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  1. What Am I? Descartes’s Various Ways of Considering the Self.Colin Chamberlain - 2020 - Journal of Modern Philosophy 2 (1):2.
    In the _Meditations_ and related texts from the early 1640s, Descartes argues that the self can be correctly considered as either a mind or a human being, and that the self’s properties vary accordingly. For example, the self is simple considered as a mind, whereas the self is composite considered as a human being. Someone might object that it is unclear how merely considering the self in different ways blocks the conclusion that a single subject of predication—the self—is both simple (...)
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  • Descartes' Causal Principle and the Case of Body-to-Mind Causation1.Raffaella De Rosa - 2013 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (4):438-459.
    It is a common view that Descartes' causal principle is to be understood in light of a similarity condition that accounts for how finite causes contribute to an explanation of their effects. This paper challenges this common view and offers a sui generis reading of Descartes' views on causation that has also the advantage of solving the two exegetical issues of whether Descartes thought of the body-to-mind relation in occasionalist or causal terms and of whether Descartes regarded sensory ideas innate (...)
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  • Color in a Material World: Margaret Cavendish Against the Early Modern Mechanists.Colin Chamberlain - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (3):293-336.
    Consider the distinctive qualitative property grass visually appears to have when it visually appears to be green. This property is an example of what I call sensuous color. Whereas early modern mechanists typically argue that bodies are not sensuously colored, Margaret Cavendish disagrees. In cases of veridical perception, she holds that grass is green in precisely the way it visually appears to be. In defense of her realist approach to sensuous colors, Cavendish argues that it is impossible to conceive of (...)
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  • Cartesian Sensations.Raffaella De Rosa - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (5):780-792.
    Descartes maintained that sensations of color and the like misrepresent the material world in normal circumstances. Some prominent scholars have argued that, to explain this Cartesian view, we must attribute to Descartes a causal account of sensory representation. I contend that neither the arguments motivating this reading nor the textual evidence offered in its support is sufficient to justify such attribution. Both textual and theoretical reasons point in the direction of an (at least partial) internalist account of Descartes' views on (...)
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  • The " Fourth Hypothesis " on the Early Modern Mind-Body Problem.Lloyd Strickland - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5:665-685.
    One of the most pressing philosophical problems in early modern Europe concerned how the soul and body could form a unity, or, as many understood it, how these two substances could work together. It was widely believed that there were three (and only three) hypotheses regarding the union of soul and body: (1) physical influence, (2) occasionalism, and (3) pre-established harmony. However, in 1763, a fourth hypothesis was put forward by the French thinker André-Pierre Le Guay de Prémontval (1716–1764). Prémontval’s (...)
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  • Descartes and the Curious Case of the Origin of Sensory Ideas.Raffaella De Rosa - 2018 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 97 (3):704-723.
    Descartes endorses the two prima facie inconsistent claims that sensory ideas are innate and caused in us by bodies. Most scholars believe that Claims A and B can be reconciled by appealing to the notion of occasional or triggering causation. I claim that this notion does not solve the theoretical problems it is introduced to solve and it generates additional difficulties. I argue that these difficulties result from conflating two questions that need to be kept distinct while inquiring about the (...)
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  • Mind–Body Causation, Mind–Body Union and the ‘Special Mode of Thinking’ in Descartes.Tom Vinci - 2008 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 16 (3):461 – 488.
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  • Elisabeth Av Böhmen Og Sinn–Kropp-Problemet.Fredrik Nilsen - 2018 - Norsk Filosofisk Tidsskrift 53 (2-03):79-91.
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  • Descartes's Passions of the Soul.Lisa Shapiro - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):268-278.
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