Citations of:
Conceptions of truth in intuitionism
History and Philosophy of Logic 25 (2):13145 (2004)
Add citations
You must login to add citations.


According to the “paradox of knowability”, the moderate thesis that all truths are knowable – ‘∀p ’ – implies the seemingly preposterous claim that all truths are actually known – ‘∀p ’ –, i.e. that we are omniscient. If Fitch’s argument were successful, it would amount to a knockdown rebuttal of antirealism by reductio. In the paper I defend the nowadays rather neglected strategy of intuitionistic revisionism. Employing only intuitionistically acceptable rules of inference, the conclusion of the argument is, firstly, (...) 

Here the relationship between understanding and knowledge of meaning is discussed from two different perspectives: that of Dummettian semantic antirealism and that of the semantic externalism of Putnam and others. The question addressed is whether or not the truth of semantic externalism would undermine a central premise in one of Dummetts key arguments for antirealism, insofar as Dummetts premise involves an assumption about the transparency of meaning and semantic externalism is often taken to undermine such transparency. Several notions of transparency (...) 

Two kinds of justification logics are studied. Then, this article shows how the notion of quasitruth can be defined in these systems. 



In this paper we present a philosophical motivation for the logics of formal inconsistency, a family of paraconsistent logics whose distinctive feature is that of having resources for expressing the notion of consistency within the object language in such a way that consistency may be logically independent of noncontradiction. We defend the view according to which logics of formal inconsistency may be interpreted as theories of logical consequence of an epistemological character. We also argue that in order to philosophically justify (...) 

The Knowability Paradox purports to show that the controversial but not patently absurd hypothesis that all truths are knowable entails the implausible conclusion that all truths are known. The notoriety of this argument owes to the negative light it appears to cast on the view that there can be no verificationtranscendent truths. We argue that it is overly simplistic to formalize the views of contemporary verificationists like Dummett, Prawitz or MartinLöf using the sort of propositional modal operators which are employed (...) 

This paper considers a topostheoretic structure for the interpretation of coconstructive logic for proofs and refutations following Trafford :22–40, 2015). It is notoriously tricky to define a prooftheoretic semantics for logics that adequately represent constructivity over proofs and refutations. By developing abstractions of elementary topoi, we consider an elementary topos as structure for proofs, and complement topos as structure for refutation. In doing so, it is possible to consider a dialogue structure between these topoi, and also control their relation such (...) 

In this paper it is argued that the understanding of Brouwer as replacing truth conditions with assertability or proof conditions, in particular as codified in the socalled BrouwerHeytingKolmogorov Interpretation, is misleading and conflates a weak and a strong notion of truth that have to be kept apart to understand Brouwer properly: truthasanticipation and truth incontent. These notions are explained, exegetical documentation provided, and semiformal recursive definitions are given. 

What is the appropriate notion of truth for sentences whose meanings are understood in epistemic terms such as proof or ground for an assertion? It seems that the truth of such sentences has to be identified with the existence of proofs or grounds, and the main issue is whether this existence is to be understood in a temporal sense as meaning that we have actually found a proof or a ground, or if it could be taken in an abstract, tenseless (...) 

Truth’s universal knowability entails its discovery. This threatens antirealism, which is thought to require it. Fortunately, antirealism is not committed to it. Avoiding it requires adoption (and extension) of Dag Prawitz’s position in his longterm disagreement with Michael Dummett on the notion of provability involved in intuitionism’s identification of it with truth. Antirealism (intuitionism generalized) must accommodate a notion of lostopportunity truth (a kind of recognitiontranscendent truth), and even truth consisting in the presence of unperformable verifications. Dummett’s position cannot abide (...) 