- (2 other versions)Is endurantism the folk friendly view of persistence?Sam Baron, Andrew J. Latham, Jordan Veng Oh & Kristie Miller - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies.details
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An Ethics of Philosophical Belief: The case for personal commitments.Chris Ranalli - forthcoming - In Sanford C. Goldberg & Mark Walker (eds.), Attitude in Philosophy. Oxford University Press.details
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(1 other version)The Dynamic Strategy of Common Sense Against Radical Revisionism.Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):141-162.details
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Can You Keep a Secret? BS Conspiracy Theories and the Argument from Loose Lips.Ryan Ross - 2022 - Episteme:1-20.details
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How can you be so sure? Illusionism and the obviousness of phenomenal consciousness.François Kammerer - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (9):2845-2867.details
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An Ecumenical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Philosophia 49 (5):2019-2040.details
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Epistemological solipsism as a route to external world skepticism.Grace Helton - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):229-250.details
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Ethical Mooreanism.Jonathan Fuqua - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):6943-6965.details
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Using and Abusing Moorean Arguments.M. Scarfone - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (1):52-71.details
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On Presumptions, Burdens of Proof, and Explanations.Petar Bodlović - 2020 - Informal Logic 40 (2):255-294.details
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Value beyond truth-value: a practical response to skepticism.Miriam Schleifer McCormick - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8601-8619.details
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A puzzle about Moorean metaphysics.Louis Doulas - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):493-513.details
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(1 other version)When Science Confronts Philosophy: Three Case Studies.Eric Dietrich - 2020 - Axiomathes 1:1-22.details
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On the Socratic Injunction to Follow the Argument Where it Leads.Jason Marsh - 2017 - In Paul Draper & J. L. Schellenberg (eds.), Renewing Philosophy of Religion: Exploratory Essays. Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press. pp. 187-207.details
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Why Moore Matters.Adam Leite - manuscriptdetails
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Fundamental and Derivative Truths.J. R. G. Williams - 2010 - Mind 119 (473):103 - 141.details
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(1 other version)Why Philosophy Can Overturn Common Sense.Susanna Rinard - 2013 - In Tamar Szabó Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology: Volume 4. Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 185.details
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Teaching Philosophy through Lincoln-Douglas Debate.Jacob Nebel, Ryan W. Davis, Peter van Elswyk & Ben Holguin - 2013 - Teaching Philosophy 36 (3):271-289.details
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Moorean Arguments and Moral Revisionism.Tristram McPherson - 2009 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (2):1-25.details
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(1 other version)Common sense as evidence: Against revisionary ontology and skepticism.Thomas Kelly - 2008 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 32 (1):53-78.details
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Peer disagreement and counter-examples.Ruth Weintraub - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (7):1773-1790.details
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Epistemic Closure, Home Truths, and Easy Philosophy.Walter Horn - 2018 - Journal of Philosophy 115 (1):34-51.details
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Taking Skepticism Seriously: How the Zhuang-Zi Can Inform Contemporary Epistemology.Chung Julianne - 2017 - Comparative Philosophy 8 (2):3-29.details
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Naturalistic Moral Realism and Moral Disagreement: David Copp’s Account.Mark Hanin - 2012 - Res Publica 18 (4):283-301.details
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Following the argument where it leads.Thomas Kelly - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):105-124.details
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(1 other version)When Science Confronts Philosophy: Three Case Studies.Eric Dietrich - 2020 - Axiomathes 30 (5):479-500.details
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Philosophical Individualism.John A. Keller - 2017 - In Being, Freedom, and Method: Themes From the Philosophy of Peter van Inwagen. New York: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Soames and Moore on method in ethics and epistemology.Sarah McGrath & Thomas Kelly - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (6):1661-1670.details
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Quality of Life Assessments, Cognitive Reliability, and Procreative Responsibility.Jason Marsh - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):436-466.details
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Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment.Thomas Kelly - 2013 - In David Phiroze Christensen & Jennifer Lackey (eds.), The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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Do formal objections to the error theory overgeneralize?Bart Streumer & Daniel Wodak - 2023 - Analysis 83 (4):732-741.details
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Hard presentism.Patrick Dawson - 2020 - Synthese 198 (9):8433-8461.details
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Carnapian Explication and the Canberra Plan’s Conceptual Analysis: a Comparison and Critique.Rogelio Miranda - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):160-179.details
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Revisionism, Scepticism, and the Non-Belief Theory of Hinge Commitments.Chris Ranalli - 2018 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 8 (2):96-130.details
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Was Moore a Moorean? On Moore and Scepticism.Peter Baumann - 2009 - European Journal of Philosophy 17 (2):181-200.details
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How Not to Be a Fallibilist.Christos Kyriacou - 2023 - The Monist 106 (4):423-440.details
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Carnapian Explication and the Canberra Plan’s Conceptual Analysis.Rogelio Miranda Vilchis - 2019 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 22 (1):160-179.details
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Taking moral skepticism seriously.Richard Joyce - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (3):843-851.details
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Moral Disagreement and Epistemic Advantages.Ben Sherman - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (3):1-20.details
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Getting the big picture: A question on composition and photography.Eli Pitcovski - 2017 - Synthese 194 (3).details
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(1 other version)The Dynamic Strategy of Common Sense Against Radical Revisionism.Jean-Baptiste Guillon - 2023 - Topoi 42 (1):141-162.details
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