- Liberalism and Conservatism in the Epistemology of Perceptual Belief.Ram Neta - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (4):685-705.details
|
|
Perceptualism and the epistemology of normative reasons.Jean Moritz Müller - 2020 - Synthese 199 (1-2):3557-3586.details
|
|
Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously.Michael Milona - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (4):897-915.details
|
|
Can Concepts Ground Apriori Knowledge? Peacocke’s Referential Turn and its Challenges.Nenad Miščević - 2008 - Acta Analytica 23 (3):233-256.details
|
|
Armchair luck: Apriority, intellection and epistemic luck. [REVIEW]Nenad Miščević - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (1):48-73.details
|
|
Cognitive Penetration and the Tribunal of Experience.Jona Vance - 2015 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (4):641-663.details
|
|
The Dogmatists and Wright on Moore’s “Proof”.Mark McBride - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):1-20.details
|
|
In defense of Epistemic Modesty.Farid Masrour - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331.details
|
|
Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.details
|
|
The epistemological argument for content externalism.Brad Majors & Sarah Sawyer - 2005 - Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):257-280.details
|
|
On Social Defeat.B. J. C. Madison - 2020 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 50 (6):719-734.details
|
|
Epistemic Internalism.Bjc Madison - 2010 - Philosophy Compass 5 (10):840-853.details
|
|
Inferentialism and cognitive penetration of perception.Jack C. Lyons - 2016 - Episteme 13 (1):1-28.details
|
|
Understanding what was said.Guy Longworth - 2018 - Synthese 195 (2):815-834.details
|
|
The Metaphysical Requirement for Models of Prediction and Explanationist Approaches to the Problem of Induction.Jaeho Lee - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (3):225-242.details
|
|
Moral Fixed Points, Rationality and the ‘Why Be Moral?’ Question.Christos Kyriacou - 2019 - Erkenntnis 86 (3):647-664.details
|
|
On having no reason: dogmatism and Bayesian confirmation.Peter Kung - 2010 - Synthese 177 (1):1 - 17.details
|
|
Expressivism and Mind-Dependence.Sebastian Köhler - 2014 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (6):750-764.details
|
|
Two Ways to Put Knowledge First.Alexander Jackson - 2012 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 90 (2):353 - 369.details
|
|
Equivalence, Reliability, and Convergence: Replies to McDowell, Peacocke, and Neta.Anil Gupta - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (2):490-508.details
|
|
Theorizing justification.Peter J. Graham - 2010 - In Joseph Campbell, Michael O'Rourke & Harvey Silverstein (eds.), Knowledge and Skepticism. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. pp. 45-72.details
|
|
Epistemic Entitlement.Peter J. Graham - 2012 - Noûs 46 (3):449-482.details
|
|
Epistemic Entitlement and Luck.Sandy Goldberg - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2):273-302.details
|
|
Expressivism and Realist Explanations.Camil Golub - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (6):1385-1409.details
|
|
Authoritative Knowledge.Juan S. Piñeros Glasscock - 2020 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2475-2502.details
|
|
The philosophical significance of the De Se.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):253-276.details
|
|
Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
|
|
Experiencia perceptual y sustento epistémico.José Luís Falguera & Santiago Peleteiro - 2014 - Revista de Filosofía (Madrid) 39 (2):7-32.details
|
|
How Are Basic Belief-Forming Methods Justified?David Enoch & Joshua Schechter - 2008 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 76 (3):547–579.details
|
|
A‐Rational Epistemological Disjunctivism.Santiago Echeverri - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 106 (3):692-719.details
|
|
Modal epistemology made concrete.Daniel Dohrn - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2455-2475.details
|
|
A problem for rationalist responses to skepticism.Sinan Dogramaci - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 168 (2):355-369.details
|
|
Communist Conventions for Deductive Reasoning.Sinan Dogramaci - 2013 - Noûs 49 (4):776-799.details
|
|
Moore’s Proof, Warrant Transmission and Skepticism.Simon Dierig - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (2):487-502.details
|
|
Dogramaci’s deflationism about rationality.Jason A. DeWitt - 2021 - Synthese 199 (1-2):4437-4455.details
|
|
Extended Rationality: A Hinge Epistemology.Annalisa Coliva - 2015 - London, England: Palgrave-Macmillan.details
|
|
Belief about Probability.Ray Buchanan & Sinan Dogramaci - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.details
|
|
Quasi-Realism for Realists.Bart Streumer - forthcoming - Philosophers' Imprint.details
|
|
Entitlement: The Basis for Empirical Epistemic Warrant.Tyler Burge - 2020 - In Peter Graham & Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen (eds.), Epistemic Entitlement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 37-142.details
|
|
The Theoretical Significance of the A Priori/A Posteriori Distinction.Joshua Schechter - forthcoming - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), The A Priori: Its Significance, Sources, and Extent. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
What is Logical Monism?Justin Clarke-Doane - forthcoming - In Christopher Peacocke & Paul Boghossian (eds.), Normative Realism. Oxford University Press.details
|
|
Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Moral Cognitivism vs. Non-Cognitivism.Mark van Roojen - 2013 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 2013 (1):1-88.details
|
|
Nonconceptual mental content.Jose Luis Bermudez - 2003 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
|
|
Primitively rational belief-forming processes.Ralph Wedgwood - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 180--200.details
|
|
Basic Justification and the Moorean Response to the Skeptic.Nicholas Silins - 2007 - In Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 2. Oxford University Press. pp. 108.details
|
|
Experience and Defeat.Nicholas Silins - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
|
|
An Imaginative Person’s Guide to Objective Modality.Derek Lam - forthcoming - In Amy Kind & Christopher Badura (eds.), Epistemic Uses of Imagination. Routledge.details
|
|
Experience is Knowledge.Matt Duncan - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. Oxford, UK: pp. 106-129.details
|
|
Explanation as a guide to induction.Roger White - 2005 - Philosophers' Imprint 5:1-29.details
|
|