- The Limits of the Doxastic.Tim Crane & Katalin Farkas - 2021 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Mind, Vol. 1. OUP. pp. 36-57.details
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There is Something Wrong with Raw Perception, After All: Vyāsatīrtha’s Refutation of Nirvikalpaka-Pratyakṣa.Amit Chaturvedi - 2020 - Journal of Indian Philosophy 48 (2):255-314.details
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Phenomenal dispositions.Henry Ian Schiller - 2020 - Synthese 197 (9):3969-3980.details
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Conscious Thought and the Cognitive Fine-Tuning Problem.Philip Goff - 2018 - Philosophical Quarterly 68 (270):98-122.details
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Consciousness and Intentionality.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2020 - In Uriah Kriegel (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 560-585.details
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Conscious thinking and cognitive phenomenology: topics, views and future developments.Marta Jorba & Dermot Moran - 2016 - Philosophical Explorations 19 (2):95-113.details
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Naturalizing Intentionality: Tracking Theories Versus Phenomenal Intentionality Theories.Angela Mendelovici & David Bourget - 2014 - Philosophy Compass 9 (5):325-337.details
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(2 other versions)Two Notions of Mental Representation.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind. New York, New York: Routledge. pp. 161-179.details
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The Phenomenology of Cognition, Or, What Is It Like to Think That P?David Pitt - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):1-36.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality.Uriah Kriegel (ed.) - 2013 - , US: Oxford University Press.details
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The Phenomenal Intentionality Research Program.Uriah Kriegel - 2013 - In Phenomenal Intentionality. , US: Oxford University Press. pp. 1–26.details
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Intentional inexistence and phenomenal intentionality.Uriah Kriegel - 2007 - Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1):307-340.details
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Reconsidering pain.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Philosophical Psychology 7 (3):325-43.details
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Folk-psychology, psychopathology, and the unconscious.Graham Macdonald - 1999 - Philosophical Explorations 2 (3):206-224.details
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Is intentionality dependent upon consciousness?Uriah Kriegel - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 116 (3):271-307.details
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The Affective Core of the Self: A Neuro-Archetypical Perspective on the Foundations of Human (and Animal) Subjectivity.Antonio Alcaro, Stefano Carta & Jaak Panksepp - 2017 - Frontiers in Psychology 8.details
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Phenomenal consciousness, collective mentality, and collective moral responsibility.Matthew Baddorf - 2017 - Philosophical Studies 174 (11):2769-2786.details
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Phenomenal Intentionality Meets the Extended Mind.Terence Horgan & Uriah Kriegel - 2008 - The Monist 91 (2):347-373.details
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"Consciousness". Selected Bibliography 1970 - 2004.Thomas Metzinger - unknowndetails
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On the psychological origins of dualism: Dual-process cognition and the explanatory gap.Brian Fiala, Adam Arico & Shaun Nichols - 2011 - In Edward Slingerland & Mark Collard (eds.), Creating Consilience: Issues and Case Studies in teh Integration of the Sciences and Humanities. Oxford University Press.details
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Cognitive automata and the law: Electronic contracting and the intentionality of software agents. [REVIEW]Giovanni Sartor - 2009 - Artificial Intelligence and Law 17 (4):253-290.details
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The concept of consciousness: The reflective meaning.Thomas Natsoulas - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (4):373-400.details
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Cognitive neuropsychology and the philosophy of mind.Tony Stone & Martin Davies - 1993 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 44 (4):589-622.details
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Reaping the whirlwind: Reply to Harnad's Other Bodies, Other Minds. [REVIEW]Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (2):219-37.details
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Belief and consciousness.Sara Worley - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):41-55.details
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Consciousness and the varieties of aboutness.Martin Davies - 1994 - In Cynthia MacDonald & Graham MacDonald (eds.), Philosophy of Psychology: Debates on Psychological Explanation. Blackwell. pp. 2.details
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Does mentality entail consciousness?Rocco J. Gennaro - 1995 - Philosophia 24 (3-4):331-58.details
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Deconstructive vs Pragmatic: A Critique of the Derrida–Searle Debate.Peter Bornedal - 2020 - The European Legacy 25 (1):62-81.details
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Fenomenologia cognitiva.Marta Jorba - 2017 - Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2).details
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¿Es la conciencia fenoménica una condición necesaria para la intencionalidad? Limitaciones del inseparatismo fenomenalista.Asier Arias Domínguez - 2019 - Agora 38 (1).details
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Syntax, semantics, and intentional aspects.Hilla Jacobson-Horowitz - 2004 - Philosophical Papers 33 (1):67-95.details
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Patterns.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.details
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What is consciousness?Norton Nelkin - 1993 - Philosophy of Science 60 (3):419-34.details
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Phenomenal Vision and Apperception: Evidence from Blindsight.Petra Stoerig - 1997 - Mind and Language 12 (2):224-237.details
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The ontology of aspectual shape.Martin Kurthen & Detlef B. Linke - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):612-614.details
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(6 other versions)Quaderns de filosofia IV, 2.Quad Fia - 2017 - Quaderns de Filosofia 4 (2).details
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Token-identity, consciousness, and the connection principle.Jürgen Schröder - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):615-616.details
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(1 other version)Personal Level Representation.Uriah Kriegel - 2012 - ProtoSociology 28:77-114.details
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Um argumento contra a tese da subjetividade ontológica da consciência no naturalismo biológico de John Searle.Tárik De Athayde Prata - 2020 - Filosofia Unisinos 21 (3):303-311.details
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Is there a conceptual connection between intentionality and consciousness?Wolfgang Barz - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (3):183-188.details
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The sense of thinking.Larry Hauser - 1993 - Minds and Machines 3 (1):21-29.details
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Convergence and its limits: Relations between analytic and continental philosophy.Dieter Freundlieb & Wayne Hudson - 1998 - Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):28 – 42.details
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Dificultades para el materialismo en filosofía de la mente: El funcionalismo ante la objeción de los" qualia".Mariano L. Rodríguez González - 1999 - Convivium: revista de filosofía 12:112.details
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Searle's argument that intentional states are conscious states.Norton Nelkin - 1995 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (3):614-615.details
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An argument against the externalist account of psychological content.S. Mandelkar - 1991 - Philosophical Psychology 4 (3):375-82.details
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Comparative Evaluation of Free Will in Muhammad Taqi Ja’fari and John Searle’s View.Seyed Ahmad Fazeli, Marziyeh Sadeghi & Morteza Zare Ganjaroudi - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Theological Research 23 (1):5-30.details
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