- Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2020 - Erkenntnis 85 (4):841-870.details
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Is there an epistemic norm of practical reasoning?Davide Fassio - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (9):2137-2166.details
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Knowledge and the Importance of Being Right.Davide Fassio - 2015 - Logos and Episteme 6 (3):265-289.details
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Replies to Cohen, Neta and Reed.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (2):473-490.details
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Guidance and mainstream epistemology.Jeremy Fantl - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):2191-2210.details
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Entitlement and misleading evidence.Jeremy Fantl - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (3):743-761.details
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What Liars Can Tell Us about the Knowledge Norm of Practical Reasoning.Don Fallis - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (4):347-367.details
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Inquiry and Confirmation.Arianna Falbo - 2021 - Analysis 81 (4):622–631.details
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Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - 2023 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 101 (2).details
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Statistical resentment, or: what’s wrong with acting, blaming, and believing on the basis of statistics alone.David Enoch & Levi Spectre - 2021 - Synthese 199 (3-4):5687-5718.details
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Lottery judgments: A philosophical and experimental study.Philip A. Ebert, Martin Smith & Ian Durbach - 2018 - Philosophical Psychology 31 (1):110-138.details
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On Deniability.Alexander Dinges & Julia Zakkou - 2023 - Mind 132 (526):372-401.details
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Knowledge Norms and Acting Well.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2012 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):49-55.details
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Knowledge and the value of cognitive ability.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2013 - Synthese 190 (17):3715-3729.details
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Belief without credence.J. Adam Carter, Benjamin W. Jarvis & Katherine Rubin - 2016 - Synthese 193 (8):2323-2351.details
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Practial reasoning, decision theory and anti-intellectualism.Jessica Brown - 2012 - Episteme 9 (1):1-20.details
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Knowledge, safety, and Gettierized lottery cases: Why mere statistical evidence is not a (safe) source of knowledge.Fernando Broncano-Berrocal - 2019 - Philosophical Issues 29 (1):37-52.details
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Experimental Philosophy, Contextualism and SSI.Jessica Brown - 2011 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (2):233-261.details
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Stakes Sensitivity and Credit Rating: A New Challenge for Regulators.Anthony Booth & Boudewijn de Bruin - 2019 - Journal of Business Ethics 169 (1):169-179.details
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Against Weatherson on How to Frame a Decision Problem.Thomas A. Blackson - 2016 - Journal of Philosophical Research 41:69-72.details
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Inquiry Beyond Knowledge.Bob Beddor - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.details
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Certainty in Action.Bob Beddor - 2020 - Philosophical Quarterly 70 (281):711-737.details
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On the intimate relationship of knowledge and action.Charity Anderson - 2015 - Episteme 12 (3):343-353.details
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Contextualism and fallibility: pragmatic encroachment, possibility, and strength of epistemic position.Jonathan E. Adler - 2012 - Synthese 188 (2):247-272.details
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Between Probability and Certainty: What Justifies Belief.Martin Smith - 2016 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.details
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Legal evidence and knowledge.Georgi Gardiner - 2019 - In Maria Lasonen-Aarnio & Clayton Littlejohn (eds.), The Routledge Handbook of the Philosophy of Evidence. Routledge.details
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John Cook Wilson.Mathieu Marion - 2010 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Infallible Knowledge: Contrastivism and the Structure of Propositions.Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra - manuscriptdetails
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Epistemic Closure Violation and Doxastic Modellability: Infallibilism and Fallibilism through the Eyes of Doubt.Iñaki Xavier Larrauri Pertierra - manuscriptdetails
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Belief, Knowledge and Practical Matters.Jie Gao - 2024 - Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press.details
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Knowledge and Action: What Depends on What?Itamar Weinshtock Saadon - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Knowledge, Practical Interests, and Rising Tides.Stephen R. Grimm - 2015 - In John Greco & David Henderson (eds.), Epistemic Evaluation: Point and Purpose in Epistemology. Oxford University Press.details
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Iterated Knowledge.Simon Goldstein - 2024 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.details
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The Limitations of the Open Mind.Jeremy Fantl - 2018 - Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.details
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A (Partial) Defence of Moderate Skeptical Invariantism.Robin McKenna - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge. pp. 154-171.details
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Omega Knowledge Matters.Simon Goldstein - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Epistemology.details
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Assertion and isolated second-hand knowledge.Jennifer Lackey - 2011 - In Jessica Brown & Herman Cappelen (eds.), Assertion: New Philosophical Essays. Oxford University Press. pp. 251--276.details
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A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.details
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Epistemic scorekeeping.Patrick Rysiew - 2012 - In Jessica Brown & Mikkel Gerken (eds.), Knowledge Ascriptions. Oxford University Press.details
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Reference, Truth, and Biological Kinds.Marcel Weber - 2014 - In: J. Dutant, D. Fassio and A. Meylan (Eds.) Liber Amicorum Pascal Engel.details
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Knowledge, Practice, and Merit.Arturs Logins - 2012 - Discipline Filosofiche 22 (2):133-152.details
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Asserting as Commitment to Knowing. An Essay on the Normativity of Assertion.Ivan Milić - 2015 - Dissertation, University of Barcelonadetails
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Belief and Credence: A Defense of Dualism.Elizabeth Jackson - 2019 - Dissertation, University of Notre Damedetails
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Credal sensitivism: threshold vs. credence-one.Jie Gao - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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Inference and action: relating beliefs to the world.Javier Gonzalez De Prado Salas - unknowndetails
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In defense of a moderate skeptical invariantism.Davide Fassio - 2021 - In Christos Kyriacou & Kevin Wallbridge (eds.), Skeptical Invariantism Reconsidered. Routledge Series in Epistemology. pp. 129-153.details
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