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  1. Neuroscience Evidence Should Be Incorporated Into Our Ethical Practices.Gidon Felsen, Louise Whiteley, Roland Nadler & Peter B. Reiner - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (4):36-38.
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  • Agency, Teleological Control and Robust Causation.Marius Usher - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, EarlyView.
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  • My Brain Made Me Do It: The Exclusion Argument Against Free Will, and What’s Wrong with It.Christian List & Peter Menzies - 2017 - In H. Beebee, C. Hitchcock & H. Price (eds.), Making a Difference: Essays on the Philosophy of Causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
    We offer a critical assessment of the “exclusion argument” against free will, which may be summarized by the slogan: “My brain made me do it, therefore I couldn't have been free”. While the exclusion argument has received much attention in debates about mental causation (“could my mental states ever cause my actions?”), it is seldom discussed in relation to free will. However, the argument informally underlies many neuroscientific discussions of free will, especially the claim that advances in neuroscience seriously challenge (...)
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  • Free Will is Not a Testable Hypothesis.Robert Northcott - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (3):617-631.
    Much recent work in neuroscience aims to shed light on whether we have free will. Can it? Can any science? To answer, we need to disentangle different notions of free will, and clarify what we mean by ‘empirical’ and ‘testable’. That done, my main conclusion is, duly interpreted: that free will is not a testable hypothesis. In particular, it is neither verifiable nor falsifiable by empirical evidence. The arguments for this are not a priori but rather are based on a (...)
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  • Neuroethics in a “Psy” World.Arleen Salles - 2014 - Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 23 (3):297-307.
    :Given the cultural psychoanalytic tradition that shapes the thought of Argentineans and their current skepticism with regard to neurosciences when it comes to understanding human behavior, this article addresses the question of how a healthy neuroethics can develop in the country.
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  • What Patients With Behavioral-Variant Frontotemporal Dementia Can Teach Us About Moral Responsibility.R. Ryan Darby, Judith Edersheim & Bruce H. Price - 2016 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 7 (4):193-201.
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  • Neuroética, Livre Arbítrio E Responsabilidade Moral: A Neurociência Não Prova Que o Livre Arbítrio É Uma Ilusão.Cinara Nahra - 2013 - Dissertatio 38:181-199.
    Com o notável avanço da neurociência na última década, especialmente com a realização de experimentos neurocientíficos que tem ajudado a lançar luzes em questões tradicionais da filosofia como altruísmo, generosidade e moralidade, foi também levantada a hipótese de que a neurociência provaria que o livre arbítrio é uma ilusão. Um dos experimentos que corroboraria esta hipótese está amplamente discutido no artigo “Unconscious determinant of free decisions in the human brain” assinado por um grupo de neurocientistas liderados por C. Soon e (...)
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  • Free Will From the Neurophilosophical Perspective.Nada Gligorov - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 1 (1):49-51.
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  • Libet-Style Experiments, Neuroscience, and Libertarian Free Will.Marcelo Fischborn - 2016 - Philosophical Psychology 29 (4):494-502.
    People have disagreed on the significance of Libet-style experiments for discussions about free will. In what specifically concerns free will in a libertarian sense, some argue that Libet-style experiments pose a threat to its existence by providing support to the claim that decisions are determined by unconscious brain events. Others disagree by claiming that determinism, in a sense that conflicts with libertarian free will, cannot be established by sciences other than fundamental physics. This paper rejects both positions. First, it is (...)
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  • Judging Mechanistic Neuroscience: A Preliminary Conceptual-Analytic Framework for Evaluating Scientific Evidence in the Courtroom.Jacqueline Anne Sullivan & Emily Baron - 2018 - Psychology, Crime and Law (00):00-00.
    The use of neuroscientific evidence in criminal trials has been steadily increasing. Despite progress made in recent decades in understanding the mechanisms of psychological and behavioral functioning, neuroscience is still in an early stage of development and its potential for influencing legal decision-making is highly contentious. Scholars disagree about whether or how neuroscientific evidence might impact prescriptions of criminal culpability, particularly in instances in which evidence of an accused’s history of mental illness or brain abnormality is offered to support a (...)
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  • Enhancing Responsibility: Directions for an Interdisciplinary Investigation.Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de Santa Maria
    [Note: articles 1-5 are in English; Intro, Discussion, and Conclusion are in Portuguese.] Responsibility practices that are part of our daily lives involve, among other things, standards about how one should praise, blame, or punish people for their actions, as well as particular acts that follow those standards to a greater or lesser extent. A classical question in philosophy asks whether human beings can actually be morally responsible for what they do. This dissertation argues that addressing this classical question is (...)
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  • Questions for a Science of Moral Responsibility.Marcelo Fischborn - 2018 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 9 (2):381-394.
    In the last few decades, the literature on moral responsibility has been increasingly populated by scientific studies. Studies in neuroscience and psychology, in particular, have been claimed to be relevant for discussions about moral responsibility in a number of ways. And at the same time, there is not yet a systematic understanding of the sort of questions a science of moral responsibility is supposed to answer. This paper is an attempt to move toward such an understanding. I discuss three models (...)
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  • Who’s Responsible for This? Moral Responsibility, Externalism, and Knowledge about Implicit Bias.Natalia Washington & Daniel Kelly - 2016 - In Jennifer Saul & Michael Brownstein (eds.), Implicit Bias and Philosophy, Volume 2: Moral Responsibility, Structural Injustice, and Ethics. Oxford University Press UK.
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  • What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism?Adam Bear & Joshua Knobe - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (8):2025-2049.
    Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features. We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were possible (...)
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  • Social Explanations and the Free Will Problem.Manuel Vargas - 2014 - In Walter Sinnott-Armstrong (ed.), Moral Psychology, Vol. 4: Free Will and Moral Responsibility. pp. 403-411.
    There is strikingly little agreement across academic fields about the existence of free will, what experimental results show, and even what the term ‘free will’ means. In Lee and Harris’ “A Social Perspective on Debates About Free Will” the authors argue that group identities and their attendant social rewards are part of the problem. As they portray it, “different philosophical stances create social groups and inherent conflict, hindering interdisciplinary intellectual exploration on the question of free will because people incorporate their (...)
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  • The Moral Psychology of Determinism.Jeremy Evans - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):639-661.
    In recent years, philosophers and psychologists have resurrected a debate at the intersection of metaphysics and moral psychology. The central question is whether we can conceive of moral agents as deterministic systems unfolding predictably and inevitably under constant laws without psychologically damaging the pro-social attitudes and moral emotions that grease the wheels of social life. These concerns are sparked by recent experiments documenting a decline in the ethical behavior of participants primed with deterministic metaphysics. But this literature has done little (...)
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  • Free Will and the Bounds of the Self.Joshua Knobe & Shaun Nichols - 2011 - In Robert Kane (ed.), Oxford Handbook of Free Will. Oxford University Press.
    If you start taking courses in contemporary cognitive science, you will soon encounter a particular picture of the human mind. This picture says that the mind is a lot like a computer. Specifically, the mind is made up of certain states and certain processes. These states and processes interact, in accordance with certain general rules, to generate specific behaviors. If you want to know how those states and processes got there in the first place, the only answer is that they (...)
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  • Conscious Will, Reason-Responsiveness, and Moral Responsibility.Markus E. Schlosser - 2013 - The Journal of Ethics 17 (3):205-232.
    Empirical evidence challenges many of the assumptions that underlie traditional philosophical and commonsense conceptions of human agency. It has been suggested that this evidence threatens also to undermine free will and moral responsibility. In this paper, I will focus on the purported threat to moral responsibility. The evidence challenges assumptions concerning the ability to exercise conscious control and to act for reasons. This raises an apparent challenge to moral responsibility as these abilities appear to be necessary for morally responsible agency. (...)
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  • Bad is Freer Than Good: Positive–Negative Asymmetry in Attributions of Free Will.Gilad Feldman, Kin Fai Ellick Wong & Roy F. Baumeister - 2016 - Consciousness and Cognition 42:26-40.
    Recent findings support the idea that the belief in free will serves as the basis for moral responsibility, thus promoting the punishment of immoral agents. We theorized that free will extends beyond morality to serve as the basis for accountability and the capacity for change more broadly, not only for others but also for the self. Five experiments showed that people attributed higher freedom of will to negative than to positive valence, regardless of morality or intent, for both self and (...)
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  • The Unplanned Obsolescence of Psychological Science and an Argument for its Revival.Stan Klein - 2016 - Pyshcology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice 3:357-379.
    I examine some of the key scientific pre-commitments of modern psychology, and argue that their adoption has the unintended consequence of rendering a purely psychological analysis of mind indistinguishable from a purely biological treatment. And, since these pre-commitments sanction an “authority of the biological”, explanation of phenomena traditionally considered the purview of psychological analysis is fully subsumed under the biological. I next evaluate the epistemic warrant of these pre-commitments and suggest there are good reasons to question their applicability to psychological (...)
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  • The BCN Challenge to Compatibilist Free Will and Personal Responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (2):121-133.
    Many philosophers ignore developments in the behavioral, cognitive, and neurosciences that purport to challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility. The reason for this is that the challenge is often framed as a denial of the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, most philosophers think that the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to responsibility and free will. Rather it is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that the (...)
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  • Neuroimaging and Responsibility Assessments.Nicole A. Vincent - 2011 - Neuroethics 4 (1):35-49.
    Could neuroimaging evidence help us to assess the degree of a person’s responsibility for a crime which we know that they committed? This essay defends an affirmative answer to this question. A range of standard objections to this high-tech approach to assessing people’s responsibility is considered and then set aside, but I also bring to light and then reject a novel objection—an objection which is only encountered when functional (rather than structural) neuroimaging is used to assess people’s responsibility.
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  • Melhoramento Humano Biotecnocientífico: A Escolha Hermenêutica É Uma Maneira Adequada de Regulá-Lo?Murilo Mariano Vilaça & Maria Clara Dias - 2013 - Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 58 (1):61-86.
    Uma forma de compreender o humano é pela sua biologia, a qual pode ser vista como ambígua. Por um lado, há características biológicas correlacionadas a capacidades extremamente especializadas e complexas, as quais abrem possibilidades que lhe são particulares, distinguindo-o ‘positivamente’ dos outros seres vivos. Por outro, como todo ser vivo, há características que tornam a vida humana finita e relativamente vulnerável, as quais costumam ser ‘negativamente’ interpretadas. Em ambos os casos, há características biológicas que, em si, não são boas nem (...)
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  • Neuroethics and Responsibility in Conducting Neuromarketing Research.Monica Diana Bercea Olteanu - 2015 - Neuroethics 8 (2):191-202.
    Over the last decade, academics and companies have shown an increased interest in brain studies and human cerebral functions related to consumer’s reactions to different stimuli. Therefore neuroethics emerged as a way to draw attention to ethical issues concerning different aspects of brain research. This review explores the environment of neuromarketing research in both business and academic areas from an ethical point of view. The paper focuses on the ethical issues involving subjects participating in neuroimaging studies, consumers that experience the (...)
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  • Blame, Desert and Compatibilist Capacity: A Diachronic Account of Moderateness in Regards to Reasons-Responsiveness.Nicole A. Vincent - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):1-17.
    This paper argues that John Fischer and Mark Ravizza's compatibilist theory of moral responsibility cannot justify reactive attitudes like blame and desert-based practices like retributive punishment. The problem with their account, I argue, is that their analysis of moderateness in regards to reasons-responsiveness has the wrong normative features. However, I propose an alternative account of what it means for a mechanism to be moderately reasons-responsive which addresses this deficiency. In a nut shell, while Fischer and Ravizza test for moderate reasons-responsiveness (...)
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  • Don't Let Them Eat Cake! A View From Across the Pond.Robin Mackenzie - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics 10 (12):16-18.
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  • Parsing Neurobiological Dysfunctions in Obesity: Nosologic and Ethical Consequences.Paul S. Appelbaum, Michael J. Devlin & Carl E. Fisher - 2010 - American Journal of Bioethics 10 (12):14-16.
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  • The Real Challenge to Free Will and Responsibility.Maureen Sie & Arno Wouters - 2008 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 12 (1):3-4.
    Adina Roskies has argued that worries that recent developments in the neurosciences challenge our ideas of free will and responsibility are misguided. Her argument focuses on the idea that we are able to act differently than we do. However, according to a dominant view in contemporary philosophy, the ability to do otherwise is irrelevant to our judgments of responsibility and free will. It rather is our ability to act for reasons that is crucial. We argue that this view is most (...)
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  • A Proposal for a Scientifically-Informed and Instrumentalist Account of Free Will and Voluntary Action.Eric Racine - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.
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  • Responsible Choices, Desert-Based Legal Institutions, and the Challenges of Contemporary Neuroscience.Michael S. Moore - 2012 - Social Philosophy and Policy 29 (1):233-279.
    Research Articles Michael S. Moore, Social Philosophy and Policy, FirstView Article.
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  • Should an Individual Composed of Selfish Goals Be Held Responsible for Her Actions?Natalia Washington & Daniel Kelly - 2014 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 37 (2):158-159.
    We discuss the implications of the Selfish Goal model for moral responsibility, arguing it suggests a form of skepticism we call the “locus problem.” In denying that individuals contain any genuine psychological core of information processing, the Selfish Goal model denies the kind of locus of control intuitively presupposed by ascriptions of responsibility. We briefly consider ways the problem might be overcome.
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  • Embodied Freedom and the Escape From Uncertainty.Boris Kotchoubey - 2010 - PSYCHE: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Research On Consciousness 16 (1):99-107.
    : Behavioral actions can attain their intended result either when all possible details and intervening factors are controlled in advance by the action plan, or when only the final outcome is taken into account while the rest is left for on-line correction. Both ways have numerous advantages and disadvantages. The former can be applied only in very simple instances and therefore, puts very strong limits on the complexity of behavior. The latter can be used for action plans of practically unlimited (...)
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  • Determinismo, compatibilismo y escepticismo respecto al libre albedrío.Miranda-Rojas Rafael - 2017 - Cinta de Moebio 60:295-305.
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  • A Tale of Two Processes: On Joseph Henrich’s the Secret of Our Success: How Culture is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter.Daniel Kelly & Patrick Hoburg - 2017 - Philosophical Psychology 30 (6):832-848.
    We situate Henrich’s book in the larger research tradition of which it is a part and show how he presents a wide array of recent psychological, physiological, and neurological data as supporting the view that two related but distinct processes have shaped human nature and made us unique: cumulative cultural evolution and culture-driven genetic evolution. We briefly sketch out several ways philosophers might fruitfully engage with this view and note some implications it may have for current philosophic debates in moral (...)
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  • Moral Responsibility and Free Will: A Meta-Analysis.Adam Feltz & Florian Cova - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 30:234-246.
    Fundamental beliefs about free will and moral responsibility are often thought to shape our ability to have healthy relationships with others and ourselves. Emotional reactions have also been shown to have an important and pervasive impact on judgments and behaviors. Recent research suggests that emotional reactions play a prominent role in judgments about free will, influencing judgments about determinism’s relation to free will and moral responsibility. However, the extent to which affect influences these judgments is unclear. We conducted a metaanalysis (...)
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  • Neuroscience and Conscious Causation: Has Neuroscience Shown That We Cannot Control Our Own Actions?Grant S. Shields - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (4):565-582.
    Neuroscience has begun to elucidate the mechanisms of volition, decision-making, and action. Some have taken the progress neuroscience has made in these areas to indicate that we are not free to choose our actions . The notion that we can consciously initiate our behavior is a crucial tenet in the concept of free will, and closely linked to how most individuals view themselves as persons. There is thus reason to inquire if the aforementioned inference drawn by some might be too (...)
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  • Neuroscience, Neuropolitics and Neuroethics: The Complex Case of Crime, Deception and fMRI.Stuart Henry & Dena Plemmons - 2012 - Science and Engineering Ethics 18 (3):573-591.
    Scientific developments take place in a socio-political context but scientists often ignore the ways their innovations will be both interpreted by the media and used by policy makers. In the rush to neuroscientific discovery important questions are overlooked, such as the ways: (1) the brain, environment and behavior are related; (2) biological changes are mediated by social organization; (3) institutional bias in the application of technical procedures ignores race, class and gender dimensions of society; (4) knowledge is used to the (...)
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  • Philosophical Issues in Neuroimaging.Colin Klein - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (2):186-198.
    Functional neuroimaging (NI) technologies like Positron Emission Tomography and functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) have revolutionized neuroscience, and provide crucial tools to link cognitive psychology and traditional neuroscientific models. A growing discipline of 'neurophilosophy' brings fMRI evidence to bear on traditional philosophical issues such as weakness of will, moral psychology, rational choice, social interaction, free will, and consciousness. NI has also attracted critical attention from psychologists and from philosophers of science. I review debates over the evidential status of fMRI, including (...)
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  • Free Will, Self-Governance and Neuroscience: An Overview.Alisa Carse, Hilary Bok & Debra J. H. Mathews - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):237-244.
    Given dramatic increases in recent decades in the pace of scientific discovery and understanding of the functional organization of the brain, it is increasingly clear that engagement with the neuroscientific literature and research is central to making progress on philosophical questions regarding the nature and scope of human freedom and responsibility. While patterns of brain activity cannot provide the whole story, developing a deeper and more precise understanding of how brain activity is related to human choice and conduct is crucial (...)
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  • Brain Signals Do Not Demonstrate Unconscious Decision Making: An Interpretation Based on Graded Conscious Awareness.Jeff Miller & Wolf Schwarz - 2014 - Consciousness and Cognition 24:12-21.
    Neuroscientific studies have shown that brain activity correlated with a decision to move can be observed before a person reports being consciously aware of having made that decision . Given that a later event cannot cause an earlier one , such results have been interpreted as evidence that decisions are made unconsciously . We argue that this interpretation depends upon an all-or-none view of consciousness, and we offer an alternative interpretation of the early decision-related brain activity based on models in (...)
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  • Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will.Sven Walter - 2014 - Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
    While epiphenomenalism—i.e., the claim that the mental is a causally otiose byproduct of physical processes that does not itself cause anything—is hardly ever mentioned in philosophical discussions of free will, it has recently come to play a crucial role in the scientific attack on free will led by neuroscientists and psychologists. This paper is concerned with the connection between epiphenomenalism and the claim that free will is an illusion, in particular with the connection between epiphenomenalism and willusionism, i.e., with the (...)
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  • Not so Fast. On Some Bold Neuroscientific Claims Concerning Human Agency.Andrea Lavazza & Mario De Caro - 2010 - Neuroethics 3 (1):23-41.
    According to a widespread view, a complete explanatory reduction of all aspects of the human mind to the electro-chemical functioning of the brain is at hand and will certainly produce vast and positive cultural, political and social consequences. However, notwithstanding the astonishing advances generated by the neurosciences in recent years for our understanding of the mechanisms and functions of the brain, the application of these findings to the specific but crucial issue of human agency can be considered a “pre-paradigmatic science” (...)
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  • Reductionism, Agency and Free Will.Maria Rigato - 2015 - Axiomathes 25 (1):107-116.
    In the context of the free will debate, both compatibilists and event-causal libertarians consider that the agent’s mental states and events are what directly causes her decision to act. However, according to the ‘disappearing agent’ objection, if the agent is nothing over and above her physical and mental components, which ultimately bring about her decision, and that decision remains undetermined up to the moment when it is made, then it is a chancy and uncontrolled event. According to agent-causalism, this sort (...)
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  • Media Portrayal of a Landmark Neuroscience Experiment on Free Will.Eric Racine, Valentin Nguyen, Victoria Saigle & Veljko Dubljevic - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (4):989-1007.
    The concept of free will has been heavily debated in philosophy and the social sciences. Its alleged importance lies in its association with phenomena fundamental to our understandings of self, such as autonomy, freedom, self-control, agency, and moral responsibility. Consequently, when neuroscience research is interpreted as challenging or even invalidating this concept, a number of heated social and ethical debates surface. We undertook a content analysis of media coverage of Libet’s et al.’s :623–642, 1983) landmark study, which is frequently interpreted (...)
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  • Decision-Making and Self-Governing Systems.Adina L. Roskies - 2018 - Neuroethics 11 (3):245-257.
    Neuroscience has illuminated the neural basis of decision-making, providing evidence that supports specific models of decision-processes. These models typically are quite mechanical, the realization of abstract mathematical “diffusion to bound” models. While effective decision-making seems to be essential for sophisticated behavior, central to an account of freedom, and a necessary characteristic of self-governing systems, it is not clear how the simple models neuroscience inspires can underlie the notion of self-governance. Drawing from both philosophy and neuroscience I explore ways in which (...)
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  • Quel pouvoir prédictif de la génétique et des neurosciences, et quels problèmes?Franck Ramus - 2011 - Médecine et Droit 2011 (106):51-58.
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  • The Neurostructure of Morality and the Hubris of Memory Manipulation.Peter A. Depergola Ii - 2018 - The New Bioethics 24 (3):199-227.
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  • The Neurostructure of Morality and the Hubris of Memory Manipulation.Peter A. DePergola - forthcoming - The New Bioethics:1-29.
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  • The Metaphysical Assumptions Required for Political Autonomy.C. D. Brewer & Jessica Morgan Gascoigne - 2013 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 4 (4):67-69.
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  • Neuroethics and the Possible Types of Moral Enhancement.John R. Shook - 2012 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 3 (4):3-14.
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