a This is an outline of a coherence theory of law. Its basic ideas are: reasonable support and weighing of reasons. All the rest is commentary.a (TM) These words at the beginning of the preface of this book perfectly indicate what On Law and Reason is about. It is a theory about the nature of the law which emphasises the role of reason in the law and which refuses to limit the role of reason to the application of deductive logic. (...) In 1989, when the first edition of On Law and Reason appeared, this book was ground breaking for several reasons. It provided a rationalistic theory of the law in the language of analytic philosophy and based on a thorough understanding of the results, including technical ones, of analytic philosophy. That was not an obvious combination at the time of the booka (TM)s first appearance and still is not. The result is an analytical rigor that is usually associated with positivist theories of the law, combined with a philosophical position that is not natural law in a strict sense, but which shares with it the emphasis on the role of reason in determining what the law is. If only for this rare combination, On Law and Reason still deserves careful study. On Law and Reason also foreshadowed and influenced a development in the field of Legal Logic that would take place in the nineties of the 20th century, namely the development of non-monotonic (a defeasiblea (TM)) logics for the analysis of legal reasoning. In the new Introduction to this second edition, this aspect is explored in some more detail. (shrink)

According to the singular conception of reality, there are objects and there are singular properties, i.e. properties that are instantiated by objects separately. It has been argued that semantic considerations about plurals give us reasons to embrace a plural conception of reality. This is the view that, in addition to singular properties, there are plural properties, i.e. properties that are instantiated jointly by many objects. In this article, I propose and defend a novel semantic account of plurals which dispenses with (...) plural properties and thus undermines the semantic argument in favor of the plural conception of reality. (shrink)

Imperatives cannot be true or false, so they are shunned by logicians. And yet imperatives can be combined by logical connectives: "kiss me and hug me" is the conjunction of "kiss me" with "hug me". This example may suggest that declarative and imperative logic are isomorphic: just as the conjunction of two declaratives is true exactly if both conjuncts are true, the conjunction of two imperatives is satisfied exactly if both conjuncts are satisfied—what more is there to say? Much more, (...) I argue. "If you love me, kiss me", a conditional imperative, mixes a declarative antecedent ("you love me") with an imperative consequent ("kiss me"); it is satisfied if you love and kiss me, violated if you love but don't kiss me, and avoided if you don't love me. So we need a logic of three -valued imperatives which mixes declaratives with imperatives. I develop such a logic. (shrink)

What is the relationship between the world and logic, between intuition and language, between objects and their quantitative determinations? Rationalists, on the one hand, hold that the world is structured in a rational way. Representationalists, on the other hand, assume that language, logic, and mathematics are only the means to order and describe the intuitively given world. In World and Logic, Jens Lemanski takes up three surprising arguments from Arthur Schopenhauer’s hitherto undiscovered Berlin Lectures, which concern the philosophy of language, (...) logic, and mathematics. Based on these arguments, Lemanski develops a new position entitled ‘rational representationalism’: the world is always structured by human beings according to linguistic, logical, and mathematical principles, but the basic vocabulary of these structural descriptions already contains metaphors taken from the world around us. (shrink)

McCall (1984) offered a semantics of counterfactual conditionals based on “real possible worlds” that avoids using the vague notion of similarity between possible worlds. I will propose an interpretation of McCall’s counterfactuals in a formal framework based on Baltag-Moss-Solecki events and protocols. Moreover, I will argue that using this interpretation one can avoid an objection raised by Otte (1987).

This essay explores an ideal notion of form (mathematical structure) that embraces logical, phenomenological, and ontological form. Husserl envisioned a correlation among forms of expression, thought, meaning, and object—positing ideal forms on all these levels. The most puzzling formal entities Husserl discussed were those he called ‘manifolds’. These manifolds, I propose, are forms of complex states of affairs or partial possible worlds representable by forms of theories (compare structuralism). Accordingly, I sketch an intentionality-based semantics correlating these four Husserlian levels of (...) form—thereby integrating logic, phenomenology, and ontology. (shrink)

‘Quantified pure existentials’ are sentences (e.g., ‘Some things do not exist’) which meet these conditions: (i) the verb EXIST is contained in, and is, apart from quantificational BE, the only full (as against auxiliary) verb in the sentence; (ii) no (other) logical predicate features in the sentence; (iii) no name or other sub-sentential referring expression features in the sentence; (iv) the sentence contains a quantifier that is not an occurrence of EXIST. Colin McGinn and Rod Girle have alleged that standard (...) first-order logic cannot adequately deal with some such existentials. The article defends the view that it can. (shrink)

En este estudio analizamos dos tendencias claramente distintas y contrapuestas en la forma de impartir cursos elementales de Lógica en la formación superior. Para este propósito, se ha seleccionado una muestra de manuales angloamericanos clásicos, así como otra más pequeña de la tradición iberoamericana para comprobar nuestras hipótesis. Los estilos identificados y analizados en dichos manuales son lo que hemos denominado lógica matemática y lógica para filósofos. En ambos casos se trata de tendencias muy generales reconocibles en las más diversas (...) tradiciones locales. El periodo analizado, 1940-1980, responde al proceso de introducción de la Lógica contemporánea en el ámbito académico occidental. (shrink)

O paradoxo da análise e a antinomia da relaçáo de nomeaçáo sáo dois argumentos que servem para explicitar um aspecto paradoxal das interpretações filosóficas da identidade. Meu objetivo nesse artigo será o de investigar esses paradoxos e seus papeis como limitadores de uma teoria semântica. Usarei como guia dessa investigaçáo a hipótese de que as dificuldades nas quais todas as teorias semânticas investigadas incorrem náo se devem a tese da relaçáo de nomeaçáo, como diria Carnap, mas ao caráter composicional dessas (...) teorias. Essa investigaçáo se dará em duas etapas. A primeira será uma investigaçáo a cerca das soluções que foram historicamente apresentadas para evitar esses paradoxos. Procuraremos mostrar que cada uma dessas soluções envolve de alguma maneira o problema de lidar com esse aspecto composicional. Em especial, daremos ênfase a uma tentativa fracassada de soluçáo defendida por Quine, Carnap e mesmo Wittgenstein e Russell, num certo período, que ficou conhecida como a tese da extensionalidade. A segunda etapa consistirá em uma avaliaçáo crítica sobre em que medida a verdadeira causadora dos paradoxos náo seria uma preferência filosófica equivocada por uma abordagem composicional da linguagem. Palavras-chave : Antinomia da relaçáo de nomeaçáo, Frege, Identidade, Paradoxo da análise, Tese da extensionalidade. (shrink)

Arnold Cusmariu ABSTRACT: The Cogito formulation in Discourse on Method attributes properties to one conceptual category that belong to another. Correcting the error ends up defeating Descartes’ response to skepticism. His own creation, the Evil Genius, is to blame. Download PDF.