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  1. The ethics of emergencies.Aksel Braanen Sterri & Ole Martin Moen - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (8):2621-2634.
    Do we have stronger duties to assist in emergencies than in nonemergencies? According to Peter Singer and Peter Unger, we do not. Emergency situations, they suggest, merely serve to make more salient the very extensive duties to assist that we always have. This view, while theoretically simple, appears to imply that we must radically revise common-sense emergency norms. Resisting that implication, theorists like Frances Kamm, Jeremy Waldron, and Larry Temkin suggest that emergencies are indeed normatively exceptional. While their approach is (...)
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  • Safety, Fairness, and Inclusion: Transgender Athletes and the Essence of Rugby.Jon Pike - 2020 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 48 (2):155-168.
    ABSTRACT In this paper, I link philosophical discussion of policies for trans inclusion or exclusion, to a method of policy making. I address the relationship between concerns about safety, fairness, and inclusion in policy making about the inclusion of transwomen athletes into women’s sport. I argue for an approach based on lexical priority rather than simple ‘balancing’, considering the different values in a specific order. I present justifying reasons for this approach and this lexical order, based on the special obligations (...)
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  • An Individual Reality, Separate From Oneself: Alienation and Sociality in Moral Theory.Jack Samuel - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.
    I argue that the social dimension of alienation, as discussed by Williams and Railton, has been underappreciated. The lesson typically drawn from their exchange is that moral theory poses a threat to the internal integrity of the agent, but there is a parallel risk that moral theory will implicitly construe agents as constitutively alienated from one another. I argue that a satisfying account of agency will need to make room for what I call ‘genuine ethical contact’ with others, both as (...)
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  • The Moral Dimensions of Boredom: A Call for Research.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Review of General Psychology 21 (1):30-48.
    Despite the impressive progress that has been made on both the empirical and conceptual fronts of boredom research, there is one facet of boredom that has received remarkably little attention. This is boredom's relationship to morality. The aim of this article is to explore the moral dimensions of boredom and to argue that boredom is a morally relevant personality trait. The presence of trait boredom hinders our capacity to flourish and in doing so hurts our prospects for a moral life. (...)
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  • Parfit's Ethics.Richard Yetter Chappell - 2021 - Cambridge University Press.
    Derek Parfit was one of the most important and influential moral philosophers of the late 20th and early 21st centuries. This Element offers a critical introduction to his wide-ranging ethical thought, focusing especially on his two most significant works, Reasons and Persons and On What Matters, and their contribution to the consequentialist moral tradition. Topics covered include: rationality and objectivity, distributive justice, self-defeating moral theories, Parfit's Triple Theory, personal identity, and population ethics.
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  • Consequentialism and Feminist Ethics.Julia Driver - 2000 - Hypatia 20 (4):183-199.
    This essay attempts to show that sophisticated consequentialism is able to accommodate the concerns that have traditionally been raised by feminist writers in ethics. Those concerns have primarily to do with the fact that consequentialism is seen as both too demanding of the individual and neglectful of the agent's special obligations to family and friends. Here, I argue that instrumental justification for partiality can be provided, for example, even though an attitude of partiality is not characterized itself in instrumental terms.
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  • Climate Refugees, Demandingness and Kagan’s Conditional.Nils Holtug - forthcoming - Res Publica:1-15.
    In the years to come, a great number of people are going to be displaced due to climate change. Climate refugees are going to migrate to find somewhere more hospitable to live. In light of this, many countries are likely to try to prevent the influx of climate refugees, and more specifically argue that they cannot reasonably be required to take in large numbers of refugees as this is simply too demanding. This objection—the demandingness objection to taking in climate refugees—is (...)
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  • Justice and the Allocation of Healthcare Resources: Should Indirect, Non-Health Effects Count? [REVIEW]Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen & Sigurd Lauridsen - 2010 - Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 13 (3):237-246.
    Alternative allocations of a fixed bundle of healthcare resources often involve significantly different indirect, non-health effects. The question arises whether these effects must figure in accounts of the conditions under which a distribution of healthcare resources is morally justifiable. In this article we defend a Scanlonian, affirmative answer to this question: healthcare resource managers should sometimes select an allocation which has worse direct, health-related effects but better indirect, nonhealth effects; they should do this when the interests served by such a (...)
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  • The Identity-Enactment Account of Associative Duties.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2351-2370.
    Associative duties are agent-centered duties to give defeasible moral priority to our special ties. Our strongest associative duties are to close friends and family. According to reductionists, our associative duties are just special duties—i.e., duties arising from what I have done to others, or what others have done to me. These include duties to abide by promises and contracts, compensate our benefactors in ways expressing gratitude, and aid those whom we have made especially vulnerable to our conduct. I argue, though, (...)
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  • Ought-contextualism and Reasoning.Darren Bradley - forthcoming - Synthese:1-23.
    What does logic tells us how about we ought to reason? If P entails Q, and you believe P, should you believe Q? There seem to be cases where you should not, for example, if you have evidence against Q, or the inference is not worth making. So we need a theory telling us when an inference ought to be made, and when not. I will argue that we should embed the issue in an independently motivated contextualist semantics for ‘ought’. (...)
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  • Inquiry and the Epistemic.David Thorstad - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-16.
    The zetetic turn in epistemology raises three questions about epistemic and zetetic norms. First, there is the relationship question: what is the relationship between epistemic and zetetic norms? Are some epistemic norms zetetic norms, or are epistemic and zetetic norms distinct? Second, there is the tension question: are traditional epistemic norms in tension with plausible zetetic norms? Third, there is the reaction question: how should theorists react to a tension between epistemic and zetetic norms? Drawing on an analogy to practical (...)
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  • Horror Films and the Argument From Reactive Attitudes.Scott Woodcock - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):309-324.
    Are horror films immoral? Gianluca Di Muzio argues that horror films of a certain kind are immoral because they undermine the reactive attitudes that are responsible for human agents being disposed to respond compassionately to instances of victimization. I begin with this argument as one instance of what I call the Argument from Reactive Attitudes (ARA), and I argue that Di Muzio’s attempt to identify what is morally suspect about horror films must be revised to provide the most persuasive interpretation (...)
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  • Harm Reduction: A Misnomer.Nicholas B. King - 2020 - Health Care Analysis 28 (4):324-334.
    ‘Harm reduction’ programs are usually justified on the utilitarian grounds that they aim to reduce the net harms of a behavior. In this paper, I contend that the historical genesis of harm reduction programs, and the crucial moral imperative that distinguishes these programs from other interventions and policies, are not utilitarian; the practical implementation of harm reduction programs is not, and probably cannot be, utilitarian; and the continued justification of harm reduction on utilitarian grounds is untenable and may itself cause (...)
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  • The Self-Effacing Functionality of Blame.Matthieu Queloz - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (4):1361-1379.
    This paper puts forward an account of blame combining two ideas that are usually set up against each other: that blame performs an important function, and that blame is justified by the moral reasons making people blameworthy rather than by its functionality. The paper argues that blame could not have developed in a purely instrumental form, and that its functionality itself demands that its functionality be effaced in favour of non-instrumental reasons for blame—its functionality is self-effacing. This notion is sharpened (...)
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  • GM Crops: Patently Wrong? [REVIEW]James Wilson - 2007 - Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Ethics 20 (3):261-283.
    This paper focuses on the ethical justifiability of patents on Genetically Modified (GM) crops. I argue that there are three distinguishing features of GM crops that make it unethical to grant patents on GM crops, even if we assume that the patent system is in general justified. The first half of the paper critiques David Resnik’s recent arguments in favor of patents on GM crops. Resnik argues that we should take a consequentialist approach to the issue, and that the best (...)
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  • How Morality Becomes Demanding Cost Vs. Difficulty and Restriction.Marcel van Ackeren - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (3):315-334.
    ABSTRACTThe standard view of demandingness understands demandingness exclusively as a matter of costs to the agent. The paper discusses whether the standard view must be given up because we should think of demandingness as a matter of difficulty or restriction of options. I will argue that difficulty can indeed increase demandingness, but only insofar as it leads to further costs. As to restrictions of options, I will show that confinement can become costly and thus increase demandingness in three ways, by (...)
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  • The Integrity Objection, Reloaded.Jill Hernandez - 2013 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (2):145-162.
    Bernard Williams? integrity objection poses a significant challenge to utilitarianism, which has largely been answered by utilitarians. This paper recasts the integrity objection to show that utilitarian agents could be committed to producing the overall best states of affairs and yet not positively act to bring them about. I introduce the ?Moral Pinch Hitter? ? someone who performs actions at the bequest of another agent ? to demonstrate that utilitarianism cannot distinguish between cases in which an agent maximizes utility by (...)
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  • A Nietzschean Critique of Obligation-Centred Moral Theory.Simon Robertson - 2011 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 19 (4):563-591.
    The focal objection of Nietzsche’s critique of morality is that morality is disvaluable because antagonistic to the highest forms of human excellence. Recent advances in Nietzsche commentary have done much to unpack this objection – an objection which, at first blush, shares certain affinities with worries developed by a number of more recent morality critics. Some, though, have sought to disassociate Nietzsche from these more recent critics, claiming that his critique is directed mainly against moralized culture and that it cannot (...)
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  • Decision Procedures, Standards of Rightness and Impartiality.Cynthia A. Stark - 1997 - Noûs 31 (4):478-495.
    I argue that partialist critics of deontological theories make a mistake similar to one made by critics of utilitarianism: they fail to distinguish between a theory’s decision procedure and its standard of rightness. That is, they take these deontological theories to be offering a method for moral deliberation when they are in fact offering justificatory arguments for moral principles. And while deontologists, like utilitarians do incorporate impartiality into their justifications for basic principles, many do not require that agents utilize impartial (...)
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  • Rule Consequentialism and Disasters.Leonard Kahn - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):219-236.
    Rule consequentialism (RC) is the view that it is right for A to do F in C if and only if A's doing F in C is in accordance with the the set of rules which, if accepted by all, would have consequences which are better than any alternative set of rules (i.e., the ideal code). I defend RC from two related objections. The first objection claims that RC requires obedience to the ideal code even if doing so has disastrous (...)
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  • What Do Our Intuitions About the Experience Machine Really Tell Us About Hedonism?Sharon Hewitt - 2010 - Philosophical Studies 151 (3):331 - 349.
    Robert Nozick's experience machine thought experiment is often considered a decisive refutation of hedonism. I argue that the conclusions we draw from Nozick's thought experiment ought to be informed by considerations concerning the operation of our intuitions about value. First, I argue that, in order to show that practical hedonistic reasons are not causing our negative reaction to the experience machine, we must not merely stipulate their irrelevance (since our intuitions are not always responsive to stipulation) but fill in the (...)
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  • Immoral Realism.Max Hayward - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (4):897-914.
    Non-naturalist realists are committed to the belief, famously voiced by Parfit, that if there are no non-natural facts then nothing matters. But it is morally objectionable to conditionalise all our moral commitments on the question of whether there are non-natural facts. Non-natural facts are causally inefficacious, and so make no difference to the world of our experience. And to be a realist about such facts is to hold that they are mind-independent. It is compatible with our experiences that there are (...)
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  • Utilitarianism about animals and the moral significance of use.David Killoren & Robert Streiffer - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1043-1063.
    The Hybrid View endorses utilitarianism about animals and rejects utilitarianism about humans. This view has received relatively little sustained attention in the philosophical literature. Yet, as we show, the Hybrid View underlies many widely held beliefs about zoos, pet ownership, scientific research on animal and human subjects, and agriculture. We develop the Hybrid View in rigorous detail and extract several of its main commitments. Then we examine the Hybrid View in relation to the view that human use of animals constitutes (...)
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  • Love in the Time of Consequentialism.Barry Maguire - 2017 - Noûs 51 (4):686-712.
    There are several powerful motivations for neutral value-based deontic theories such as Act Consequentialism. Traditionally, such theories have had great difficulty accounting for partiality towards one's personal relationships and projects. This paper presents a neutral value-based theory that preserves the motivations for Act Consequentialism while vindicating some crucial intuitions about reasons to be partial. There are two central ideas. The first is that when it comes to working out what you ought to do, your friends’ interests, the needs of your (...)
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  • Multiple-Act Consequentialism.Joseph Mendola - 2006 - Noûs 40 (3):395–427.
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  • The Cost of Consequentialization.Hanno Sauer - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (1-2):100-109.
    Consequentializers suggest that for all non‐consequentialist moral theories, one can come up with a consequentialist counterpart that generates exactly the same deontic output as the original theory. Thus, all moral theories can be “consequentialized.” This paper argues that this procedure, though technically feasible, deprives consequentialism of its potential for normative justification. By allowing purported counterexamples to any given consequentialist moral theory to be accommodated within that theory’s account of value, consequentializers achieve a hollow victory. The resulting deontically equivalent consequentalist counterpart (...)
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  • Conservatism in Metaethics: A Case Study.Christopher Cowie - 2015 - Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):605-619.
    Metaethicists typically develop and assess their theories—in part—on the basis of the consistency of those theories with “ordinary” first-order normative judgment. They are, in this sense, “methodologically conservative.” This article shows that this methodologically conservative approach obstructs a proper assessment of the debate between internalists and externalists. Specifically, it obstructs one of the most promising readings of internalism. This is a reading—owed to Bernard Williams—in which internalism is part of a practically and politically motivated revision of the assessment of action. (...)
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  • Korsgaard's Rejection of Consequentialism.David Cummiskey - 2011 - Metaphilosophy 42 (4):360-367.
    Abstract: In her recent book Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity, Christine Korsgaard does a wonderful job developing her Kantian account of normativity and the rational necessity of morality. Korsgaard's account of normativity, however, has received its fair share of attention. In this discussion, the focus is on the resulting moral theory and, in particular, on Korsgaard's reason for rejecting consequentialist moral theories. The article suggests that we assume that Korsgaard's vindication of Kantian rationalism is successful and ask whether, nonetheless, her (...)
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  • From Virtue to Decency.Johan Brännmark - 2006 - Metaphilosophy 37 (5):589-604.
    In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one (...)
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  • A Refutation of Consequentialism.Robert Guay - 2005 - Metaphilosophy 36 (3):348-362.
    The thesis of this paper is that consequentialism does not work as a comprehensive theory of right action. This paper does not offer a typical refutation, in that I do not claim that consequentialism is self-contradictory. One can with perfect consistency claim that the good is prior to the right and that the right consists in maximizing the good. What I claim, however, is that it is senseless to make such a claim. In particular, I attempt to show that the (...)
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  • A Fault Line in Ethical Theory.Shyam Nair - 2014 - Philosophical Perspectives 28 (1):173-200.
    A traditional picture is that cases of deontic constraints--- cases where an act is wrong (or one that there is most reason to not do) even though performing that act will prevent more acts of the same morally (or practically) relevant type from being performed---form a kind of fault line in ethical theory separating (agent-neutral) consequentialist theories from other ethical theories. But certain results in the recent literature, such as those due to Graham Oddie and Peter Milne in "Act and (...)
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  • On Why There is a Problem of Supererogation.Nora Grigore - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (4):1141-1163.
    How can it be that some acts of very high moral value are not morally required? This is the problem of supererogation. I do not argue in favor of a particular answer. Instead, I analyze two opposing moral intuitions the problem involves. First, that one should always do one’s best. Second, that sometimes we are morally allowed not to do our best. To think that one always has to do one’s best is less plausible, as it makes every morally best (...)
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  • Vesting Agent-Relative Permissions in a Proxy.Saba Bazargan-Forward - 2018 - Law and Philosophy 37 (6):671-695.
    We all have agent-relative permissions to give extra weight to our own well-being. If you and two strangers are drowning, and you can save either yourself or two strangers, you have an agent-relative permission to save yourself. But is it possible for you to ‘vest’ your agent-relative permissions in a third party – a ‘proxy’ – who can enact your agent-centered permissions on your behalf, thereby permitting her to do what would otherwise be impermissible? Some might think that the answer (...)
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  • Should I believe all the truths?Alexander Greenberg - 2020 - Synthese 197 (8):3279-3303.
    Should I believe something if and only if it’s true? Many philosophers have objected to this kind of truth norm, on the grounds that it’s not the case that one ought to believe all the truths. For example, some truths are too complex to believe; others are too trivial to be worth believing. Philosophers who defend truth norms often respond to this problem by reformulating truth norms in ways that do not entail that one ought to believe all the truths. (...)
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  • Reflection Without Regress.Cory Davia - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):995-1017.
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  • A Wholehearted Defense of Ambivalence.D. Justin Coates - 2017 - The Journal of Ethics 21 (4):419-444.
    Despite widespread agreement that ambivalence precludes agency “at its best,” in this paper I argue that ambivalence as such is no threat to one’s agency. In particular, against “unificationists” like Harry Frankfurt I argue that failing to be fully integrated as an agent, lacking purity of heart, or being less than wholehearted in one’s choices, tells us nothing about whether an agent’s will is properly functioning. Moreover, it will turn out that in many common circumstances, wholeheartedness with respect to some (...)
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  • Agar's Review of Katz. [REVIEW]Nicholas Agar - 2002 - Biology and Philosophy 17 (1):123-139.
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  • When Propriety is Improper.Kevin Blackwell & Daniel Drucker - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):367-386.
    We argue that philosophers ought to distinguish epistemic decision theory and epistemology, in just the way ordinary decision theory is distinguished from ethics. Once one does this, the internalist arguments that motivate much of epistemic decision theory make sense, given specific interpretations of the formalism. Making this distinction also causes trouble for the principle called Propriety, which says, roughly, that the only acceptable epistemic utility functions make probabilistically coherent credence functions immodest. We cast doubt on this requirement, but then argue (...)
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  • Companion Animal Ethics: A Special Area of Moral Theory and Practice?James Yeates & Julian Savulescu - 2017 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 20 (2):347-359.
    Considerations of ethical questions regarding pets should take into account the nature of human-pet relationships, in particular the uniquely combined features of mutual companionship, quasi-family-membership, proximity, direct contact, privacy, dependence, and partiality. The approaches to ethical questions about pets should overlap with those of animal ethics and family ethics, and so need not represent an isolated field of enquiry, but rather the intersection of those more established fields. This intersection, and the questions of how we treat our pets, present several (...)
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  • Aristotle and Autism: Reconsidering a Radical Shift to Virtue Ethics in Engineering.Heidi Furey - 2017 - Science and Engineering Ethics 23 (2):469-488.
    Virtue-based approaches to engineering ethics have recently received considerable attention within the field of engineering education. Proponents of virtue ethics in engineering argue that the approach is practically and pedagogically superior to traditional approaches to engineering ethics, including the study of professional codes of ethics and normative theories of behavior. This paper argues that a virtue-based approach, as interpreted in the current literature, is neither practically or pedagogically effective for a significant subpopulation within engineering: engineers with high functioning autism spectrum (...)
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  • Political Philosophy and the Challenge of the Personal: From Narcissism to Radical Critique. [REVIEW]Susan E. Babbitt - 1995 - Philosophical Studies 77 (2-3):293 - 318.
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  • Moral Advice and Moral Theory.Uri D. Leibowitz - 2009 - Philosophical Studies 146 (3):349 - 359.
    Monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about the structure of the best explanation of the rightness (wrongness) of actions. In this paper I argue that the availability of good moral advice gives us reason to prefer particularist theories and pluralist theories to monist theories. First, I identify two distinct roles of moral theorizing—explaining the rightness (wrongness) of actions, and providing moral advice—and I explain how these two roles are related. Next, I explain what monists, pluralists, and particularists disagree about. Finally, I (...)
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  • Why Can’T What is True Be Valuable?Jim Hutchinson - 2019 - Synthese (7):1-20.
    In recent discussions of the so-called “value of truth,” it is assumed that what is valuable in the relevant way is not the things that are true, but only various states and activities associated with those things: knowing them, investigating them, etc. I consider all the arguments I know of for this assumption, and argue that none provide good reason to accept it. By examining these arguments, we gain a better appreciation of what the value of the things that are (...)
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  • False Consciousness for Liberals, Part I: Consent, Autonomy, and Adaptive Preferences.David Enoch - 2020 - Philosophical Review 129 (2):159-210.
    The starting point regarding consent has to be that it is both extremely important, and that it is often suspicious. In this article, the author tries to make sense of both of these claims, from a largely liberal perspective, tying consent, predictably, to the value of autonomy and distinguishing between autonomy as sovereignty and autonomy as nonalienation. The author then discusses adaptive preferences, claiming that they suffer from a rationality flaw but that it's not clear that this flaw matters morally (...)
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  • Evidence Sensitivity in Weak Necessity Deontic Modals.Alex Silk - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (4):691-723.
    Kolodny and MacFarlane have made a pioneering contribution to our understanding of how the interpretation of deontic modals can be sensitive to evidence and information. But integrating the discussion of information-sensitivity into the standard Kratzerian framework for modals suggests ways of capturing the relevant data without treating deontic modals as “informational modals” in their sense. I show that though one such way of capturing the data within the standard semantics fails, an alternative does not. Nevertheless I argue that we have (...)
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  • Moral Enhancement and Self-Subversion Objections.Kelly Sorensen - 2014 - Neuroethics 7 (3):275-286.
    Some say moral bioenhancements are urgent and necessary; others say they are misguided or simply will not work. I examine a class of arguments claiming that moral bioenhancements are problematic because they are self-subverting. On this view, trying to make oneself or others more moral, at least through certain means, can itself be immoral, or at least worse than the alternatives. The thought here is that moral enhancements might fail not for biological reasons, but for specifically morally self-referential reasons. I (...)
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  • Conflictual Moralities, Ethical Torture: Revisiting the Problem of “Dirty Hands”. [REVIEW]Moran Yemini - 2014 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 17 (1):163-180.
    The problem of “dirty hands” has become an important term, indeed one of the most important terms of reference, in contemporary academic scholarship on the issue of torture. The aim of this essay is to offer a better understanding of this problem. Firstly, it is argued that the problem of “dirty hands” can play neither within rule-utilitarianism nor within absolutism. Still, however, the problem of “dirty hands” represents an acute, seemingly irresolvable, conflict within morality, with the moral agent understood, following (...)
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  • Duties to Make Friends.Stephanie Collins - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (5):907-921.
    Why, morally speaking, ought we do more for our family and friends than for strangers? In other words, what is the justification of special duties? According to partialists, the answer to this question cannot be reduced to impartial moral principles. According to impartialists, it can. This paper briefly argues in favour of impartialism, before drawing out an implication of the impartialist view: in addition to justifying some currently recognised special duties, impartialism also generates new special duties that are not yet (...)
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  • Economic Analysis, Common-Sense Morality and Utilitarianism.J. Moreh - 1992 - Erkenntnis 37 (1):115 - 143.
    Economic concepts and methods are used to throw light on some aspects of common-sense ethics and the difference between it and Utilitarianism. (1) Very few exceptions are allowed to the rules of common-sense ethics, because of the cost of information required to justify an exception to Conscience and to other people. No such stringency characterizes Utilitarianism, an abstract system constructed by philosophers. (2) Rule Utilitarianism is neither consistent with common-sense ethics, nor does it maximize utility as has been claimed for (...)
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  • What’s Wrong with Esoteric Morality.Michael Cholbi - 2020 - Les Ateliers de l'Éthique / the Ethics Forum 15 (1-2):163-185.
    A moral theory T is esoteric if and only if T is true but there are some individuals who, by the lights of T itself, ought not to embrace T, where to embrace T is to believe T and rely upon it in practical deliberation. Some philosophers hold that esotericism is a strong, perhaps even decisive, reason to reject a moral theory. However, proponents of this objection have often supposed its force is obvious and have said little to articulate it. (...)
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