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Comparative Expectations.Arthur Paul Pedersen - 2014 - Studia Logica 102 (4):811-848.details
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Symmetry arguments against regular probability: A reply to recent objections.Matthew W. Parker - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 9 (1):8.details
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Persistent Disagreement and Polarization in a Bayesian Setting.Michael Nielsen & Rush T. Stewart - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):51-78.details
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Deterministic Convergence and Strong Regularity.Michael Nielsen - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 71 (4):1461-1491.details
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Feminist Philosophy of Science.Lynn Hankinson Nelson - 2002 - In Peter Machamer & Michael Silberstein (eds.), The Blackwell Guide to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. pp. 312–331.details
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On projecting grue.John Moreland - 1976 - Philosophy of Science 43 (3):363-377.details
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Presentists can believe in closed timelike curves.Bradley Monton - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):199–202.details
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Kolmogorov Conditionalizers Can Be Dutch Booked.Alexander Meehan & Snow Zhang - forthcoming - Review of Symbolic Logic:1-36.details
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Formal Qualitative Probability.Daniel Kian Mc Kiernan - manuscriptdetails
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Possibility and probability.Isaac Levi - 1989 - Erkenntnis 31 (2-3):365--86.details
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Coherence, regularity and conditional probability.Isaac Levi - 1978 - Theory and Decision 9 (1):1-15.details
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Introductive probability and the paradox of ideal evidence.Theo A. F. Kuypers - 1976 - Philosophica 17.details
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Against relative overlap measures of coherence.Jakob Koscholke & Michael Schippers - 2016 - Synthese 193 (9).details
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Formal Qualitative Probability.Daniel Kian Mc Kiernan - 2021 - Review of Symbolic Logic 14 (4):882-909.details
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Decision theory as philosophy.Mark Kaplan - 1983 - Philosophy of Science 50 (4):549-577.details
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Non-Measurability, Imprecise Credences, and Imprecise Chances.Yoaav Isaacs, Alan Hájek & John Hawthorne - 2021 - Mind 131 (523):892-916.details
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The Consistency Argument for Ranking Functions.Franz Huber - 2007 - Studia Logica 86 (2):299-329.details
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The plain man's guide to probability. [REVIEW]Colin Howson - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):157-170.details
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Logic and probability.Colin Howson - 1997 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 48 (4):517-531.details
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Shrinking three arguments for conditionalization.Sophie Horowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Perspectives 35 (1):303-319.details
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Carnap's inductive probabilities as a contribution to decision theory.Joachim Hornung - 1980 - Metamedicine 1 (3):325-367.details
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Carnap's inductive probabilities as a contribution to decision theory.Joachim Hornung - 1980 - Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 1 (3):325-367.details
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Is Strict Coherence Coherent?Alan Hájek - 2012 - Dialectica 66 (3):411-424.details
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Deliberation welcomes prediction.Alan Hájek - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):507-528.details
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Arguments for–or against–Probabilism?Alan Hájek - 2008 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 59 (4):793-819.details
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Zum einfachheitsprinzip in der wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung.von Hans Hermes - 1958 - Dialectica 12 (3‐4):317-331.details
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Carnap and de finetti on bets and the probability of singular events: The dutch book argument reconsidered.Klaus Heilig - 1978 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 29 (4):325-346.details
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Rational belief change, Popper functions and counterfactuals.William L. Harper - 1975 - Synthese 30 (1-2):221 - 262.details
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Revising Probabilities and Full Beliefs.Sven Ove Hansson - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (5):1005-1039.details
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Slightly more realistic personal probability.Ian Hacking - 1967 - Philosophy of Science 34 (4):311-325.details
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On falling short of strict coherence.Ian Hacking - 1968 - Philosophy of Science 35 (3):284-286.details
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The subjective theory of probability. [REVIEW]D. A. Gillies - 1972 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):138-157.details
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Explicating formal epistemology: Carnap's legacy as Jeffrey's radical probabilism.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 53:33–42.details
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Conditional Probability and Dutch Books.Frank Döring - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (3):391 - 409.details
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Three characterizations of strict coherence on infinite-valued events.Tommaso Flaminio - 2020 - Review of Symbolic Logic 13 (3):593-610.details
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A probabilistic theory of coherence.Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194–199.details
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Regularity and Hyperreal Credences.Kenny Easwaran - 2014 - Philosophical Review 123 (1):1-41.details
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Primitive Conditional Probabilities, Subset Relations and Comparative Regularity.Joshua Thong - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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Cambridge and Vienna: Frank P. Ramsey and the Vienna Circle.Maria Carla Galavotti (ed.) - 2004 - Dordrecht: Springer Verlag.details
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Dutch book arguments.Susan Vineberg - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Bayesian Epistemology.William Talbott - 2006 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Philosophy as conceptual engineering: Inductive logic in Rudolf Carnap's scientific philosophy.Christopher F. French - 2015 - Dissertation, University of British Columbiadetails
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Assessing Theories. The Problem of a Quantitative Theory of Confirmation.Franz Huber - 2004 - Dissertation, University of Erfurtdetails
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Why Subjectivism?Chloé de Canson - manuscriptdetails
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Varieties of Bayesianism.Jonathan Weisberg - 2011details
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Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.Aron Vallinder - 2018 - Dissertation, London School of Economicsdetails
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More trouble for regular probabilitites.Matthew W. Parker - 2012details
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The normative status of logic.Florian Steinberger - 2017 - Stanford Enyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Infinitesimal Probabilities.Sylvia Wenmackers - 2016 - In Richard Pettigrew & Jonathan Weisberg (eds.), The Open Handbook of Formal Epistemology. PhilPapers Foundation. pp. 199-265.details
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