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Are vague predicates incoherent?

Synthese 46 (1):121-141 (1981)

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  1. Resolution Spaces: A Topological Approach to Similarity.Konstantinos Georgatos - 2000 - In DEXA 2000. IEEE Computer Society. pp. 553-557.
    A central concept for information retrieval is that of similarity. Although an information retrieval system is expected to return a set of documents most relevant to the query word(s), it is often described as returning a set of documents most similar to the query. The authors argue that in order to reason with similarity we need to model the concept of discriminating power. They offer a simple topological notion called resolution space that provides a rich mathematical framework for reasoning with (...)
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  • (1 other version)Une classe de concepts.Paul Franceschi - 2002 - Semiotica 139 (139):211-226.
    Je m'attache dans le présent article à élaborer la construction d'une classe générale de concepts, qui intègre notamment un certain nombre de contraires polarisés d'usage courant. Le point de départ de cette construction ne réside pas dans des concepts usuels, lexicalisés, c'est-à-dire pour lesquels il existe un mot correspondant dans le langage courant propre à une langue donnée. A l'inverse, la démarche qui préside à la construction de la présente classe de concepts consiste dans une définition abstraite de cette dernière, (...)
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  • Les énoncés psychologiques à la première personne et le problème de la connaissance de soi.Michel Seymour - 1991 - Philosophiques 18 (1):3-23.
    Un argument en faveur de l'infaillibilité a priori est considéré puis rejeté. Il s'agit de critiquer un argument de type cartésien visant à fonder la connaissance de soi sur un type privilégié de rapport épistémique. On montre que plusieurs catégories d'énoncés psychologiques à la première personne ne peuvent donner lieu à un tel savoir infaillible. La discussion culmine sur l'examen du Cogito. Il est démontré que le philosophe cartésien ne peut savoir a priori qu'il pense puisqu'il ne peut savoir a (...)
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  • Vaghezza: confini, cumuli e paradossi.Sebastiano Moruzzi - 2012 - Roma: Laterza.
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  • Anti‐Atomism about Color Representation.John Morrison - 2013 - Noûs 47 (2):94-122.
    According to anti-atomism, we represent color properties (e.g., red) in virtue of representing color relations (e.g., redder than). I motivate anti-atomism with a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indistinguishable chips. I then develop two versions of anti-atomism.
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  • (1 other version)On a Class of Concepts.Paul Franceschi - 2002 - Semiotica 139:211-226.
    This article describes the philosophical construction of a class of concepts whose structure and properties are of interest in various fields. The focus here is on applications in the area of paradigmatic analysis of the current taxonomy and proposes it as an alternative to the classification proposed by Greimas.
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  • Strict finitism.Crispin Wright - 1982 - Synthese 51 (2):203 - 282.
    Dummett's objections to the coherence of the strict finitist philosophy of mathematics are thus, at the present time at least, ill-taken. We have so far no definitive treatment of Sorites paradoxes; so no conclusive ground for dismissing Dummett's response — the response of simply writing off a large class of familiar, confidently handled expressions as semantically incoherent. I believe that cannot be the right response, if only because it threatens to open an unacceptable gulf between the insight into his own (...)
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  • Prefaces, Sorites and Guides to Reasoning.Rosanna Keefe - 2021 - In Lee Walters & John Hawthorne (eds.), Conditionals, Paradox, and Probability: Themes from the Philosophy of Dorothy Edgington. Oxford, England: Oxford University press. pp. 212-226.
    Is there an interesting relation between the Preface paradox and the Sorites paradox that might be used to illuminate either or both of those paradoxes and the phenomena of rationality and vagueness with which they, respectively, are bound up? In particular, if we consider the analogy alongside a familiar response to the Preface Paradox that employs degrees of belief, does this give any support to the thought that we should adopt some kind of degree-theoretic treatment of vagueness and the sorites? (...)
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  • Vagueness as Arbitrariness: Outline of a Theory of Vagueness.Sagid Salles - 2021 - Springer.
    This book proposes a new solution to the problem of vagueness. There are several different ways of addressing this problem and no clear agreement on which one is correct. The author proposes that it should be understood as the problem of explaining vague predicates in a way that systematizes six intuitions about the phenomenon and satisfies three criteria of adequacy for an ideal theory of vagueness. The third criterion, which is called the “criterion of precisification”, is the most controversial one. (...)
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  • Neutralism and the Observational Sorites Paradox.Patrick Greenough - manuscript
    Neutralism is the broad view that philosophical progress can take place when (and sometimes only when) a thoroughly neutral, non-specific theory, treatment, or methodology is adopted. The broad goal here is to articulate a distinct, specific kind of sorites paradox (The Observational Sorites Paradox) and show that it can be effectively treated via Neutralism.
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  • Castles Built on Clouds: Vague Identity and Vague Objects.Benjamin L. Curtis & Harold W. Noonan - 2014 - In Ken Akiba & Ali Abasnezhad (eds.), Vague Objects and Vague Identity: New Essays on Ontic Vagueness. Dordrecht, Netherland: Springer. pp. 305-326.
    Can identity itself be vague? Can there be vague objects? Does a positive answer to either question entail a positive answer to the other? In this paper we answer these questions as follows: No, No, and Yes. First, we discuss Evans’s famous 1978 argument and argue that the main lesson that it imparts is that identity itself cannot be vague. We defend the argument from objections and endorse this conclusion. We acknowledge, however, that the argument does not by itself establish (...)
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  • Is Incommensurability Vagueness?John Broome - 1997 - In Ruth Chang (ed.), Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason. Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard.
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  • Hypercomparatives.Adam Morton - 1997 - Synthese 111 (1):97-114.
    In natural language we rarely use relation-words with more than three argument places. This paper studies one systematic device, rooted in natural language, by which relations of greater adicity can be expressed. It is based on a higher-order relation between 1-place, 2-place, and 4-place relations (and so on) of which the relation between the positive and comparative degrees of a predicate is a special case. Two formal languages are presented in this connection, one of which represents the language of communication (...)
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  • The sorites paradox and higher-order vagueness.J. A. Burgess - 1990 - Synthese 85 (3):417-474.
    One thousand stones, suitably arranged, might form a heap. If we remove a single stone from a heap of stones we still have a heap; at no point will the removal of just one stone make sufficient difference to transform a heap into something which is not a heap. But, if this is so, we still have a heap, even when we have removed the last stone composing our original structure. So runs the Sorites paradox. Similar paradoxes can be constructed (...)
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  • Indiscriminability and phenomenal continua.Diana Raffman - 2012 - Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):309-322.
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  • Physicalism, instrumentalism and the semantics of modal logic.Graeme Forbes - 1983 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 12 (3):271 - 298.
    The delicate point in the formalistic position is to explain how the non-intuitionistic classical mathematics is significant, after having initially agreed with the intuitionists that its theorems lack a real meaning in terms of which they are true (S. C. Kleene, 1952).
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  • A model of tolerance.Elia Zardini - 2008 - Studia Logica 90 (3):337-368.
    According to the naive theory of vagueness, the vagueness of an expression consists in the existence of both positive and negative cases of application of the expression and in the non- existence of a sharp cut-off point between them. The sorites paradox shows the naive theory to be inconsistent in most logics proposed for a vague language. The paper explores the prospects of saving the naive theory by revising the logic in a novel way, placing principled restrictions on the transitivity (...)
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  • Matching Sensible Qualities: A Skeleton in the Closet for Representationalism.Robert Schroer - 2002 - Philosophical Studies 107 (3):259-273.
    The intransitivity of matching sensible qualities of color isa threat not only to the sense-data theory, but to allrealist theories of sensible qualities, including thecurrent leading realist theory: representationalism.I save representationalism from this threat by way ofa novel yet empirically plausible hypothesis about theintrospective classification of sensible qualities of color.I argue that due to limitations of the visual system's abilityto extract fine-grained information about color fromthe environment, introspective classification of sensiblequalities of color is sensitive to features of context.I finish by (...)
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  • Phenomenal Sorites Paradoxes and Looking the Same.Rosanna Keefe - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):327-344.
    Taking a series of colour patches, starting with one that clearly looks red, and making each so similar in colour to the previous one that it looks the same as it, we appear to be able to show that a yellow patch looks red. I ask whether phenomenal sorites paradoxes, such as this, are subject to a unique kind of solution that is unavailable in relation to other sorites paradoxes. I argue that they do not need such a solution, nor (...)
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  • A case for "qualitative confirmation" for the social and behavioral sciences.Steven I. Miller & Marcel Fredericks - 1991 - Philosophy of Science 58 (3):452-467.
    This paper attempts to clarify the meaning and significance of "qualitative confirmation". The need to do so is related to the fact that, without such a conceptualization, a large portion of the human sciences are relegated to a less than scientific status. Accordingly, "qualitative confirmation" is viewed as a proper subset of traditional confirmation theory. To establish such a case, a general Hempelian framework is utilized, but it is supplemented with two additional levels of confirmation. It is concluded that the (...)
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  • Thisness and vagueness.Graeme Forbes - 1983 - Synthese 54 (2):235-259.
    This paper is about two puzzles, or two versions of a single puzzle, which deserve to be called paradoxes, and develops some apparatus in terms of which the apparently conflicting principles which generate the puzzles can be rendered consistent. However, the apparatus itself is somewhat controversial: the puzzles are modal ones, and the resolution to be advocated requires the adoption of a counterpart theoretic semantics of essentially the kind proposed by David Lewis, which in turn requires qualified rejection of certain (...)
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