We consider fine hierarchies in recursion theory, descriptive set theory, logic and complexity theory. The main results state that the sets of values of different Boolean terms coincide with the levels of suitable fine hierarchies. This gives new short descriptions of these hierarchies and shows that collections of sets of values of Boolean terms are almost well ordered by inclusion. For the sake of completeness we mention also some earlier results demonstrating the usefulness of fine hierarchies.

We investigate the structure of the Medvedev lattice as a partial order. We prove that every interval in the lattice is either finite, in which case it is isomorphic to a finite Boolean algebra, or contains an antichain of size $2^{2^{\aleph }0}$ , the size of the lattice itself. We also prove that it is consistent with ZFC that the lattice has chains of size $2^{2^{\aleph }0}$ , and in fact these big chains occur in every infinite interval. We also (...) study embeddings of lattices and algebras. We show that large Boolean algebras can be embedded into the Medvedev lattice as upper semilattices, but that a Boolean algebra can be embedded as a lattice only if it is countable. Finally we discuss which of these results hold for the closely related Muchnik lattice. (shrink)

This paper is primarily concerned with ℵ 0 -categoricity of theories of partially ordered sets. It contains some general conjectures, a collection of known results and some new theorems on ℵ 0 -categoricity. Among the latter are the following. Corollary 3.3. For every countable ℵ 0 -categorical U there is a linear order of A such that $(\mathfrak{U}, is ℵ 0 -categorical. Corollary 6.7. Every ℵ 0 -categorical theory of a partially ordered set of finite width has a decidable theory. (...) Theorem 7.7. Every ℵ 0 -categorical theory of reticles has a decidable theory. There is a section dealing just with decidability of partially ordered sets, the main result of this section being. Theorem 8.2. If $(P, is a finite partially ordered set and K P is the class of partially ordered sets which do not embed $(P, , then Th(K P ) is decidable iff K P contains only reticles. (shrink)

The “somewhat vague, intuitive” notion from computability theory of an effective procedure (method) or algorithm can be fairly precisely defined even if it is not sufficiently formal and precise to belong to mathematics proper (in a narrow sense)—and even if (as many have asserted) for that reason the Church–Turing thesis is unprovable. It is proved logically that the class of effective procedures is not decidable, i.e., that there is no effective procedure for ascertaining whether a given procedure is effective. This (...) result is proved directly from the notion itself of an effective procedure, without reliance on any (partly) mathematical lemma, conjecture, or thesis invoking recursiveness or Turing-computability. In fact, there is no reliance on anything very mathematical. The proof does not even appeal to a precise definition of ‘effective procedure’. Instead, it relies solely and entirely on a basic grasp of the intuitive notion of an effective procedure. Though the result that effectiveness is undecidable is not surprising, it is also not without significance. It has the consequence, for example, that the solution to a decision problem, if it is to be complete, must be accompanied by a separate argument that the proposed ascertainment procedure invariably terminates with the correct verdict. (shrink)

This is a non-technical version of "The Decision Problem for Effective Procedures." The “somewhat vague, intuitive” notion from computability theory of an effective procedure (method) or algorithm can be fairly precisely defined, even if it does not have a purely mathematical definition—and even if (as many have asserted) for that reason, the Church–Turing thesis (that the effectively calculable functions on natural numbers are exactly the general recursive functions), cannot be proved. However, it is logically provable from the notion of an (...) effective procedure, without reliance on any (partially) mathematical thesis or conjecture concerning effective procedures, such as the Church–Turing thesis, that the class of effective procedures is undecidable, i.e., that there is no effective procedure for ascertaining whether a given procedure is effective. The proof does not even appeal to a precise definition of ‘effective procedure’. Instead, it relies solely and entirely on a basic grasp of the intuitive notion of such a procedure. Though the result itself is not surprising, it is also not without significance. It has the consequence, for example, that the solution to a decision problem, if it is to be complete, must be accompanied by a separate argument that the proposed ascertainment procedure is, in fact, a decision procedure, i.e., effective—for example, that it invariably terminates with the correct verdict. (shrink)

Smullyan in [Smu61] identified the recursion theoretic essence of incompleteness results such as Gödel's first incompleteness theorem and Rosser's theorem. Smullyan showed that, for sufficiently complex theories, the collection of provable formulae and the collection of refutable formulae are effectively inseparable—where formulae and their Gödel numbers are identified. This paper gives a similar treatment for proof speed-up. We say that a formal system S1is speedable over another system S0on a set of formulaeAiff, for each recursive functionh, there is a formulaαinAsuch (...) that the length of the shortest proof ofαin S0is larger thanhof the shortest proof ofαin S1. We characterize speedability in terms of the inseparability by r.e. sets of the collection of formulae which are provable in S1but unprovable in S0from the collectionA–where again formulae and their Gödel numbers are identified. We provide precise definitions of proof length, speedability and r.e. inseparability below.We follow the terminology and notation of [Rog87] with borrowings from [Soa87]. Below,ϕis an acceptable numbering of the partial recursive functions [Rog87] andΦa complexity measure associated withϕ[Blu67], [DW83]. (shrink)

The sentences employed in semantic paradoxes display a wide range of semantic behaviours. However, the main theories of truth currently available either fail to provide a theory of paradox altogether, or can only account for some paradoxical phenomena by resorting to multiple interpretations of the language. In this paper, I explore the wide range of semantic behaviours displayed by paradoxical sentences, and I develop a unified theory of truth and paradox, that is a theory of truth that also provides a (...) unified account of paradoxical sentences. The theory I propose here yields a threefold classification of paradoxical sentences – liar-like sentences, truth-teller-like sentences, and revenge sentences. Unlike existing treatments of semantic paradox, the theory put forward in this paper yields a way of interpreting all three kinds of paradoxical sentences, as well as unparadoxical sentences, within a single model. (shrink)

A well-known theorem by Martin asserts that the degrees of maximal sets are precisely the high recursively enumerable degrees, and the same is true with ‘maximal’ replaced by ‘dense simple’, ‘r-maximal’, ‘strongly hypersimple’ or ‘finitely strongly hypersimple’. Many other constructions can also be carried out in any given high r. e. degree, for instance r-maximal or hyperhypersimple sets without maximal supersets . In this paper questions of this type are considered systematically. Ultimately it is shown that every conjunction of simplicity- (...) and non-extensibility properties can be accomplished, unless it is ruled out by well-known, elementary results. Moreover, each construction can be carried out in any given high r. e. degree, as might be expected. For instance, every high r. e. degree contains a dense simple, strongly hypersimple set A which is contained neither in a hyperhypersimple nor in an r-maximal set. The paper also contains some auxiliary results, for instance: every r. e. set B can be transformed into an r. e. set A such that A has no dense simple superset, the transformation preserves simplicity- or non-extensibility properties as far as this is consistent with , and A [TRIPLE BOND]TB if B is high, and A ≥TB otherwise. Several proofs involve refinements of known constructions; relationships to earlier results are discussed in detail. (shrink)

This paper introduces the notion of cW10-creative set, which strengthens that of semicreative set in a similar way as complete creativity strengthens creativity. Two results are proven, both of which imply that not all semicreative sets are cW10-creative. First, it is shown that semicreative Dedekind cuts cannot be cW10-creative; the existence of semicreative Dedekind cuts was shown by Soare. Secondly, it is shown that if A ⊕ B, the join of A and B, is cW10-creative, then either A or B (...) is cW10-creative, and the same is not true with ‘cW10-creative’ replaced by ‘semicreative’. Moreover, sets A, B which provide a counterexample for can be constructed within any given nonrecursive r.e. T-degrees a, b. MSC: 03D30. (shrink)

Krull [4] extended Galois theory to arbitrary normal extensions, in which the Galois groups are precisely the profinite groups. Metakides and Nerode [7] produced two recursively presented algebraic extensionsK⊂Fof the rationals such thatFis abelian,Fis of infinite degree overK, and the Galois group ofFoverK, although of cardinalityc, has only one recursive element. This indicated the limits of effectiveness for Krull's theory. Nerode suggested developing a natural effective version of Krull's theory.It is evident from the classical literature that the free profinite group (...) on denumerably many generators can be obtained effectively as the Galois group of a recursive extension of the rationals over a subfield. Nerode conjectured that it could be obtained effectively as the Galois group of the algebraic numbers over a suitable subfield. The case of finitely many generators was done non-effectively by Jarden [3]. The author believes that the denumerable case, as presented in §2, is also new classically. Using this result and the effective Krull theory, every “co-recursively enumerable” profinite group is effectively the Galois group of a recursively enumerable field of algebraic numbers over a recursive subfield. (shrink)

The modern theory of computability is based on the works of Church, Markov and Turing who, starting from quite different models of computation, arrived at the same class of computable functions. The purpose of this paper is the show how the main results of the Church-Markov-Turing theory of computable functions may quickly be derived and understood without recourse to the largely irrelevant theories of recursive functions, Markov algorithms, or Turing machines. We do this by ignoring the problem of what constitutes (...) a computable function and concentrating on the central feature of the Church-Markov-Turing theory: that the set of computable partial functions can be effectively enumerated. In this manner we are led directly to the heart of the theory of computability without having to fuss about what a computable function is.The spirit of this approach is similar to that of [RGRS]. A major difference is that we operate in the context of constructive mathematics in the sense of Bishop [BSH1], so all functions are computable by definition, and the phrase “you can find” implies “by a finite calculation.” In particular ifPis some property, then the statement “for eachmthere isnsuch thatP” means that we can construct a functionθsuch thatP)for allm. Church's thesis has a different flavor in an environment like this where the notion of a computable function is primitive.One point of such a treatment of Church's thesis is to make available to Bishopstyle constructivists the Markovian counterexamples of Russian constructivism and recursive function theory. The lack of serious candidates for computable functions other than recursive functions makes it quite implausible that a Bishopstyle constructivist could refute Church's thesis, or any consequence of Church's thesis. Hence counterexamples such as Specker's bounded increasing sequence of rational numbers that is eventually bounded away from any given real number [SPEC] may be used, as Brouwerian counterexamples are, as evidence of the unprovability of certain assertions. (shrink)

Let $V_\propto$ be a fixed, fully effective, infinite dimensional vector space. Let $\mathscr{L}(V_\propto)$ be the lattice consisting of the recursively enumerable (r.e.) subspaces of $V_\propto$ , under the operations of intersection and weak sum (see § 1 for precise definitions). In this article we examine the algebraic properties of $\mathscr{L}(V_\propto)$ . Early research on recursively enumerable algebraic structures was done by Rabin [14], Frolich and Shepherdson [5], Dekker [3], Hamilton [7], and Guhl [6]. Our results are based upon the more (...) recent work concerning vector spaces of Metakides and Nerode [12], Crossley and Nerode [2], Remmel [15], [16], and Kalantari [8]. In the main theorem below, we extend a result of Lachlan from the lattice E of r.e. sets to $\mathscr{L}(V_\propto)$ . We define hyperhypersimple vector spaces, discuss some of their properties and show if $A, B \in \mathscr{L}(V_\propto)$ , and A is a hyperhypersimple subspace of B then there is a recursive space C such that A + C = B. It will be proven that if $V \in \mathscr{L}(V_\propto)$ and the lattice of superspaces of V is a complemented modular lattice then V is hyperhypersimple. The final section contains a summary of related results concerning maximality and simplicity. (shrink)

The context for this paper is Feferman's theory of explicit mathematics, a formal framework serving many purposes. It is suitable for representing Bishop-style constructive mathematics as well as generalized recursion, including direct expression of structural concepts which admit self-application. The object of investigation here is the theory of explicit mathematics augmented by the monotone fixed point principle, which asserts that any monotone operation on classifications (Feferman's notion of set) possesses a least fixed point. To be more precise, the new axiom (...) not merely postulates the existence of a least solution, but, by adjoining a new functional constant to the language, it is ensured that a fixed point is uniformly presentable as a function of the monotone operation. The upshot of the paper is that the latter extension of explicit mathematics (when based on classical logic) embodies considerable proof-theoretic strength. It is shown that it has at least the strength of the subsystem of second order arithmetic based on Π 1 2 comprehension. (shrink)

Satisfaction systems and reductions between them are presented as an appropriate context for analyzing the satisfiability and the validity problems. The notion of reduction is generalized in order to cope with the meet-combination of logics. Reductions between satisfaction systems induce reductions between the respective satisfiability problems and (under mild conditions) also between their validity problems. Sufficient conditions are provided for relating satisfiability problems to validity problems. Reflection results for decidability in the presence of reductions are established. The validity problem in (...) the meet-combination is proved to be decidable whenever the validity problem for the components are decidable. Several examples are discussed, namely, involving modal and intuitionistic logics, as well as the meet-combination of modal logic and intuitionistic logic. (shrink)

A natural problem from elementary arithmetic which is so strongly undecidable that it is not even Trial and Error decidable (in other words, not decidable in the limit) is presented. As a corollary, a natural, elementary arithmetical property which makes a difference between intuitionistic and classical theories is isolated.

The aim of this paper is to comprehensively question the validity of the standard way of interpreting Chaitin's famous incompleteness theorem, which says that for every formalized theory of arithmetic there is a finite constant c such that the theory in question cannot prove any particular number to have Kolmogorov complexity larger than c. The received interpretation of theorem claims that the limiting constant is determined by the complexity of the theory itself, which is assumed to be good measure of (...) the strength of the theory. I exhibit certain strong counterexamples and establish conclusively that the received view is false. Moreover, I show that the limiting constants provided by the theorem do not in any way reflect the power of formalized theories, but that the values of these constants are actually determined by the chosen coding of Turing machines, and are thus quite accidental. (shrink)

Chaitin’s incompleteness result related to random reals and the halting probability has been advertised as the ultimate and the strongest possible version of the incompleteness and undecidability theorems. It is argued that such claims are exaggerations.

For a computable structure \, if there is a computable infinitary Scott sentence, then the complexity of this sentence gives an upper bound for the complexity of the index set \\). If we can also show that \\) is m-complete at that level, then there is a correspondence between the complexity of the index set and the complexity of a Scott sentence for the structure. There are results that suggest that these complexities will always match. However, it was shown in (...) Knight and McCoy that there is a structure ) for which the index set is m-complete \, though there is no computable \ Scott sentence. In the present paper, we give an example of a particular equivalence structure for which the index set is m-complete \ but for which there is no computable \ Scott sentence. There is, however, a computable \ pseudo-Scott sentence for the structure, that is, a sentence that acts as a Scott sentence if we only consider computable structures. (shrink)

Chomsky’s highly influential Syntactic Structures ( SS ) has been much praised its originality, explicitness, and relevance for subsequent cognitive science. Such claims are greatly overstated. SS contains no proof that English is beyond the power of finite state description (it is not clear that Chomsky ever gave a sound mathematical argument for that claim). The approach advocated by SS springs directly out of the work of the mathematical logician Emil Post on formalizing proof, but few linguists are aware of (...) this, because Post’s papers are not cited. Chomsky’s extensions to Post’s systems are not clearly defined, and the arguments for their necessity are weak. Linguists have also overlooked Post’s proofs of the first two theorems about effects of rule format restrictions on generative capacity, published more than ten years before SS was published. (shrink)

In this paper, I evaluate the claim that the equivalence of multiple intensionally distinct definitions of random sequence provides evidence for the claim that these definitions capture the intuitive conception of randomness, concluding that the former claim is false. I then develop an alternative account of the significance of randomness-theoretic equivalence results, arguing that they are instances of a phenomenon I refer to as schematic equivalence. On my account, this alternative approach has the virtue of providing the plurality of definitions (...) of randomness with conceptual unity and a rationale for certain investigations that are carried out in the field. (shrink)