa. The structure of “vector space” is involved necessarily in order to differ the part “by itself” from it in relation to the whole as a projection within it. That difference is reflected in the new dimension of vector space both mathematically and conceptually. Then, “negative or complex probability” are interpreted as a quantity corresponding the generalized case where the part can be “bigger” than the whole, and it is represented only partly in general within the whole. (shrink)

The book is devoted to the contemporary stage of quantum mechanics – quantum information, and especially to its philosophical interpretation and comprehension: the first one of a series monographs about the philosophy of quantum information. The second will consider Be l l ’ s inequalities, their modified variants and similar to them relations. The beginning of quantum information was in the thirties of the last century. Its speed development has started over the last two decades. The main phenomenon is entanglement. (...) The subareas are quantum computer, quantum communication (and teleportation), and quantum cryptography. The book offers the following main conceptions, theses and hypotheses: – dualistic Phythagoreanism as a new kind among the interpretations of quantum mechanics and information: arithmetical, logical, and metamathematical one; – Gödel ’ s first incompleteness theorem is an undecidable proposition, and consequently the second one,too. – a partial rehabilitation of Hilbert ’ s program for the self-foundation of mathematics; – the dual-foundation of mathematics; – Skolemian relativity between: Cantor ’s kinds of infinity, finiteness and infinity, discreteness and continuity, completeness and incompleteness, etc.; – information is a physical quantity representing the non-reducibility of a system to its parts, particularly nonaddtivity; – there exist pure relations «by itself», which cannot be reduced to predications; – energy conservation can and should be generalized; – Einstein’ s «general covariance» or «principle of relativity» can and should be generalized to cover discrete morphisms where the notion of velocity does not make sense. (shrink)

In this paper we attempt to analyze the concept of quantum probability within quantum computation and quantum computational logic. While the subjectivist interpretation of quantum probability explains it as a reliable predictive tool for an agent in order to compute measurement outcomes, the objectivist interpretation understands quantum probability as providing reliable information of a real state of affairs. After discussing these different viewpoints we propose a particular objectivist interpretation grounded on the idea that the Born rule provides information about an (...) intensive realm of reality. We then turn our attention to the way in which the subjectivist interpretation of probability is presently applied within both quantum computation and quantum computational logic. Taking as a standpoint our proposed intensive account of quantum probability we discuss the possibilities and advantages it might open for the modeling and development of both quantum computation and quantum computational logic. (shrink)

We argue that the notion of pure sate within Standard Quantum Mechanics is presently applied within the specialized literature in relation to two mutually inconsistent definitions. While the first provides a basis-dependent definition which makes reference to the certain prediction of measurement outcomes, the latter provides a purely abstract invariant definition which lacks operational content. In this work we derive a theorem which exposes the serious inconsistencies existent within these two incompatible definitions of purity.

In this paper we address a deeply interesting debate that took place at the end of the last millennia between David Mermin, Adan Cabello and Michiel Seevinck, regarding the meaning of relationalism within quantum theory. In a series of papers, Mermin proposed an interpretation in which quantum correlations were considered as elements of physical reality. Unfortunately, the very young relational proposal by Mermin was too soon tackled by specially suited no-go theorems designed by Cabello and Seevinck. In this work we (...) attempt to reconsider Mermin's program from the viewpoint of the Logos Categorical Approach to QM. Following Mermin's original proposal, we will provide a redefinition of quantum relation which not only can be understood as a preexistent element of physical reality but is also capable to escape Cabello’s and Seevinck's no-go-theorems. In order to show explicitly that our notion of ontological quantum relation is safe from no-go theorems we will derive a non-contextuality theorem. We end the paper with a discussion regarding the physical meaning of quantum relationalism. (shrink)

In this paper we we will argue against the orthodox definition of quantum entanglement which has been implicitly grounded on several widespread presuppositions which have no relation whatsoever to the formalism of QM. We will show how these presuppositions have been introduced through a naive interpretation of the quantum mathematical structure which assumes dogmatically that the theory talks about "small particles" represented by pure states which suddenly "collapse" when a measurement takes place. In the second part of this paper we (...) will present a non-collapse approach to QM which makes no use whatsoever of particle metaphysics, escaping the need to make reference to space-time separability or the restriction to certain predictions of definite valued binary properties. Our paper ends up concluding the essential need to redefine the notion of quantum entanglement, at least in the cases of: i) non-collapse interpretations of QM; or, ii) any other interpretation which abandons the idea that QM makes reference to "small particles". (shrink)

In this paper we consider the notion of quantum entanglement from the perspective of the logos categorical approach [26, 27]. Firstly, we will argue that the widespread distinctions, on the one hand, between pure states and mixed states, and on the other, between separable states and entangled states, are completely superfluous when considering the orthodox mathematical formalism of QM. We will then argue that the introduction of these distinctions within the theory of quanta is due to another two completely unjustified (...) metaphysical presuppositions, namely, the idea that there is a “collapse” of quantum states when being measured and the idea that QM talks about “elementary particles”. At distance from these distinctions and taking the logos approach as a standpoint, we will propose an objective formal account of the notion of entanglement in terms of potential coding which introduces the necessary distinction between intensive relations and effective relations. We will also discuss how this new definition of entanglement provides an anschaulich content to this —supposedly “spooky”— quantum relational feature. (shrink)

We propose that observables in quantum theory are properly understood as representatives of symmetry-invariant quantities relating one system to another, the latter to be called a reference system. We provide a rigorous mathematical language to introduce and study quantum reference systems, showing that the orthodox “absolute” quantities are good representatives of observable relative quantities if the reference state is suitably localised. We use this relational formalism to critique the literature on the relationship between reference frames and superselection rules, settling a (...) long-standing debate on the subject. (shrink)

It is shown that there are significant conceptual differences between QM and QFT which make it difficult to view the latter as just a relativistic extension of the principles of QM. At the root of this is a fundamental distiction between Born-localization in QM (which in the relativistic context changes its name to Newton–Wigner localization) and modular localization which is the localization underlying QFT, after one separates it from its standard presentation in terms of field coordinates. The first comes with (...) a probability notion and projection operators, whereas the latter describes causal propagation in QFT and leads to thermal aspects of locally reduced finite energy states. The Born–Newton–Wigner localization in QFT is only applicable asymptotically and the covariant correlation between asymptotic in and out localization projectors is the basis of the existence of an invariant scattering matrix. -/- In this first part of a two part essay the modular localization (the intrinsic content of field localization) and its philosophical consequences take the center stage. Important physical consequences of vacuum polarization will be the main topic of part II. The present division into two semi-autonomous essays is the result of a partition and extension of an originally one-part manuscript. (shrink)

The degree-of-presence concept, accompanying that of the wavefunction-reality postulate, is introduced and studied in two ways. To begin with, an incomplete exposition of the present author's views is given. Subsequently, a short historical and philosophical review of answers to the question about the meaning of indeterminate individual-system probabilities is presented from the literature. It is done in the form of a carefully selected collage of quotations mostly with polemic comments by the present author and with further elaboration of his point (...) of view. The advocated notion of ‘degree of presence’ generalizes the intuitively most easily acceptable idea of ‘delocalization’ in wavelike behavior of a quantum system. (shrink)

Hugh Everett III proposed that a quantum measurement can be treated as an interaction that correlates microscopic and macroscopic systems—particularly when the experimenter herself is included among those macroscopic systems. It has been difficult, however, to determine precisely what this proposal amounts to. Almost without exception, commentators have held that there are ambiguities in Everett’s theory of measurement that result from significant—even embarrassing—omissions. In the present paper, we resist the conclusion that Everett’s proposal is incomplete, and we develop a close (...) reading that accounts for apparent oversights. We begin by taking a look at how Everett set up his project—his method and his criterion of success. Illuminating parallels are found between Everett’s method and then-contemporary thought regarding inter-theoretic reduction. Also, from unpublished papers and correspondence, we are able to piece together how Everett judged the success of his theory of measurement, which completes our account of his intended contribution to the resolution of the quantum measurement problem. (shrink)

The literature on physicalism often fails to elucidate, I think, what the word physical in physical ism precisely means. Philosophers speak at times of an ideal set of fundamental physical facts, or they stipulate that physical means non-mental , such that all fundamental physical facts are fundamental facts pertaining to the non-mental. In this article, I will probe physicalism in the very much tangible framework of quantum mechanics. Although this theory, unlike “ideal physics” or some “final theory of non-mentality”, is (...) an incomplete theory of the world, I believe this analysis will be of value, if for nothing else, at least for bringing some taste of physical reality, as it were, back to the debate. First, I will introduce a broad characterization of the physicalist credo. In Sect. 2, I will provide a rather quick review of quantum mechanics and some of its current interpretations. In Sect. 3, the notion of quantum non-separability will be analyzed, which will facilitate a discussion of the wave function ontology in Sect. 4. In Sects. 5 and 6, I will explore competing views on the implications of this ontology. In Sect. 7, I will argue that the prior results, based on a thoroughly realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, support only a weak version of non-reductive physicalism. (shrink)

In a recently proposed interpretation of quantum mechanics, U. Mohrhoff advocates original and thought-provoking views on space and time, the definition of macroscopic objects, and the meaning of probability statements. The interpretation also addresses a number of questions about factual events and the nature of reality. The purpose of this note is to examine several issues raised by Mohrhoff's interpretation, and to assess whether it helps providing solutions to the long-standing problems of quantum mechanics.

This paper offers a critique of the Bayesian interpretation of quantum mechanics with particular focus on a paper by Caves, Fuchs, and Schack containing a critique of the “objective preparations view” or OPV. It also aims to carry the discussion beyond the hardened positions of Bayesians and proponents of the OPV. Several claims made by Caves et al. are rebutted, including the claim that different pure states may legitimately be assigned to the same system at the same time, and the (...) claim that the quantum nature of a preparation device cannot legitimately be ignored. Both Bayesians and proponents of the OPV regard the time dependence of a quantum state as the continuous dependence on time of an evolving state of some kind. This leads to a false dilemma: quantum states are either objective states of nature or subjective states of belief. In reality they are neither. The present paper views the aforesaid dependence as a dependence on the time of the measurement to whose possible outcomes the quantum state serves to assign probabilities. This makes it possible to recognize the full implications of the only testable feature of the theory, viz., the probabilities it assigns to measurement outcomes. Most important among these are the objective fuzziness of all relative positions and momenta and the consequent incomplete spatiotemporal differentiation of the physical world. The latter makes it possible to draw a clear distinction between the macroscopic and the microscopic. This in turn makes it possible to understand the special status of measurements in all standard formulations of the theory. Whereas Bayesians have written contemptuously about the “folly” of conjoining “objective” to “probability,” there are various reasons why quantum-mechanical probabilities can be considered objective, not least the fact that they are needed to quantify an objective fuzziness. But this cannot be appreciated without giving thought to the makeup of the world, which Bayesians refuse to do. Doing this on the basis of how quantum mechanics assigns probabilities, one finds that what constitutes the macroworld is a single Ultimate Reality, about which we know nothing, except that it manifests the macroworld or manifests itself as the macroworld. The so-called microworld is neither a world nor a part of any world but instead is instrumental in the manifestation of the macroworld. Quantum mechanics affords us a glimpse “behind” the manifested world, at stages in the process of manifestation, but it does not allow us to describe what lies “behind” the manifested world except in terms of the finished product—the manifested world, for without the manifested world there is nothing in whose terms we could describe its manifestation. (shrink)

Any attempt to introduce probabilities into quantum mechanics faces difficulties due to the mathematical structure of Hilbert space, as reflected in Birkhoff and von Neumann's proposal for a quantum logic. The (consistent or decoherent) histories solution is provided by its single framework rule, an approach that includes conventional (Copenhagen) quantum theory as a special case. Mermin's Ithaca interpretation addresses the same problem by defining probabilities which make no reference to a sample space or event algebra (“correlations without correlata”). But this (...) leads to severe conceptual difficulties, which almost inevitably couple quantum theory to unresolved problems of human consciousness. Using histories allows a sharper quantum description than is possible with a density matrix, suggesting that the latter provides an ensemble rather than an irreducible single-system description as claimed by Mermin. The histories approach satisfies the first five of Mermin's desiderata for a good interpretation of quantum mechanics, including Einstein locality, but the Ithaca interpretation seems to have difficulty with the first (independence of observers) and the third (describing individual systems). (shrink)

A goal of most interpretations of quantum mechanics is to avoid the apparent intrusion of the observer into the measurement process. Such intrusion is usually seen to arise because observation somehow selects a single actuality from among the many possibilities represented by the wavefunction. The issue is typically treated in terms of the mathematical formulation of the quantum theory. We attempt to address a different manifestation of the quantum measurement problem in a theory-neutral manner. With a version of the two-slit (...) experiment, we demonstrate that an enigma arises directly from the results of experiments. Assuming that no observable physical phenomena exist beyond those predicted by the theory, we argue that no interpretation of the quantum theory can avoid a measurement problem involving the observer. (shrink)

In honor of Daniel Greenberger's 65th birthday, I record for posterity two superb examples of his wit, offer a proof of an important theorem on quantum correlations that even those of us over 60 can understand, and suggest, by trying to make it look silly, that invoking “quantum nonlocality” as an explanation for such correlations may be too cheap a way out of the dilemma they pose.

Quantum theory has the property of “local tomography”: the state of any composite system can be reconstructed from the statistics of measurements on the individual components. In this respect the holism of quantum theory is limited. We consider in this paper a class of theories more holistic than quantum theory in that they are constrained only by “bilocal tomography”: the state of any composite system is determined by the statistics of measurements on pairs of components. Under a few auxiliary assumptions, (...) we derive certain general features of such theories. In particular, we show how the number of state parameters can depend on the number of perfectly distinguishable states. We also show that real-vector-space quantum theory, while not locally tomographic, is bilocally tomographic. (shrink)