Purpose: This, the second part of a two-part paper, describes how the concerns of enactive cognitive science have been realized in actual research: methodological issues, proposed explanatory mechanisms and models, some of the potential as both a theoretical and applied science, and several of the major open research questions. Findings: Despite some skepticism about "mechanisms" in constructivist literature, enactive cognitive science attempts to develop cognitive formalisms and models. Such techniques as feedback loops, self-organization, autocatalytic networks, and dynamical systems modeling are (...) used to develop alternatives to cognitivist models. A number of technical similarities are starting to emerge in the different models being proposed. Research Implications: The need to resolve the interplay between autonomy and coupling with the environment suggests the need for further technical research. And the reintroduction of first-person concerns into cognitive science raises some questions of method, particularly with regard to the relationship between first-person experience, neuroscience, and methods of description, analysis, and explanation. Results to date suggest that insights from enactive cognitive science could lead to innovations in the design of artifacts. (shrink)

The modern history of verisimilitude can be divided into three periods. The first began in 1960, when Karl Popper proposed his qualitative definition of what it is for one theory to be more truthlike than another theory, and lasted until 1974, when David Miller and Pavel Trichý published their refutation of Popper's definition. The second period started immediately with the attempt to explicate truthlikeness by means of relations of similarity or resemblance between states of affairs (or their linguistic representations); the (...) work within this similarity approach was summarized in the books of Graham Oddie [1986] and Ilkka Niiniluoto [1987]. During the subsequent third period, studies in verisimilitude have been actively continued, and interesting results and applications have been achieved, but not many dramatic novelties. While it is now obsolete to claim that truthlikeness with reasonable properties cannot be defined at all, there is still a lot of controversy about the best and least arbitrary approach to doing this. (shrink)

We know that we can learn much from the reports of multiple competent, independent, unbiased observers. There are also things we can learn from the reports of competent but biased observers. Specifically, when reports go against the grain of an agent’s known biases, we can be relatively confident in the veracity of those reports. Triangulating on the truth via that mechanism requires a multiplicity of observers with distinct biases, each of whose reports might be one-way decisive in that fashion. It (...) also presupposes that all observers share the same fundamental epistemic standards. (shrink)

The development of a conception of critical pedagogy is itself an aspect of the development of critical rationality within late modern societies, closely connected with the role of education in developing critical rationality. The role of critique pervades all aspects of life: for people as citizens, workers and self-determining private individuals. Late modern societies depend on a critically minded population for their viability, for the democratic management of a competing balance of interests and for a capacity for rapid renewal. These (...) requirements put a demand on the education system for the development of critical rationality. However, its development contains within itself the seeds, not just of renewal, but of transformation or even anarchy. This is discussed in relation to three major aspects of education—liberal, civic and vocational—and it is argued that there is a tension within each that arises from the requirement of critique for their successful functioning as educational practices in liberal societies and from the implausibility of developing forms of critique that are inherently self-limiting. Societies that espouse the development of critical rationality as a key educational aim exist in a state of tension and of uncertainty as to the extent to which it can be developed. Attempts to limit critique to consideration only of what is worthwhile are bound to be futile. On the other hand, education must be concerned with preparation for the worthwhile. Critique thus performs the important function of ensuring that our conception of the worthwhile does not remain fixed, but is itself an agent of social change. This paper explores this issue and argues that the problem of reconciling preparation for social participation with preparation for critical engagement exists in all three spheres. The problems may not be resolvable ones but should encourage continual awareness of the scope and limits of educational critique in liberal societies. (shrink)

Regarding the dichotomy between applied science and pure science, there are two apparently paradoxical facts. First, they are distinguishable. Second, the outcomes of pure sciences (e.g. scientific theories and models) are applicable to producing the outcomes of applied sciences (e.g. technological artefacts) and vice versa. Addressing the functional roles of applied and pure science, i.e. to produce design representation and science representation, respectively, I propose a new characterisation of the dichotomy that explains these two facts.

Knowledge is closed under implication, according to standard theories. Orthodoxy can allow, though, that apparent counterexamples to closure exist, much as Kripkeans recognize the existence of illusions of possibility which they seek to explain away. Should not everyone, orthodox or not, want to make sense of “intimations of openness”? This paper compares two styles of explanation: evidence that boosts P’s probability need not boost that of its consequence Q; evidence bearing on P’s subject matter may not bear on the subject (...) matter of Q. (shrink)

With the recent rise of the philosophy of scientific practices, SSK (Sociology of Scientific Knowledge), and feminist approaches to the philosophy of science, a new perspective is gradually coming into being, holding that the starting point for scientific research is opportunity. Opportunistic features in solar neutrino experiments, Opportunistic features of complexity studies emerging from economics, and the measurement of insects’ flight can prove the above perspective from different angels. It is important and significant to determine whether the starting point for (...) scientific research is opportunity, a problem, or an observation. (shrink)

The development of a conception of critical pedagogy is itself an aspect of the development of critical rationality within late modern societies, closely connected with the role of education in developing critical rationality. The role of critique pervades all aspects of life: for people as citizens, workers and self-determining private individuals. Late modern societies depend on a critically minded population for their viability, for the democratic management of a competing balance of interests and for a capacity for rapid renewal. These (...) requirements put a demand on the education system for the development of critical rationality. However, its development contains within itself the seeds, not just of renewal, but of transformation or even anarchy. This is discussed in relation to three major aspects of education—liberal, civic and vocational—and it is argued that there is a tension within each that arises from the requirement of critique for their successful functioning as educational practices in liberal societies and from the implausibility of developing forms of critique that are inherently self-limiting. Societies that espouse the development of critical rationality as a key educational aim exist in a state of tension and of uncertainty as to the extent to which it can be developed. Attempts to limit critique to consideration only of what is worthwhile are bound to be futile. On the other hand, education must be concerned with preparation for the worthwhile. Critique thus performs the important function of ensuring that our conception of the worthwhile does not remain fixed, but is itself an agent of social change. This paper explores this issue and argues that the problem of reconciling preparation for social participation with preparation for critical engagement exists in all three spheres. The problems may not be resolvable ones but should encourage continual awareness of the scope and limits of educational critique in liberal societies. (shrink)

The dangers of character reification for cladistic inference are explored. The identification and analysis of characters always involves theory-laden abstraction—there is no theory-free “view from nowhere.” Given theory-ladenness, and given a real world with actual objects and processes, how can we separate robustly real biological characters from uncritically reified characters? One way to avoid reification is through the employment of objectivity criteria that give us good methods for identifying robust primary homology statements. I identify six such criteria and explore each (...) with examples. Ultimately, it is important to minimize character reification, because poor character analysis leads to dismal cladograms, even when proper phylogenetic analysis is employed. Given the deep and systemic problems associated with character reification, it is ironic that philosophers have focused almost entirely on phylogenetic analysis and neglected character analysis. (shrink)

This essay attempts to distinguish and discuss the importance and limitations of different ways of being wrong. At first it is argued that strictly falsifiable knowledge is concerned with simple (instrumental) mistakes only, and thus is incapable of understanding more complex errors (and truths). In order to gain a deeper understanding of mistakes (and to understand a deeper kind of mistake), it is argued that communicative aspects have to be taken into account. This is done in the theory of communicative (...) action, which adds to our knowledge of errors the notion of communicative mistakes: mistakes as obstacles for sincere communication. However, to overcome this still purely negative judgement of errors, two processes are examined in which mistakes are best regarded as developmental steps, that is, steps not only meaningful in their own right (as containing some truth), but also as necessary preconditions for further progress. This would suggest that truth is born out of errors. But if so, one has to understand the wrongness of such errors; how is it that they are erroneous if they (somehow) contain the truth? At the end of this essay, a tentative answer to this question is given. (shrink)

University of North Carolina at Greensboro Most approaches to the philosophy of the natural and social sciences are basedon completed scientific investigations. However, there are many importantcases in science in which testing is incomplete. These cases are termed suspendedtrials and are particularly significant in biomedical and allied health fields. Initially,the authors' interest in suspended trials was piqued by a controversialmethod for assisting autistic children known as facilitated communication. Thisarticle examines facilitated communication and other examples of suspendedtrials from the perspective of (...) an economics of science and game theory. Themodel is consistent with recent evolutionary approaches to the philosophy ofthe natural and social sciences and with recent contributions to an economicunderstanding of science. Key Words: clinical trials • innovative therapies • economics of science • suspended trials • facilitated communication • economics of clinical research. (shrink)

In this paper, the Carneades argumentation system is extended to represent a procedural view of inquiry in which evidence is marshalled to support or defeat claims to knowledge. The model is a sequence of moves in a collaborative group inquiry in which parties take turns making assertions about what is known or not known, putting forward evidence to support them, and subjecting these moves to criticisms. It is shown how this model of evaluating evidence in an inquiry is based on (...) a defeasible logic using forms of argument that admit exceptions. It is contended that reasoning from absence of knowledge is as important to inquiry as positive reasoning from evidence to knowledge. The philosophical conflict between this view of reasoning about knowledge and the true-belief-plus view is explored by airing objections and replies on both sides. (shrink)

The Adam Smith problem refers to a claimed inconsistency between the Theory of Moral Sentiments and the Wealth of Nations, regarding the portrayal of human nature in these two books. Previous research predominantly resolved the claimed inconsistency by uncovering virtuous, less selfish character traits in the Wealth of Nations. This article voices caution. I acknowledge – on methodological grounds – fundamental differences regarding the portrayal of human nature in Smith’s behavioral ethics, i.e. the Theory of Moral Sentiments, as compared with (...) Smith’s economic research. The key argument is that Smith’s two books address different research problems and hence do not, need not and cannot adopt the same view of human nature – for methodological reasons, so my argument. Adam Smith scholarship overlooked that Smith himself in considerable degrees understood “economic man” as a heuristic abstraction. I connect to the philosophies of science of Imre Lakatos and Karl Popper. (shrink)

We argue that broad, simplegeneralizations, not specifically linked tocontingencies, will rarely approach truth in ecologyand evolutionary biology. This is because mostinteresting phenomena have multiple, interactingcauses. Instead of looking for single universaltheories to explain the great diversity of naturalsystems, we suggest that it would be profitable todevelop general explanatory frameworks. A frameworkshould clearly specify focal levels. The process orpattern that we wish to study defines our level offocus. The set of potential and actual states at thefocal level interacts with conditions at (...) thecontiguous lower and upper levels of organization,through sets of many-to-one and one-to-manyconnections. The number of initiating conditions andtheir permutations at the lower level define thepotential states at the focal level, whereas theactual state is constrained by the upper-levelboundary conditions. The most useful generalizationsare explanatory frameworks, which are road maps tosolutions, rather than solutions themselves. Suchframeworks outline what is understood about boundaryconditions and initiating conditions so that aninvestigator can pick and choose what is required toeffectively understand a specific event or situation. We discuss these relationships in terms of examplesinvolving sex ratio and mating behavior, competitivehierarchies, insect life-histories and the evolutionof sex. (shrink)

Confirmation bias is often used as an umbrella term for many related phenomena. Information searches, evidence interpretation, and memory recall are the three main components of the thinking proces...

Psychosomatic medicine, with its prevailing biopsychosocial model, aims to integrate human and exact sciences with their divergent conceptual models. Therefore, its own conceptual foundations, which often remain implicit and unknown, may be critically relevant. We defend the thesis that choosing between different metaphysical views on the ‘mind–body problem’ may have important implications for the conceptual foundations of psychosomatic medicine, and therefore potentially also for its methods, scientific status and relationship with the scientific disciplines it aims to integrate: biomedical sciences, psychology (...) and social sciences. To make this point, we introduce three key positions in the philosophical ‘mind–body’ debate and investigate their consequences for the conceptual basis of the biopsychosocial model in general and its ‘psycho-biological’ part in particular. Despite the clinical merits of the biopsychosocial model, we submit that it is conceptually underdeveloped or even flawed, which may hamper its use as a proper scientific model. (shrink)

According to Thagard, the behavior of practitioners of a field may also be used for demarcation between science and pseudoscience due to its social dimension in addition to the epistemic one. I defended the tendency of pseudoscientists to commit fallacies, and the number of fallacies they commit can be a secondary tool for demarcation problem and this tool is consistent with Thagardian approach. In this paper, I selected the astrology as the case and I revealed nine types of logical fallacies (...) frequently committed by astrologers while introducing their field and/or defending their claims against the scientific inquiries and refutation efforts. I also argued that recognizing these fallacies may help the audience to demarcate between the scientific and the pseudoscientific arguments. (shrink)

Before any citizen enters the role of scientist, medical practitioner, lawyer, epidemiologist, and so on, each and all grow up in a society in which the categories of human differentiation are folk categories that organize perceptions, relations, and behavior. That was true during slavery, during Reconstruction, the eugenics period, the two World Wars, and is no less true today. While every period understandably claims to transcend those categories, medicine, law, and science are profoundly and demonstrably influenced by the embedded folk (...) notions of race and ethnicity. (shrink)

states are to be understood in terms of their functional relationships to other mental states, not in terms of their material instantiation in any particular kind of hardware. But the argument that material instantiation is irrelevant to functional..

The commonalities of Douglas Walton's Slippery Slope Arguments and James Davies's Ways of Thinking are obvious: both are written by Canadian philosophers; both lie within the broad field of informal logic; and both make appeals in support of dialogical reasoning. But there the similarities end. The former is the work of a prolific author writing a treatise focussing narrowly on one topic within informal logic; the latter is the product of a newcomer to book-writing, and his is a textbook intended (...) for beginning students. (shrink)

This paper draws on the philosophy of Karl Popper to present a descriptive evolutionary epistemology that offers philosophical solutions to the following related problems: ‘What happens when learning takes place?’ and ‘What happens in human learning?’ It provides a detailed analysis of how learning takes place without any direct transfer of information from the environment to the learner, and it significantly extends the author's earlier published work on this topic. She proposes that learning should be construed as a special case (...) of ‘problem solving’ and as a fundamentally critical and creative process in which learning organisms develop ‘expectations’ that are not purely an outcome of genetic inheritance or random mutation. Human learning is then characterised with reference to: objectified knowledge; descriptive and argumentative language; theoretical problems; the search for error and specific limitation. If the author's evolutionary analysis of learning is valid, it would suggest that we should, if we wish to promote learning, be wary of corralling children and older students in environments that inhibit autonomous activity, that discourage criticality and creativity and generally limit opportunities for trial and error‐elimination. But education institutions, particularly those for older children and adolescents, are very often environments of this constraining kind. Traditionally, educationists have vastly underestimated the human potential for imaginative criticism—because in general they have not recognised the extent to which it lies at the heart of what humans, including the youngest children, do in order to succeed at even the most basic tasks. (shrink)

The contrast between the past-future symmetry of mechanical theories and the time-arrow observed in the behaviour of real complex systems doesn’t have nowadays a fully satisfactory explanation. If one confides in the Laplace-dream that everything be exactly and completely describable by the known mechanical differential equations, the whole experimental evidence of the irreversibility of real complex processes can only be interpreted as an illusion due to the limits of human brain and shortness of human history. In this work it is (...) surmised that in the description of real events it would be more reasonable to renounce exactness and completeness of mechanical differential equations, assuming that also further effects exist in nature, governed by different kinds of rules, in spite of being so weak to be directly unobservable in single motions. This surmise can explain not only the time-arrow, but also why, in particular cases, it can happen that approximate and/or statistical models represent an improvement of mechanical theories instead of an approximation: this happened for Boltzmann gas-model and also for the famous work of Max Planck on blackbody-radiation. And it also appears as a more promising “working hypothesis”, stimulating and guiding us to learn more about limits and origin of the basic equations, and also about the nature of chance and the meaning of probability, which is nowadays not clear in spite of the fundamental role it plays in physics. Particularly that kind of probability which gives the connection between quantum–mechanical differential equations and observable events. (shrink)

Humans appear to follow normative rules of inductive reasoning in "premise diversity tasks" that is, they know that dissimilar rather than similar evidence is better for generalising hypotheses. In three experiments, we use a "hypothesis limitation task" to compare a related inductive reasoning skill knowing how to limit hypotheses by using a negative test strategy. Participants are told that one category member has some property (e.g. Dogs have a merocrine gland) and are asked what evidence they would test to ensure (...) that either all (generalisation) or only (limitation) category members have that property (e.g. All/Only mammals have merocrine glands; tests: wolf, bull, crocodile). Despite participants' reluctance to use negative tests in the Wason 2-4-6 task and other reasoning tasks, participants do use normatively correct negative tests in the hypothesis limitation task as often as they use diverse positive tests in the premise diversity task. Moreover, when given a hypothesis limitation task before a rule evaluation task (similar to the 2-4-6 task), the use of negative tests increases. Thus, when testing hypotheses, people can and do use the right kind of test strategy for the task. (shrink)