- Incapacity, Inconceivability, and Two Types of Objectivity.Nicholas Sars - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 103 (1):76-94.details
|
|
The Limits of Free Will: Replies to Bennett, Smith and Wallace.Paul Russell - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):357-373.details
|
|
Molinism's kryptonite: Counterfactuals and circumstantial luck.Andre Leo Rusavuk - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.details
|
|
“Free Will and Affirmation: Assessing Honderich’s Third Way”.Paul Russell - 2017 - In Gregg D. Caruso (ed.), Ted Honderich on Consciousness, Determinism, and Humanity. London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. Pp. 159-79..details
|
|
Hypocrisy is Vicious, Value-Expressing Inconsistency.Benjamin Rossi - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (1):57-80.details
|
|
Don’t make a fetish of faults: a vindication of moral luck.Stefan Https://Orcidorg Riedener - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (3):693-711.details
|
|
Manipulation and liability to defensive harm.Massimo Renzo - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3483-3501.details
|
|
Criminal Law and the Autonomy Assumption: Adorno, Bhaskar, and Critical Legal Theory.Craig Reeves - 2014 - Journal of Critical Realism 13 (4):339-367.details
|
|
Adorno, Freedom and Criminal Law: The ‘Determinist Challenge’ Revitalised.Craig Reeves - 2016 - Law and Critique 27 (3):323-348.details
|
|
What do We Want from a Theory of Epistemic Blame?Adam Piovarchy - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):791-805.details
|
|
Responsibility for Testimonial Injustice.Adam Piovarchy - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (2):597–615.details
|
|
Hypocrisy, Standing to Blame and Second‐Personal Authority.Adam Piovarchy - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):603-627.details
|
|
What Makes the Free Will Debate Substantive?Derk Pereboom - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):257-264.details
|
|
Self-Defense, Deterrence, and the Use Objection: A Comment on Victor Tadros’s Wrongs and Crimes.Derk Pereboom - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):439-454.details
|
|
Review of Why Free Will is Real, Christian List, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2019. [REVIEW]Derk Pereboom - 2022 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 17 (1):229-234.details
|
|
Powers, laws and freedom of the will: Steven Horst: Laws, mind, and free will. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2011, 277pp, $36.00 HB.Derk Pereboom - 2014 - Metascience 23 (3):491-495.details
|
|
On Carolina Sartorio’s Causation and Free Will.Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (6):1535-1543.details
|
|
Incapacitation, Reintegration, and Limited General Deterrence.Derk Pereboom - 2018 - Neuroethics 13 (1):87-97.details
|
|
From Neuroscience to Law: Bridging the Gap.Tuomas K. Pernu & Nadine Elzein - 2020 - Frontiers in Psychology 11.details
|
|
A Defense of Free Will Skepticism: Replies to Commentaries by Victor Tadros, Saul Smilansky, Michael McKenna, and Alfred R. Mele on Free Will, Agency, and Meaning in Life.Derk Pereboom - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):617-636.details
|
|
Moral Responsibility for Actions and Omissions: The Asymmetry Thesis Rejected.David Palmer & Yuanyuan Liu - 2021 - Erkenntnis 86 (5):1225-1237.details
|
|
Free will and control: a noncausal approach.David Palmer - 2021 - Synthese 198 (10):10043-10062.details
|
|
Moral responsibility, conversation, and desert: comments on Michael McKenna’s conversation and responsibility.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (1):63-72.details
|
|
Liability, culpability, and luck.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (11):3523-3541.details
|
|
Duties, Desert, and the Justification of Punishment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (3):425-438.details
|
|
Desert, fairness, and resentment.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2013 - Philosophical Explorations 16 (2):117-132.details
|
|
Desert, Free Will, and Our Moral Responsibility Practices.Dana Kay Nelkin - 2019 - The Journal of Ethics 23 (3):265-275.details
|
|
Causality and determination, powers and agency: Anscombean perspectives.Jesse M. Mulder, Thomas Müller, Dawa Ometto & Niels van Miltenburg - 2022 - Synthese 200 (6):1-16.details
|
|
‘Animals run about the world in all sorts of paths’: varieties of indeterminism.Jesse M. Mulder - 2021 - Synthese (5-6):1-17.details
|
|
Respuestas a los comentaristas.Carlos Moya - 2018 - Quaderns de Filosofia 5 (1):127-147.details
|
|
Frankfurtian Reflections: A Critical Discussion of Robert Lockie’s “Three Recent Frankfurt Cases”.Carlos J. Moya - 2016 - Philosophia 44 (2):585-605.details
|
|
Emergent Agent Causation.Juan Morales - 2023 - Synthese 201:138.details
|
|
Libertarian Free Will and the Physical Indeterminism Luck Objection.Dwayne Moore - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (1):159-182.details
|
|
Manipulation and Degrees of Blameworthiness.Martin Montminy & Daniel Tinney - 2018 - The Journal of Ethics 22 (3-4):265-281.details
|
|
“Let’s build an Anscombe box”: assessing Anscombe’s rebuttal of the statistics objection against indeterminism-based free agency.Thomas Müller - 2022 - Synthese 200 (2):1-22.details
|
|
The Three-Case Argument against the Moral Justificatory Significance of Basic Desert.Aleksandr Mishura - 2021 - Philosophia 50 (3):1327-1340.details
|
|
Crossing the Line: New Intuitions Behind Frankfurt-Type Cases.Aleksandr Mishura - 2017 - Axiomathes 27 (4):393-402.details
|
|
Reactive attitudes and personal relationships.Per-Erik Milam - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):102-122.details
|
|
In defense of non-reactive attitudes.Per-Erik Milam - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (3):294-307.details
|
|
The Zygote Argument Is Still Invalid: So What?Kristin M. Mickelson - 2020 - Philosophia 49 (2):705-722.details
|
|
Preemptive Omissions.Joseph Metz - 2024 - Erkenntnis 89 (3):1117-1138.details
|
|
Keeping It Simple: Rethinking Abilities and Moral Responsibility.Joseph Metz - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (4):651-668.details
|
|
Reasonable Pluralism about Desert-Presupposing Moral Responsibility: A Conditional Defense.J. P. Messina - 2020 - Journal of Value Inquiry 55 (1):189-208.details
|
|
The emotion account of blame.Leonhard Menges - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (1):257-273.details
|
|
Responsibility, Free Will, and the Concept of Basic Desert.Leonhard Menges - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (2):615-636.details
|
|
Responsibility and appropriate blame: The no difference view.Leonhard Menges - 2020 - European Journal of Philosophy 29 (2):393-409.details
|
|
Free will, determinism, and the right levels of description.Leonhard Menges - 2021 - Philosophical Explorations 25 (1):1-18.details
|
|
A Defense of Privacy as Control.Leonhard Menges - 2021 - The Journal of Ethics 25 (3):385-402.details
|
|
On Pereboom’s Disappearing Agent Argument.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 11 (3):561-574.details
|
|
Direct control.Alfred R. Mele - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (2):275-290.details
|
|