- Folk psychology is not a predictive device.Adam Morton - 1996 - Mind 105 (417):119-37.details
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Procedural Moral Enhancement.G. Owen Schaefer & Julian Savulescu - 2016 - Neuroethics 12 (1):73-84.details
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Instrumentalism about practical reason: not by default.Thomas Schmidt - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (1):17-27.details
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The Scope of Instrumental Morality.Michael Moehler - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (2):431-451.details
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Race Research and the Ethics of Belief.Jonny Anomaly - 2017 - Journal of Bioethical Inquiry 14 (2):287-297.details
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Formalizing Darwinism, Naturalizing Mathematics.Fabio Sterpetti - 2015 - Paradigmi. Rivista di Critica Filosofica 33 (2):133-160.details
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(1 other version)Rationality and its contexts.Timothy Lane - 2016 - In Timothy Joseph Lane & Tzu-Wei Hung (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. London, U.K.: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 3-13.details
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How to Pay for Public Education.Mark R. Reiff - 2014 - Theory and Research in Education 12 (1):4-52.details
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(1 other version)The Many Moral Particularisms.Sean McKeever & Michael Ridge - 2005 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (1):83-106.details
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Epistemic utility theory’s difficult future.Chad Marxen - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):7401-7421.details
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The Evidentialist's Wager.William MacAskill, Aron Vallinder, Caspar Oesterheld, Carl Shulman & Johannes Treutlein - 2021 - Journal of Philosophy 118 (6):320-342.details
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Rational beliefs in rationalizability.Xiao Luo - 2016 - Theory and Decision 81 (2):189-198.details
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Reasons for Action and Psychological Capacities.Rosemary Lowry - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (4):521 - 531.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism.Matthew Lockard - 2013 - Synthese 190 (9):1701-1718.details
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Neuroprediction, Truth-Sensitivity, and the Law.Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen - 2014 - The Journal of Ethics 18 (2):123-136.details
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Newcomb’s problem isn’t a choice dilemma.Zhanglyu Li & Frank Zenker - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):5125-5143.details
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How Supererogation Can Save Intrapersonal Permissivism.Han Li - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (2):171-186.details
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A Theory of Epistemic Supererogation.Han Li - 2018 - Erkenntnis 83 (2):349-367.details
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Money as tool, money as drug: The biological psychology of a strong incentive.Stephen E. G. Lea & Paul Webley - 2006 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 29 (2):161-209.details
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The trouble with prudence.Anthony Simon Laden - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (1):19 – 40.details
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Skepticism, Mental Disorder and Rationality.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 13 (1):1-30.details
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(1 other version)Evolutionary debunking: the Milvian Bridge destabilized.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Synthese 196 (7):2695-2713.details
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Information, Meaning, and Error in Biology.Lucy A. K. Kumar - 2014 - Biological Theory 9 (1):89-99.details
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An epistemic value theory.Dennis Whitcomb - 2007 - Dissertation, Rutgersdetails
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Is depressive rumination rational?Timothy Lane & Georg Northoff - 2016 - In Timothy Joseph Lane & Tzu-Wei Hung (eds.), Rationality: Constraints and Contexts. London, U.K.: Elsevier Academic Press. pp. 121-145.details
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Can the lottery paradox be solved by identifying epistemic justification with epistemic permissibility?Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2019 - Episteme 16 (3):241-261.details
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Sunk costs, rationality, and acting for the sake of the past.Thomas Kelly - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):60–85.details
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Moorean Facts and Belief Revision, or Can the Skeptic Win?Thomas Kelly - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):179-209.details
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Following the argument where it leads.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):105-124.details
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Justícia, incentius i constructivisme.Andrew Williams - 2009 - Enrahonar: Quaderns de Filosofía 43:15-30.details
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In defence of repugnance.Michael Huemer - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):899-933.details
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The Rational Reconstruction of Argumentation Referring to Consequences and Purposes in the Application of Legal Rules: A Pragma-Dialectical Perspective.Eveline T. Feteris - 2005 - Argumentation 19 (4):459-470.details
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(1 other version)Commentary/Elqayam & Evans: Subtracting “ought” from “is”.Natalie Gold, Andrew M. Colman & Briony D. Pulford - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (5).details
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Active agents.Vincent F. Hendricks - 2003 - Journal of Logic, Language and Information 12 (4):469-495.details
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Foundations of Contemporary Revealed Preference Theory.D. Wade Hands - 2013 - Erkenntnis 78 (5):1081-1108.details
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The relatively happy fish.Chad Hansen - 2003 - Asian Philosophy 13 (2 & 3):145 – 164.details
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Hume on Justice.Rosalind Hursthouse - 2010 - In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 264.details
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Hypothetical Markets: Educational Application of Ronald Dworkin’s Sovereign Virtue.Stephen Gough - 2006 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 40 (3):287-299.details
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From Intelligence to Rationality of Minds and Machines in Contemporary Society: The Sciences of Design and the Role of Information.Wenceslao J. Gonzalez - 2017 - Minds and Machines 27 (3):397-424.details
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A framework for the unification of the behavioral sciences.Herbert Gintis - 2007 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 30 (1):1-16.details
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How (far) can rationality be naturalized?Gerd Gigerenzer & Thomas Sturm - 2012 - Synthese 187 (1):243-268.details
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Reasonable utility functions and playing the cooperative way.Gerald F. Gaus - 2008 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 11 (2):215-234.details
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Is the public incompetent? Compared to whom? About what?Gerald Gaus - 2008 - Critical Review: A Journal of Politics and Society 20 (3):291-311.details
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Higher-order preferences and the master rationality motive.Keith E. Stanovich - 2008 - Thinking and Reasoning 14 (1):111 – 127.details
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Intrinsic vs. extrinsic value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemology.Matthias Steup - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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When is it selectively advantageous to have true beliefs? Sandwiching the better safe than sorry argument.Christopher L. Stephens - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (2):161-189.details
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First- and Second-Level Bias in Automated Decision-making.Ulrik Franke - 2022 - Philosophy and Technology 35 (2):1-20.details
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Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.details
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Weighing and Balancing in the Justification of Judicial Decisions.Eveline Feteris - 2008 - Informal Logic 28 (1):20-30.details
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