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  1. Five-Year-Olds’ Systematic Errors in Second-Order False Belief Tasks Are Due to First-Order Theory of Mind Strategy Selection: A Computational Modeling Study.Burcu Arslan, Niels A. Taatgen & Rineke Verbrugge - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Task constraints distinguish perspective inferences from perspective use during discourse interpretation in a false belief task.Heather J. Ferguson, Ian Apperly, Jumana Ahmad, Markus Bindemann & James Cane - 2015 - Cognition 139 (C):50-70.
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  • Six-year-olds' difficulties handling intensional contexts.Sarah Hulme, Peter Mitchell & David Wood - 2003 - Cognition 87 (2):73-99.
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  • Shape constancy and theory of mind: is there a link?Peter Mitchell & Laura M. Taylor - 1999 - Cognition 70 (2):167-190.
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  • Alphabetic and nonalphabetic L1 effects in English word identification: a comparison of Korean and Chinese English L2 learners. [REVIEW]Min Wang, Keiko Koda & Charles A. Perfetti - 2003 - Cognition 87 (2):129-149.
    Different writing systems in the world select different units of spoken language for mapping. Do these writing system differences influence how first language (L1) literacy experiences affect cognitive processes in learning to read a second language (L2)? Two groups of college students who were learning to read English as a second language (ESL) were examined for their relative reliance on phonological and orthographic processing in English word identification: Korean students with an alphabetic L1 literacy background, and Chinese students with a (...)
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  • Mindreading in Gettier Cases and Skeptical Pressure Cases.Jennifer Nagel - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
    To what extent should we trust our natural instincts about knowledge? The question has special urgency for epistemologists who want to draw evidential support for their theories from certain intuitive epistemic assessments while discounting others as misleading. This paper focuses on the viability of endorsing the legitimacy of Gettier intuitions while resisting the intuitive pull of skepticism – a combination of moves that most mainstream epistemologists find appealing. Awkwardly enough, the “good” Gettier intuitions and the “bad” skeptical intuitions seem to (...)
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  • Children's acquisition of evidentiality.Anna Papafragou - unknown
    This paper is concerned with the acquisition of the semantics and pragmatics of evidentiality. Evidentiality markers encode the speaker’s source for the information being reported in the utterance. While languages like English express evidentiality in lexical markers (I saw that it was raining vs. I heard that it was raining), other languages grammaticalize evidentiality. In Turkish, for all instances of past reference there is an obligatory choice between the suffixes -DI (realized as –di, -dı, -du, -dü, -ti, -tı, -tu, -tü (...)
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  • Evidentiality in language and cognition.Anna Papafragou - 2007 - Cognition 103 (2):253-299.
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  • How do young children process beliefs about beliefs?: Evidence from response latency.Haruo Kikuno, Peter Mitchell & Fenja Ziegler - 2007 - Mind and Language 22 (3):297–316.
    Are incorrect judgments on false belief tasks better explained within the framework of a conceptual change theory or a bias theory? Conceptual change theory posits a change in the form of reasoning from 3 to 4 years old while bias theory posits that processing factors are responsible for errors among younger children. The results from three experiments showed that children who failed a test of false belief took as long to respond as those who passed, and both groups of children (...)
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  • Realism and children's early grasp of mental representation: belief-based judgements in the state change task.Rebecca Saltmarsh, Peter Mitchell & Elizabeth Robinson - 1995 - Cognition 57 (3):297-325.
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  • Do humans have two systems to track beliefs and belief-like states?Stephen Andrew Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly - 2009 - Psychological Review 116 (4):953-970.
    The lack of consensus on how to characterize humans’ capacity for belief reasoning has been brought into sharp focus by recent research. Children fail critical tests of belief reasoning before 3 to 4 years (Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001; Wimmer & Perner, 1983), yet infants apparently pass false belief tasks at 13 or 15 months (Onishi & Baillargeon, 2005; Surian, Caldi, & Sperber, 2007). Non-human animals also fail critical tests of belief reasoning but can show very complex social behaviour (e.g., (...)
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  • A developmental shift in processes underlying successful belief‐desire reasoning.Ori Friedman & Alan M. Leslie - 2004 - Cognitive Science 28 (6):963-977.
    Young children’s failures in reasoning about beliefs and desires, and especially about false beliefs, have been much studied. However, there are few accounts of successful belief-desire reasoning in older children or adults. An exception to this is a model in which belief attribution is treated as a process wherein an inhibitory system selects the most likely content for the belief to be attributed from amongst several competing contents [Leslie, A. M., & Polizzi, P. (1998). Developmental Science, 1, 247–254]. We tested (...)
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  • Two sources of evidence on the non-automaticity of true and false belief ascription.Elisa Back & Ian A. Apperly - 2010 - Cognition 115 (1):54-70.
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  • Do children start out thinking they don't know their own minds?Peter Mitchell, Ulrich Teucher, Mark Bennett, Fenja Ziegler & Rebecca Wyton - 2009 - Mind and Language 24 (3):328-346.
    Various researchers have suggested that below 7 years of age children do not recognize that they are the authority on knowledge about themselves, a suggestion that seems counter-intuitive because it raises the possibility that children do not appreciate their privileged first-person access to their own minds. Unlike previous research, children in the current investigation quantified knowledge and even 5-year-olds tended to assign relatively more to themselves than to an adult (Studies 1 and 2). Indeed, children's estimations were different from ratings (...)
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  • Belief, desire and the prediction of behaviour.José L. Zalabardo - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):295-310.
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  • Children's understanding that utterances emanate from minds: using speaker belief to aid interpretation.Peter Mitchell, Elizabeth J. Robinson & Doreen E. Thompson - 1999 - Cognition 72 (1):45-66.
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  • Conversation, Gaze Coordination, and Beliefs About Visual Context.Daniel C. Richardson, Rick Dale & John M. Tomlinson - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (8):1468-1482.
    Conversation is supported by the beliefs that people have in common and the perceptual experience that they share. The visual context of a conversation has two aspects: the information that is available to each conversant, and their beliefs about what is present for each other. In our experiment, we separated these factors for the first time and examined their impact on a spontaneous conversation. We manipulated the fact that a visual scene was shared or not and the belief that a (...)
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