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What is it like to be a bat?

Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50 (1974)

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  1. Marc Bekoff and Dale Jamieson, eds., Readings in animal cognition, cambridge, MA: MIT press, 1996, XV + 379 pp., $30.00 (paper), ISBN 0-262-52208-X. [REVIEW]Colin G. Beer - 1999 - Minds and Machines 9 (1):156-160.
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  • Why we can’t say what animals think.Jacob Beck - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (4):520–546.
    Realists about animal cognition confront a puzzle. If animals have real, contentful cognitive states, why can’t anyone say precisely what the contents of those states are? I consider several possible resolutions to this puzzle that are open to realists, and argue that the best of these is likely to appeal to differences in the format of animal cognition and human language.
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  • The origins of modal error.George Bealer - 2004 - Dialectica 58 (1):11-42.
    Modal intuitions are the primary source of modal knowledge but also of modal error. According to the theory of modal error in this paper, modal intuitions retain their evidential force in spite of their fallibility, and erroneous modal intuitions are in principle identifiable and eliminable by subjecting our intuitions to a priori dialectic. After an inventory of standard sources of modal error, two further sources are examined in detail. The first source - namely, the failure to distinguish between metaphysical possibility (...)
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  • The status of private events in behavior analysis.William M. Baum - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):644-644.
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  • Justice at the Margins: The Social Contract and the Challenge of Marginal Cases.Nathan Bauer & David Svolba - 2017 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 55 (1):51-67.
    Attempts to justify the special moral status of human beings over other animals face a well-known objection: the challenge of marginal cases. If we attempt to ground this special status in the unique rationality of humans, then it becomes difficult to see why nonrational humans should be treated any differently than other, nonhuman animals. We respond to this challenge by turning to the social contract tradition. In particular, we identify an important role for the concept of recognition in attempts to (...)
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  • Experiencing things together: What is the problem?Peter Baumann - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):9 - 26.
    Suppose someone hears a loud noise and at the same time sees a yellow flash. It seems hard to deny that the person can experience loudness and yellowness together. However, since loudness is experienced by the auditory sense whereas yellowness is experienced by the visual sense it also seems hard to explain how.
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  • Against Branching Identity.William A. Bauer - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1709-1719.
    Would you survive if your consciousness branched into two or more streams? Commonly discussed within the context of split-brain scenarios, this possibility might soon become commonplace with mind uploading technology. Cerullo suggests that after nondestructive mind uploading and other branching scenarios, personal identity would continue in two streams of consciousness. Thus he argues for what he calls branching identity. In this discussion, I evaluate the theory of branching identity and Cerullo’s arguments for it, concluding that branching identity is insufficiently justified (...)
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  • Understanding self and other.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):142-154.
    We consider the various criticisms and requests for clarification made by the commentators of our framework for understanding intentional relations. Our response is organized according to the main themes in the target article: general theory, phylogeny, development, and autism. We also add some discussion of further issues, such as simulation and moral theory, that were not addressed in the target article.
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  • The concept of intentionality: Invented or innate?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):29-30.
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  • Simulation is not enough: A hybrid model of disgust attribution on the basis of visual stimuli.Luca Barlassina - 2013 - Philosophical Psychology 26 (3):401-419.
    Mindreading is the ability to attribute mental states to other individuals. According to the Theory-Theory (TT), mindreading is based on one's possession of a Theory of Mind. On the other hand, the Simulation Theory (ST) maintains that one arrives at the attribution of a mental state by simulating it in one's own mind. In this paper, I propose a ST-TT hybrid model of the ability to attribute disgust on the basis of visual stimuli such as facial expressions, body postures, etc. (...)
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  • Some hallucinations are experiences of the past.Michael Barkasi - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (3):454-488.
    When you hallucinate an object, you are not in the normal sort of concurrent causal sensory interaction with that object. It's standardly further inferred that the hallucinated object does not actually exist. But the lack of normal concurrent causal sensory interaction does not imply that there does not exist an object that is hallucinated. It might be a past‐perceived object. In this paper, I argue that this claim holds for at least some interesting cases of hallucination. Hallucinations generated by misleading (...)
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  • Preamble.Allison Barnes, Cara Spencer, Gavin B. Sullivan & Sam Coleman - 2007 - Philosophical Psychology 20 (6):815 – 833.
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  • Intentional relations and social understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.
    Organisms engage in various activities that are directed at objects, whether real or imagined. Such activities may be termed “intentional relations.” We present a four-level framework of social understanding that organizes the ways in which social organisms represent the intentional relations of themselves and other agents. We presuppose that the information available to an organism about its own intentional relations (or first person information) is qualitatively different from the information available to that organism about other agents’ intentional relations (or third (...)
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  • Imaginative Culture and the Enriched Nature of Positive Experience.Nathaniel F. Barrett - 2022 - Frontiers in Psychology 13:831118.
    To understand the evolution of imaginative culture, we need to understand its unique affective power. The purpose of this article is to explain our enjoyment of imaginative culture from the standpoint of a distinctive theoretical approach to understanding affect in terms of the dynamic and energetic features of consciousness. This approach builds upon John Dewey’s view of enjoyment as the enrichment of experience, adding perspectives from studies of the dynamics of consciousness and from ecological psychology. Its main thesis is that (...)
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  • How monkeys do things with “words”.Simon Baron-Cohen - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):148-149.
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  • Can children with autism integrate first and third person representations?Simon Baron-Cohen - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):123-124.
    Barresi & Moore contrast two theories of autism: (1) in autism there is a general inability to integrate first and third person information (of any kind), and (2) in autism there is a specific inability to represent an agent's perceptual or volitional mental state being about another agents mental state. Two lines of experimental evidence suggest that the first of these is too broad, favoring instead the more specific “theory of mind” account.
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  • Are false beliefs representative mental states?Karen Bartsch & David Estes - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (1):30-31.
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  • Communication and internal states: What is their relationship?Michael Bamberg - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):643-644.
    Common folks “have” emotions and talk to others; and sometimes they make “their” emotions the topic of such talk. The emotions seem to be “theirs,” since they can be conceived of as private states ; and they can be topicalized, because we seem to be able to attribute or lend a conventionalized public form to some inner state or event. This is the way much of our folk-talk and folk-thinking about emotions, the expression thereof, the role of language in these (...)
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  • Learning how to deceive.John D. Baldwin - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (2):245-246.
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  • In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
    During the last two decades, several different anti-physicalist arguments based on an epistemic or conceptual gap between the phenomenal and the physical have been proposed. The most promising physicalist line of defense in the face of these arguments – the Phenomenal Concept Strategy – is based on the idea that these epistemic and conceptual gaps can be explained by appeal to the nature of phenomenal concepts rather than the nature of non-physical phenomenal properties. Phenomenal concepts, on this proposal, involve unique (...)
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  • Comments on David Rosenthal's “Consciousness, Content, and Metacognitive Judgments”.Kati Balog - 2000 - Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):215-219.
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  • Taylor and Parfit on personal identity: a response to Lotter [1].D. P. Baker - 1999 - South African Journal of Philosophy 18 (3):331-346.
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  • Peter Godfrey-Smith: Metazoa: Animal Life and the Birth of the Mind.Supriya Bajpai & Lalit Saraswat - 2022 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 53 (4):605-609.
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  • What is it Like to See a Bat? A Critique of Dretske’s Representationalist Theory of Qualia.Andrew Bailey - 2005 - Disputatio 1 (18):1 - 27.
    This paper critiques the representationalist account of qualia, focussing on the Representational Naturalism presented by Fred Dretske in Naturalizing the Mind. After laying out Dretskes theory of qualia and making clear its externalist consequences, I argue that Dretskes definition is either too liberal or runs into problems defending its requirements, in particular naturalness and mentalness. I go on to show that Dretskes account of qualia falls foul of the argument from misperception in such a way that Dretske must either admit (...)
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  • Perhaps Sisyphus is the relevant model for animal-language researchers.Donald M. Baer - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (4):642-643.
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  • Ethology and physiology: A happy marriage.Gerard P. Baerends - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (3):369-370.
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  • Awareness inflated, evaluative conditioning underestimated.Frank Baeyens, Jan De Houwer & Paul Eelen - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):396-397.
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  • More empirical cases to break the accord of phenomenal and access-consciousness.Talis Bachmann - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-251.
    Additional experiments show that P-consciousness and A consciousness can be empirically dissociated for the theoretically so phisticated observer. Phenomenal consciousness can have several degrees that are indirectly measurable.
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  • Deviations from intensity-duration reciprocity as possible indicators of pathology.Harvey Babkoff - 1979 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 2 (2):255-257.
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  • Evidence that phenomenal consciousness is the same as access consciousness.Bernard J. Baars - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):249-249.
    Block seems to propose untested answers to empirical questions. Whether consciousness is a “mongrel problem,” rather than a single core fact with many facets, is an empirical issue. Likewise, the intimate relationship between personal consciousness and global access functions cannot be decided pretheoretically. This point is demonstrated by the reader's private experience of foveal versus parafoveal vision, and for conscious versus unconscious representation of the many meanings of common words.
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  • Consciousness is associated with central as well as distributed processes.Bernard J. Baars & Michael Fehling - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):203-204.
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  • A curious coincidence? Consciousness as an object of scientific scrutiny fits our personal experience remarkably well.Bernard J. Baars - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):669-670.
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  • Concepts, introspection, and phenomenal consciousness: An information-theoretical approach.Murat Aydede & Güven Güzeldere - 2005 - Noûs 39 (2):197-255.
    This essay is a sustained attempt to bring new light to some of the perennial problems in philosophy of mind surrounding phenomenal consciousness and introspection through developing an account of sensory and phenomenal concepts. Building on the information-theoretic framework of Dretske (1981), we present an informational psychosemantics as it applies to what we call sensory concepts, concepts that apply, roughly, to so-called secondary qualities of objects. We show that these concepts have a special informational character and semantic structure that closely (...)
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  • Perception With Compensatory Devices: From Sensory Substitution to Sensorimotor Extension.Malika Auvray & Erik Myin - 2009 - Cognitive Science 33 (6):1036–1058.
    Sensory substitution devices provide through an unusual sensory modality (the substituting modality, e.g., audition) access to features of the world that are normally accessed through another sensory modality (the substituted modality, e.g., vision). In this article, we address the question of which sensory modality the acquired perception belongs to. We have recourse to the four traditional criteria that have been used to define sensory modalities: sensory organ, stimuli, properties, and qualitative experience (Grice, 1962), to which we have added the criteria (...)
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  • Le défi de l'institutionnalisation des savoirs d'expérience dans les services de rétablissement. Une approche pragmatiste.Laure Aussedat - 2022 - Dialogue 61 (1):83-106.
    What does it mean, in concrete terms, to recognise and highlight experiential knowledge in the context of recovery-oriented psychiatric services? Based on a study of the tasks entrusted to the “médiateurs de santé pairs”, and using John Dewey's pragmatist theory of inquiry, I will examine the conditions under which it is possible to institutionalise patient knowledge, as well as the limits of this institutionalisation. Rather than thinking of this institutionalisation in terms of information-gathering, Dewey allows us to think of it (...)
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  • The Endogenous Feedback Network: A new approach to the comprehensive study of consciousness.Claudia Carrara Augustenborg - 2010 - Consciousness and Cognition 19 (2):547-579.
    The phenomenon of consciousness has received through the centuries a profusion of interpretations, engaging researchers across many disciplines. Nevertheless, consensus still floats at large. The aim of the present work is therefore twofold. Through the review of a selected number of existing proposals, it will first be considered the extents of their reciprocal compatibility, tentatively shaping an integrated, theoretical profile of consciousness. A new theory, the Endogenous Feedback Network will consequently be introduced which, besides being able to accommodate the main (...)
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  • Why Physics Does Not Inform the Human Condition, But Its Boundaries Do.Harald Atmanspacher - forthcoming - Foundations of Science:1-13.
    The science of physics has been extremely successful over the last four centuries, mainly for one reason: It does everything it can to disregard anything that has to do with non-physical parts of reality. Although the human body is a physical body, large parts of what distinguishes human beings, sometimes briefly called the human condition, does not belong to the physical domain. This implies that physics (and other sciences of the material universe) offers nothing more than self-imposed helplessness when it (...)
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  • Toward an objective phenomenological vocabulary: how seeing a scarlet red is like hearing a trumpet’s blare.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2013 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 12 (4):837-858.
    Nagel’s challenge is to devise an objective phenomenological vocabulary that can describe the objective structural similarities between aural and visual perception. My contention is that Charles Sanders Peirce’s little studied and less understood phenomenological vocabulary makes a significant contribution to meeting this challenge. I employ Peirce’s phenomenology to identify the structural isomorphism between seeing a scarlet red and hearing a trumpet’s blare. I begin by distinguishing between the vividness of an experience and the intensity of a quality. I proceed to (...)
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  • Consciousness: Mapping the theoretical landscape.Anthony P. Atkinson, Michael S. C. Thomas & Axel Cleeremans - 2000 - Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (10):372-382.
    What makes us conscious? Many theories that attempt to answer this question have appeared recently in the context of widespread interest about consciousness in the cognitive neurosciences. Most of these proposals are formulated in terms of the information processing conducted by the brain. In this overview, we survey and contrast these models. We first delineate several notions of consciousness, addressing what it is that the various models are attempting to explain. Next, we describe a conceptual landscape that addresses how the (...)
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  • Consciousness without conflation.Anthony P. Atkinson & Martin Davies - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):248-249.
    Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of the relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.
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  • I Am Not My Body, This Is Not My Body.Yochai Ataria - 2016 - Human Studies 39 (2):217-229.
    This paper suggests that during severe and prolonged traumatic experiences such as trauma type II, one may develop disownership toward the entire body. In this situation one’s body becomes a pure object and as such an integral part of the hostile environment. This article applies Merleau-Ponty’s approach to perception in order to improve our understanding of this process.
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  • Rainbow's end: The structure, character, and content of conscious experience.Brandon Ashby - 2022 - Mind and Language 37 (3):395-413.
    Separatism, representationalism, and phenomenal intentionalism are the primary views on the relationship between the phenomenality and intentionality of experience. I defend a novel position that is incompatible with separatism, can enrich representationalism and phenomenal intentionalism, but can also be accepted independently of those views. I call it phenomenal schematics: The phenomenal characters of our experiences have structures that place a priori, formal, and sometimes semantic constraints on our experience's possible intentional contents. Phenomenal structures are like the grammar of a language (...)
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  • The complex link between neuroanatomy and consciousness.Giorgio A. Ascoli - 2000 - Complexity 6 (1):20-26.
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  • Panpsychism and AI consciousness.Marcus Arvan & Corey J. Maley - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.
    This article argues that if panpsychism is true, then there are grounds for thinking that digitally-based artificial intelligence may be incapable of having coherent macrophenomenal conscious experiences. Section 1 briefly surveys research indicating that neural function and phenomenal consciousness may be both analog in nature. We show that physical and phenomenal magnitudes—such as rates of neural firing and the phenomenally experienced loudness of sounds—appear to covary monotonically with the physical stimuli they represent, forming the basis for an analog relationship between (...)
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  • Throwing the conscious baby out with the Cartesian bath water.J. Aronson, E. Dietrich & E. Way - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (2):202-203.
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  • The Emergence and Development of Animal Research Ethics: A Review with a Focus on Nonhuman Primates.Gardar Arnason - 2020 - Science and Engineering Ethics 26 (4):2277-2293.
    The ethics of using nonhuman animals in biomedical research is usually seen as a subfield of animal ethics. In recent years, however, the ethics of animal research has increasingly become a subfield within research ethics under the term “animal research ethics”. Consequently, ethical issues have become prominent that are familiar in the context of human research ethics, such as autonomy or self-determination, harms and benefits, justice, and vulnerability. After a brief overview of the development of the field and a discussion (...)
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  • Personal Intentionalism and the Understanding of Emotion Experience.Sarah Arnaud & Kathryn Pendoley - 2023 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 30 (7):61-87.
    How should we seek to account for the qualitative aspect of emotion? Strong intentionalism presents one promising avenue for such an account. According to strong intentionalism, the phenomenology of a mental state is entirely determined by that state's intentional content. Given that many views of the emotions have it that the intentionality and phenomenology of the emotions are very closely related, this makes strong intentionalism an especially promising route. However, strong intentionalism has rarely been defended for emotions and, we argue, (...)
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  • Perception-consciousness and action-consciousness?D. M. Armstrong - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (2):247-248.
    Block's distinction between phenomenal and access consciousness is accepted, and it is agreed that one may be found without the other, but his account of the distinction is challenged. Phenomenal consciousness is perceptual consciousness, and it is a matter of gaining information of a detailed, nonverbal sort about the subject's body and environment. Access consciousness is good, old-fashioned introspection.
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  • Monkeys and consciousness.D. M. Armstrong - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (1):147-148.
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  • How to understand consciousness: The strength of the phenomenological method.Maria Armezzani - 2009 - World Futures 65 (2):101 – 110.
    Analyzing the outline of the endless literature on consciousness, the separation between science and philosophy rather than being overcome, seems to come back in different shapes. According to this point of view, the hard problem seems to be how to study consciousness while avoiding a slip back to the old dualism. This article outlines the advantages of the phenomenological method. This method, more than getting over the mind-body separation, anticipates it through an open gaze, able to bring back the human (...)
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