- Why Be Moral? Can the Psychological Literature on Well-Being Shed any Light?Valerie Tiberius - 2013 - Res Philosophica 90 (3):347-364.details
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Facing the Facts and Living Well: Comments on Neera Badhwar, Well-Being: Happiness in a Worthwhile Life.Valerie Tiberius - 2016 - Journal of Value Inquiry 50 (1):219-226.details
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Judgementalism about normative decision theory.Johanna Thoma - 2021 - Synthese 198 (7):6767-6787.details
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Essentially Grounded Non-Naturalism and Normative Supervenience.Toppinen Teemu - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):645-653.details
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What’s So Queer About Morality?Luke Taylor - 2020 - The Journal of Ethics 24 (1):11-29.details
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Sobel on Pleasure, Reason, and Desire.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (1):101-115.details
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Silencing Desires?Attila Tanyi - 2013 - Philosophia 41 (3):887-903.details
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Desires as additional reasons? The case of tie-breaking.Attila Tanyi - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 152 (2):209-227.details
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Circularity, Naturalism, and Desire-Based Reasons.Attila Tanyi - 2017 - Res Philosophica 94 (4):451-470.details
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Veritism Unswamped.Kurt Sylvan - 2018 - Mind 127 (506):381-435.details
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What apparent reasons appear to be.Kurt Sylvan - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (3):587-606.details
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Humean Externalism and the Argument from Depression.Steven Swartzer - 2015 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 9 (2):1-16.details
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A challenge for Humean externalism.Steven Swartzer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):23-44.details
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The Possibility of Love Independent Reasons.Jussi Suikkanen - 2011 - Essays in Philosophy 12 (1):32-54.details
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Non-Naturalism and Reference.Jussi Suikkanen - 2017 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 11 (2):1-24.details
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Contractualism as Restricted Constructivism.Jussi Suikkanen - 2018 - Topoi 37 (4):571-579.details
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Neo‐Humean rationality and two types of principles.Caj Strandberg - 2024 - Analytic Philosophy 65 (2):256-273.details
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An Ecumenical Account of Categorical Moral Reasons.Caj Strandberg - 2019 - Journal of Moral Philosophy 16 (2):160-188.details
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Wild Goose Chase: Still No Rationales for the Doctrine of Double Effect and Related Principles.Uwe Steinhoff - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (1):1-25.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism, permissibility, and reasons for belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2018 - In Conor McHugh, Jonathan Way & Daniel Whiting (eds.), Normativity: Epistemic and Practical. Oxford University Press. pp. 260-280.details
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An Instrumentalist Account of How to Weigh Epistemic and Practical Reasons for Belief.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen & Mattias Skipper - 2019 - Mind 129 (516):1071-1094.details
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An instrumentalist unification of zetetic and epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2021 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.details
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An intrapersonal, intertemporal solution to an interpersonal dilemma.Valerie Soon - 2021 - Philosophical Studies 178 (10):3353-3370.details
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Reason claims and contrastivism about reasons.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):231-242.details
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Reasons for and reasons against.Justin Snedegar - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):725-743.details
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Negative Reason Existentials.Justin Snedegar - 2013 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 2 (2):108-116.details
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Contrastive Reasons and Promotion.Justin Snedegar - 2014 - Ethics 125 (1):39-63,.details
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Affective Experience, Desire, and Reasons for Action.Declan Smithies & Jeremy Weiss - 2019 - Analytic Philosophy 60 (1):27-54.details
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Reasons, inescapability and persuasion.Neil Sinclair - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2823-2844.details
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Reasons Internalism and the Function of Normative Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2017 - Dialectica 71 (2):209-229.details
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Promotionalism, Motivationalism and Reasons to Perform Physically Impossible Actions.Neil Sinclair - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):647-659.details
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On the Connection between Normative Reasons and the Possibility of Acting for those Reasons.Neil Sinclair - 2016 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19 (5):1211-1223.details
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Ethical Reductionism.Neil Sinhababu - 2018 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 13 (1):32-52.details
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Acting and Believing Under the Guise of Normative Reasons.Keshav Singh - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 99 (2):409-430.details
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Inescapability and Normativity.Matthew Silverstein - 2012 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (3):1-27.details
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Basic knowledge and the normativity of knowledge: The awareness‐first solution.Paul Silva - 2022 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (3):564-586.details
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Agency and Normative Self-Governance.Matthew Silverstein - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (3):517-528.details
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Epistemic Rationality.Harvey Siegel - 2019 - Metaphilosophy 50 (5):608-630.details
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Discussion Note: Selim Berker’s Combinatorial Argument against Practical Reasons for Belief.Adam Shmidt - 2020 - Philosophia 48 (2):763-776.details
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Subjectivism about Future Reasons or The Guise of Caring.Yonatan Shemmer - 2019 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 101 (3):630-648.details
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II—Objectivity and Idolatry.Yonatan Shemmer - 2016 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 90 (1):191-216.details
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Still waiting for a plausible Humean theory of reasons.Nicholas Shackel - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (3):607-633.details
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Reasons Wrong and Right.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 97 (3):371-399.details
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Reasons and Promotion.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Philosophical Issues 25 (1):98-122.details
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Problems for pure probabilism about promotion (and a disjunctive alternative).Nathaniel Sharadin - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (5):1371-1386.details
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Promotion as contrastive increase in expected fit.Nathaniel Sharadin & Finnur Dellsén - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1263-1290.details
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Ecumenical epistemic instrumentalism.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2021 - Synthese 198 (3):2613-2639.details
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Epistemic instrumentalism and the reason to believe in accord with the evidence.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2018 - Synthese 195 (9):3791-3809.details
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Desire and What It’s Rational to Do.Ashley Shaw - 2021 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 99 (4):761-775.details
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Checking the Neighborhood: A Reply to DiPaolo & Behrends on Promotion.Nathaniel Sharadin - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-8.details
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