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  1. A pilgrim's progress: From cognitive science to cooperative design. [REVIEW]Liam J. Bannon - 1989 - AI and Society 4 (4):259-275.
    This paper provides a glimpse of some different theoretical frameworks and empirical methods in the author's search for theories and practices that might improve the utility and usability of computer artifacts. The essay touches on some problematic aspects of currently accepted theories and techniques in the cognitive sciences, especially in their application to the field of human-computer interaction, and mentions some alternative conceptions based on a cultural-historical approach. The intent is to widen the nature of the debate about appropriate frameworks (...)
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  • (1 other version)From Interface to Correspondence: Recovering Classical Representations in a Pragmatic Theory of Semantic Information.Orlin Vakarelov - 2013 - Minds and Machines (3):1-25.
    One major fault line in foundational theories of cognition is between the so-called “representational” and “non-representational” theories. Is it possible to formulate an intermediate approach for a foundational theory of cognition by defining a conception of representation that may bridge the fault line? Such an account of representation, as well as an account of correspondence semantics, is offered here. The account extends previously developed agent-based pragmatic theories of semantic information, where meaning of an information state is defined by its interface (...)
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  • Autopoiesis, Life, Mind and Cognition: Bases for a Proper Naturalistic Continuity. [REVIEW]Mario Villalobos - 2013 - Biosemiotics 6 (3):379-391.
    The strong version of the life-mind continuity thesis claims that mind can be understood as an enriched version of the same functional and organizational properties of life. Contrary to this view, in this paper I argue that mental phenomena offer distinctive properties, such as intentionality or representational content, that have no counterpart in the phenomenon of life, and that must be explained by appealing to a different level of functional and organizational principles. As a strategy, and following Maturana’s autopoietic theory (...)
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  • Language Learning From Positive Evidence, Reconsidered: A Simplicity-Based Approach.Anne S. Hsu, Nick Chater & Paul Vitányi - 2013 - Topics in Cognitive Science 5 (1):35-55.
    Children learn their native language by exposure to their linguistic and communicative environment, but apparently without requiring that their mistakes be corrected. Such learning from “positive evidence” has been viewed as raising “logical” problems for language acquisition. In particular, without correction, how is the child to recover from conjecturing an over-general grammar, which will be consistent with any sentence that the child hears? There have been many proposals concerning how this “logical problem” can be dissolved. In this study, we review (...)
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  • Immersive ideals / critical distances : study of the affinity between artistic ideologies in virtual Reality and previous immersive idioms.Joseph Nechvatal (ed.) - 2010 - Berlin: LAP Lambert Academic Publishing AG & Co KG.
    My research into Virtual Reality technology and its central property of immersion has indicated that immersion in Virtual Reality (VR) electronic systems is a significant key to the understanding of contemporary culture as well as considerable aspects of previous culture as detected in the histories of philosophy and the visual arts. The fundamental change in aesthetic perception engendered by immersion, a perception which is connected to the ideal of total-immersion in virtual space, identifies certain shifts in ontology which are relevant (...)
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  • Against Logicist Cognitive Science.Mike Oaksford & Nick Chater - 1991 - Mind and Language 6 (1):1-38.
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  • Logicism, Mental Models and Everyday Reasoning: Reply to Garnham.Nick Chater & Mike Oaksford - 1993 - Mind and Language 8 (1):72-89.
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  • Enaction-based artificial intelligence: Toward co-evolution with humans in the loop. [REVIEW]Pierre De Loor, Kristen Manac’H. & Jacques Tisseau - 2009 - Minds and Machines 19 (3):319-343.
    This article deals with the links between the enaction paradigm and artificial intelligence. Enaction is considered a metaphor for artificial intelligence, as a number of the notions which it deals with are deemed incompatible with the phenomenal field of the virtual. After explaining this stance, we shall review previous works regarding this issue in terms of artificial life and robotics. We shall focus on the lack of recognition of co-evolution at the heart of these approaches. We propose to explicitly integrate (...)
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  • Sensitive and insensitive causation.James Woodward - 2006 - Philosophical Review 115 (1):1-50.
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  • The Generality Problem, Statistical Relevance and the Tri-Level Hypothesis.James R. Beebe - 2004 - Noûs 38 (1):177 - 195.
    In this paper I critically examine the Generality Problem and argue that it does not succeed as an objection to reliabilism. Although those who urge the Generality Problem are correct in claiming that any process token can be given indefinitely many descriptions that pick out indefinitely many process types, they are mistaken in thinking that reliabilists have no principled way to distinguish between relevant and irrelevant process types.
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  • The brain's 'new' science: Psychology, neurophysiology, and constraint.Gary Hatfield - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):388-404.
    There is a strong philosophical intuition that direct study of the brain can and will constrain the development of psychological theory. When this intuition is tested against case studies on the neurophysiology and psychology of perception and memory, it turns out that psychology has led the way toward knowledge of neurophysiology. An abstract argument is developed to show that psychology can and must lead the way in neuroscientific study of mental function. The opposing intuition is based on mainly weak arguments (...)
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  • Intuitions in linguistics.Michael Devitt - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):481-513.
    Linguists take the intuitive judgments of speakers to be good evidence for a grammar. Why? The Chomskian answer is that they are derived by a rational process from a representation of linguistic rules in the language faculty. The paper takes a different view. It argues for a naturalistic and non-Cartesian view of intuitions in general. They are empirical central-processor responses to phenomena differing from other such responses only in being immediate and fairly unreflective. Applying this to linguistic intuitions yields an (...)
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  • (1 other version)Before and below 'theory of mind': Embodied simulation and the neural correlates of social cognition.Vittorio Gallese - 2007 - Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B-Biological Sciences 362 (1480):659-669.
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  • The dynamical hypothesis in cognitive science.Tim van Gelder - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (5):615-28.
    According to the dominant computational approach in cognitive science, cognitive agents are digital computers; according to the alternative approach, they are dynamical systems. This target article attempts to articulate and support the dynamical hypothesis. The dynamical hypothesis has two major components: the nature hypothesis (cognitive agents are dynamical systems) and the knowledge hypothesis (cognitive agents can be understood dynamically). A wide range of objections to this hypothesis can be rebutted. The conclusion is that cognitive systems may well be dynamical systems, (...)
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  • Program execution in connectionist networks.Martin Roth - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (4):448-467.
    Recently, connectionist models have been developed that seem to exhibit structuresensitive cognitive capacities without executing a program. This paper examines one such model and argues that it does execute a program. The argument proceeds by showing that what is essential to running a program is preserving the functional structure of the program. It has generally been assumed that this can only be done by systems possessing a certain temporalcausal organization. However, counterfactualpreserving functional architecture can be instantiated in other ways, for (...)
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  • On the proper treatment of connectionism.Paul Smolensky - 1988 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 11 (1):1-23.
    A set of hypotheses is formulated for a connectionist approach to cognitive modeling. These hypotheses are shown to be incompatible with the hypotheses underlying traditional cognitive models. The connectionist models considered are massively parallel numerical computational systems that are a kind of continuous dynamical system. The numerical variables in the system correspond semantically to fine-grained features below the level of the concepts consciously used to describe the task domain. The level of analysis is intermediate between those of symbolic cognitive models (...)
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  • Because mere calculating isn't thinking: Comments on Hauser's Why Isn't My Pocket Calculator a Thinking Thing?.William J. Rapaport - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):11-20.
    Hauser argues that his pocket calculator (Cal) has certain arithmetical abilities: it seems Cal calculates. That calculating is thinking seems equally untendentious. Yet these two claims together provide premises for a seemingly valid syllogism whose conclusion - Cal thinks - most would deny. He considers several ways to avoid this conclusion, and finds them mostly wanting. Either we ourselves can't be said to think or calculate if our calculation-like performances are judged by the standards proposed to rule out Cal; or (...)
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  • The chinese room argument--dead but not yet buried.Robert I. Damper - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (5-6):159-169.
    This article is an accompaniment to Anthony Freeman’s review of Views into the Chinese Room, reflecting on some pertinent outstanding questions about the Chinese room argument. Although there is general agreement in the artificial intelligence community that the CRA is somehow wrong, debate continues on exactly why and how it is wrong. Is there a killer counter-argument and, if so, what is it? One remarkable fact is that the CRA is prototypically a thought experiment, yet it has been very little (...)
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  • What to say to a skeptical metaphysician: A defense manual for cognitive and behavioral scientists.Don Ross & David Spurrett - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (5):603-627.
    A wave of recent work in metaphysics seeks to undermine the anti-reductionist, functionalist consensus of the past few decades in cognitive science and philosophy of mind. That consensus apparently legitimated a focus on what systems do, without necessarily and always requiring attention to the details of how systems are constituted. The new metaphysical challenge contends that many states and processes referred to by functionalist cognitive scientists are epiphenomenal. It further contends that the problem lies in functionalism itself, and that, to (...)
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  • Perception as Unconscious Inference.Gary Hatfield - 2002 - In D. Heyer (ed.), Perception and the Physical World: Psychological and Philosophical Issues in Perception. John Wiley and Sons. pp. 113--143.
    In this chapter I examine past and recent theories of unconscious inference. Most theorists have ascribed inferences to perception literally, not analogically, and I focus on the literal approach. I examine three problems faced by such theories if their commitment to unconscious inferences is taken seriously. Two problems concern the cognitive resources that must be available to the visual system (or a more central system) to support the inferences in question. The third problem focuses on how the conclusions of inferences (...)
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  • Materialism, functionalism, and supervenient qualia.Ausonio Marras - 1993 - Dialogue 32 (3):475-92.
    Qualia are phenomenal properties of sensations and perceptual states: they are whatever it is that gives such states their “felt,” qualitative character. (In speaking of sensations, I speak of course not of mental objects or mental contents, but of mental events—of sensings, not sensa.).
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  • Triviality Arguments Reconsidered.Paul Schweizer - 2019 - Minds and Machines 29 (2):287-308.
    Opponents of the computational theory of mind have held that the theory is devoid of explanatory content, since whatever computational procedures are said to account for our cognitive attributes will also be realized by a host of other ‘deviant’ physical systems, such as buckets of water and possibly even stones. Such ‘triviality’ claims rely on a simple mapping account of physical implementation. Hence defenders of CTM traditionally attempt to block the trivialization critique by advocating additional constraints on the implementation relation. (...)
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  • Can artificial intelligence explain age changes in literary creativity?Carolyn Adams-Price - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):532-532.
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  • Objections to Computationalism: A Survey.Marcin Miłkowski - 2018 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 66 (3):57-75.
    In this paper, the Author reviewed the typical objections against the claim that brains are computers, or, to be more precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practically all the popular objections are based on uncharitable interpretations of the claim, he argues that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive science, and non-trivial.
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  • From Computer Metaphor to Computational Modeling: The Evolution of Computationalism.Marcin Miłkowski - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):515-541.
    In this paper, I argue that computationalism is a progressive research tradition. Its metaphysical assumptions are that nervous systems are computational, and that information processing is necessary for cognition to occur. First, the primary reasons why information processing should explain cognition are reviewed. Then I argue that early formulations of these reasons are outdated. However, by relying on the mechanistic account of physical computation, they can be recast in a compelling way. Next, I contrast two computational models of working memory (...)
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  • Perceptual Experience and Cognitive Penetrability.Somogy Varga - 2017 - European Journal of Philosophy 25 (2):376-397.
    This paper starts by distinguishing three views about the phenomenal character of perceptual experience. ‘Low-level theorists’ argue that perceptual experience is reducible to the experience of low-level properties, ‘high-level theorists’ argue that we have perceptual experiences of high-level properties, while ‘disunified view theorists’ argue that perceptual seemings can present high-level properties. The paper explores how cognitive states can penetrate perceptual experience and provides an interpretation of cognitive penetration that offers some support for the high-level view.
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  • You Don't Know How You Think: Introspection and Language of Thought.Edouard Machery - 2005 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 56 (3):469-485.
    The question, ‘Is cognition linguistic?' divides recent cognitive theories into two antagonistic groups. Sententialists claim that we think in some language, while advocates of non linguistic views of cognition deny this claim. The Introspective Argument for Sententialism is one of the most appealing arguments for sententialism. In substance, it claims that the introspective fact of inner speech provides strong evidence that our thoughts are linguistic. This article challenges this argument. I claim that the Introspective Argument for Sententialism confuses the content (...)
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  • (1 other version)Conceptual and Logical Aspects of the ‘New’ Evolutionary Epistemology.Paul Thompson - 1988 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (sup1):235-253.
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  • (1 other version)Cognitive Modularity of Emotion.Louis C. Charland - 2006 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (5 (Supp.)):213-228.
    In a recent survey of contemporary philosophy of emotion, Ronald de Sousa states that "in recent years … emotions have once again become the focus of vigorous interest in philosophy, as well as in other branches of cognitive science" (de Sousa 2003, 1). He then goes on to make the important observation that "in view of the proliferation of increasingly fruitful exchanges between researchers of different stripes, it is no longer useful to speak of the philosophy of emotion in isolation (...)
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  • Freud's Own Blend: Functional Analysis, Idiographic Explanation, and the Extension of Ordinary Psychology.Neil C. Manson - 2003 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2):179-195.
    If we are to understand why psychoanalysis extends ordinary psychology in the precise ways that it does, we must take account of the existence of, and the interplay between, two distinct kinds of explanatory concern: functional and idiographic. The form and content of psychoanalytic explanation and its unusual methodology can, at least in part, be viewed as emerging out of Freud's attempt to reconcile these two types of explanatory concern. We must also acknowledge the role of the background theoretical context (...)
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  • Biologically Plausible, Human‐Scale Knowledge Representation.Eric Crawford, Matthew Gingerich & Chris Eliasmith - 2016 - Cognitive Science 40 (4):782-821.
    Several approaches to implementing symbol-like representations in neurally plausible models have been proposed. These approaches include binding through synchrony, “mesh” binding, and conjunctive binding. Recent theoretical work has suggested that most of these methods will not scale well, that is, that they cannot encode structured representations using any of the tens of thousands of terms in the adult lexicon without making implausible resource assumptions. Here, we empirically demonstrate that the biologically plausible structured representations employed in the Semantic Pointer Architecture approach (...)
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  • Creativity, combination, and cognition.Terry Dartnall - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):537-537.
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  • Attention and the Cognitive Penetrability of Perception.Dustin Stokes - 2018 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 96 (2):303-318.
    One sceptical rejoinder to those who claim that sensory perception is cognitively penetrable is to appeal to the involvement of attention. So, while a phenomenon might initially look like one where, say, a perceiver’s beliefs are influencing her visual experience, another interpretation is that because the perceiver believes and desires as she does, she consequently shifts her spatial attention so as to change what she senses visually. But, the sceptic will urge, this is an entirely familiar phenomenon, and it hardly (...)
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  • The Structure of Semantic Competence: Compositionality as an Innate Constraint of The Faculty of Language.Guillermo Del Pinal - 2015 - Mind and Language 30 (4):375–413.
    This paper defends the view that the Faculty of Language is compositional, i.e., that it computes the meaning of complex expressions from the meanings of their immediate constituents and their structure. I fargue that compositionality and other competing constraints on the way in which the Faculty of Language computes the meanings of complex expressions should be understood as hypotheses about innate constraints of the Faculty of Language. I then argue that, unlike compositionality, most of the currently available non-compositional constraints predict (...)
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  • Turing Machines and Semantic Symbol Processing: Why Real Computers Don’t Mind Chinese Emperors.Richard Yee - 1993 - Lyceum 5 (1):37-59.
    Philosophical questions about minds and computation need to focus squarely on the mathematical theory of Turing machines (TM's). Surrogate TM's such as computers or formal systems lack abilities that make Turing machines promising candidates for possessors of minds. Computers are only universal Turing machines (UTM's)—a conspicuous but unrepresentative subclass of TM. Formal systems are only static TM's, which do not receive inputs from external sources. The theory of TM computation clearly exposes the failings of two prominent critiques, Searle's Chinese room (...)
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  • Indexing the World? Visual Tracking, Modularity, and the Perception–Cognition Interface.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 67 (1):215-245.
    Research in vision science, developmental psychology, and the foundations of cognitive science has led some theorists to posit referential mechanisms similar to indices. This hypothesis has been framed within a Fodorian conception of the early vision module. The article shows that this conception is mistaken, for it cannot handle the ‘interface problem’—roughly, how indexing mechanisms relate to higher cognition and conceptual thought. As a result, I reject the inaccessibility of early vision to higher cognition and make some constructive remarks on (...)
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  • Embodying Social Practice: Dynamically Co-Constituting Social Agency.Brian W. Dunst - unknown
    Theories of cognition and theories of social practices and institutions have often each separately acknowledged the relevance of the other; but seldom have there been consistent and sustained attempts to synthesize these two areas within one explanatory framework. This is precisely what my dissertation aims to remedy. I propose that certain recent developments and themes in philosophy of mind and cognitive science, when understood in the right way, can explain the emergence and dynamics of social practices and institutions. Likewise, the (...)
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  • Commentary on Zenon W. Pylyshyn (2002). Mental imagery? In search of a theory. BBS 25 (2): 157–182.B. Hommel, J. Müsseler, G. Aschersleben & W. Prinz - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27:4.
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  • Creative thinking presupposes the capacity for thought.James H. Fetzer - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):539-540.
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  • A psychologically implausible architecture that is always conscious, always active.Mark Vincent LaPolla & Bernard J. Baars - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):448-449.
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  • On models and mechanisms.William R. Uttal - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):459-460.
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  • Cartesian vs. Newtonian research strategies for cognitive science.Morton E. Winston - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):463-464.
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  • Re-membering cognition.Susan F. Chipman - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):441-442.
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  • A cognitive theory without inductive learning.Lev Goldfarb - 1992 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 15 (3):446-447.
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  • Smolensky's proper treatment of connectionism: Having it both ways.Vinod Goel - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (2):400-401.
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  • Level of analysis is not a central issue.James A. Reggia - 1990 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 13 (2):406-407.
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  • Précis of The creative mind: Myths and mechanisms.Margaret A. Boden - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):519-531.
    What is creativity? One new idea may be creative, whereas another is merely new: What's the difference? And how is creativity possible? These questions about human creativity can be answered, at least in outline, using computational concepts. There are two broad types of creativity, improbabilist and impossibilist. Improbabilist creativity involves novel combinations of familiar ideas. A deeper type involves METCS: the mapping, exploration, and transformation of conceptual spaces. It is impossibilist, in that ideas may be generated which – with respect (...)
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  • Behavioral stress and myocardial ischemia: An example of conditional response modification.George E. Billman - 1986 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 9 (2):295-296.
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  • Chaos in brains: Fad or insight?Donald H. Perkel - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):180-181.
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  • Connectionist models as neural abstractions.Ronald Rosenfeld, David S. Touretzky & Boltzmann Group - 1987 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 10 (2):181-182.
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