- (1 other version)Does moral ignorance exculpate?Elizabeth Harman - 2011 - Ratio 24 (4):443-468.details
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Willfully Blind for Good Reason.Deborah Hellman - 2009 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 3 (3):301-316.details
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The ethics of belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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Epistemic Partiality and the Nature of Friendship.Jack Warman - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice (3):371-388.details
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Belief in Kant.Andrew Chignell - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (3):323-360.details
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Understanding Friendship.Michel Croce & Matthew Jope - forthcoming - Philosophical Issues.details
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Epistemic Partialism.Cathy Mason - 2023 - Philosophy Compass (2):e12896.details
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Moral encroachment and the ideal of unified agency.Cory Davia - 2022 - Philosophical Explorations 26 (2):179-196.details
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Can the Demands of Justice Always Be Reconciled with the Demands of Epistemology? Testimonial Injustice and the Prospects of a Normative Clash.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2021 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 29 (4):537-558.details
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Regrettable beliefs.Mica Rapstine - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (7):2169-2190.details
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Wronging by Requesting.N. G. Laskowski & Kenneth Silver - 2022 - In Mark C. Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics, Volume 11.details
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Pascal, Pascalberg, and friends.Samuel Lebens - 2020 - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 87 (1):109-130.details
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Believing the best: on doxastic partiality in friendship.Lindsay Crawford - 2017 - Synthese 196 (4):1575-1593.details
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On the special insult of refusing testimony.Allan Hazlett - 2017 - Philosophical Explorations 20 (sup1):37-51.details
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The non-remedial value of dependence on moral testimony.Paddy Jane McShane - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (3):629-647.details
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II—What’s Wrong with Paternalism: Autonomy, Belief, and Action.David Enoch - 2016 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 116 (1):21-48.details
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A Lover’s Shame.Ward E. Jones - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (5):615-630.details
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Being Open-Minded about Open-Mindedness.Kasim Khorasanee - 2024 - Philosophy 99 (2):191-221.details
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Ingroup Attitude: A Reliance-Based Analysis.Xin Zhang - unknowndetails
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Sins of Thought.Mark Schroeder - 2020 - Faith and Philosophy 37 (3):273-293.details
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Bias and interpersonal skepticism.Robert Pasnau - 2022 - Noûs 56 (1):154-175.details
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Ethics and Epistemic Hopelessness.James Fritz - 2023 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 66 (6):977–1005.details
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Anti‐reductionism and Expected Trust.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 100 (4):952-970.details
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Distinctive duress.Craig K. Agule - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (4):1007-1026.details
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Rational stability under pragmatic encroachment.Mark Schroeder - 2018 - Episteme 15 (3):297-312.details
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Against epistemic partiality in friendship: value-reflecting reasons.Sanford C. Goldberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (8):2221-2242.details
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Giving the Benefit of the Doubt.Paul Faulkner - 2018 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 26 (2):139-155.details
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Disagreement and the value of self-trust.Robert Pasnau - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2315-2339.details
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A Feminist Interpretation of Hume on Testimony.Dan O'Brien - 2010 - Hypatia 25 (3):632 - 652.details
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Epistemic reasons for action: a puzzle for pragmatists.Stephanie Leary - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-22.details
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Academic friendship in dark times.Penny Enslin & Nicki Hedge - 2019 - Ethics and Education 14 (4):383-398.details
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What is Friendship?Uri D. Leibowitz - 2018 - Disputatio 10 (49):97-117.details
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Epistemic Partialism and Taking Our Friends Seriously.Cathy Mason - 2024 - American Philosophical Quarterly 61 (3):233-243.details
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The ethics of believing out loud.Heather Spradley - 2020 - Analytic Philosophy 63 (1):1-15.details
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The guise of the good and the problem of partiality.Allan Hazlett - 2019 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 49 (6):851-872.details
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Impartiality.Troy Jollimore - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.details
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A Practice-based Account of The Truth Norm of Belief.Xintong Wei - forthcoming - Episteme:1-21.details
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True Faith: Against Doxastic Partiality about Faith (in God and Religious Communities) and in Defence of Evidentialism.Katherine Dormandy - 2021 - Australasian Philosophical Review 5 (1):4-28.details
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Epistemically flawless false beliefs.Kate Nolfi - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11291-11309.details
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The Role of Epistemic Virtue in the Realization of Basic Goods.Baril Anne - 2016 - Episteme 13 (4):379-395.details
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If epistemic partialism is true, don’t tell your friends.Scott Woodcock - forthcoming - Analysis.details
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The Cognitive Demands of Friendship.Anna Brinkerhoff - 2022 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 104 (1):101-123.details
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Proselytism as Epistemic Violence: A Jewish Approach to the Ethics of Religious Persuasion.Samuel Lebens - 2021 - The Monist 104 (3):376-392.details
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Belief in a Fallen World.Robert Pasnau - 2018 - Res Philosophica 95 (3):531-559.details
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(1 other version)Book Symposium: Alfred Archer and Jake Wojtowicz’s Why it’s OK to be a Sports Fan.Alfred Archer, Jake Wojtowicz, Adam Kadlac, Joe Slater, Nathaniel Baron-Schmitt & Nina Windgätter - forthcoming - Sport, Ethics and Philosophy:1-35.details
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Epistemic redress.George Hull - 2022 - Synthese 200 (3):1-21.details
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Paternalism.Jessica Begon - 2016 - Analysis 76 (3):355-373.details
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(1 other version)What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2022 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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(1 other version)What should relational egalitarians believe?Anne-Sofie Greisen Hojlund - 2021 - Sage Publications: Politics, Philosophy and Economics 21 (1):55-74.details
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Patriotism as bad faith.Simon Keller - 2005 - Ethics 115 (3):563-592.details
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