- A Unified Empirical Account of Responsibility Judgments.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (3):611-639.details
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(1 other version)Self‐Agency.Elisabeth Pacherie - 2011 - In Shaun Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford handbook of the self. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Judgments about moral responsibility and determinism in patients with behavioural variant of frontotemporal dementia: Still compatibilists.Florian Cova, Maxime Bertoux, Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & Bruno Dubois - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):851-864.details
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Free will in everyday life: Autobiographical accounts of free and unfree actions.Tyler F. Stillman, Roy F. Baumeister & Alfred R. Mele - 2011 - Philosophical Psychology 24 (3):381 - 394.details
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Experimental Philosophy on Free Will: An Error Theory for Incompatibilist Intuitions.Eddy Nahmias & Dylan Murray - 2011 - In Jesús H. Aguilar, Andrei A. Buckareff & Keith Frankish (eds.), New waves in philosophy of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 189--215.details
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(1 other version)Is Incompatibilism Intuitive?Jason Turner, Eddy Nahmias, Stephen Morris & Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):28-53.details
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Temperament and intuition: A commentary on Feltz and Cokely.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Trevor Kvaran & Eddy Nahmias - 2009 - Consciousness and Cognition 18 (1):351-355.details
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At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology.Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2009 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 52 (5):449-466.details
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Moral Responsibility Invariantism.Brandon Warmke - 2011 - Philosophia 39 (1):179-200.details
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Experimental philosophy and free will.Tamler Sommers - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):199-212.details
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Judgments of moral responsibility: a unified account.Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson - 2012 - In Gunnar Björnsson & Karl Persson (eds.), The Explanatory Component of Moral Responsibility. Blackwell. pp. 1–10.details
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Survey-Driven Romanticism.Simon Cullen - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.details
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Manipulation, Compatibilism, and Moral Responsibility.Alfred R. Mele - 2008 - The Journal of Ethics 12 (3-4):263-286.details
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Personal autonomy.Sarah Buss - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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How to challenge intuitions empirically without risking skepticism.Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):318–343.details
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Free will, moral responsibility, and mechanism: Experiments on folk intuitions.Eddy Nahmias, D. Justin Coates & Trevor Kvaran - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):214–242.details
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The past and future of experimental philosophy.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Eddy Nahmias - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):123 – 149.details
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(1 other version)The rise and fall of experimental philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.details
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The Epistemology of Thought Experiments: First Person versus Third Person Approaches.Kirk Ludwig - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):128-159.details
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Analytic epistemology and experimental philosophy.Joshua Alexander & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 2 (1):56–80.details
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(1 other version)On trying to save the simple view.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2006 - Mind and Language 21 (5):565-586.details
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Neuroscientific challenges to free will and responsibility.Adina Roskies - 2006 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 10 (9):419-423.details
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(1 other version)Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions : an essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer - 2007 - In Peter A. French & Howard K. Wettstein (eds.), Philosophy and the Empirical. Blackwell. pp. 202–213.details
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Close calls and the confident agent: Free will, deliberation, and alternative possibilities.Eddy Nahmias - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 131 (3):627-667.details
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The phenomenology of free will.Eddy Nahmias, Stephen G. Morris, Thomas Nadelhoffer & Jason Turner - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (7-8):162-179.details
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(1 other version)Moral responsibility and determinism: The cognitive science of folk intuitions.Shaun Nichols & Joshua Knobe - 2007 - Noûs 41 (4):663–685.details
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Qualitative methods show that surveys misrepresent “ought implies can” judgments.Kyle Thompson - 2023 - Philosophical Psychology 36 (1):29-57.details
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Micro credit and the threshold of praiseworthiness.Martin Montminy - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):28-43.details
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The Four-Case Argument and the Existential/Universal Effect.Andrew J. Latham & Hannah Tierney - 2021 - Erkenntnis 88 (6):2379-2389.details
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(1 other version)Experimental Philosophy and the Incentivisation Challenge: a Proposed Application of the Bayesian Truth Serum.Philipp Schoenegger - 2021 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology:1-26.details
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“Internally Wicked”: Investigating How and Why Essentialism Influences Punitiveness and Moral Condemnation.Justin W. Martin & Larisa Heiphetz - 2021 - Cognitive Science 45 (6):e12991.details
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A Rationalist Defence of Determinism.Michael A. Istvan - 2020 - Theoria 87 (2):394-434.details
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Folk intuitions and the conditional ability to do otherwise.Thomas Nadelhoffer, Siyuan Yin & Rose Graves - 2020 - Philosophical Psychology 33 (7):968-996.details
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Experimental philosophy and moral responsibility.Gunnar Björnsson - 2022 - In Dana Kay Nelkin & Derk Pereboom (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Moral Responsibility. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 494–516.details
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Causal deviance and the ascription of intent and blame.Ross Rogers, Mark D. Alicke, Sarah G. Taylor, David Rose, Teresa L. Davis & Dori Bloom - 2019 - Philosophical Psychology 32 (3):404-427.details
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The developmental and cultural psychology of free will.Tamar Kushnir - 2018 - Philosophy Compass 13 (11):e12529.details
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“Could Have Chosen Otherwise Under Identical Conditions”: An Evolutionary Perspective on Free Will.John Banja - 2015 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 6 (2):3-11.details
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On the legal responsibility of autonomous machines.Bartosz Brożek & Marek Jakubiec - 2017 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 25 (3):293-304.details
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Free will is about choosing: The link between choice and the belief in free will.Gilad Feldman, Roy Baumeister & Kin Fai Wong - 2014 - Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 55:239-245.details
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A Proposal for a Scientifically-Informed and Instrumentalist Account of Free Will and Voluntary Action.Eric Racine - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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The Metaphysical Irrelevance of the Compatibilism Debate (and, More Generally, of Conceptual Analysis).Mark Balaguer - 2010 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 47 (1):1-24.details
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Bad is freer than good: Positive–negative asymmetry in attributions of free will.Gilad Feldman, Kin Fai Ellick Wong & Roy F. Baumeister - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 42:26-40.details
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Experimental philosophy of actual and counterfactual free will intuitions.Adam Feltz - 2015 - Consciousness and Cognition 36 (C):113-130.details
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Basic desert, conceptual revision, and moral justification.Nadine Elzein - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):212-225.details
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Predicting Philosophical Disagreement.Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely - 2013 - Philosophy Compass 8 (10):978-989.details
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(1 other version)Book Review of Alexander, Joshua. Experimental Philosophy: An Introduction.David J. Frost - 2012 - Philosophia 40 (4):903-917.details
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(1 other version)Folk intuitions, slippery slopes, and necessary fictions: An essay on Saul Smilansky's free will illusionism.Thomas Nadelhoffer & Adam Feltz - 2007 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 31 (1):202-213.details
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From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s Folk Concept of Free Will.Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):211-224.details
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(1 other version)Accentuate the Negative.Joshua Alexander, Ronald Mallon & Jonathan M. Weinberg - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):297-314.details
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Saving the intuitions: polylithic reference.Ioannis Votsis - 2011 - Synthese 180 (2):121 - 137.details
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