- Destructive defeat and justificational force: the dialectic of dogmatism, conservatism, and meta-evidentialism.Matthias Steup - 2018 - Synthese 195 (7):2907-2933.details
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Intuitions, Meaning, and Normativity: Why Intuition Theory Supports a Non‐Descriptivist Metaethic.Matthew S. Bedke - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (1):144-177.details
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Scepticism and Perceptual Justification.Matthias Steup - 2017 - Analysis 77 (1):211-224.details
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Mental Files: Replies to my Critics.François Recanati - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):207-242.details
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Transmission Failure Explained.Martin Smith - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):164-189.details
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How you know you are not a brain in a vat.Alexander Jackson - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (10):2799-2822.details
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Replies to Leite, Turri, and Gerken.Krista Lawlor - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):235-255.details
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Inference and Scepticism.Jose L. Zalabardo - 2013 - In Dylan Dodd & Elia Zardini (eds.), Scepticism and Perceptual Justification. New York: Oxford University Press.details
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Solving the Moorean Puzzle.Michael Blome-Tillmann - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (2):493-514.details
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Purposes of reasoning and Moore’s proof of an external world.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4181-4200.details
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Entitlement and Evidence.Martin Smith - 2013 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 91 (4):735-753.details
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Skepticism: Lehrer versus Mooreanism.Guido Melchior - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 161 (1):47-58.details
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Bootstrap and rollback: generalizing epistemic circularity.Jesper Kallestrup - 2012 - Synthese 189 (2):395-413.details
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In defense of Epistemic Modesty.Farid Masrour - 2011 - Philosophical Issues 21 (1):312-331.details
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The Dogmatists and Wright on Moore’s “Proof”.Mark McBride - 2012 - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1):1-20.details
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An old problem for the new rationalism.Yuval Avnur - 2011 - Synthese 183 (2):175-185.details
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Immediate warrant, epistemic responsibility, and Moorean dogmatism.Adam Leite - 2011 - In Andrew Evan Reisner & Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen (eds.), Reasons for Belief. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 158–179.details
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Moore's Proof And Martin Davies's Epistemic Projects.Annalisa Coliva - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):101-116.details
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Is there a priori knowledge by testimony?Anna-Sara Malmgren - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (2):199-241.details
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Factive phenomenal characters.Benj Hellie - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):259--306.details
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Metamerism, constancy, and knowing which.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2008 - Mind 117 (468):549-585.details
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Hume and reliabilism.Qu Hsueh - 2021 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (34):27-51.details
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Epistemic Justification: Probability, Normalcy, and the Functional Theory.Marvin Backes - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (1):65-81.details
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(1 other version)Justification as a loaded notion.Yuval Avnur - 2019 - Synthese 198 (5):4897-4916.details
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Philosophical Investigation Series: Selected Texts in Epistemology and Philosophy of Science / Série Investigação Filosófica: Textos Selecionados de Epistemologia e Filosofia da Ciência.Rodrigo Reis Lastra Cid & Luiz Helvécio Marques Segundo (eds.) - 2020 - Pelotas: Editora da UFPel / NEPFIL Online.details
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Epistemic perceptualism, skill and the regress problem.J. Adam Carter - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (5):1229-1254.details
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Normalcy, justification, and the easy-defeat problem.Marvin Backes - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (11):2877-2895.details
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How to Explain the Rationality of Perception.Harmen Ghijsen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):500-512.details
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Cogency, Warrant Transmission-Increase and non-Ideal Thinkers.Manuel Pérez Otero - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 99 (S1):23-43.details
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Husserl’s Conception of Experiential Justification: What It Is and Why It Matters.Philipp Berghofer - 2018 - Husserl Studies 34 (2):145-170.details
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(1 other version)Hume's Internalist Epistemology in EHU 12.Hsueh Qu - 2017 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 96 (3):517-539.details
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Recent Work on McKinsey's Paradox.J. Kallestrup - 2011 - Analysis 71 (1):157-171.details
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The Self File and Immunity to Error Through Misidentification.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2013 - Disputatio 5 (36):191-206.details
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Emotion and the new epistemic challenge from cognitive penetrability.Jona Vance - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 169 (2):257-283.details
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Knowledge, Justification and Normative Coincidence1.Martin Smith - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 89 (2):273-295.details
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(1 other version)Why Alief is Not a Legitimate Psychological Category.Hans Muller & Bana Bashour - 2011 - Journal of Philosophical Research 36:371-389.details
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Moorean responses to skepticism: a defense. [REVIEW]Tim Willenken - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 154 (1):1 - 25.details
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Reliabilist justification: Basic, easy, and brute. [REVIEW]Jesper Kallestrup - 2009 - Acta Analytica 24 (3):155-171.details
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Solving the problem of easy knowledge.Tim Black - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.details
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(1 other version)Epistemological Externalism and the Project of Traditional Epistemology.Adam Leite - 2007 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):505-533.details
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Contextualismo meta-epistemológico y el problema del criterio.Rodrigo Laera - 2013 - Agora 32 (2):101-128.details
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Wright Back to Dretske, or Why You Might as Well Deny Knowledge Closure.Marc Alspector-Kelly - 2014 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (3):570-611.details
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Internalism, externalism, and epistemic source circularity.Ian David MacMillan - unknowndetails
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(1 other version)Deep Disagreements and Rational Resolution.Jonathan Matheson - 2021 - Topoi 40 (5):1025-1037.details
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Can the skepticism debate be resolved?Igor Douven - 2009 - Synthese 168 (1):23 - 52.details
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(1 other version)Epistemological externalism and the project of traditional epistemology.Adam Leite - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (3):505–533.details
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The paradox of Moore's proof of an external world.Annalisa Coliva - 2008 - Philosophical Quarterly 58 (231):234–243.details
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Moore’s proof, theory-ladenness of perception, and many proofs.Mark Walker - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (8):2163-2183.details
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The Legacy of Reid's Common Sense in Analytic Epistemology.Mark Boespflug - 2019 - Journal of Scottish Philosophy 17 (1):23-37.details
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Epistemological disjunctivism: Neo-Wittgensteinian and moderate neo-Moorean.Joshua Stuchlik - 2020 - Episteme 17 (4):438-457.details
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